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23 June 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Reassessment of Insurgent Strength in Guatemala

REFERENCE: ALA Memorandum ALA-M-82-10151, dated 17 November 1982

1. A revised estimate of insurgent strength in Guatemala  (b)(1)

during the last half of 1982 through May 1983. It includes an analysis of the extent and intensity of insurgent activity, and probable guerrilla casualties resulting from government actions during that time.

Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)	800 to 1,000
Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA)	700 to 800
Rebel Armed Forces (FAR)	approx. 400
Guatemalan Communist Party/Dissident Faction (PGT/D)	100 to 200
Guatemalan Communist Party/Orthodox Faction (PGT/O)	300 to 400 <sup>a</sup>
Total Strength (full-time combatants)	2,000 to 2,500 <sup>b</sup>
Militia (part-time irregulars)	2,000 to 2,500 <sup>c</sup>

2. This assessment represents a reduction from the previous  estimate of 2,000 to 3,000 full-time insurgents within the country.

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ALA-M-83-10103

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3. Comments and inquiries regarding this estimate are encouraged. Responses should be directed to [redacted] CIA/Central American Branch, [redacted]

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Deputy Chief, Central America Branch

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<sup>a</sup> The increase in PGT/O strength reflects the most current intelligence information, and not an increase in this group's actual numbers during the past six months.

<sup>b</sup> While the precise addition of the individual groups totals 2,300 to 2,800, a total strength of 2,000 to 2,500 is recommended to more accurately indicate insurgent strength. The PGT/O is not given consideration within the insurgent totals because it has largely disdained military-related activities, and remains outside the Gautemalan National Revolutionary Union--the guerrilla umbrella organization.

<sup>c</sup> The militia figure again reflects an earlier CIA/DIA determination that probably an equal number of part-time supporters could be expected to participate actively in insurgent operations, if so directed and if weaponry were available. Nevertheless, we continue to judge that only a limited percentage of this group could be mustered for any given operation.

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