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SECURITY INFORMATION

527 CACWU

25 October 1951

SUBJECT: REDSOX/AEQUOR/Contact Report

TO: Chief, ZACACTUS
Washington, D. C.

INFO: Chief of Mission
Frankfurt, Germany

ATTN: []

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1. Transmitted herewith is the Contact Report on Meeting
Between [] and Cambista 2 in Brussels on 8 October 1951.
2. Copies have been sent through ZACABIN channels.

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DATE 2007

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3 ZACACTUS, Washington, w/1 Encl. in tripl.
3 Chief of Mission, Frankfurt, w/1 Encl.
2 CSOB w/o Encl.
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1 ENCL. HEREWITH
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Cambista 2

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SECURITY INFORMATION

CONTACT REPORT ON MEETING BETWEEN] AND CMBISTA 2

IN BRUSSELS ON 8 OCTOBER 1951

The undersigned met CMBISTA 2 in Brussels on October 8 1951 to discuss general AR/UCR matters and for the specific purpose of getting CAP (Combined Assessment Program GSOB/LRELOPE) under way.

1. Immediate alerting of Candidates in Germany for Assessment:

It was decided that CMBISTA 2 would send one of the men previously used for spotting in Germany to alert candidates for CAP assessment. His task would be:

a. Direct candidates to appear at prearranged meeting place, date and time for transportation to the assessment center.

b. Warn them of strictest security mindedness on the grounds that all matters relating to the preparation of possible conflict with the U.S.S.R. should obviously require complete discretion. Warning should contain the following:

- (1) Careless talk would compromise U.S.-Belorussian relations, thus constituting a grave blow to Belorussian interests.
- (2) Violators will be considered as traitors by the Belorussian National Authorities.
- (3) Violators will be prosecuted by the U.S.

Spotter will tell subjects that per agreement between U.S. and Belorussian authorities they are going to be assessed by a U.S. commission whose task it will be to gauge their military qualifications. Spotter will assist candidates in selecting a cover most appropriate to their individual case.

2. Availability of Proposed Liaison Man:

The undersigned suggested that subject previously recommended by CMBISTA 2 for liaison work be assessed along with the first CAP package. CMBISTA 2 seemed confident that proposed liaison man would be available on 16 October at the latest. It was decided to start assessing other subjects on 16 October regardless of liaison man's availability. For security purposes, CMBISTA 2 was to tell liaison man that subjects who will be assessed along with him are being looked into for possible wartime use only.

In order to furnish us with a preview of his assessing capabilities, which, if cleared, may be one of his functions with us, liaison man will be asked to make personal observations on other candidates potentials and communicate his findings to us. CMBISTA 2 requested special disposal handling of liaison man in the event that we find him unsuitable for our use. CMBISTA 2 suggested that liaison man be neutralized with a newspaper job and odd non-sensitive tasks in

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Munich for a few months, after which CAMBISTA 2 can tell him that his services would be more valuable as the head of one of the local Belorussian organizations in London.

3. Disposal of Undesirable Candidates:

a. CAMBISTA 2 appeared seriously worried at the possibility of our rejecting candidates which he especially recommends (re CAMPOSANTO 3's disposal on 21 August 1951). He stated that it would endanger the loss of his prestige in Belorussian political circles. He also stated that his and CAMBISTA 4's understanding (re CAMBISTA 4's talks with U.S. officials in Washington) had been that CAMBISTA 2 would be entirely responsible for the unquestionable and unquestioned bona fide of especially recommended candidates. CAMBISTA 2 feels that our assessment methods (Carriage) are a retraction of original statements and an indication of lack of confidence toward CAMBISTA 2 and 4. CAMBISTA 2 stated that he would refuse dealing with us in his present capacity if it would involve putting him in an embarrassing position in Belorussian political circles.

b. The above statements were made with unusual heat and a vehemence incompatible with CAMBISTA 2's behavior to date, exposing to the undersigned the rigid aspects of CAMBISTA 2's political ambition and fear of political blemish.

c. The situation appeared serious enough to warrant an attempt towards a compromise. The undersigned suggested that the problem could be eased a good deal if approached from another angle; mainly, that CAMBISTA 2 make less positive commitments when recruiting even the most likely prospect, basing his reservation on the fact that Americans make it a point to approach all subjects objectively, regardless of subjects' references and backing, since only an objective and level-headed opinion can both enlighten and protect all concerned. Also, that final decision on all subjects lies not with one American but with an accumulation of various opinions and debates, the outcome of which CAMBISTA 2 could not predict with accuracy.

d. By way of compromise and in order to protect CAMBISTA 2 from future embarrassment, it was suggested that cases involving subjects particularly recommended by him should be handled in such a manner that if disposal becomes necessary all efforts should be made, jointly with CAMBISTA 2, to make it as painless as possible.

e. The following procedure governing possible disposal of individuals especially recommended by CAMBISTA 2 was agreed upon:

- (1) We assess.
- (2) We come to a conclusion.
- (3) We present our findings to CAMBISTA 2.
- (4) All decide on a painless disposal.

f. CAMPOSANTO 3's (Re 345 CMCWU) disposal case was again rehearsed. CAMBISTA 2 reported that CAMPOSANTO 3 was bitter, crushed, and crying on CAMBISTA 4's shoulder. Also, that he was shouting his mouth off about our assessment methods in spite of secrecy agreement. The undersigned reminded CAMBISTA 2 that the U.S. takes an extremely dim view of secrecy agreement breaches and warned CAMBISTA 2 of serious repercussions thereof. On CAMBISTA 2's insistence that we re-assess CAMPOSANTO 3,

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the undersigned referred CAMBISTA 2 to our previous agreement on this matter and stated again that we would cope with the problem when in possession of CAMPOSANTO 3's new history elaborating on previous lies.

4. Proposed Belorussian Staff Salaries:

CAMBISTA 2 suggested that the salaries of Belorussian personnel eventually employed by us to discharge the functions of liaison, w/t instructor, housekeeper, etc., could be paid by one of their representatives (presumably CAMBISTA 2), thus:

- a. Preventing subjects from getting that old "agent" feeling.
- b. Presenting them with the fact that their salaries are drawn from a sum contributed by the U.S. for overall support of the Belorussian cause.
- c. Keeping us out of financial quibbles.
- d. (COMMENT: Giving CAMBISTA 2 added power over Belorussian personnel.)

5. CAMBISTA 2's Progress Report:

- a. Belgium: Two additional candidates have been spotted. Preliminary FRQ has been furnished on one candidate. FRQ on second candidate will be forthcoming on 22 October. Both candidates are available for assessment immediately.
- b. France: Additional information on candidates spotted in August has been furnished. Information on availability of candidates for assessment will be forthcoming on 22 October. New regions are being canvassed.
- c. England: CAMPOSANTO 1 letter-drop in London has been alerted (Re MUNIFG 4924). Assurance obtained from receiver that CAMBISTA 2 would be notified immediately upon receipt of expected letter. Receiver stated having received a letter from Sender about a month ago. CAMBISTA 2 feels that his contact with Receiver was achieved without major security compromise. Availability for assessment of candidates spotted in August will be forthcoming on 22 October. New regions are being canvassed.

- d. Odd: (1) World survey of Belorussian political organizations will be forthcoming on 22 October.
- (2) CAMBISTA 2 furnished a paper entitled "Basis, Ideology and Policy of the BNR", prepared in Russian for our analysis.
- (3) A bulletin issued by the Independent Party in French and English containing IP comments on current affairs will come out at the end of October.
- (4) A w/t instructor type, former w/t instructor with Ander's Army, has been spotted in England. Another candidate with some w/t qualifications has been spotted in Belgium. Additional information on both subjects will be forthcoming on 22 October.

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- (5) A housekeeper couple has been spotted in Germany. They will be approached for preliminary FRQ's on or about 15 October.
- (6) CAMBISTA 2 will tackle Belorussian instructor type prospects on or about 22 October.
- (7) Translations of key editorials having appeared in the last four issues of the Belorussian publication in Munich, "The Fatherland", will be furnished on 22 October.

6. Request for Additional Financial Support:

a. CAMBISTA 2 introduced a new request pertaining to extended financial aid beyond the present newspaper-pushing agreement. CAMBISTA 2 stated that aid is needed for general Belorussian organizational purposes. In CAMBISTA 2's estimate, an important contribution would be allotment made by us to various Belorussian officials enabling them to devote full time to their official duties, rather than being compelled to occupy the better portion of their day in abstract salaried employment.

b. CAMBISTA 2 added that similar aid was being extended by us to other emigre groups and named Kerensky as one of the recipients. He suggested that if some such support could be worked out in the future, we could furnish a round over-all support figure to a key Belorussian official for distribution where most needed.

c. The above requests were presented by CAMBISTA 2 with moderation, and no claim, as such, was felt. The undersigned interjected that it was important to preserve the rare quality of U.S.-Belorussian relations to date by an ever present awareness among Belorussians that our relations should never/allowed to deteriorate into a mere dollar usage process. The point was stressed that U.S. relations with some of the other emigre groups have been severed due to precisely this type of misconception.

d. With a liberal amount of eulogy and schmaltz, the undersigned got the warning across that the U.S. will not play rich uncle if it is felt that extracting dollars from us is the Belorussians' only objective.

e. Detailed discussions relating to extended support were postponed to the next scheduled meeting with CAMBISTA 2 in Munich on or about 22 October.

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