SECRET NONE IDENTIFIED

EXCLUSIVE FOR, NOFORN, ORCON, SENSITIVE, SPECAT, US ONLY

DOCNO: SOCODE: UNIT: SERIES: SERIESNO: SOURCE: DOCTYPE: DOCRYPE: DOCRIGATE: ORIGATE: ORIGATE: ORIGATE: OCCLASS: CODEWORD: HANDLING: CAVEATS: EXCLUSIVE FOR, NOFORN, ORCON, SENSITIVE, SPECAT, US ONLY TITLE: RUSSIA: REACTION OF RUSSIAN MEDIA OFFICIALS TO PUTIN'SAPPOINTMENT AS PREMIE ABSTRACT: REACTION OF RUSSIAN MEDIA OFFICIALS TO PUTIN'S APPOINTMENT AS PREMIER COUNTRY: RUSSIA PUBTYPE: ADDENDUM: UPDATEDATE: XREFS: DBNAME: ACCN: HARDCOPY: PAGECNT: 0 [Page 1]						
TITLE: RUSSIA: REACTION OF RUSSIAN MEDIA OFFICIALS TO PUTIN'S APPOINTMENT AS PREMIER REACTION OF RUSSIAN MEDIA OFFICIALS TO PUTIN'S APPOINTMENT AS PREMIER COUNTRY: RUSSIA PUBTYPE: INFORMATION REPORT NONE IDENTIFIED 19990816 XREFS: DBNAME: ACCN: HARDCOPY: PAGECNT: 0 [Page 1]	DOCNO: SOCODE: UNIT: SERIES: SERIESNO: SOURCE: DOCTYPE: DOR: TOR: ORIGDATE: ORIGDATE: ORIGYEAR: DOCCLASS: CODEWORD: HANDLING:					(b)(3)
ABSTRACT: REACTION OF RUSSIAN MEDIA OFFICIALS TO PUTIN'S APPOINTMENT AS PREMIER COUNTRY: RUSSIA PUBTYPE: INFORMATION REPORT ADDENDUM: NONE IDENTIFIED 19990816 XREFS: DBNAME: ACCN: HARDCOPY: PAGECNT: 0 [Page 1]	CAVEATS:	EXCLUSIVE FOR, NOF	ORN, ORCON, SENSI	TIVE, SPECAT, US	ONLY	
COUNTRY: RUSSIA PUBTYPE: INFORMATION REPORT ADDENDUM: NONE IDENTIFIED UPDATEDATE: 19990816 XREFS: DBNAME: ACCN: HARDCOPY: PAGECNT: 0 [Page 1]	TITLE:	RUSSIA: REACTION (OF RUSSIAN MEDIA	OFFICIALS TO PUT	IN'SAPPOINTMENT	AS PREMIER
PUBTYPE: INFORMATION REPORT ADDENDUM: NONE IDENTIFIED UPDATEDATE: 19990816 XREFS: DBNAME: ACCN: HARDCOPY: PAGECNT: 0 [Page 1]	ABSTRACT:	REACTION OF RUSSIAN	MEDIA OFFICIALS	TO PUTIN'S APPO	INTMENT AS PREM	IER
ADDENDUM: NONE IDENTIFIED UPDATEDATE: 19990816 XREFS: DBNAME: ACCN: HARDCOPY: PAGECNT: 0 [Page 1]	COUNTRY:	RUSSIA				
DBNAME: ACCN: HARDCOPY: PAGECNT: 0 [Page 1]	ADDENDUM: UPDATEDATE:	NONE IDENTIFIED				
PAGECNT: 0 [Page 1]	DBNAME: ACCN:					(b)(3)
		0				
(b)	[Page 1]					
						(b)(3)
						(4)(-)

EXCLUSIVE FOR, NOFORN, ORCON, SENSITIVE, SPECAT, US ONLY NONE IDENTIFIED SECRET

Page 1

NONE IDENTIFIED

EXCLUSIVE FOR, NOFORN, ORCON, SENSITIVE, SPECAT, US ONLY

	(b)(3)
PAGE 001 TOT: 132316Z AUG 99 CIA 525262	(b)(3)
S E C R E T SPECAT NOFORN ORCON SPECAT 132316Z CIA 525262 TO:	(b)(2)
	(b)(3)
SERIAL:	(b)(3)
PASS:	(b)(3)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	
WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE	
REPORT CLASS S E C R E TNOFORNORCON	
EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED AT END OF REPORT	
DIST: 13 AUGUST 1999	
COUNTRY: RUSSIA	(b)(1)
SUBJ: REACTION OF RUSSIAN MEDIA OFFICIALS TO PUTIN'S APPOINTMENT AS PREMIER	(b)(1) (b)(3)
DOI:	
SOURCE:	(b)(1) (b)(3)
SUMMARY: NONE.	
TEXT: 1. MANY RUSSIAN MEDIA OFFICIALS STRONGLY DISAGREE WITH PRESIDENT BORIS ((YEL'TSIN))'S 9 AUGUST DECISION TO NOMINATE FORMER FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE (FSB) DIRECTOR VLADIMIR ((PUTIN)) AS PREMIER OF ALL RUSSIA. NOVOSTI DIRECTOR ALEKSEY ((VOLIN)) WAS	(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3)
PARTICULARLY ANGRY WITH YEL'TSIN FOR FIRING PREMIER SERGEY ((STEPASHIN)) AND INSTALLING PUTIN AS ACTING PREMIER. VOLIN ASSESSED THE KREMLIN'S LATEST SHAKEUP TO BE A STUPID MOVE, GIVEN THE COUNTRY'S ALREADY UNSTABLE POLITICAL AND	(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3)
EXCLUSIVE FOR, NOFORN, ORCON, SENSITIVE, SPECAT, US ONLY	(b)(1) (b)(3)

NONE IDENTIFIED SECRET

Page 2

Approved for Release: 2022/03/09 C05289048

SECRET

NONE IDENTIFIED

EXCLUSIVE FOR, NOFORN, ORCON, SENSITIVE, SPECAT, US	(b)(3)
FINANCIAL SITUATION. LIKED STEPASHIN AND HAD WANTED HIM TO BE GIVEN SUFFICIENT TIME TO PROSPER IN THE POSITION. VOLIN, HOWEVER, ALSO PREDICTED THE RUBLE WOULD FALL AGAIN BY THE END OF AUGUST. VOLIN HAD MENTIONED THAT STEPASHIN'S OUSTER MIGHT HAVE SAVED HIM FROM BEING BLAMED FOR ANOTHER FINANCIAL CRISIS, SUCH AS FORMER PREMIER SERGEY ((KIRIYENKO)) WAS BLAMED FOR THE AUGUST 1998 FINANCIAL COLLAPSE.	(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3)
	(b)(1) (b)(3)
2. MOST RUSSIAN JOURNALISTS AND THEIR GOVERNMENT COUNTERPARTS DISLIKE AND DISTRUST PUTIN. IN FACT, THE NOVOSTI EMPLOYEES BECAME SO UPSET ABOUT STEPASHIN'S DISMISSAL THAT NEW MASS MEDIA MINISTER MIKHAIL ((LESIN)) HAD TO	(b)(1) (b)(3)
MAKE A SPECIAL TRIP TO NOVOSTI HEADQUARTERS ON 9 AUGUST TO CALM DOWN HIS EMPLOYEES. LESIN GATHERED TOGETHER HIS MINIONS LATE ON 9 AUGUST AND REASSURED THEM ABOUT THE CONTINUITY OF THEIR JOBS AND THE REGIME. LESIN ASKED HIS PEOPLE TO RESPECT PUTIN AND NOT TO BLAME HIM FOR THE KREMLIN'S INDECISIVENESS.	(b)(1) (b)(3)
LESIN ALSO TOLD THE NOVOSTI STAFF NOT TO VIEW THIS LEADERSHIP CHANGE AS OUT OF THE ORDINARY OR WORRISOME. LESIN THEN	(b)(1) (b)(3)
JOKINGLY PREDICTED THAT YEL'TSIN WOULD PROBABLY APPOINT TWO OR THREE MORE "SUCCESSORS" BY THE TIME HE LEAVES OFFICE IN 2000. THE GENERAL CONSENSUS OF LESIN AND HIS	(b)(1)
EMPLOYEES WAS THAT IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR YEL'TSIN TO TRANSFORM PUTIN INTO A SERIOUS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE.	(b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3)
	(b)(1) (b)(3)
4.	
	(b)(1) (b)(3)
POC: COMMENTS, EVALUATIONS, AND REQUIREMENTS WELCOME.	(b)(3)
ACQ: DISSEM:	(b)(1) (b)(3)
	(b)(1)
	(b)(3)

(b)(1)

SECRET

NONE IDENTIFIED

EXCLUSIVE FOR, NOFORN, ORCON, SENSITIVE, SPECAT, US ONLY

	(b)(3)
WARNING: REPORT CLASS S E C R E TNOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALSDISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.	
ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF	(b)(3)
END OF MESSAGE SECRET.	(b)(3)
END OF MESSAGE SECRET	
	(b)(3)