

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Only Official designations should be used in the TO column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across the comment numbered to correspond with the number in the TO column. Each officer should initial (check mark) in the TO column. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

No. **RJTH-120**  
DATE

**SR/nc**

	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1				✓	
2				in	
3				MS	
4	Bio (J.P.)				That [redacted] suggests [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] has a copy of <b>KAPOK</b> [redacted]
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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

~~Secret~~  
~~Confidential~~  
~~Top Secret~~

(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA ROUTE)

DISPATCH NO. 74-120

SECRET - ~~TOP SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, SR

DATE: MAY 4 - 1954

FROM Chief, [ ]

INFO: Senior Representatives

SUBJECT GENERAL: REDGAP/Operational

SPECIFIC: Inducement of Soviet Defections

COPY ROUTING	
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1. Forwarded herewith as Attachment A is a paper prepared by [ ] on the subject of inducement of Soviet defections.

2. The paper was prepared in order to share with appropriate persons the opinions, conclusions, and suggestions of a case officer who has for a considerable time been concerned with the subject, and who has been fortunate enough to have had better-than-average opportunity to obtain facts bearing on the problem.

3. Although the paper has been written in a positive tone to avoid endless equivocation, there is no intention of presenting the contents as dogma. It is suggested, rather, that it may be used as a starting point and stimulant for the preparation of a similar study incorporating and consolidating the experiences of others who have contributions on the subject of inducing Soviet defections. Facts and conclusions which have been included should be checked carefully with the records and compared with others knowledgeable on the subject. Various sources now available to the division should also be able to contradict or confirm some of the statements made as well as contribute additional material.

4. We believe there is a strong need for such a study to be circulated to appropriate personnel associated with the defection problem, particularly those in the Field since they do not normally have access to much of the material available to Headquarters personnel and have no way of benefiting from what experience is accumulated.

5. It is requested that this dispatch and attachment be called to the attention of [ ]

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Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

28 April 1954

Attachment

Report as noted above

Distribution

3 - Addressee (w/att)  
1 - Sr. Rep, NA (w/att)

SECRET - ~~TOP SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

copy in file # 74-120-2  
per IP/CRU

SUBJECT: The Inducement of Soviet Defections

PREPARED BY: [ ]

The observations and conclusions contained in this report are based on the experience of the writer in connection with the subject of inducement of defection of Soviet citizens. Some personal experience has been had in direct dealing with defectors from the Soviet Union, although the writer has also drawn from and given careful consideration to the experiences of other intelligence officers with whom he has discussed defection and who have had first-hand experience in working with defectors from the Soviet Union. As an estimate, probably more than half of the contents of this report is based on facts and opinions elicited while associated with the [ ]

Factors Contributing to the Decision to Defect

It is clear that without restricting discussion to a particular individual there will be a number of possible factors likely to influence a Soviet to defect. In very few, if any, instances will there be one and only one important factor. Analysis of previous defection cases would also seem to indicate that these factors which play a major part in the decision vary, generally speaking, with the type of individual, e.g., of peasant background, factory worker, private in the Soviet army, lieutenant in the army, junior intelligence officers, senior intelligence officers, technical personnel, foreign trade representatives, diplomats, etc.

Some factors these various people are likely to have in common.

Others will be peculiar to a particular group. Of the fairly substantial

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number of defectors from the Soviet army, for example, who were enlisted men, a large number if not a majority appear to have acted on impulse. More or less disaffected with the USSR, they were ultimately influenced in their decisions by such things as reluctance to leave a mistress behind when transferred back to the USSR, minor trouble with the authorities growing out of infractions of such regulations as those against drunk and disorderly conduct, fraternization, unauthorized absence -- even for short periods -- from their posts or barracks, etc. Such troubles, although by American standards relatively minor, are punished more severely in the Soviet Union. Some comparatively immature and uneducated defectors, either military or civilian, have acted from a spirit of adventure --- again, apparently on impulse.

These defectors have usually rationalized their defections as stemming from ideological convictions, but in numerous cases this seems to have occurred after the defection. In some instances where the defector was being considered for operational use, the interrogators calculatedly and subtly attempted to broaden the base of the defector's disaffection from essentially an isolated incident to ideological differences with communism, the regime, or the Soviet system. This was done by highlighting certain parts of the defector's personal history to the point where he would dwell on them long enough to develop a deep sense of injustice or personal wrong regarding specific acts or the system as a whole. It is recognized that other more basic factors may also have had a marked influence on such decisions to defect and that the "incident" may have merely been the final source of motivation, although this is a moot question judging from the data now available.

The point, however, is that few of the defections of Soviets to date can be attributed unequivocally and primarily to pure ideological motivation. There are fairly numerous instances of defectors who have been fully satisfied that their decision to defect was a proper one when, on being asked -- perhaps months later -- if they believed in communism or the theory of communism have replied either in the affirmative or with the qualification that certain aspects of communism are good. It would seem a mistake to assume that most Soviet defectors are categorically opposed to communism or that they defected because of this.

Illogical as it may seem, we should bear in mind that many Soviets are confused on the question of political ideology and tend to differentiate rather sharply between what they consider political theory and practice. This may well be because of the dissimulation traditionally practiced by communist leaders who calculatedly mislead their subjects by calling falsehoods truth. Perhaps it could be put this way: the Soviet system is not what the communists say it is, nor is communism in practice and as exemplified in the Soviet Union what the communists say it is. After this exposition some may prefer to lump together the contents of paragraphs 1 and 2 below. The writer believes, however, that accuracy is best served by making a distinction.

Here are what seem to be the most common and most pronounced factors contributing to the decision to defect:

1. Granting that we may be inclined to exaggerate the importance and incidence of political ideology on the theoretical level as a prime cause of defection, it should nevertheless be listed as a factor strongly influencing a relatively small number of defectors. It is possible, if



not likely, that with the passage of time, infiltration of more truths to the Soviet peoples, and the increase of apparent contradictions of communism made manifest to the Soviet people, political ideology will increase also as an important factor influencing the decision to defect.

2. Probably the strongest factor influencing the defection of Soviets falling within the category of intellectuals is what can be described most simply as disillusionment with, opposition to, or disgust with the Soviet system. Persons falling within this category of defectors might very well express themselves as "completely fed up with the system." Those aspects of the system of Soviet life to which such defectors take greatest exception are:

A. Injustice. There are so many examples of injustice (by the standards of any country in the so-called free world) in the Soviet Union as to make it pointless to present any here. They appear in every field of activity within the Soviet Union, permeating every level of society.

B. Oppression by the regime. This is a chronic condition affecting in varying degrees nearly every resident of the Soviet Union. It becomes particularly significant in connection with this discussion when it has been directed pointedly at the individual concerned or at a member of his family, or to state it differently, when he has been made acutely aware of its presence for one reason or another.

C. Lack of present security. No one in the Soviet Union can feel secure at any time. He can cite numerous examples of persons in every line of work and at all levels of the party, military, or government who have virtually overnight lost their positions, lost "everything," or

been punished for apparently invalid or insufficient cause. A case in point, which had a shocking effect on many Soviet citizens, particularly members of the MVD, was the deposing, arrest, and execution of L.P. Beriya in 1953. Such actions have a lingering effect of long duration on Soviet citizens. They reason that if such can happen to a man like Beriya, it could more easily happen to them. It creates an atmosphere of hopelessness and hand-to-mouth living. There is no sense in diligently and carefully working and building for the future, for the situation of an individual may be changed overnight and all of his hopes erased in one sweep.

D. Inability to plan for the future. While it is not completely true that in the Soviet system an individual cannot plan for the future with some possibility of having his plans work out, it is recognized by all that the plans, no matter how carefully laid, may be completely altered by the whims of a superior within the Soviet structure, either the government, the military, or the Party. Certainly one thing basic to all human beings is the desire for security, and this is impossible for anyone who is living under the Soviet system. Individual abilities are not, in many cases, major factors, because any individual is merely a pawn in the hands of those who make the Soviet system work.

E. Falseness and hiding the truth. It has been said by some defectors from the Soviet Union that probably 60 per cent of the residents of the USSR accept without question whatever is told them by their government and party. It follows, then, that the other 40 per cent do not accept as true everything which is published through party and governmental propaganda media. The falsity of many statements made by the government and by the party is recognized by some Soviet citizens, and this causes

them to think and wonder why such falsifications are necessary. They consider it a reflection on their intelligence and an indication of distrust of the people by those in positions of authority. The Soviet who recognizes it rejects and resents the falsification as surely as does the citizen of any other nation.

F. Interference in and lack of respect for personal relations and the lives of the people. A complete lack of respect for personal relations of its citizens has been an outstanding characteristic of the Soviet regimes. There is all too frequently little or no hesitancy in separating husband and wife, and on occasion even parents of children if it is considered in the best interests of the government or the party. An individual's career can be seriously hindered by factors over which he has absolutely no control, such as actions allegedly taken by his parents or grandparents. Although this seems completely irrational to a Westerner, it is accepted and typical of life in the Soviet Union. A person completely innocent of any crime by Western judicial standards can be punished for the alleged crimes of a relative. These things are resented, even by those persons who are completely the products of a Soviet environment.

G. Lack of material comforts and conveniences. Although most Soviets are not able to compare their material comforts and conveniences either in quantity or quality with those of persons having comparable positions in countries outside the Soviet orbit, many Soviets are nevertheless well aware and acutely conscious of their lack of various, almost basic, comforts and conveniences.

H. Unfulfilled promises. The publications of the USSR are filled with promises, and the files of out-dated Soviet publications are



filled with unfulfilled promises. It has been possible for the Soviet Union to promise improvements for the future and to delay fulfillment of those promises for years on various pretexts; but there always comes a time when the usual pretexts are inadequate to satisfy the Soviet citizen. There has by now accumulated such a vast list of unfulfilled promises that even the average Soviet citizen cannot fail to be aware of them. This is more than discouraging for some Soviets. It makes them wonder if there is any hope for future fulfillment.

I. Fear as a primary means of control. There is no doubt that the primary mechanism or technique of control of the Soviet population is Fear. There is not a single rational Soviet citizen anywhere in the world today who is not motivated by Fear. The ramifications of this inculcation and encouragement of Fear by the Soviet authorities are themselves things to which defectors take exception. They see perhaps their superior or supervisor malingering and avoiding acts which he knows with reasonable assurance are proper because of his fear that such actions may be construed by someone as incorrect or improper, and that he will suffer as a result. An individual can observe the unpleasant things which are done by friends and associates because of Fear. While Fear is admittedly a motivating factor in Western society for both good and evil, its omnipresence in the Soviet Union is overwhelming by contrast. It is not surprising that people want to get out from under such an aggregation of fears.

J. Corruption of human beings. It is unpleasant for many, perhaps particularly the intellectuals, to see the corruption of human beings brought about by the Soviet system. The Soviet system breeds pros-

titutes and prostitution; prostitution of the individual to the system and to those in positions of authority within the system. An honest, sincere, and idealistic person moves up the economic and social ladder to a position of increased power and authority, and his friends and associates can see the change in personality which takes place. He becomes sucked up into the group of those who are controlling and suppressing, and he, too, must control and suppress or he fails and falls. The higher he goes, the more suppressive, oppressive, and authoritarian he must be. He cannot succeed without changing, and it is unpleasant for his associates to see such changes, but within the Soviet system there is no other way to attain success. All thinking Soviet citizens realize that only those who prostitute themselves to the system can attain success. They are well aware of the many incompetent people who have attained success because they have been willing to follow implicitly and accept without question or even thought the wishes and the orders of those in positions of higher authority than themselves. A sincere, conscientious and honest man doesn't have much of a chance in the Soviet system.

K. The aura of suspicion within the Soviet Union. If Fear is the primary technique of control of the Soviet population, suspicion is a reflection of the fear of those in authority, as well as a concomitant of the fears engendered in the Soviet population. Although the word "trust" is understood by a Soviet, it is something which he seldom, if ever, experiences. It has been replaced by suspicion under the Soviet system. The final authority in the Soviet Union today, the Central Committee of the Communist Party, is suspicious of everyone, including its own membership. This suspicion reaches down to the lowest level of Soviet society and

spreads out in all directions. A supervisor is suspicious of his employees; the employee is suspicious of his fellow employees, who in turn reciprocate this suspicion. A Soviet suspects his associates of improper actions or thoughts from the standpoint of loyalty to the regime. At the same time he fears that his associates may suspect him of the same sort of thing. Perfectly legitimate activities are delayed or suspended because of the suspicion of those in a position of authority that the ulterior motivation behind the acts or actions has not been made clear. This, of course, results in inefficiency which cannot but have an irritating effect on conscientious people. One would like to feel that he is trusted by others, and at the same time be able to feel that he can trust certain other friends and associates. It is difficult for the Westerner to comprehend, but it is nevertheless true that such is impossible in the Soviet Union. Suspicion is a factor strongly influencing the lives of every subject of the Soviet system.

L. Monotony. The Soviet people have been described by some writers as the Gray Masses. Unfortunately, this term, however accurate, is difficult to fully appreciate and understand for most Westerners since, although fairly widely used, it is seldom defined. Perhaps it can be described as monotony of appearance, thought, and action of an overwhelming number of people. If the people are themselves monotonous to a non-Soviet observer, they are the products themselves of monotony. They are subjected to monotonous repetitions -- in the press, the radio, the theatre, the movies, and in the fields of art as a part of a calculated scheme of indoctrination by the communist authorities. Whereas variety is one of the basic things sought by all peoples, the

Soviets seem to have appreciably less of it than most. Listening to the Soviet radio, reading Soviet magazines, various publications, including novels and short stories, is exceedingly boring to the point of drudgery. This results in an unvoiced craving on the part of the Soviet people which is very seldom satisfied.

3. Personal factors occurring with relatively high frequency among defectors which are an outgrowth of those aspects of the Soviet system recounted in the paragraphs above are easy enough to understand.

A. Fear of demotion or punishment. The fear of demotion or punishment for failure or alleged failure to do one's job properly is a fairly constant source of concern to most rational Soviets, particularly those who would fall within the category of intellectuals. This fear, incidentally, apparently increases with the degree of authority held by the given individual. The higher his position, the greater the fear. It is true that in many instances the Soviets are ruthless in their punishment of those who fail in their assignments. While the Soviet system possesses a tremendous capacity for punishment, we have in the past, however, ascribed to it incorrectly greater irrationality and ruthlessness in meting out punishments to those who have failed in assignments than is normally the case. It would be a mistake, for example, to assume that an MVD officer assigned abroad would be severely punished should one of his operations become blown. Whether or not he would receive any punishment is dependent upon the circumstances surrounding the operation. Even those Soviets who get into trouble abroad, on return to the Soviet Union, may receive nothing more than a severe reprimand and a reassignment, which might, however, be made with the stipulation that they would not be

sent abroad on another assignment. Automatic incarceration of such offenders and particularly severe punishment is not the order of the day.

What bothers those Soviets assigned abroad who feel that they have made mistakes or that they will be accused of making mistakes is not so much the fear of incarceration as the knowledge from examples familiar to every one of them that they may be demoted, given unpleasant assignments, or forbidden ever to go abroad again. Demotion in the Soviet Union, of course, carries with it much more than the loss of title. It includes the loss of many privileges and prerogatives of a very basic sort including housing and special purchasing privileges which go with a particular job. The knowledge that one probably will not be permitted to go abroad again is very likely a very significant factor. There probably are Soviets abroad today who have no intention to defect, yet who are aware of the possibility that they might at some time in the future change their minds. They would like to think that the possibility of escape remains open. This, of course, would be precluded if they knew that they were never to be assigned abroad again.

B. Desire for a better and more comfortable life. Those Soviets who have had an opportunity to reside abroad all become aware of the variations in the standard of living within the Soviet Union and the standard of living abroad. This is true even though those abroad for the most part are required to live a fairly cloistered life. Their own personal standard of living abroad may be little better than what they enjoyed in the Soviet Union because of their special privileges there. They realize, however, that the general standard of living in most countries abroad is superior to that obtaining in the Soviet Union, and they

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are concomitantly aware that there is always a good chance that they will lose their privileged positions either through a mis-step or through the actions of others which are not based on any faults of their own. Those abroad who are rational beings can hardly fail to conclude that the difference between the standard of living in the USSR and most foreign countries outside the Soviet orbit, except for the very highest officials of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party, is enormous.

C. Attachment for an acquaintance met abroad ("Love"). This has apparently been a strong motivating factor for defection of a substantial number of the Soviets who have defected to date; whether by coincidence or for other reasons, it would seem that most of those defectors falling into this category have been of the fairly low-level type, including specifically comparatively young enlisted men and non-commissioned officers of the Soviet military forces.

D. Dissatisfaction with one's job, demoralization. There have been instances where apparently one of the strong factors influencing an individual's defection from the Soviet regime was dissatisfaction with his job for one of two reasons: 1) dislike of the job and very little prospect for improvement, and 2) refusal to carry out the onerous activities sometimes required; the latter applies to some of the duties sometimes required of members of the Soviet Intelligence Services abroad.

E. There is no known instance of a defection of a Soviet for purposes of receiving a monetary reward.

F. There have been a very small number of defections in which religion or religious freedom was a prominent motivating factor.

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It is probable that for defectors the difficulties of self-analysis coupled with inability properly to vocalize their feelings have led to erroneous or incomplete conclusions as to the factors significantly contributing to their decisions to defect. It is also probable that several, if not all, of the factors innumeraed above actually have influenced most Soviet defections. If adequate data were available, it should be useful to attempt a determination of those factors most pronouncedly affecting defectors of varying background types. This would facilitate predicting with greater accuracy than is now possible both the most suitable approach and proposal to defect and the probable reaction in any given instance.

The factors as listed above are believed to apply particularly to those Soviets classed as intellectuals, but in many cases may apply as well to those of other types. The conclusion that we should have a good personality or character analysis of any Soviet being considered for a defection inducement is inescapable. Defection obviously is a very delicate matter involving all sorts of sensibilities and emotions on the part of the one defecting. Anyone attempting a defection inducement does himself a disservice by over-simplifying what is a most complicated matter. There is no satisfactory alternative to good information and an aptness for empathy if accurate predictions and correct planning of a defection inducement are to result.

#### Factors Serving as Deterents to Defection

1. Reluctance to separate from one's family. The factor of family is one of the two most powerful deterents to defection. As is well

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known, it has been for some time a policy of the Soviet regime to hold as hostages members of the family of those of its personnel who are sent abroad. This means that if the Soviet citizen abroad is to defect, he does so with the full knowledge that he will never see his family again. It has been the policy of the Soviets, even in these cases where they permitted family members to accompany an employee sent abroad, to refuse permission for children over the age of eight years to go abroad. This has been done for two reasons, ostensibly: 1) To permit the child to be raised as a Soviet citizen, attending Soviet schools and receiving the normal political indoctrination given to all children who are raised under the Soviet system, and 2) To avoid having them corrupted by what they observe and experience in the enemy capitalist world. There are indications that the Soviets have decided to change this policy and to permit, on a more extensive scale, not only the spouses and younger children of a Soviet employee sent abroad to accompany him, but to permit all of his immediate family, including spouse and school-age children, to accompany him. Whether this new policy will be fully implemented is not known at this time.

2. Concern for welfare of family. The Soviet regime's policy of holding hostages in the USSR has tended to deter defections, not only because of the reluctance of an individual to voluntarily separate himself for life from his family, but because of his concern for the welfare of the family. The first question is, Will they be able to care for themselves without any support from him? and the second consideration is, Will the regime take reprisals against them? According to USSR law, the authorities are authorized to take reprisals against the immediate relatives

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of any traitor, and within the category of traitors are included those who defect from the Soviet Union. The punishment may take the form of incarceration in prison, assignment to forced labor, or exile to a remote area where the family members may be required to live for five to ten years, and sometimes for the remainder of their lives. For the family members life under such circumstances is extremely difficult, especially when they have been used to the types of special privileges which normally are granted to families of those calibre of persons who are permitted to go abroad in a professional capacity for the Soviet Government.

3. Ignorance of the type of treatment that will be received.

Because of the lack of information, in fact almost complete absence of information, held by most potential defectors on the subject of the type of treatment they will receive, this large question-mark has a powerful deterring effect. In the absence of information to the contrary, the Soviets can only assume that on defection to, for example, the Americans, they will receive, or there is a good chance that they will receive, the same type of treatment that would be meted out by their own government to such a defector. Closely tied in with this is the strong fear of punishment by the Americans if they should defect to them in the event that they have been engaged in intelligence activities directed against the Americans.

4. Ignorance of how to establish contact with the proper American authorities. The factor of family was listed as one of the two prime deterrents to defection. Ignorance of whom to contact and how to establish contact in order to defect to the proper American authorities is the second most powerful deterrent to defection by the Soviets. This

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factor may seem a little ridiculous on first consideration. It should seem the easiest thing in the world for a Soviet to go to the nearest American military attache, American military headquarters, MP, or the nearest American embassy or consulate. It would in fact be easy to do so; and yet professional Soviet intelligence officers are known to have been deterred in taking action to defect because they could not find the service with which they wanted to deal. The situation will vary from area to area in the world, but there is reason to believe, on the basis of experience to date, that at least the intelligence personnel of the Soviets who are abroad would prefer to defect to KUBARK. The reasons for this are rather interesting and quite significant in connection with the entire question of inducement of Soviet defections. Soviet intelligence personnel would much prefer to defect to a professional intelligence officer. In some areas of the world G-2 would fall into this category; in other parts its reputation, so far as the local Soviet intelligence officers are concerned, is not good enough. They are reluctant to go to a diplomatic installation for fear that their case will be mishandled by someone unfamiliar with the many problems associated with this sort of action. They do not want to become political footballs. Many, for very valid reasons as far as they are concerned, would prefer to disappear without a trace, rather than become the object of worldwide publicity. One of the reasons for this, of course, is the effect on their families. Until a solution is found which will make it simple for any potential defector to know to whom to go and how to go about defection, this will remain a major problem and an important deterrent to Soviet defection.

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5. Lack of access to Americans or facts about the United States.

Although a Soviet may have considered defecting to the Americans, he would like to investigate and resolve any doubts which remain, or as many of them as possible, before taking the final step; yet many Soviets abroad cannot read English nor understand it, and therefore have a limited or warped understanding of what the United States is like and what Americans are like. Until recently at least, the Soviets stationed abroad were forbidden contact with Americans except when acting on orders from their supervisors. Here, again, there are recent indications that this policy has been changed, which will result in the ability of Soviets stationed abroad to have increased contact not only with Americans, but with other foreigners.

6. Fear of capitalism. The intensive indoctrination and propagandizing which has been carried on for over three decades in the Soviet Union on the subject of capitalism has not been without powerful effect. Those Soviets who have access to information on the United States and other free countries see instances of apparent confirmation in the non-Soviet press of those charges leveled by the communists against capitalism and capitalists. Soviets are subjected to propaganda involving gross exaggerations of various aspects of capitalism, which, however, have a basis in fact and which, therefore, are even more convincing. This basic tried-and-proved propaganda technique has successfully worked to the disadvantage of those seeking to induce Soviet defections. To many Soviets capitalism is a vicious system of survival of the fittest; and they are fearful lest they not be able to compete in a capitalistic world with the fittest. Capitalism to them is repugnant from a

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humanitarian standpoint. They argue that "at least in the USSR we are taken care of; we have jobs, medical care, schooling, and a place -- however humble -- in which to live." In the capitalistic world they are afraid to be on their own, since this is for most of them a unique experience not without considerable danger. Their fear of capitalism is a direct result of ignorance, but regardless of the falaciousness of their conclusions, fear of capitalism is a significant deterrent to defection.

One incontrovertible fact stands out in connection with defection inducement: the beliefs and opinions of a potential defector are what we must reckon with -- regardless of their accuracy, rationality, or basis in fact. Whatever can be done to bring such beliefs closer to the truth will contribute to successful defection inducement.

7. Inability to adjust to life in the free world. Almost every Soviet defector, particularly those of above average intellectual level, is greatly concerned about his ability to survive outside the Soviet system. One of the most important considerations is the usual lack of knowledge of the English language or other appropriate language. Potential defectors wonder how they will be able to get along amongst people who have spoken English from birth and with whom they must compete for work, love, acknowledgment, and other important fundamentals of existence. An MVD border guard may ask the question, "What can I do for a living? My only specialty is being a border guard." He can see the possibility of reasonable security and comfort only if he can feel assured that he will receive considerable guidance and help from someone who understands his many basic problems. A Soviet stationed abroad may choose (and in actual fact has chosen) to return to the Soviet Union and a certain prison

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sentence rather than defect and thereby jump into an enigma. Related to this question is the fact that, although an individual may not have sufficient rank to qualify for special privileges under the Soviet system, he cannot help but reflect on the efforts which have over a period of years gone into his elevation to the point where he makes, say, 1500 rubles a month. And he is reluctant to disregard this in favor of taking a chance in the non-Soviet world.

8. Attachment for Russian culture. Although a very few striking exceptions are on record, most Russian Soviets, as might be expected, feel a strong attachment for and identification with Russian culture as contrasted with the Soviet system. This they are reluctant to divorce themselves from, and some Soviets would like assurance that they will be able to find abroad compatriots who continue to live in accordance with at least some of the Russian cultural patterns. Soviet defectors seem sharply divided on this question; some strongly believing that they must not associate with other Russians for fear that this would lead to identification of them and retaliation against them by Soviet intelligence. Those most concerned about their personal safety are former members of Soviet intelligence services or government or party officials. The greater the rank, the greater the danger.

9. Fear of failure to escape safely from the Soviets. Every Soviet citizen stationed abroad is well aware of the certain and severe punishment which will be meted out to him if he should fail in his attempted escape from Soviet control. Except in sheer desperation, he will not attempt escape under any circumstances other than such that he feels failure is virtually impossible.

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10. Fear of assassination by the Soviets. Many, if not all Soviets abroad, are fearful of assassination or kidnapping by the Soviets if they can be located after their defection. This fear is encouraged by the Soviet authorities and is inspired by the systematic and repetitious indoctrination on the omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence of the Soviet Intelligence Service. It is also for this reason that many Soviets, particularly those in the intelligence services and those of the highest calibre, prefer to disappear without a trace rather than receive world-wide publicity as a result of their defection

11. Special privileges for those in positions of authority.

Closely related to the factor of ignorance of the type of treatment that would be received after defection is the deterrent presented by the comparatively good life and special privileges available to those within the Soviet system who are in positions of authority or responsibility. In this connection it should be remembered that the more important the individual or potential defector is, the greater the privileges he has as a part of the Soviet system. Some of the other factors which have been described will have to be of over-riding importance in order to offset the deterring effect of this particular factor, particularly with prominent Soviets.

There are no instances of a Soviet citizen who was neutral on the subject of defection and who was convinced by an American that he should defect. How, then, do defections come about?

1. On impulse, because of abnormal fear, desire for adventure, or because of irrationality;
2. After a long period of analysis and consideration the decision

is made to defect if and when the opportunity presents itself;

3. After a tentative decision has been made to defect, by seeking a means and an opportunity to defect or by being approached and shown how defection and escape from the Soviet system is possible.

Approach to the Problem of Inducing Defection:

1. Experience to date, at least, has shown clearly that it is a waste of time to attempt to sell someone who is "cold" on the subject to defect. This is difficult to accept because trying to sell someone who is "cold" on the subject is the easy way out, and one at least goes through the motions of doing his job. This approach will probably cause only complications and unpleasantness for all concerned.

2. The positive approach is to demonstrate to someone who has made up his own mind to defect how he can do it. There are several key points to keep in mind:

A. Be clear and brief. The offer should be perfectly clear and concrete, never vague or general. The worst type of proposal is an ambiguous one. The person should be told what he can expect, what he should not expect, and, if necessary, it should be stated in response to questions that it is impossible to answer certain questions at the present time. He should, however, have a clear idea as to what he is getting into, and what the factors involved are. This should not be construed as implying that it is necessary to state a specific sum of money, for instance, which will be given to the individual as a reward or as a resettlement expense. In this connection, for example, it is sufficient to say simply that his financial needs will be taken care of, that he will be resettled; and he must be told in what type of an area he will be

resettled. In short, he must know what specifically or at least what type of things he can expect and how he will be treated, assuming good will on his own part and honesty and sincerity.

B. He should always be told where and when to appear for a rendezvous, and emergency and alternate rendezvous should be given to him.

C. He should always be given a means to make contact with the person making the proposal to him, even though his present decision to defect is in the negative. This is extremely important, since after more careful and lengthy consideration he may change his mind and decide to defect. Also, with the passage of time there may be other factors develop which will influence him to change his original decision.

3. Anyone attempting to induce a defection must be prepared to receive, to safely house, and to transport a defector. Where commercial travel will be necessary, the person making the proposal or his associates should be capable of providing, although circumstances may make its use unnecessary, at least a minimum of disguise for the defector, which would include providing him with eye-glasses if he doesn't wear them, or with different types of eye-glasses if he does; arranging for a different hair style and color, possibly including either straightening or waving his hair as appropriate; providing a moustache or arranging for the removal of a moustache; providing different clothes, especially different style of clothes; and, if he normally wears a hat, having him not wear a hat, or vice-versa, etc. False documentation also will be required if commercial travel is used.

4. Since the cold approach to an individual concerning whom it is not known whether he is considering defection or not is non-productive,

there must be a means of obtaining information which will enable intelligent selection of those persons to approach in order to show them how they can successfully defect and escape from the Soviet system.

5. Who should make the proposal to the potential defector?

A. The proposal should be made by someone who can satisfy the potential defector, if not actually prove to him, that he is a bona-fide representative of the United States Intelligence Service. In order to do this, the easiest solution is to use a clean-cut-looking American. Depending upon the situation he must be able to speak either Russian or a language well-known to the person being approached; preferably he should be able to speak Russian, but there is no harm whatsoever if he speaks it with an American accent as long as he can make himself clearly understood and can understand any statements or questions voiced by the prospective defector. A very strong caveat is warranted in connection with the selection of the person to make the proposal. Do not use a typical Russian emigre type of person. Although Russian emigres abroad are used for low-level work by Soviet intelligence, they are generally not considered by the Soviets as trustworthy or reliable. They normally are held in low repute by all Soviet officials abroad. There may, of course, be exceptions to this caveat, depending upon personal relationships between the emigre and the prospective defector. The undesirability of using Russian emigre types to make the proposal to the prospective defector applies equally to Americans of Russian descent who could be taken for the usual Russian emigre. It should be kept in mind in this connection that there is always a very great fear on the part of a prospective defector that a proposal is a provocation initiated by his own service.

B. An alternative to the clean-cut American type to make the proposal to the prospective defector is a native of the country in which the Soviet is located. This person should be in such a position and doing such a type of work that when he approaches a representative of the Soviet Mission on one pretext or another which seems bona fide and after more than one meeting indicates a certain amount of admiration for the Soviet Union, the Soviet contacted will, in the normal course of events, feel obligated to submit a contact report to the Center. The Center will then, if the native looks promising, instruct its man to continue contacting him until such time as he can determine whether it would be feasible to attempt to recruit him. Without going into an elaboration of the techniques involved, the purpose can be stated simply as being to justify periodic contacts between the native of the area and the Soviet under consideration as a possible defector. Over a period of several weeks, or preferably several months, the Soviet should have concluded that the native is definitely not a provocation by his own service at such time as the native makes a proposal to him.

Perhaps the most important point to be made is that defections will not be induced by argument. They will be induced by showing those who have made up their own minds to defect how to go about defecting.