

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
Office of the A.C. of S., G-2,
A.P.O. #464, U. S. Army

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1 June 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal.

TO: Chief, CIC, Fifth Army, APO 464, US Army.

1. Herewith for information the following CSDIC reports.

Interrogation Report on SS Standartenfuehrer RAUFF, Walther,
file reference, CSDIC/SC15AG/SD 11, copy number 51.

First Detailed Interrogation Report on Rittmeister GPAF THUN -
HOHENSTEIN, file reference CSDIC/CAT/SD 9, copy number 41.

Interrogation Report on Leut. WERDENIK, Fritz, file reference
CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 12, copy number 51.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army

ARTHUR R. BLOM,
Lt. Col., Inf.,
Asst. A.C. of S., G-2

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Interrogation Report

on

SS Sturmbannführer RAUFER Walther

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CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 11.

Copy No: 51

This report contains information on the history, functions and personalities of the SIFD and SD in Gruppe OBER ITALIEN WEST.

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R. V. WEDEKIND, Major, I.O.
C.O., CSDIC Sub-Centre
HQ 15 Army Group, GME.

CSDIC SC,
29 May 45.

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PERSONALITIES

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1. SOURCE(a) Personal Details

Name: RAUFF, Walther
 Alias: ~~RAUFF, Walther~~
 Rank: SS Standartenfuehrer
 Unit: GRUPE OBER ITALIEN WEST DER SIPO UND SD
 Id No: See Documents, sub-para 1.b.
 FP No: C2039
 Party No: 5216415 (No of membership book)
 SS No: Forgotten
 Home Address: 15, Amtsfeldstrasse, WERNIGRODE a. HARC.
 Surrendered: 30 Apr 45, Aussonkommando, MILAN, to US troops
 Interrogated: 22 May 45, CSDIC Sub-Centre, 15 Army Group, COMF.

(b) Documents

- i) Membership book No 5216415 of the Nazi Party, issued at MUNICH, 25 May 1940, showing Source's entry into the Party on 1 May 32.
- ii) Diary 1942, including names and addresses of higher SS officers in GERMANY.
- iii) Wehrpass of the German Navy.
- iv) Official passport, issued 22 May 42 at BERLIN, valid until 22 May 43, and extended by the German Consulate at NAPLES till 22 May 44.
- v) Permit to carry arms up to 7.65 mm calibre, issued on 27 Jul 38 at BERLIN and valid for three years. The permit to carry arms also covers "public meetings and processions".
- vi) Identity disc, with the inscription "SS AUSB. ABT. KONITZ - No 11634". The identity disc is a "cover", similar to that issued to all members of the SIPO and SD Aussonkommando, MILAN.

(c) History and Career

Source was born at COETHEN (Anhalt) on 19 Jun 1906, and after three years of Volksschule and nine years at the Gymnasium at MAGDEBURG, became a cadet in the German Navy in 1924. After a training period of four years on various ships and shore establishments, Source was promoted to the rank of midshipman (ensign) on 1 Oct 1926. His promotion to Sub-Lt occurred in 1930. From 1930-33 Source was instructor at a Mines School and eventually commanded a minesweeper. He was transferred to the 1st Minesweeping Flotilla in 1934, in the rank of Lieut and was placed in command of the Flotilla from 1934-36. During the period 1936-37 Source was instructor at the Mines School at KIEL and placed in command of TB 196 in 1937.

Source left the Navy on 31 Dec 37, through the influence of his friend HEYDRICH, to become SS candidate and trainee at the SD Hauptamt BERLIN, with the intention of acquiring a working knowledge of all departments. On 20 Apr 38 Source was given the rank of Hauptsturmfuehrer, with the task of carrying out the mobilisation preparations of the SD. At beg 1939 Source moved to PRAGUE with the SD Einsatzkdo, where he continued his work in connection with the mobilisation preparations. In Apr 39 he returned to the SD Hauptamt BERLIN, where he continued the same task till Sep 39, when he was transferred to Amt IID (Technik), and given the task of putting the SD communications on a war footing. This included WT, RT, teleprint, MT and air transport.

/On 1 May 40

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On 1 May 40, and at his own request, Source was transferred back to the Navy, as OC of the 38th Minesweeping Flotilla operating between CHERBOURG and CALAIS. Source was promoted to the rank of Lt-Cmdr in Apr 41.

At the request of HEYDRICH Source returned to the SD Hauptamt BERLIN, Amt IID in Jun 41, but in Sep 41 moved to PRAGUE as technical adviser to HEYDRICH on all matters of communications in the Protectorate. Source remained in this job till Jun 42, when he returned to the SD Hauptamt BERLIN.

In Jul 42 Source was appointed head of the SD Einsatzkommando AFRIKA, but his staff was unable to go beyond ATHENS, and Source flew to TOBRUK for a personal interview with ROMMEL. It was decided that the arrival of the SD Einsatzkommando had been too long delayed to be of any value, and Source returned to BERLIN with his staff.

In Nov 42 Source went to TUNIS with an SD Einsatzkommando, somewhat reduced in size, and remained there till 10 May 43, when he flew over to ITALY with his staff.

Source was appointed OC of the Einsatzkommando COCSEA in Jul 43. On 8 Sep 43 Source flew to BOLZANO to see SS Gruppenfuhrer HARSTER, who appointed Source OC GRUPPE OBER ITALIEN WEST of the SIFO and SD, with HQ in MILAN. Source arrived at MILAN to take up his appointment on 13 Sep 43 and remained there till his surrender on 30 Apr 45.

(a) Assessment

Source is a typical member of the SD hierarchy who has brought his organisation of political gangsterism to stream-lined perfection and is proud of the fact. By nature cynical and overbearing, but cunning and shifty rather than intelligent, he regards his past activities as a matter of course. He was at first most uncooperative during interrogation and refused to lay his cards on the table.

His contempt and everlasting malice towards the Allies are but slightly concealed. Source is considered a menace if ever set free, and failing actual elimination, is recommended for life-long internment.

Reliability: Good

(Interrogated by A.J.D.)

2. GRUPPE OBER ITALIEN WEST OF THE SIFO AND SD

(a) Formation

When Source flew to see HARSTER at BOLZANO on 12 Sep 43, he was given the task, together with MUELLER, of organising the SIFO and SD set-up in the Western part of Upper ITALY. The original scheme was that Source should take over the area of PIEDMONT and LIGURIA, with provisional HQ at TURIN, whilst MUELLER was to be responsible for LOMBARDY, with HQ at MILAN. During the night 12/13 Sep 43, MUELLER became incapacitated through a strong attack of rheumatism and was unable to make the journey. Source was therefore commissioned by HARSTER to carry out alone the task of establishing the SIFO and SD network in NW ITALY (see App "A").

Source arrived in MILAN on 13 Sep 43, with a staff of 35, including technical personnel (drivers, interpreters, WT operators, etc) and began establishing the Aussenkommando, MILAN, with SAEWECHE in charge.

About 10 days later Source went to TURIN, and with part of his original staff plus reinforcements set up Aussenkommando TURIN, under SCHMIDT.

With the arrival of further reinforcements, Aussenkommando GENOA was established at geb. Dec 43, under MEUNTEUFEL.

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(b) Power of Authority

The heads of the various Kommandos hold low ranks (Leut, Oblt and Hpt) but were constantly in contact with officers of much higher rank (Oberst and even General) of various German and Italian commands. In order to back up the authority of the Kommandos, Source in the rank of Obersturmfuehrer acted as the official representative of the SIPO and SD. Furthermore, at the inception of the Gruppe OBER ITALIEN WEST, communications between MILAN and VERONA were very bad, and in all cases where the Bds was not available owing to technical difficulties, Source had full authority to act for the Bds himself.

(c) Source's Tasks

Owing to the fact that the economic and political point of gravity in Upper ITALY was centred in the triangle MILAN-TURIN-GENOA, Source's main task was to provide the German authorities concerned with consolidated political and economic reports on that area.

From the organisational point of view, the establishment of the Gruppe OBER ITALIEN WEST was a departure from the normal SD set-up, particularly in ITALY, where the Aussenkommandos were normally responsible direct to the Bds. The original intention, therefore, had been to dissolve the Gruppe OBER ITALIEN WEST as soon as the various Aussenkommandos had been established firmly, and to place them under the immediate control of the Bds. This move was to have taken place in Feb 44, but was not carried out because the centralised system of information, particularly in regard to anti-strike measures, was considered a great success. Another reason for the retention of the Gruppe was that HARSTER was anxious to have a high-ranking SD subordinate at MILAN.

Source mentions the following as being his main tasks as head of Gruppe OBER ITALIEN WEST:-

- i) The organisation and development of all units and sub-units of the SIPO and SD in LOMBARDY, PIEDMONT and LIGURIA.
- ii) To summarise and issue reports on political matters concerning ITALY only.
- iii) To liaise officially with all German military, political and economic authorities.
- iv) To liaise officially with all Italian political and above all police authorities in the areas.
- v) To supervise the policy and work of all units and sub-units under his command.

In the course of his duties, Source travelled extensively in the areas under his command, and at the beginning visited TURIN and GENOA at least once a week, later once a fortnight.

Source states that in the course of his visits to the Aussenkommandos, the various heads gave him a verbal report on the most important happenings, without going into details, in addition to which he was given a summarised report giving the activities of the Aussenkommando in concentrated form. Source claims that in the course of twenty months' activity the items reported have been so numerous that a repetition of particular items is impossible.

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(d) Abt VI Tasks

During the initial period, Abt VI was non-existent owing to the fact that RSHA could not, or would not, make available the necessary personnel. Abt VI was first set up in MILAN in Feb 44, under ZIMMER, with the task of building up a post-occupational network and procuring political information from abroad.

Source was forbidden to have any direct contacts with SWITZERLAND or any other country, except on the express authority of Amt VI BERLIN. This authority was applied for through VERONA. Source states negotiations of this kind were very protracted and tiresome and that the application was rejected in the majority of cases.

Members of Amt VI BERLIN working in Source's area on special missions were officially required to make their presence known to Source, but in some cases this rule was not observed. Source claims that these specialists only gave him the general outline of their mission without going into details. This policy is stated to be in accordance with the "leadership" principle (Fuehrerprinzip), according to which no officer may learn more of a secret matter than is absolutely necessary for him to carry out his task. The principle was strictly adhered to by members of Abt IV and VI VERONA with the result that Source claims to be uninformed on many of the activities of VERONA in his area.

Source also claims that in individual cases the Aussenkommandos had orders to report direct to VERONA. Under this heading came enemy agents, WT agents (including those who might be used) and all matters dealt with centrally by VERONA.

The policy of secrecy is stated to have been most marked in the case of certain missions, the members of which were in no way controlled by Source.

(e) Post-Occupational Network

ZIMMER had already prepared a network of agents, of whom Source knows about five, when DON BARBARESCHI, who had been arrested and then released to be returned to SWITZERLAND, informed ZIMMER that his post-occupational plans were well-known to the Allies and mentioned certain details which convinced him that he would have to start again with a new network. The existing network was in fact scrapped, according to Source.

The setting up of a new network did not get beyond the planning stage and the renting of a flat (location unknown) because during the last eight weeks prior to the surrender ZIMMER was fully occupied with the surrender negotiations and all Abt VI work in MILAN came to a standstill.

3. SOURCE'S PERSONAL CONTACTS

Source claims that with the exception of BENUZZI, who was his only informer, he had no other personal agents or informers in the strict sense of the word i.e., persons who for financial or political reasons supplied him with information at regular intervals.

With the exception of BENUZZI, all informers were controlled by the heads of the departments III, IIID, IV, V and VI. Source's dealings with these informers were conducted exclusively through the heads of the departments.

The following are the personalities from whom Source obtained information in an official capacity:

Col GELORINI GNR

Col PRESTI UPI

Questore LARICI

BRACCO, former vice-Mayor of MILAN

Questore COSTA, working in MILAN on a special mission from the Italian
/Source was also (Chief of Police.

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Source also was in constant touch with the German Consulates at MILAN and TURIN, from whom he obtained a certain amount of information.

In 1945, Source had three audiences with MUSSOLENI as well as innumerable interviews with the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Labour and the Chief of Police.

In an official capacity, Source also liaised with a number of Fascists, leaders of Fascist formations and Government officials.

4. THE PENETRATION OF THE ALLIED AND PARTISAN ORGANISATION

On principle the Partisan organisation is stated to have been far easier to penetrate than that of the Allies. Both German and Italian bodies were concerned with the penetration of the Partisan organisation, and the resultant increase in personnel and the greater scope of the inquiries yielded a great amount of useful information. By systematic research, particularly by the Aussenkommandos and the Io of the SS, and Police Chiefs, a very accurate OE of the Partisan Movement was built up, including its communication system and the relation between the CLN in the towns and the Partisan formations operating in the country. In Source's opinion the immense growth of the Partisan Movement was a distinct disadvantage for the Allies in that far too many written orders were issued and when captured, as often happened, these documents yielded useful information. Source also described as a disadvantage the fact that the Partisans were obliged to work with certain Italians, who in order to save their lives, or for material gain, divulged the complete extent of their knowledge when captured.

Source added that if despite the extensive knowledge which the Germans possessed of the Partisan set-up, aggressive action against them was never decisive, this was solely due to the inadequacy of the manpower at the disposal of the Germans.

The penetration of the Partisan organisation also revealed loopholes in the Allied organisation, as both bodies stood in some sort of relationship to one another. The penetration of the Allied organisation is stated to have been incomparably more difficult, owing to the fact that it employed fewer men, working independently and unknown to one another, in small groups of two or three, and also because these men were better trained, cleverer and better concealed. If arrested, they talked considerably less than the Partisans.

The weak point in the Allied organisation is stated to have been certain Italian elements who were not chosen with sufficient care in that they were not really fanatical anti-Fascists or anti-Nazis, and if arrested provided a not inconsiderable amount of information. Under this category, Source refers mainly to former Italian soldiers who accepted missions merely in order to be able to return to their families in N ITALY. Such agents, if arrested, would also talk about their training in the South, their mission, etc, and were usually found to be the easiest type to turn round. Source is unable to remember the names of individual agents particularly as cases of this kind were handled centrally by Abt. IV at Bds. VERONA.

During the period Oct 45-Mar 45 a number of organisations and missions were uncovered. In Jan 45, Aussenkommando TURIN issued a summary giving details of about 50-60 missions which had been revealed at one place or another. The summary included organisations which had been eliminated, including the names of members, and also those which had been penetrated but not yet eliminated as well as missions about which no information was available.

The position at Aussenkommando GENOVA was similar. There were points of penetration everywhere and successes against individual missions, but in Source's view the complete penetration and elimination of the Allied organisations, both in North and South ITALY was never achieved.

/The following are

The following are the organisations known by Source to have been eliminated: "OTTO", "FRANCO", "TAR", "C11", "STELLA", "FIRI" (Italian) and "DCRA". On his arrest, FERRI gave valuable information on the CLN and its organisation, as well as the economic and political conditions in S ITALY.

The organisation for supporting the Partisan groups from the air was well-known, thanks to the captured material distributed by VERONI. If a WT operator was captured with his set it was possible in the majority of cases to get to know the code. Frequently, messages which had already been sent were also found on the operator when captured.

The WT operator who accompanied TUCKER and DON BARRARESCHI on their mission from SWITZERLAND into the Province of COMO is stated to have been extremely cowardly and to have been unable to withstand prolonged interrogation.

Source affirms that the German organisation worked under a great disadvantage in that nearly all Italians supported the Partisans and the Allies. Even Italian bodies such as the Police, UPI and SID very often worked not for but against the Germans, as a form of reinsurance with the Allies.

5. SD ACTIVITIES IN SWITZERLAND

(a) General Policy

SWITZERLAND was regarded as a preserve of Amt VI RSHA working across the German frontier, and any activity on the part of SD in ITALY was considered "illegal". In view of its close proximity to the Swiss frontier, however, Source's organisation had ample opportunity of developing contacts, which in fact it did. All such contacts were immediately reported to HARSTER or HUEGEL at VERONA, who decided whether their further development was to be directed centrally from VERONA or by the various bodies under Source's command, but particularly by the Grenzbefehlsstelle WEST at COMO, under VOETTERL and GLEMENS.

Owing to the lack of personnel, time and means, the penetration of the Allied organisation in SWITZERLAND from N ITALY was more a matter of chance and opportunity than a planned undertaking. Source describes this policy as one of the typical mistakes of Amt VI RSHA.

With the exception of UGO, BENUZZI and BICCHIERAI, Source himself had no personal contacts with SWITZERLAND. Source also disclaims all knowledge of any direct contacts existing between Amt VI VERONA and SWITZERLAND and considers this possibility as being very remote.

(b) Local Border Traffic (Kleiner Grenzverkehr)

This was the method by which most of the information was secured. The agents employed were Italian, Swiss and German. FRAGER and LANGATZ, both of COMO, frequently visited SWITZERLAND for business reasons, and their trips yielded information of general interest.

(c) German Consul at LUGANO

Source knew Frhr von NEURATH personally from his AFRICA days and now and then obtained information of a general nature from him.

(d) Dr PORTA

The above, Federale of COMO, had a well organised Intelligence Service in SWITZERLAND and at first made all the information collected available to the SD. Later on, the relations between PORTA and VOETTERL became unfriendly and the supply of information ceased. Source has no knowledge in regard to the details of the information concerned.

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(c) X Flotilla MAS

At one time the above organization planned to establish an Intelligence Service in SWITZERLAND. It was to have worked in conjunction with smuggling organization, but the scheme was never carried out. The film star, VALENTI Osvaldo, was also connected with the organization, which was run on amateurish lines, and had its HQ at LANCEO D'INTELVI.

(f) MARINOTTI and the Undertaking "WESTWIND"

MARINOTTI, manager of SNIA VISCOSE, was serving a short term of imprisonment during the course of which he expressed the wish to go to SWITZERLAND in order to contact some Allied representatives. His aim was to open negotiations with a view to saving the industry in N ITALY from destruction, but he wished to carry out his mission with the knowledge of the German authorities.

MARINOTTI's plan was approved, because it was decided to make use of his visit to SWITZERLAND in order to contact Allied political circles in that country. The scheme was given the cover name "WESTWIND" and placed under the personal direction of HARSTER.

MARINOTTI went to SWITZERLAND, and the first results looked promising. After one of MARINOTTI's visits across the border, a meeting took place at CERNOBBIO between HARSTER, MARINOTTI and Source. The meeting was also attended by a Swiss lawyer, KREUTER (or GREUTER), allegedly a close collaborator with the British or American Intelligence Service. As a result of the progress made, HARSTER went to BERLIN in order to obtain permission to continue the discussions. BERLIN's attitude was not encouraging and the scheme was abandoned.

Source states that MARINOTTI did not bring back any information from SWITZERLAND other than that connected with the negotiations. He is aware, however, that one of MARINOTTI's former collaborators, Count CCMITA (?) is alleged to have worked for the British Intelligence Service, but that the two had had differences of opinion and no longer saw one another.

Source has no information regarding the present whereabouts of MARINOTTI but presumes him to be in SWITZERLAND.

(g) PARILI

On 15 Feb 45 SS Obergruppenfuhrer WOLFF expressed the wish to have some means of establishing contact with the Allies in SWITZERLAND. Source discussed the matter with ZIEGLER, and it was agreed to nominate PARILI, whom ZIEGLER knew in a purely personal way from GENOA. ZIEGLER had never had any intelligence dealings with PARILI before. PARILI was keen on the proposal, as he himself was interested in the preservation of Upper ITALY. WOLFF and HARSTER agreed to PARILI's nomination, and from then onwards the negotiations followed the already well-known course.

Source himself took part in these negotiations, going to SWITZERLAND (LUGANO) end Feb-Beg Mar 45 accompanied by ZIEGLER, where he negotiated with Professor HUSSMANN and Major WELLS of the Swiss Intelligence Service. He was obliged to explain to the Swiss representatives why WOLFF's visit to BERLIN had taken longer than expected. At the same time, Source was handed a list of prisoners held by the SD and on whose behalf the Swiss representatives wished to intervene. Source states that if they had not yet left his area, all the prisoners on the list were set free. This was the only time Source is stated to have gone to SWITZERLAND.

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6. SD ACTIVITIES AGAINST S FRANCE

(a) General Policy

After the loss of FRANCE, Amt VI RSHA tried various ways and means of getting agents into FRANCE. With this object, it sent several representatives on special missions to ITALY to examine the possibility of putting agents across the border of S FRANCE. Source was fully occupied with his job in ITALY and had very little time or interest to devote to this new phase of activity. He asserts that these special missions always annoyed him, inasmuch as the officers conducting them were always very secretive and were continually making demands for accommodation and stores.

(b) SENNER

SENNER was first of the representatives to arrive from Amt VI on a special mission. He came to MILAN in Oct/Nov 44, and after a short stay announced his intention of going to S REMO to examine the possibility of putting agents across the RIVIERA border. Source never saw SENNER again, nor did he receive any reports of his activities, which were signalled straight to BERLIN.

(c) NEISSER

NEISSER arrived in MILAN in Dec 44 on a special mission from Amt VI. The mission was to find ways and means to plant agents in S FRANCE through PIEDMONT. Source drew NEISSER's attention to the fact that the area in question was dangerous owing to Partisan activities and that the mountain roads would hardly be passable during the winter. NEISSER thought he could succeed provided he found agents of the sporting type, and left for TURIN in order to study conditions on the spot. He later returned to MILAN, convinced that the PIEDMONT area was unsuitable for the purpose he had in mind, and left for S REMO on Jan 45. Source has not seen NEISSER since and has no information as to his activities. He is believed to have remained at S REMO.

(d) GOHL

GOHL arrived from BERLIN a little after NEISSER, but with the same mission as the latter and SENNER. In addition, GOHL had the task of controlling the "TOSCA" organisation, a group of Frenchmen of the FTP, under BARTHELEMY, who were to operate in FRANCE. Source has never seen BARTHELEMY or any of the other Frenchmen but thinks that none of them ever undertook a mission.

In the meantime, GOHL went to S REMO to take charge of all the various groups (SENNER, NEISSER, Army) and to sort out the confusion which had arisen. This was due to the policy of Amt VI of sending numbers of Frenchmen to N ITALY who, on arrival, were either unwilling or unsuitable and only intent on having a good time. Some of these Frenchmen arrived alone, others were in charge of a draft leader. Of these draft leaders, Source knows the following superficially: ROHL'S, SAHN and FRINGS (or VRINGS?) - Oblts, and SCHULTE - officer cadet. Source is unable to describe these draft leaders, nor can he state whether they returned to GERMANY or remained at S REMO.

In mid Feb 45 the confusion became so great that HANSTER ordered GOHL to MILAN with the task of collecting all the Frenchmen there and passing them on to the organisations for which they were most suited. GOHL had a small office opposite the Albergo "TURISMO" and was assisted in his work by a certain STENGRITT and another man whose name Source has forgotten.

/About 25-30 Frenchmen

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About 25-30 Frenchmen who turned up in MILAN allegedly for the purpose of crossing into FRANCE but did black market transactions instead, were arrested and sent back to GERMANY. Of this number, Source can remember only a certain SELON Andre and wife.

Source cannot give any information about GOHL's activities at S REMO.

(c) BERGER

A certain BERGER, a German national who had worked in FRANCE previously, was to have started operations at S REMO. He came into conflict with GOHL and was arrested on a suspicion of trying to escape to SWITZERLAND. From MILAN, BERGER was eventually sent to GERMANY.

7. COLLABORATORS

(a) "UGO"

Source heard "UGO's" real name in Dec 44 for the first time, but cannot remember it. Confronted with the name of "Dr UGO MODESTI", Source admitted the possibility that this might have been another of "UGO's" aliases, but cannot confirm this with certainty. Source states emphatically that "MODESTI" was not the real name of "UGO". He is equally certain that "UGO" never used any other cover names, at least not in his dealings with the Aussenkommando.

i) Recruitment

"UGO" approached SAEWECKE in Oct/Nov 43 and offered his services as an old member of the OVRA. "UGO" belonged to the OVRA at MILAN or GENOA, and owing to the fact that the activities of that organisation had been considerably curtailed following the events of 8 Sep 43, he was endeavouring to find a new field of activity for himself. "UGO" proposed that he should be allowed to continue to work independently with his own collaborators, and to send all reports to the SD instead of to the OVRA. As a result of a request to the head of CVRA (Dr LETO), "UGO" and 5-7 of his collaborators were seconded to the Aussenkommando MILAN.

ii) Remuneration

"UGO" and his collaborators were only seconded to the Aussenkommando MILAN and continued to draw their pay from OVRA. The SD never paid them a fixed wage and merely kept them in rations. On special occasions, such a Christmas, or if "UGO" had pulled off a particularly good job, he was given a bonus, which he divided amongst his men. Expenses which "UGO" incurred in the course of his duty were refunded, and in individual cases "UGO" was permitted to retain a portion of any funds confiscated "in order to devote them to his future tasks". Source cannot even give an estimate of the amounts involved.

iii) "UGO's" Work

On the basis of the reports which "UGO" gave of his previous activities, he seemed well suited to carry out the mission which the Aussenkommando had set itself, namely to ensure peaceful and orderly conditions for the fighting troops in the rear areas. With this object in view, "UGO's" efforts were at first devoted exclusively to the penetration of the opposing political organisations. Source states that "UGO" worked in close collaboration with SAEWECKE and, together with his own collaborators, achieved considerable success.

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iv) Activities in SWITZERLAND

"UGO" had OVRA connections in SWITZERLAND, and suggested to SAWECKE that these should be utilized to further the penetration of the political opposition parties. Source states that "UGO" worked on the knowledge that the CLN and all its affiliated parties had their own connections in SWITZERLAND, which might be tapped to provide useful information on the political set-up in ITALY itself.

Source was asked by SAWECKE to give the scheme his blessing, but before doing so, Source interviewed "UGO" personally, allegedly for the first time. Source thought the proposal interesting, but as he had been expressly forbidden to work into SWITZERLAND, he talked the matter over with HARSTER before giving a reply. Source recommended the scheme to HARSTER, with the proviso that ESHA BERLIN should not be informed, as the whole scheme was an Amt III rather than an Amt VI matter (penetration of the political opposition from abroad) HARSTER agreed.

v) Missions in SWITZERLAND

"UGO's" first mission into SWITZERLAND, which he undertook with the object of reviving his connections with the OVRA network in that country, took place about Jun 44. "UGO" crossed the frontier illegally with one of his collaborators, whose name Source claims not to know.

The results of this first mission were allegedly reported direct to SAWECKE, and Source claims to have no information on the subject.

Source believes that "UGO" carried out a total of two or three missions into SWITZERLAND but states that later on "UGO" stopped going to SWITZERLAND himself owing to the fear of having been recognised.

Source cannot state whether "UGO's" collaborator was permanently in SWITZERLAND, or whether he crossed the border illegally on every mission. The latter supposition is believed to be correct.

Source describes the Swiss information supplied by "UGO" as unimportant, and in part merely a confirmation of facts already known. "UGO" always came back with Swiss newspapers, but of the actual information Source can remember only that relating to BLANCHI, which Source insists was already known to him. The information was to the effect that Gen BLANCHI, former Italian Military Attache at BERNE, was head of the Italian Intelligence in SWITZERLAND and that he had sent a certain number of agents to ITALY. The names of the agents or their missions were not mentioned.

vi) The Case of MONTANELLI

In order to extend his Swiss activities, "UGO" submitted a plan whereby he would cultivate the friendship of several influential people imprisoned by the SD, and pose as an anti-Fascist who had been forced to work for the Germans by force of circumstances. Having gained the confidence of these people, "UGO" planned to help them escape into SWITZERLAND, where he hoped his pose as liberator would gain him admittance into the circle of escapees. "UGO" submitted a list of five or six people whom he wished to have released, but Source was slightly suspicious and narrowed the number down to three people. Of these, Source remembers only one, an Italian journalist by the name of MONTANELLI. The other two, whose names Source cannot recall, were an old Italian general who had some connection with the CLN, and an American girl who had been imprisoned on a charge of suspected espionage. In regard to the circumstances of the girl's arrest, Source can only recall that she was arrested while on the way to FRANCE via SWITZERLAND, allegedly for the purpose of visiting her fiancée, a young French diplomat.

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"UGO" planned to use the General and the American girl merely as a "visiting-card" for himself and his collaborators, whilst MONTANELLI was to be used in the role of informer. Source, through SAEWECKE, approved of the scheme, and all three were released and smuggled across the Swiss frontier in Jul 44. MONTANELLI was married to a German woman, who, like himself, had been arrested on a charge of working for the enemy. "UGO", with a view to gaining MONTANELLI's confidence, promised the latter that his wife would receive preferential treatment in prison and even went as far as to promise her release, provided his (MONTANELLI's) work proved satisfactory. MONTANELLI's wife was transferred to the concentration camp at BOLZANO with orders to the camp authorities to grant her preferential treatment with a view to her future release and removal to INNSBRUCK or neighbourhood, where her parents lived. MONTANELLI's wife subsequently tried to escape from the camp at BOLZANO, with the result that she was guarded more closely and her release never took place.

Source thinks that MONTANELLI must have got information of what took place at BOLZANO, because nothing more was heard of him after Oct 44 until "UGO" received MONTANELLI's summons from SWITZERLAND on 23 Feb 45 (see sub-para ix).

vii) Cases Handled by "UGO"

Source believes it was "UGO's" idea to return DEMETRIĆ Sergei to the South of ITALY with the intention of causing a split within the Socialist Party. The DEMETRIĆ mission took place with the approval of Source, but the planning was done jointly by "UGO" and SAEWECKE.

"UGO" took part in the interrogation of FARRI.

"UGO" was NOT allowed to interrogate any members of the FRANCHI organisation, because he was not considered sufficiently reliable at the time.

Source is unable to give any further information on individual cases handled by "UGO", but suggests that SAEWECKE, who was in touch with "UGO" almost daily, will be able to give full details.

viii) Relations between "UGO" and BENUZZI

"UGO" and BENUZZI were bitter enemies, a fact which Source attributes to professional jealousy. Both tried to inflict the maximum harm on one another, and Source was constantly being reminded of the alleged collaboration of one or the other with the enemy. These allegations were held in general terms and were never backed up by any proofs.

A typical example of BENUZZI's tactics was to inform Source that the CLN had become aware that one of their members had been imprisoned again, and that the information could only have leaked out through "UGO". "UGO" often used the same line.

When both "UGO" and BENUZZI disappeared into SWITZERLAND at beg Mar 45, the supporters of both accused the other side of having betrayed their chief to the Allies. Statements of this kind in favour of BENUZZI were made by both his wife and FERRATA.

ix) "UGO's" Last Mission to SWITZERLAND

At noon, 23 Feb 45, Source was informed by SAEWECKE that "UGO" had received an urgent request for an interview with MONTANELLI in SWITZERLAND, and that the latter had an important message for him ("UGO"). SAEWECKE asked Source to give a decision in the matter. Source found every argument in favour of "UGO" accepting the invitation, since if he had wished to escape, he could have done so without informing Source. Furthermore, the message from MONTANELLI seemed genuine enough, and apart from that, information of every description was required in view of the already tense military situation. Source therefore gave his approval.

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"UGO" crossed into SWITZERLAND illegally during the night 23/24 Feb 45 and was never seen again. Two or three days later SAEWECKE told Source that "UGO" had informed one of his men that all was well, but that his stay had been extended for a day or two.

When BENUZZI also disappeared and "UGO" failed to return SAEWECKE and "UGO's" collaborators made inquiries from which it transpired that "UGO" had been kidnapped by the English Secret Service, interrogated and taken to ROME. Source states he had no further news about "UGO" and is ignorant of his present whereabouts. "UGO's" men at the Aussenkommando MILAN, disheartened by the disappearance of their leader, continued to work for Source, but with complete lack of success.

x) Source's Estimate of "UGO's" Reliability

Source states that "UGO's" activities in SWITZERLAND did not come up to his expectations and that his main efforts were directed towards the penetration of the Italian enemy political set-up on Italian soil. In this he was successful.

"UGO" and his collaborators are stated to have sought out, apprehended and interrogated a number of people of different shades of political opinion. Reports of these interrogations were submitted in writing to SAEWECKE. In addition, "UGO" frequently issued consolidated political reports on the opposition parties, the development of the CLN, SAP, GAP and other organisations.

"UGO" also did some counter-espionage work, but was not allowed to play any agents back or send them on missions without the authority of SAEWECKE, who in special cases obtained Source's approval.

Source had no information regarding "UGO's" collaborators or contacts. Source states that SAEWECKE had complete confidence in "UGO" but claims that he himself regarded him with a certain amount of suspicion. This suspicion was based on:

- i) "UGO's" lack of success in SWITZERLAND.
- ii) BENUZZI's persistent allegations.
- iii) Statements made by GOMARASCU in mid Feb 45, to the effect that "UGO" was working with the CLN against the SD.

Source thought that GOMARASCU might have been mistaken, but in order to leave no doubts as to "UGO's" reliability it was decided to lay a trap. This was not carried out owing to "UGO's" disappearance.

(b) BENUZZI

i) Personal History

BENUZZI is thought to have been born at TRENTO of mixed Italo-German parents. He was for many years a member of the OVRA and during the last war worked in the Italian Intelligence Service against GERMANY.

One of BENUZZI's brothers is employed with the Italian State Railways and was last known to be at VERCINA. He also had a married sister at VIENNA.

Source believes that during his activity with OVRA he became involved with CLAWO, with the result that he was banished to the LIPARI Islands. He was pardoned in 1943, when he settled down at NAPLES.

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ii) BENUZZI's Previous Activities as Informer

When BENUZZI was set free in 1943 he was no longer a member of OVRA. Instead, he set himself up as an independent "information merchant". According to Source, BENUZZI was in touch with WUESTER, the German Consul General at NAPLES. Source also believes, but cannot confirm, that BENUZZI was already in contact with the German Naval Abwehr at that time (1943).

Anticipating the occupation of NAPLES by the Allies, BENUZZI moved to ROME where he contacted KAPPLER at the Aussenkommando. BENUZZI worked for KAPPLER for about four weeks, but fearing an early fall of the city, established his HQ at MILAN, Albergo "MILANO", Room 1/2. On the way to MILAN BENUZZI called on the Naval Abwehr at LA SPEZIA, for whom he was already working and for whom he was to continue to work.

iii) The Recruitment of BENUZZI

Immediately on his arrival from ROME in Nov 43, BENUZZI called on Source, with a letter of introduction from KAPPLER and offered his services as informer. Source accepted, having in the meantime been assured by KAPPLER of BENUZZI's reliability.

The agreement reached was, broadly speaking, that BENUZZI should supply Source with political information from N ITALY, but continue to supply the Naval Abwehr with military information. In addition, BENUZZI promised to introduce Source to various Italian personalities likely to be of interest to the SD.

A very close collaboration developed between Source and BENUZZI, who eventually became Source's chief informer, as far as the North Italian political set-up was concerned. BENUZZI knew all the Fascist personalities who played a leading role after 8 Sep 43. He was at liberty to call on Source any time he wished, in contrast to the majority of the other agents, who were received by the heads of the various departments. All BENUZZI's reports were made verbally.

iv) BENUZZI's Finances

BENUZZI gave the impression that his cooperation was due to his attachment to the Germans, or at least to his admiration for Source. He also informed Source that the Naval Abwehr was paying him a salary of 300 Dollars a month, an allowance far more liberal than the SD could afford to pay. BENUZZI gave Source to understand that he would not fail to ask for anything he needed, but that he understood that Source was unable to pay his expenses out of the modest means (service funds) at his disposal. BENUZZI added that occasionally he might ask Source to perform favours which would yield him a satisfactory return. As an example, BENUZZI recounted the case of the old Jewess in ROME, whose release, if it had been successful, would have brought him in a lot of money. Apparently the woman was not released as she had already been moved to GERMANY.

In 1944, BENUZZI's income was assured by virtue of an indemnity of two million Lire paid by the Republican Government for wrongful imprisonment and banishment. This sum had been promised to him by the former Minister of the Interior, RUFFARINI, and was being paid in instalments of 250,000 Lire. This indemnity covered also his apartment which had been confiscated at the time of his arrest. The protracted negotiations attending the payment of these instalments were of value to Source, inasmuch as BENUZZI was often obliged to visit the seat of the Italian Government at MADRID, where he met a large number of leading personalities (Prefects, Questuras, heads of departments of the various ministries, ministers, etc). BENUZZI invariably returned from these visits with a wealth of information which it would have been very difficult to obtain by any other means.

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BENUZZI also intervened on behalf of a number of personalities of all political shades imprisoned by the SD. He never mentioned that the release of these prisoners brought him money, but would rather stress the innocence or the harmlessness of the prisoners, or claim that their release was essential in order to gain entry into certain circles for the purpose of obtaining information. Source is convinced that in many cases BENUZZI derived considerable financial benefit from the prisoners or their families.

There was also another form of remuneration, to which BENUZZI and the woman living with him as his wife were very susceptible. Both BENUZZI and his "wife", a Viennese, used to enjoy themselves in German circles and were invited to the receptions held in the MILAN office. On such occasions it was customary for BENUZZI and his "wife" to receive presents, and Source had the impression that these invitations and presents were appreciated far more by BENUZZI than if he had been drawing a salary of 100,000 Lire a month.

BENUZZI also made presents to Source, the total value of which he estimates at approximately 20,000 Lire. These presents were in return for the gifts made to BENUZZI and his "wife" at the official receptions at the office, all of which were paid out of service funds. Source estimates the value of these presents at rather more than 20,000 Lire but is unable to mention any precise figure.

Source has no information as to how BENUZZI conducted the financial side of his business. Source believes that he acted as intermediary as and when the opportunity occurred, and also did occasional business with the members of the RUK. Source had no information on the latter subject.

v) Prisoners Released as a Result of BENUZZI's Intervention

Owing to the fact that BENUZZI and BICCHIERAI frequently intervened on behalf of the same prisoner, Source can only estimate the number of prisoners released as a result of BENUZZI's intervention alone. Source believes that during the total period of collaboration with BENUZZI this figure does not exceed a dozen persons.

The principle upon which Source worked was that only a short-term prisoner could be released, and even then Source made certain that the release would not have unfavourable political repercussions.

Of the persons released as a result of BENUZZI's intervention with Source, the latter can remember only MONTAGNA. Whether BRUNO, DIENA and LEONI owe their release exclusively to BENUZZI is not certain, as BICCHIERAI also intervened on their behalf.

If the prisoners had already been moved to VERONA or BOLZANO, BENUZZI used to go straight to HARSTER to negotiate for their release. A case in point was VENEGONO, imprisoned at BOLZANO and released on orders of HARSTER as a result of BENUZZI's intervention. BENUZZI wanted VENEGONO released in order to have some bargaining power with the Communists and also as a form of reinsurance with the Communist Party. Source believes that BENUZZI also considered VENEGONO as a possible source of information in the future.

Source states emphatically that he never received any money from BENUZZI for liberating political prisoners.

vi) BENUZZI's Activities on Behalf of the SD

BENUZZI's activities on behalf of the SD were of a purely political nature and were centred round Italian Government and administrative circles, as well as the political parties of the opposition. In view of his extensive connections, BENUZZI performed the former task to the utmost satisfaction of his employer, while his information on the opposition parties, although less voluminous, was nevertheless reliable.

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BENUZZI never gave Source any military information and never carried out any political missions abroad on behalf of the SD.

vii) BENUZZI's Contacts

BENUZZI, whom Source describes as the born agent, with a wonderful memory, never restricted his activities to any given set of people. No source of information was considered too insignificant, and he listened as readily to the liftboy as he did to a cabinet minister.

BENUZZI never disclosed the source of his information unless it was to emphasize its importance. For instance, he would state that a particular piece of information had come from the Minister of the Interior himself, etc.

The following are known by Source to have been some of BENUZZI's more important sources of information:

BUFFARINI	-	former Minister of the Interior
LEONE	-	Secretary to BUFFARINI
BEVILACQUA	-	Secretary to BUFFARINI
CELIO	-	Prefect of CCNO
ZERBINO	-	Minister of the Interior
RASSI	-	Prefect of MILAN
PARINI	-	former Prefect of MILAN
TURCHI	-	former Prefect of LA SPEZIA
TAMBURINI	-	former Chief of Police
MONTAGNA	-	Chief of Police
BETTINI	-	formerly at the MILAN Questura
FERRATA	-	former Italian Consul in HOLLAND
BELLOTTI	-	Major of the GNR and Stubaf in Italian Waffen SS
VANUCCHI	-	only for a short time, after which there was deep enmity between the two.

BENUZZI's most intimate connection was with BICCHIERI, through whom he came in touch with various personalities of the CLN. BENUZZI never mentioned the names of these CLN personalities to Source.

viii) Informers employed by BENUZZI

Although BENUZZI was very liberal with his tips, Source knows only one instance where BENUZZI employed an informer with a fixed salary. This was a former policeman (name unknown) who was given the task of providing BENUZZI with certain information from the Questura at MILAN. The salary paid is stated to have been 2,000 Lire a month.

ix) BENUZZI's Activities in SWITZERLAND

Source states he gave BENUZZI strict orders not to indulge in any kind of intelligence activities (political or military) in SWITZERLAND. Source considered BENUZZI far more useful in ITALY and did not wish him to compromise himself by any illegal activities in SWITZERLAND.

BENUZZI is stated to have adhered to this ruling, and apart from bringing back cigarettes and books, the only Swiss matters discussed between the two were Red Cross and Jewish questions.

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Source admits he had other plans for BENUZZI, whom he hoped to use after a German withdrawal from N ITALY, either as an intelligence collecting agency in SWITZERLAND, or as an intermediary between GERMANY and N ITALY, or both. This, according to Source, was the main reason why he wished to preserve BENUZZI, and why he frowned upon his frequent visits to SWITZERLAND, without, however, actively opposing them.

With a view to avoiding the consequences of the anticipated Allied occupation of N ITALY, BENUZZI made preparations for crossing into SWITZERLAND. He did this with the help of BICCHIERAI and BRENNI, Swiss Consul General at MILAN/COMO, by having himself nominated as Delegate to the Italian Red Cross. In this capacity he intended to supervise the general welfare of Italian Jews interned in GERMANY and, if necessary, to submit complaints to the appropriate authorities in SWITZERLAND. From the German side, no obstacles were put in his way, and BENUZZI was repeatedly granted exit and entry permits for his visits to SWITZERLAND. BENUZZI obtained his visa personally from the Swiss Consul General, with the assistance of the Church and the Red Cross.

The financial aspect of the probability that BENUZZI would take refuge in SWITZERLAND if N ITALY were occupied by the Allies was discussed between Source and HERSTER. It was agreed that a special account should be opened in favour of BENUZZI, to be maintained by B&S VERONA, and credited with 500 Swiss francs monthly. It was also agreed upon that the total amount accumulated should be paid to BENUZZI in one lump sum as soon as he took his final departure from N ITALY, but only on condition that he settled down permanently in SWITZERLAND. BENUZZI has never drawn any money from this account, and up till Feb 45 never received any payments from Source on account of his visits to SWITZERLAND. Source has no information on what happened to this account but states emphatically that BENUZZI has no claim to it, as the N&S administration never released the amount.

x) BENUZZI's Contacts in SWITZERLAND

The following are the names of people in SWITZERLAND BENUZZI visited from time to time:

Bishop of LUGANO
Police Chief of the Canton of TICINO
Col BON of the Red Cross
Sally MEYER - American citizen at BERNE
VALLOTTA - the "alleged" representative of Sally MEYER
JONES (?) - member of American Consulate at LUGANO, at BICCHIERAI's request.

Source reaffirmed that apart from Jewish and Red Cross matters, BENUZZI never reported any details of his business with the above.

xi) BENUZZI's Last Visit to SWITZERLAND

BENUZZI informed Source after returning from one of his visits to SWITZERLAND in Feb 45 that he had had an appointment with Sally MEYER or his representative, but that neither had turned up at LUGANO. BENUZZI then told Source that he intended to apply for a special permit to travel to BERNE in order to meet the above. He thought he could obtain this special permit with MEYER's assistance.

/On Tuesday,

On Tuesday, 25 Feb 45, BENUZZI went to LUGANO with the intention of procuring this permit, adding that he would return the same day if successful. BENUZZI failed to return the same day, and on 27 Feb 45, Source was informed through "BENUZZI's wife" that he had gone to BERNE and would not return to MILAN till 28 Feb 45. When BENUZZI failed to turn up by 3 Mar 45, his "wife" went to LUGANO to make inquiries. From the report which the "wife" brought back it transpired that BENUZZI left the Hotel "BELLEVUE" at BERNE at 2130 hrs on the evening of 26 or 27 Feb, accompanied by two persons and was not seen again. His papers, luggage and valuables had been left behind in his room. Source had no other information for the time being, but took immediate steps to stop BENUZZI's "wife" from leaving ITALY.

At Source's request, BENUZZI's "wife" saw BRENNI, Swiss Consul General, and made inquiries about her "husband" who, after crossing the border legally, had disappeared in SWITZERLAND. BRENNI was unable to give an explanation, and as with the "UGC" case, it transpired he had no information on the matter at all.

Further inquiries made by "UGC's" men, BICCHIERAI and other people failed to throw any light on the whereabouts of BENUZZI. One of GOMARASCU's men claimed that BENUZZI was with a priest in a place between LUGANO and CHIASSO, while another report claimed he was hiding in a tannery. The last report, from an unknown source, stated that BENUZZI was South of LUGANO in a church building belonging to an organisation which had already been engaged in harbouring refugees of a similar kind. Lack of time prevented Source from making further inquiries.

xii) Estimate of BENUZZI

Source describes BENUZZI as a born "information merchant" who is so possessed with this single idea that his whole conscious and unconscious mind is directed to that end.

The salient feature of his character is stated to be his cowardice and fear of physical injury, both of which have helped to shape the policy of his work, namely the safeguarding of his own personal safety.

As far as BENUZZI's reliability is concerned, Source describes him as one whose chief desire is to satisfy all his customers.

Source has not yet made up his mind whether BENUZZI escaped to SWITZERLAND voluntarily, or was kidnapped by the enemy intelligence, or has been playing a double game right from the start.

(c) Professor GOMARASCU

GOMARASCU met BICCHIERAI at end 1944, and through him made the acquaintance of BENUZZI. BENUZZI offered to introduce Source to GOMARASCU, in view of the fact that the latter had expressed a desire to get in touch with the leading German authorities in MILAN. Source agreed to the proposal, and subsequently several meetings took place in Source's office, at which GOMARASCU, Source's interpreter and a young man with the cover name "SCALA" took part. "SCALA" was GOMARASCU's collaborator. The meetings took place without BENUZZI.

In Source's opinion, GOMARASCU is a 100% freemason and one of the leading figures in the freemason movement in N ITALY. In the course of the conversation with Source, GOMARASCU referred to his so-called movement in general terms, saying it was inspired solely by humanistic motives without having any political leaning in particular. The movement is said to be violently anti-Communist but also opposed to Fascism and particularly to the leading personalities of Fascism. The basis of the agreement between Source and GOMARASCU was founded on the fighting against the East.

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GOMARASCU appeared to possess a very extensive information service in ITALY, which he offered to place at Source's disposal in the interests of fighting Communism. GOMARASCU claimed to control 10,000 armed supporters in MILAN ready to suppress any Communist or Partisan revolt. In exchange for his collaboration, GOMARASCU made the following demands:

- a) The arrest of Communist opponents named by him.
- b) The avoiding of any destruction and unnecessary bloodshed in the event of a withdrawal.

Source agreed to both points.

GOMARASCU is stated to have mentioned to Source that he had collaborated with SID on the same basis until Sep 44. After this date his collaboration with SID had ceased owing to the fact that the information he supplied was never acted upon.

GOMARASCU claimed to have no foreign connections at all. He also disclaimed any financial support on the part of the Allies. His movement was supposed to finance itself. GOMARASCU also claimed to control bands of supporters, particularly South of MILAN, who carried out anti-Communist activities.

"SCALA" lived for a long time in SWITZERLAND. He entered that country illegally after the disappearance of BENUZZI (Mar 45), and Source believes it was he who reported the presence of BENUZZI somewhere between LUGANO and CHIASSO. He made a further attempt later on to contact BENUZZI (end Apr 45) but was unsuccessful. Source states that "SCALA" was not an agent of his, but only a collaborator of GOMARASCU. The last information Source had of "SCALA" was on 28 Apr 45, when the latter made a telephone call from an unspecified German unit, where he had apparently made an attempt to confiscate the weapons. In view of this fact Source considers that "SCALA" collaborated openly with the GLN.

The information supplied by GOMARASCU was concerned exclusively with the activities of Communists and corrupt Fascists, but after a certain time the information became unreliable. As a specific instance Source mentions the occasion when GOMARASCU denounced a number of persons as active Communists. Their arrest and subsequent interrogation showed them to be Christian-Democrats, Socialists or quite harmless people, all of which were later released.

As a reward for his collaboration, GOMARASCU was given a permit to run a car and supplied with a certain amount of petrol. He was also issued with a permit to carry arms. Source affirms that neither GOMARASCU nor "SCALA" ever received any money from the SD.

(d) BICCHIERAI

i) Personal Details

BICCHIERAI comes from a good MILAN family. He studied law, and after completion of his studies became a lawyer in the service of the Church. He became a priest at the age of 35.

BICCHIERAI is a realist of more than average intelligence. He has advanced ideas and a great deal of understanding for technical developments. He drives his own car and has invested his money in a number of new technical gadgets. He is in far closer touch with daily life than most other priests and is very adapted to undertake special jobs. He is, for instance, administrator of the ecclesiastical pension fund in N ITALY, and as such wields great influence with the middle and lower sections of the priesthood in N ITALY.

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BICCHIERAI has great political ambitions and is able to exert a not inconsiderable influence on the political outlook of Cardinal SCHUSTER. Politically, BICCHIERAI is a Christian-Democrat, an anti-Fascist and anti-Communist, but tolerant towards the other political parties. He has travelled extensively in EUROPE, but not in GERMANY.

ii) Financial Position

Source has the impression that BICCHIERAI is very adroit in financial matters and not indisposed to make a handsome living for himself. Source considers him wealthy. BICCHIERAI never received any money, either from Source personally or from unit funds, apart from small presents on special occasions. Source is unaware to what extent BICCHIERAI profited from his intervention and subsequent release of prisoners, but Source suspects that now and then he derived some profit from the transaction. Source is certain, however, that the Church as such gained material and political advantages as a result of its successful interventions on behalf of prisoners.

iii) Source's First Meeting with BICCHIERAI and Subsequent Arrangement

The nature of Source's work made it essential for him to have some sort of official contact with the Church in order to establish a direct exchange of views on every day matters. The Church, too, had every interest in establishing contact with the SD in order to provide for direct intervention with the highest authority on matters of special importance.

Source informed RENUZZI of his intention of establishing an official contact with the Church, and RENUZZI offered to put Source in touch with his friend BICCHIERAI. This offer was accepted, and the three had their first meeting on 27 Dec 43. Source has no information regarding the previous associations between RENUZZI and BICCHIERAI but has no doubt that in introducing BICCHIERAI RENUZZI hoped to have the protection of the Church if things went wrong later on.

The result of this and subsequent meetings was that BICCHIERAI obtained from Source several concessions resulting in an improvement of the amenities at SAN VITTORE Prison (holding of church services, installation of a public address system and provision of foodstuffs).

A further concession granted to BICCHIERAI concerned the treatment of priests imprisoned at SAN VITTORE on charges of supporting the Partisans, espionage, carrying of weapons and making speeches hostile to the Government. The agreement reached between the two provided that instead of imprisonment at SAN VITTORE, priests charged with the above crimes were remanded at the ecclesiastical lunatic asylum at CESANO BOSCONO for definite or indefinite periods and released after consultation between Source and BICCHIERAI.

In due course, the scope of BICCHIERAI's intervention was increased by the inclusion of ordinary prisoners of all political shades. The number of prisoners whose release was demanded by BICCHIERAI grew out of all proportion, and eventually an agreement was reached whereby political prisoners were exchanged for German troops captured by the Partisans.

Source cannot remember the numbers of prisoners exchanged, or released, as a result of BICCHIERAI's intervention, but the number is said to be considerable. The number was particularly great on special occasions (Easter, 20 Apr, Christmas, etc), when Source granted an amnesty for political prisoners.

iv) BICCHIERAI's Relations with the CLN

BICCHIERAI's successful intervention on behalf of political prisoners gained him a considerable reputation with the CLN, particularly as he had been instrumental in securing the release of some of its members in the name of the Church. BICCHIERAI very quickly gained access to all the parties affiliated to the CLN, including Communists, and made personal contacts with the leading members. Source affirms that BICCHIERAI never divulged to him the name of a single member of the CLN or any other political party. On the other hand, in the course of the many conversations he had with BICCHIERAI, he managed to learn quite a number of things which he could not have learned from any other source.

8. PERSONALITIES

(2) Gruppe CERER ITALIEN WEST of the SIPC and SD
 (Note: Many of the Personalities have already been described in CSDIC/SC /15AG/SD 2. Where the name is marked "+" reference should be made to that report.)

i) Aussenkommando MILAN

REHRETS (REHRENS ?)	Uatuf. In Abt IIID. Age about 35. About 1.78 m tall, slim, blond hair, clean shaven.
+ BEUER	Hptstuf. CC Abt IIID and LO to RUK.
+ BLANK	Oschaf. In Abt I and II.
+ BRANDES	Oschaf. Driver in Abt I and II.
+ DURST Franz	Sondf. In Abt IIID.
+ DURST Mario	Sondf. In Abt III.
+ EICHLER	German girl. In Abt IV.
+ ETZMANNDRFER	Ustuf. In Abt IV and V.
<u>FLUEGEL</u>	German woman. Interpreter in Abt IV. Age about 50. About 1.62 m tall, corpulent, grey hair.
+ GRADSACK	Oschaf. In Abt IV and V.
<u>HEINE</u>	German girl. Secretary to ZIMMER. Age about 22. About 1.70 m tall, slim, dark-brown hair, oval face, "simple" type. Record: Left Aussenkommando MILAN on 23 Apr 45 for BOLZANO.

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+ HEININGER Hptschaf. In Abt IV and V.

+ HEISNAR Ustuf. In Abt IV and V.

HINNEY Ustuf. Formerly in Abt IV.
Age about 25.
About 1.80 m tall, corpulent, dark-brown hair, wears spectacles, very effeminate.
Record: Left Aussenkommando MILAN at end Apr 45 to take up an appointment at the Aussenposten PARMA.

+ JARSKO Ustuf. In Abt IV and V.

+ KLEMM Oschaf. In Abt IV and V.

+ KOCH Stuschaf. In Abt IV and V.

+ KRAUSE Ostuf. In Abt IV and V.
(cf CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 2 where the name is erroneously given as KRAUSER)

+ KUEGLER Oschaf. In Abt IV and V.
(cf CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 2 where the name is erroneously given as KUEBLER)

+ LANGNER Oschaf. In Abt I and II.

+ MEIER Oschaf. In Abt IV and V.

+ MORGANTE German woman. In Abt IV.

RAMRATH Hptschaf. In Abt IV (i).
Age about 30.
About 1.80 m tall, slim-athletic build, black hair, dark eyes, has shifty look.

+ RAUSCH Ustuf. In Abt III.

+ REINER Hptstuf. OC Abt III.

+ RITZI German girl. In Abt I and II.

+ SAEWECKE Hptstuf. 2 i/c to Source and OC Abt IV and V.

SOEMIDT Oschaf. Driver in Abt I and II.
Age about 40.
About 1.80 m tall, broad shouldered, black hair, wears spectacles.
Native of N GERMANY.

SOHNEMADEL German woman. In Abt I and II.

+ SCHOEFFMAN Stuschaf. In Abt IV and V.

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- + SEIDEL Willi Ustuf. In Abt IV and V.
- + STROPP Stuschaf. In Abt IV and V.
- UNGER Hptschaf. Driver in Abt I and II.
Age about 32.
About 1.75 m tall, very broad, light brown hair.
Native of BERLIN.
- + URBANEK Hptschaf. In Abt IV and V.
- + WIEDENHORN Ustuf. In Abt IIIID.
- + WOERNDL Oschaf. In Abt IV and V.
- + ZIMMER Ostuf. OC Abt VI.

ii) Aussenposten PAVIA

- + MOSER Ustuf. OC Aussenposten PAVIA.
- ~~STOINSCHKE~~ German civilian. Interpreter.
No description available.
Native of S TYROL.

iii) Aussenposten BERGAMO

- + LANGER Ustuf. OC Aussenposten BERGAMO.
- + MOLL German girl. Clerk.

iv) Aussenkommando TURIN

- + RABEL Ostuf. In Abt III.
- BLUNK Ustuf. 2 i/c Abt IV and V.
Age about 30.
About 1.77 m tall, slim, dark hair and eyes, thin face.
- BRANK Ustuf. In Abt IV and V.
No description available.
Native of AUSTRIA.
- ~~DEMETZ~~ Schaf. Clerk in Abt III.
Age about 25.
About 1.78 m tall, blond hair, broad shoulders.
Native of S TYROL.
- HAUNOLD Ustuf. In Abt IV and V.
Age about 35.
About 1.78 m tall, broad shouldered, black hair, dark eyes.
Native of AUSTRIA.

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LESSNER Ustuf. OC Abt I and II.
Age about 30.
About 1.76 m tall, slim, blond hair.

MANG Ustuf. In Abt IV and V.
No description available.
Native of AUSTRIA.

~~MCNAUNI~~ Sondf. Interpreter to SCHMIDT in Abt IV and V.
Age about 30.
About 1.75 m tall, slim, dark-brown hair, dark eyes.
Speaks very good Italian. Native of S TYROL.

+ SCHMIDT Hptstuf. OC Aussonkommando TURIN.

SIEGEL Ustuf. In Abt IV and V.
Age about 40.
About 1.76 m tall, very slim, dark hair and eyes.
Native of AUSTRIA.

+ VONIER Sondf. In Abt III.
(cf CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 2 where the name is erroneously
given as VONGER)

WARTHA Ustuf. In Abt IV and V.
Age about 40.
About 1.85 m tall, athletic build, black hair, dark
eyes, small black moustache.
Native of AUSTRIA.

v) Aussenposten BIELLA

+ SCHUH Ostuf. OC Aussenposten BIELLA. Now PW.

vi) Aussenposten ASTI

SEVERIN Ustuf. OC Aussenposten ASTI.
Age about 28.
About 1.74 m tall, slim, blond hair.

vii) Aussenposten AOSTA

SPICAR Ustuf. OC Aussenposten AOSTA.
Age about 28.
About 1.78 m tall, slim, blond hair, blue eyes.
Probably native of AUSTRIA.

viii) Aussenkommando NOVARA

~~ANDORFER~~ Ostuf. OC Aussenkommando NOVARA.
Age about 34.
About 1.70 m tall, slim, blond hair, elephant ears.
Native of STYRIA.
Record: Received bullet wound in left side of head when
attacked by Partisans in mid Apr 45. Was in
hospital at CERNOBBIO until at least 23 Apr 45.

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EISENKLEB Ostuf. - OC Aussenkommando NOVARA since mid Apr 45.
Age about 30.
About 1.76 m tall, dark-brown hair, dark eyes, thin face.

ix) Aussenkommando GENOA

BAST Ustuf. OC Abt I and II.
Age about 30.
About 1.75 m tall, slim, blond hair.
Native of SAXONY.

BAUER Sondf. In Abt III.
Age about 40.
About 1.76 m tall, broad shoulders, thin dark hair, one
gold tooth.
Native of S TYROL.

ENGEL Siegfried Ostuf. OC Aussenkommando GENOA.
Age about 34.
About 1.86 m tall, slim, dark hair, dark eyes, clean
shaven.
Native of N GERMANY.

GRIESER Ustuf. In Abt IV (i) (Partisan Control).
Age about 24.
About 1.80 m tall, slim, blond hair.

HELLWAGNER Hptstuf. 2 i/c Aussenkommando GENOA and OC Abt IV and V.
No description available.
Native of AUSTRIA (or S GERMANY).

HERMANN Stuschef. In Abt IV and V.
No description available.
Native of E FRUSSIA.

HUEDNER Ustuf. In Abt III.
Age about 24.
About 1.77 m tall, slim, dark hair, wears powerful
spectacles.

MICHELSEN Ustuf. OC Abt VI.
Age about 30.
About 1.77 m tall, slim, blond hair, thin face.
Native of N GERMANY.

SIEMSEN Ustuf. In Abt IV (i) (Partisan Control).
Age about 26.
About 1.78 m tall, slim, blond hair, blue eyes, red
Native of HAMBURG.

WEDDEL Ustuf. OC Abt III.
Age about 32.
About 1.75 m tall, well-built, blond hair.
Native of N GERMANY.

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x) Aussenposten S REMO

REITER Stuschaf. OC Aussenposten S REMO. Ex-seaman.
Age about 35.
About 1.74 m tall, broad build, blond hair, blue eyes.
Native of N GERMANY.
Probably remained with Ligurian Army.

xi) Aussenposten NOVI LIGURE

SCHLESIER Uctuf. OC Aussenposten NOVI LIGURE.
Age about 40.
About 1.78 m tall, well-built, black hair and eyes.
Native of AUSTRIA.

xii) Aussenposten LA SEEZIA

WOISETSCHLAEGER Oschaf. 2 i/c Aussenposten LA SEEZIA.
No description available.

xiii) Grenzbefehlsstelle WEST, COMG/CERNOBIC

BARBIERI Dino Naturalised Italian. Interpreter.
Age about 30.
About 1.80 m tall, fat, blond hair, blue eyes, full face.
Record: Was German waiter at Hotel "EDEN", BERLIN.

WEITHOLZ German girl. Telephone operator.
Age about 24.
About 1.67 m tall, slim, blonde hair.

CLEMENS Hptstuf. 2 i/c. Now EW.

GUGGENBERGER Hptschaf. Driver.
Age about 30.
About 1.76 m tall, well-built, black hair, small moustache.
Native of SALZBURG.

HOFFMANN Hptschaf. In Abt IV.
No description available.

NAERT Hptschaf. In Abt IV.
No description available.

OHNEBERG Oschaf. In Abt IV.
No description available.

VOETTERL Hptstuf. OC. Now EW.

VOGEL Hptschaf. Admin NCO.
Age about 30.
About 1.72 m tall, slim, black hair, dark eyes.

WACHOLDA German girl. Clerk to VOETTERL.
No description available.

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WILLNER
Oschaf. Driver.
Age about 30.
About 1.69 m tall, slim, blond hair, thin face.
Native of BERLIN.

xiv) Aussenposten LECCO

OBERRAUCH
Ustuf. CC Aussenposten LECCO.
No description available.

xv) Aussenposten SONDRIO

HOLZL
Hptschaf. OC Aussenposten SONDRIO.
No description available.

xvi) Aussenposten VARESE

NOGGLER
Hptschaf. OC Aussenposten VARESE.
Age about 30.
About 1.77 m tall, well-built with broad shoulders, dark hair and eyes.
Native of BAVARIA.

(b) Projected Post-Occupational Network

"KATJA"
German (?) girl. WT operator.
No description available.
Record: Was working independently, location unknown.
Posted to S TYROL in mid-Apr 45 owing to absence of WT Control station. Later recommended by Source to be sent home.

SZOLYOMI
alias "ANDREAS"
Hungarian agent. Ex-sports teacher.
Age about 25.
About 1.78 m tall, athletic build, black hair.
Record: Was to have worked in MILAN, posing as Communist, without a WT set and relying on line-crossers. Assets were medical supplies. Became suspect after FRANCHI affair, placed under temporary arrest, and removed from post-occupational network.
Last known to be in MILAN.

1 N.U.
Italian officer.
No description available.
Record: Was enrolled as Post-occupational agent, but Source cannot state whether he was installed. Was Adjutant to Italian General (ex-Adjutant or friend of one of the CARDINALIS).

2 and 3 N.U.

Two Italian agents.

No description available.

Record: Were to be installed independently in two shops selling electrical goods in MILAN, one of which is believed to have been in Corso BUENOS AIRES, as cover for installation of WT sets. Both later removed from Post-occupational network (reasons for removal forgotten).

(o) Informers

BARRACU

Italian (?) girl.

No description or information available.

Last known to be in MILAN.

DENUZZI

Italian. Chief political informer to Source. Now PW.

BICCHIERAI

Italian priest. Source's connection with Cardinal SCHUSTER.

Present whereabouts unknown.

BOGNAR Marilda (?)

Italian (?) girl.

Alias "Countess"

No description or information available.

Alias "SAN SEVERINO"

Present whereabouts unknown.

"Giorgio"

Italian. General situation and political informer for Aussenkommando MILAN.

No description available.

Last known to be in MILAN.

GOMARASCU

Italian Professor, Medical Faculty of MILAN University. Freemason and collaborator with Source on anti-Communist matters.

Last known to be in MILAN.

KARNATZ

German. Business man in COMC. Worked in SWITZERLAND for SD.

Last known to be in SWITZERLAND.

MANFREDI Anja

Baroness.

No description available.

Record: Was sent on special mission to SWITZERLAND by Amt VI RSHA, via Aussenkommando MILAN, but was refused visa. Was originally Finnish nationality but became naturalised Italian after second marriage. Husband remained in S ITALY.

Private Address: Hotel "PLAZA", MILAN.

PARILI

Italian Baron.

No description available.

Record: Was used as intermediary for Armistice negotiations with DILLAS.

Last known to be in SWITZERLAND.

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PORTA Dr Federale of CCMO. Provided Swiss information for SD.
Believed killed by Partisans.

FRAGER German. Business man with firm of FRUA at CCMO.
German agent for SWITZERLAND. Wife is Swiss (or French?).
No description available.
Last known to be in SWITZERLAND.

RADICE Italian(?).
No description or information available.
Last reported to be at CCMO.

"SCALA" Italian. Collaborator of Prof GOMARASCU.
No description available.
Private Address: MILAN (?)
Present whereabouts unknown.

SIVCRGNAN Italian (?) Countess.
No description or information available.
Private Address: Outside MILAN.
Present whereabouts unknown.

SERRA Miranda Italian girl.
No description or information available.
Private Address: MILAN.
Present whereabouts unknown.

"TRE- STELLE" General situation and political informer for Aussen-
kommando MILAN.
No description available.
Last known to be in MILAN.

"UGO" Italian. Member of CVRA, seconded to SD MILAN in Nov 43.
Age about 35.
About 1.67 m tall, slim wiry build, black glossy hair -
with parting, black piercing eyes, thin face, prominent
cheek-bones.
May also have used cover name - "Dr Ugo MODESTI".
Believed now PW.

(d) Other Agents

BARTHELEMY Frenchman. (C TOSCA Group of FTF which was to operate
as line-crossing group into S FRANCE under CCHL.
No description available.
Record: Went to GERMANY, Jan 45.
Present whereabouts unknown.

BERGER German. Worked in FAKIS for SD.
No description available.
Record: Was to have been OC French line-crossers at
S REMO. Arrested and sent to GERMANY, end
Jan 45.
Present whereabouts unknown.

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DEMETRIO Sergei

Italian (?).
No description available.
Record: Was sent by "UGC" and SAWECKE on political mission to ROME. Captured by Allies (?).
Present whereabouts unknown.

MONTANELLI

Italian. Ex-political prisoner.
No description available.
Record: Recruited by "UGC" for mission in SWITZERLAND.
Present whereabouts unknown.

SELON Andre

Frenchman. Line-crosser.
No description available.
Record: Arrested in ITALY for black market activities and sent back to GERMANY.
Present whereabouts unknown.

1. N.U.

Italian General. Recruited by "UGC" for mission in SWITZERLAND.
No description available.
Last known to be in SWITZERLAND.

2. N.U.

American girl. Recruited by "UGC" for mission in SWITZERLAND.
No description available.
Last known to be in SWITZERLAND.

(c) Contacts

1) HENUZZI's Contacts

RASSI

Prefect of MILAN.
Present whereabouts unknown.

BELOTTI

Major of GNR and Stubaf in Italian Waffen SS.
Private Address: MILAN.

RETTINI

Formerly at MILAN Questura.
Private Address: MILAN.

BCN

Col. Official of the Red Cross.

LEVILACQUA

Secretary to DUFFARINI.
Last known to be in MADERNO.

DUFFARINI

Ex-Minister of the Interior.

CELIO

Prefect of COMO.
Believed killed by partisans.

FERRATA

Ex-Italian Consul in HOLLAND.
Private Address: MILAN (with country house outside town)
(Porter at Albergo "MILANO" knows actual address)

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LEONE Secretary to BUFFARINI.
Last known to be at MADERNO.

JONES (?) American Consular official at LUGANO.

MEYER Sally American male citizen at BERNE.
Member of Jewish Advisory Committee.

MONTAGNA Chief of Police.
Present whereabouts unknown.

PARINI Ex-Prefect of MILAN.
Last known to be in MILAN - possibly killed.

TAMBURINI Ex-Chief of Police.
Record: Was arrested in Jun 45 but later believed released.
Present whereabouts unknown.

TURCHI Ex-Prefect at La SPEZIA.
Present whereabouts unknown.

VALLOBRA Representative of MEYER Sally.

VANUCCHI Merchant.
Private Address: Albergo "PLAZA", MILAN

ZERBINO Minister of the Interior. Now dead.

1 N.U. Ex-Italian policeman, paid by BENUZZI to obtain information from Questura, MILAN.

2 N.U. Bishop of LUGANO.

3 N.U. Police Chief of Canton of TICINO.

ii) Source's Contacts

IRACCO Ex-Vice-Mayor of MILAN.
Private Address: MILAN.

COSTA Questore. Was working in MILAN on special mission for Italian Chief of Police.
Private Address: MILAN

GELCRMINI Col. GNR.
Private Address: MILAN

LARICE Questore of MILAN.
Private Address: MILAN

PRESTI Col. UPI.
Private Address: MILAN

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(f) Released Political Prisoners

MONTAGNA Bruno Released as a result of BENUZZI's intervention.
No description available.
Private Address: unknown

BRUNO Pio Release probably partly due to BENUZZI's intervention.
No description available.
Private Address: unknown

DIENA Giorgio As for BRUNO.
No description available.
Private Address: unknown

LEONI Pietro As for BRUNO.
No description available.
Private Address: unknown.

VENEGONO Released by HARSTER as a result of BENUZZI's intervention.
No description available.
Private Address: unknown.

(g) Allied Agents Captured as known

COMITA (?) Italian Count. Former collaborator of MARINOTTI.
Last known to be in SWITZERLAND.

DON BARBARESCHI Italian.
No description available.
Record: Was surprised outside SAN VITTORE Prison at midnight in Jun 44 by Source's Adjutant, after curfew, with a manservant of UCCELLI family, while trying to find out whether Signa UCCELLI was included in a transport of prisoners leaving for BOLZANO. Both fled but were later captured. Was imprisoned for breaking curfew and later released by intervention of NICCHIERALI. Was arrested for second time, in Feb 45, by Fascist Militia (?), Source being informed by SS Obergruppenfuehrer WOLFF. Disclosed to ZIMMER the penetration of his Post-occupational network.
Present whereabouts unknown.

KREUTER (or GREUTER ?) Swiss lawyer connected with MARINOTTI's peace moves.

FARRI Interrogated by "UGC".

TUCKER According to Source was responsible for peace moves.
Arrested by Fascist Militia.

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(h) Miscellaneous

BIANCHI Italian General. Ex-Italian Military Attache in BERNE. Head of Italian Intelligence Service in SWITZERLAND. No description available. Last known to be in BERNE.

BRENNI Swiss Consul General at MILAN/COMO. No description available.

FRINGS (VRINGS ?) Oblt. OC draft of French line-crossers from AST HAMBURG. No description available. Present whereabouts unknown.

GOHL Stubaf. Sent on special mission from Amt VI RSHA to take charge of line-crossing activities against S FRANCE. No description available. Last known to be in MILAN.

HARSTER SS Gruppenfuhrer. Head of SAS in ITALY. Now PW.

HUSSMANN Professor. Member of Swiss Intelligence Service. Met ZIEGLER and Source at LUGANO, beg Mar 45.

LETO Dr. Head of CVRA. No description available. Present whereabouts unknown.

MARINOTTI Manager of SNIA VISCOSSE. Took peace proposals to SWITZERLAND. Last known to be in SWITZERLAND.

MUELLER Stubaf. No description available. Rec rd: Was to have set-up in N ITALY with Source. Present whereabouts unknown.

NEISSER Ostuf. Sent on special mission from Amt VI RSHA to S REMO in Jan 45 to operate line-crossers against S FRANCE. No description available. Last known to be in S REMO.

NEURATH von Frhr. German Consul at LUGANO. Supplied information of general nature to Source. No description available. Present whereabouts unknown.

ROHLFS Oblt. OC draft of French line-crossers. No description available. Present whereabouts unknown.

SAHN Oblt. OC draft of French line-crossers. No description available. Present whereabouts unknown.

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SCHULTE Officer-cadet. OC draft of French line-crossers.
No description available.
Present whereabouts unknown.

SCHUSTER Cardinal of MILAN.

SENNER Ustuf. Sent on special mission from Amt VI RSHA in
Nov 44 to operate line-crossers against S FRANCE.
No description available.
Last known to be in S REMO.

STEEGEN von German. Baron.
No description available.
Record: Was arrested by SAEWECKE in Sep/Oct 44 on
suspicion of having worked for Allies.
(Circumstances leading to arrest unknown).
Was removed to German Army Section of SAN
VITTORE Prison and later appeared before
Court Martial. Proceedings never completed
owing to absence of unknown key witness.
Last known to be in German Army Section, SAN VITTORE
Prison. (cf CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 8)

UCCELLI Italian family in MILAN.
Quoted by DON BARIATTRESCHI after first arrest.

WEIDL Major. Member of Swiss Intelligence Service. Met
ZIMMER and Source at LUGANO, beg Mar 45.

WERNER German.
No description available.
Record: Was arrested by SAEWECKE in Mar/Apr 44 for
being a half-Jew and a homosexual. Also on
suspicion of having worked for Allies which
was never proved. Later moved to FOSSOLI
or BOLZANO. (cf CSDIC/SC/15AG/SD 8)
Present whereabouts unknown.

WOLFF SS Obergruppenfuehrer. GOC Police and SD in ITALY.
Now PW.

WUBSTER German Consul General at NAPLES in 1943.
No description available.
Present whereabouts unknown.

VALENTI Osvaldo Connected with Swiss Intelligence Service of X Flotilla
MAS. Believed executed by Partisans.

9. DISPOSAL

Source, who at the request of certain Allied services has been
interrogated in some detail, on his two chief collaborators, is recommended for CI
interment unless required for further interrogation.

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
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APPENDIX "A"

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