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13 October 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. FRANK

SUBJECT:

Recommended Lines of Thought for

Operational Planning.


1. At the weekly meeting in Mr. Webb's office Tuesday afternoon I covered practically all of the subject matter upon which I had been briefed by yourself and the others who attended the morning briefing session, and a considerable amount of interest was shown on the part of Mr. Webb and General Magruder, in particular. Toward the conclusion of the session, Mr. Webb began to spark off a number of ideas and as he warmed to his subject, he began to produce some very useful thoughts. All of the others present at the meeting were much impressed by his grasp of the significance and operational possibilities of the OPC activity. and General Magruder was especially enthusiastic in his comment upon Mr. Webb's suggestions.

- 2. In view of the fact that Mr. Webb has taken this degree of personal interest and has gotten to the point of generating some lines of policy guidance to us, I believe that we would be well advised to do what we can to develop some refinements, and ultimately to produce some plans and projects along the lines of Mr. Webb's recommendations. We will surely be asked from time to time in the future what we are doing about his proposals, and in addition there is no doubt that he has got hold of some useful thoughts.
- The first line of thought developed by Mr. Webb originated with a discussion of the situation in Yugoslavia, and the fact that Tito's performance and the Tito heresy are causing the Cominform more disturbance and woe than any single thing which has occurred since the war.

He pointed to the possibility that Tito himself may be knocked off, and that in such an event, his regime may or may not be destroyed along with him. (Park (b)(1)(b)(3)

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Armstrong ventured the estimate that the mere assassination of Tito would not result in the downfall of his administration, since he has been constantly strengthening the organization of his Government to the point that it should be able to carry on without him.	(b)(1) (b)(3)
4. Mr. Webb went on from this to propose that we should put considerable effort into spreading the story of the Tito heresy, and moreover that we should endeavor to induce similar developments in other Communist areas and within the Communist Parties of free areas. He suggested the use of purchasable Communists who might operate within the Communist parties to proclaim that they were the leaders of the true Communist faith as against the Moscow-attached leaders such as Togliatti. OPC should not limit its attacks upon the Communists/efforts to wean away from Communist control or influence the left wing Socialists and others whom they have captured, but should set about to fragment the Communist Parties themselves using the Tito formula as our model.	(b)(3)
	(b)(1) (b)(3)
6. Mr. Webb made reference to the article on Tito by Hamilton Fish Armstrong in the current issue of the Atlantic Monthly Magazine, and whereas he agreed that it could not be effectively used in its present form because of its American origin and authorship—he said that we should draw material from it which should be caused to appear in disguised forms.  7. Mr. Webb then proposed that OPC should be able to employ covert methods toward	(b)(1)

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public opinion in the direction of a better under- standing between the peoples of the two areas. He said that he understood it to be an American policy objective that the	(b)(3)
and realize that they must work more closely together for their common economic benefit and political salvation. Such being the case, it should be a very useful operation.	(b)(1) (b)(3)
favorable to this result. Our representatives in	(b)(3)
should be able, working through cutouts, to line up a considerable number of press and periodical writers who could go to work on this general theme. Some of these people would no doubt be willing to do this beautiful be some of these people would	(b)(3)
while others would certainly require monetary inducement. The hand of the U.S. Government should remain antique.	
to be undertaken by our overt propaganda people. They should confine themselves to overt propaganda and should	4.74
of articles favorable to this objective in the appearance	(b)(1) (b)(3)
press. It was agreed that this should be a feasible operation and I have asked Mr. Offic to discuss this matter with and when he is in Mr.	(b)(3)
Office can report to us the results of this discussion so that an appropriate project can be prepared on the basis of this and other information which can be assembled. (The thought	(b)(3) (b)(3)
writers for this purpose, the more promising a series of	;
ing other propaganda purposes. The cost of operating in this manner would be conspicuously lower than what	:
if we tried to buy or initiate entire newspapers or other periodicals.) To the same end, I believe that influence could be brought to bear upon the labor groups	:
through existing contacts which we have with	(b)(1)
possibility with one of our principal contacts.	(b)(3)

F.G.W.

ADPC/FGW/rap

cc: SADO

Note attached addendum.