

DATE: 2 June 1972

TO: The Director

FROM: George A. Carver, Jr.

SUBJECT: Radio Project

REMARKS: Attached are two papers dealing with the radio project. Attachment A, which you can read at your leisure (if you care to) is the concept paper I talked at the 1 June WSAG, where it was discussed and endorsed. (Irwig asked a few questions, Moorer pointed out the cost factors involved in using CORONET SOLO--1.5-2.0 million of Air Force money--but the general atmosphere was warm endorsement ranging upward to positive enthusiasm.) Haig then directed that a memorandum be prepared for the President outlining all aspects of the project so he could render a decision thereon. Attachment B, at which I would appreciate your taking at least a quick glance, is my draft of the memo for the President, prepared per NSC staff (Holdridge) request as a memo to the SRG Chairman (Kissinger) from Sullivan (the chief psychological warrior). I propose to dispatch it to Sullivan promptly if you have no objections.

*Carver*

*File Archie Bunker*

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## RADIO OPERATION CONCEPT PAPER

### I. Assumption

This paper is based on the assumption that Radio Hanoi's six transmitters in the Hanoi area are silenced through military action. A separate JCS paper discusses the military aspect of the problem, which in itself should prove a major psychological initiative.

### II. Proposal

We propose to preempt Radio Hanoi's two medium wave frequencies (677 and 1010) for a period of time in order to:

(1) Shock the North Vietnamese public into a sense of the reality of their position, shaking their conviction that they will eventually win the war.

(2) Exploit the psychological power of the suggestion of peace to stimulate the North Vietnamese people to take a different view of the struggle.

(3) Create confusion and generate psychological pressure on the North Vietnamese leadership and

(4) Generate questioning doubts about the official DRV leadership line that North Vietnam's goals can only be achieved through military victory.

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(5) Encourage the belief that peaceful negotiations are a better method, from every perspective, for achieving the North Vietnamese people's legitimate aspirations.

### III. Thematic Approach

(1) If Hanoi's transmitting facilities are indeed silenced, we have no way of knowing, or guaranteeing, how long Hanoi will be off the air. The time lapse before the DRV can begin rebroadcasting via repairs or some form of jury rig may be measured in minutes, hours or days. The concept here advanced involves preempting Radio Hanoi's frequencies and coming up on them the minute Hanoi's own broadcasts are silenced. Our broadcasts would be black in the sense that they would be structured to convince the North Vietnamese listening public that they were hearing an official voice of the Lao Dong Party or at least some faction thereof.

(2) This black <sup>cast</sup> broadcast would begin with straight news portraying a grim picture along these lines: "You are already aware of the great escalation in the bombing being conducted on North Vietnamese soil. You also know of the American and GVN efforts to cut off supplies from outside our country by mining our ports and destroying our railroads and highways.

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In addition many of our people have already discovered at first hand that power plants and factories are also being destroyed from the air. This has moved the battlefront into our own country. The problems this presents for us are very real. For example, supply ships from nations that have helped us in the past have turned away from the port of Haiphong and other ports because of the mines present and because of the American threat to take other steps to prevent delivery of supplies to our country.

"For about two months we have committed every available division of our army to a massive invasion of South Vietnam. Despite our great effort, our forces have advanced only 20 miles into South Vietnam. Over 400 of the tanks provided us by the Soviet Union have been destroyed by the South Vietnamese militia and by the South Vietnamese armed forces. Much of our artillery provided us by the Soviet Union has also been destroyed. Although they have fought very bravely, tens of thousands of our soldiers have been killed or wounded.

"The people of our country have worked hard and courageously, carrying out the slogan that the rear supports the front. The actions of the US and the Government of Vietnam in cutting off outside supplies and

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bombing all means of supply and transportation within our country have created a situation where there no longer is a rear to support the front. Our own country is being heavily bombed, even our concrete plants, our factories, our power plants, our railroads, bridges and our petroleum storage points. The mining of our harbors and the cutting of overland communications into our country prevents our socialist allies from providing us with the means to continue the war. The pacification program in South Vietnam, of which you have heard so much, prevents us from relying on any support within that country. "

(3) Once a hard news picture of the true situation had been presented, our proposed broadcast would then move to stimulate internal stress by broadcasting the (notional) communique of the "21st Plenum of the Vietnam Workers Party Central Committee" (a meeting which has not taken place -- the last was the 20th Plenum). In typical North Vietnamese jargon this communique will lay the blame for the present crisis on the 3rd Party Congress (which was in effect their declaration of war in 1960 on South Vietnam) and state that "Peace has now become the single guiding objective of the Party. " (Full illustrative text attached).

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~IV. Follow-on and Ancillary Action:

(1) Radio Hanoi also masquerades as Liberation Radio (PRG) the Voice of the Pathet Lao as well as the Voice of FUNK. Plans can be drawn up to broadcast to those audiences in their languages on other radios with a simple message of the destruction North Vietnam is suffering. No twists are planned.

(2) All other white, black and grey radios will maximize their broadcasting during the period that Radio Hanoi is down on the assumption that people with radios will be searching their dials for any news, even proscribed news.

(3) If this project is approved, we propose to activate another project which could lend it verisimilitude -- the ostensible mailing from Hanoi of a "letter from Ho Chi Minh" to exiles in Paris. This letter would be ostensibly written at the same time that Ho wrote his will and contain his reservation about the leadership' qualities of Le Duan and his fear that Le Duan's dogmatism, stubbornness, and lack of sophistication could lead the Party into a cul de sac in the future; in which case it is Ho's wish that his reservations be surfaced.

V. Implementation. CORONET SOLO appears to be the only feasible way to implement this operation, for the following reasons:

(1) There are no two alternate medium wave transmitters which could be made available quickly.

(a) The VOA medium wave transmitters in Hue cannot be heard in Hanoi in the daytime -- when the bombing has to take place -- nor are they on the correct frequency.

(b) The VOA medium wave transmitter in the Philippines would require time consuming retuning of the antennas to employ Hanoi's frequencies and during this period could not be used for VOA's own programming.

(c) Other extant medium wave transmitters present similar technical (and in some cases political) problems.

(2) CORONET SOLO can be ready and come on the air on Hanoi's frequencies the moment Hanoi Radio goes down.

(3) CORONET SOLO's medium wave broadcasts can be heard in the Red River Delta but not in other world cities where Radio Hanoi is monitored internationally. This fact could help minimize the blow back in world and U.S. opinion which thus may not learn of the operation until

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it is over. (This is the reason that we do not plan to broadcast on short wave which can be heard outside of North Vietnam.)

(4) A final reason for trying to confine the broadcast to North Vietnam for a limited time is to prevent any unpredictable side effects in South Vietnam.

(5) The bombing will perforce be carried out during daylight hours. Therefore our preemptive broadcasts would start during the daylight and carry over into the evening. For planning purposes we consider that the operation will continue only for these first few hours. We assume that the DRV will (1) broadcast denials to the Hanoi City populace on its closed circuit broadcasting system and (2) activate backup equipment and deny the broadcasts on a countrywide basis in a matter of hours if not minutes. While our operation may last only a few minutes, the total plan will include a two to three day contingency if Radio Hanoi remains off the air for that length of time.

(6) To use CORONET SOLO for more than one or two days would require considerable expense in MIG cap and diverted strike sorties. Therefore, we would plan to shut down our black operation after three days, pleading impossibility to carry on because of allied military pressure.

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Communique of the 21st Plenum of the  
Vietnam Workers Party Central Committee

The Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers Party has held an emergency meeting, its 21st plenary session, to discuss and decide on the immediate tasks facing the Party and people in the present situation. The plenum heard a number of reports and adopted a resolution on the new strategic lines which are to be implemented by the entire Party, army and people.

The characteristics of the present situation in our country are that North Vietnam is striving to advance toward socialism under extremely difficult wartime conditions while assisting the South in achieving the people's national democratic revolution. The victories achieved demonstrate that the strategic lines of the September 1960 Third National Party Congress and the resolution of the December 1963 9th plenum of the Central Committee were entirely correct. The long, hard and heroic war of resistance against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys in South Vietnam has over the years attained notable success and these achievements of the Vietnam revolution have splendidly contributed to the safeguarding of peace in Southeast Asia and in the world. It is with these factors in mind and in order to pursue on a more rational basis the everlasting goal of reunifying Vietnam that the Central Committee informs the compatriots and combatants of its decision.

The current situation in Vietnam has reached the point where, in weighing the earnest aspirations for peace of the entire Vietnamese people, the well-being and highest interests of all the people, and the efficacy of the revolutionary cause of the fatherland, the Party Central Committee has decided to advance the Party's strategic lines.

Therefore, the Central Committee has decided the following:

1. Peace in Vietnam will become the single guiding objective of the Party. The military phase of the struggle has lasted too long, too many brave sons and comrades have died and become wounded. The armed struggle line of the Party is no longer appropriate and correct in view of the new situation and our people's long-term interests. Peace is the earnest wish of all the people. Peace is the earnest wish of the Party Central Committee. Peace will return to Vietnam. This is the pledge of the Central Committee. It is the decision of the Central Committee to seek to end the war now.

2. The binding up the wounds of the war and the peaceful reconstruction of Vietnam are the most urgent tasks of the Party, army and people. These tasks are directly related to the maintenance of the Vietnamese people's independence, freedom and democracy. The Party Central Committee will henceforth devote all its efforts toward fulfilling these tasks. The Party Central Committee wishes to express its unbounded gratitude to the Soviet Union, China and the fraternal socialist camp for their strong and determined support of the Central Committee's decision to seek peace.
3. The Party Central Committee has taken the following actions with regard to leading the Party:
  - Comrade Politburo members will henceforth discharge their responsibilities solely at the behest of the Central Committee and be completely responsible before the Central Committee.
  - In view of Articles 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 of the statutes of the Vietnam Workers Party

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and pending the holding of the Fourth National Party Congress, the Central Committee has decided to lead all Party activities on a regular basis and collectively to be responsible before the people in implementing the letter and spirit of the resolution of the 21st plenum.

Dear comrades, combatants and compatriots,

On the basis of the resolution of the 21st plenum of the Party Central Committee, peace will finally return and the war will come to an end. The Vietnamese people's will has triumphed. The people are indeed masters in their own land. Let all the Party, army and people, the people's security forces, the militia and mass organizations coordinate their actions, firmly grasp the situation and uphold the Central Committee's 21st plenum resolution.

The Party Central Committee expresses its unshakeable belief that our people, struggling heroically and perseveringly, will unite around the Central Committee and achieve the resolution of the Central Committee's 21st plenum for the sake of the fatherland and future generations of the Vietnamese people.

--Eternal glory to the Vietnamese people!

--Long Live the Party!

--Let us rejoice at the peace-loving decision of the Party  
Central Committee!

---Long Live Vietnam!

[Announcer: You have just heard a major Party proclamation.  
It will be repeated at regular and dictation speed. Stay tuned  
for further bulletins!]

[The National Anthem]

1 June 1972

## MEMORANDUM TO THE CHAIRMAN, SENIOR REVIEW GROUP

Subject: Proposed Radio Operation

Genesis. The operation and proposal outlined below was developed by the Psychological Pressure Operations Group (PPOG), chaired by Mr. John P. Horgan of CIA. The proposal was reviewed and endorsed by the senior psychological warfare oversight group which I chair (and under whose aegis the PPOG functions). At my request, a concept paper on this operation was tabled and discussed at the 1 June meeting of the Washington Special Action Group, which collectively endorsed the concept and directed that this summary memorandum be forwarded for the President's consideration.

Assumption. This proposal is based on the assumption that Radio Hanoi's transmitting capabilities are silenced more or less simultaneously in a single set of air strikes. A separate JCS paper will discuss the details of this proposed military operation, which in itself would constitute a significant psychological warfare action.

Proposal. As soon as Radio Hanoi's own transmitters and/or antennae are knocked out, we propose to pre-empt Hanoi's domestic frequencies with our own broadcasts on these frequencies. These broadcasts would be black in the sense that they would be carefully designed to convince the North Vietnamese listening public (at least initially) that it was hearing an official voice of the DRV/Lao Dong Party or some faction thereof.

Objectives. This operation would have the following objectives:

. To create general confusion and generate psychological pressure on the North Vietnamese leadership.

. To shock the North Vietnamese public into a sense of the reality of the DRV's position and shake the population's belief in eventual DRV victory.

. To exploit the psychological power of suggestion by playing the theme of peace to stimulate the North Vietnamese people to take a different view of the struggle.

. To generate ~~the~~<sup>and</sup> encourage questioning doubts about the official DRV leadership line that North Vietnam's goals can only be achieved through military victory.

To encourage the view that peaceful negotiations are, from every perspective, a better method than continued military struggle for achieving the North Vietnamese people's legitimate aspirations.

Thematic Approach. Our black broadcast would lead off with straight news giving a stark, realistic description of the DRV's situation couched in the right sort of jargon to sound like an official voice levelling with the populace. The news would cover and make clear (by direct statement or implication readily recognizable through the jargon's code-word phraseology) the lack of Communist progress in South Vietnam, the ferocity and effectiveness of South Vietnamese resistance, the fact that North Vietnamese forces are regarded as invading aggressors, not liberators, the heavy material losses and horrendous personnel casualties incurred to date by Hanoi's forces, the effectiveness and mounting impact of the mining of the ports and the accompanying aerial bombardment of North Vietnam, the unreality of expecting enough Soviet or Chinese aid to arrive soon enough to improve the DRV's situation and prospects, etc., etc.



Once a hard news picture of the DRV's true situation had been presented, our proposed broadcast would then move to stimulate internal discord and encourage thinking along the lines outlined above. This effort would be built around a (notional) communique of the "21st Plenum of the Vietnam Workers Party Central Committee" (the last real Plenum, the 20th, was held early this year). The pitch would be that the 21st Plenum had been convened on an emergency basis in light of the worsening crisis situation. Its official communique (patterned on the legitimate communiques of previous plena), in typical Party jargon, would lay the blame for the present crisis on the now "incorrect" line laid down by Le Duan at the 1960 3rd Party Congress (which was, in effect, the Lao Dong's official declaration of war on South Vietnam). After levying transparently veiled criticism on the current Politburo leadership, particularly Le Duan, the 21st Plenum's communique would build up to the new line that "peace has now become the correct guiding objective of the Party."

Follow-on and Ancillary Action:

Radio Hanoi also masquerades as Liberation Radio  
(PRG) <sup>and</sup> the Voice of the Pathet Lao as well as the Voice of  
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FUNK. Plans will be drawn up to broadcast to those audiences in their languages on other radios with a simple message of the destruction North Vietnam is suffering, without further twists (which might be counterproductive).

All other white, black and grey radios will maximize their broadcasting during the period that Radio Hanoi is down on the assumption that people with radios will be searching their dials for any news, even proscribed news.

If this project is approved, we propose to activate another project which could lend it verisimilitude -- the purported (and plausibly documented) mailing from Hanoi of a "letter from Ho Chi Minh" to exiles in Paris. This letter ostensibly <sup>would have</sup> ~~has~~ been written at the same time that Ho wrote his will and would reflect his reservations about Le Duan analagous to Lenin's deathbed reservations about Stalin. The letter would reflect "Uncle Ho's" concern that Le Duan's stubborn dogmatism, ambition and lack of

sophistication could one day lead the Party into a cul de sac and "Uncle Ho's" wish that these reservations be surfaced if such a situation ever began to develop.

Implementation. The actual broadcasts would be made from tapes produced by CIA employing the proven skills of its controlled assets who already have considerable experience in mimicing Hanoi's radio output [redacted]

[redacted] For several reasons, implementation of this operation would require the use of CORONET SOLO aircraft of the (Pennsylvania) Air National Guard.

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These are transmitter/jamming aircraft (C-121s) whose equipment and crews are well tested. (they were once used to broadcast for Radio Cambodia). Each CORONET SOLO aircraft can transmit on one medium and two short wave frequencies. While orbiting over the sea, CORONET SOLO could monitor Radio Hanoi and begin broadcasting on that station's frequencies the moment Hanoi's transmitters leave the air. CORONET SOLO's signal should be strong enough for easy reception on simple

transistor receivers from Hanoi to the Gulf of Tonkin and on more sophisticated receivers throughout the Red River delta. The aircraft can remain on station to transmit from five to eight hours.

Two CORONET SOLO aircraft are ready for deployment within 12 hours of notification, with volunteer crews whose participation (consequently) would not require federalizing the CORONET SOLO unit. Two additional CORONET SOLO aircraft are now being modified. They could deploy twenty days after the two aircraft now ready, but deployment of these two additional aircraft would require federalization of the parent Air National Guard unit.

CORONET SOLO is necessary because there are no alternate medium wave transmitters that could feasibly be employed.

The VOA medium wave transmitters in Hue cannot be heard in Hanoi in the daytime -- when the bombing has to take place -- nor are they on the correct frequency.

The VOA medium wave transmitters in the Philippines would require time consuming retuning of the antennas to employ Hanoi's frequencies and during this period could not be used for VOA's own programming.

Other extant medium wave transmitters present similar technical (and in some cases political) problems.

CORONET SOLO can be ready and come on the air on Hanoi's frequencies the moment Hanoi Radio goes down.

CORONET SOLO's broadcasts can be heard in the Red River delta but are not likely to be picked up abroad where Radio Hanoi is monitored internationally. This fact could help minimize the blow back in world and U.S. opinion, which thus may not learn of the operation until it is over.

Time-Frame. If Hanoi's transmitting facilities are indeed silenced, we have no way of knowing, or guarantceing, how long Hanoi will be off the air. The time lapse before the DRV can begin rebroadcasting via repairs or some form of jury rig may be measured in minutes, hours

or days. For planning purposes we are assuming that the DRV will (1) broadcast denials to the Hanoi City populace on its closed circuit broadcasting system and (2) activate backup equipment and deny the broadcasts on a countrywide basis in a matter of hours if not minutes. While our operation may last only a few minutes, the total plan will include a two to three day contingency if Radio Hanoi remains off the air for that length of time.\*

The temporal extent of this operation will have to be played by ear in light of actual events. We would hit the airwaves with the hard news to ensure that that word gets through, then move to our other themes. If we have to shut down our black operation after several days for technical or other reasons while the real Radio Hanoi is still off the air, we would plead the impossibility of carrying on because of mounting (i. e., successful) allied military pressure.

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\*To use CORONET SOLO for more than one or two days would require considerable expense in MIG cap and diverted strike sorties.

Potential Political Problems. This project -- which those who developed it have christened ARCHIE BUNKER -- is based on a hoax. The fact that this is a hoax is bound to get out, probably within a fairly short time frame. Within North Vietnam itself this fact of life is not necessarily bad. In denouncing the hoax the Party will have to lose face by acknowledging that it was put off the air and its own frequencies successfully pre-empted. Furthermore, genies of divisive speculation and hopes for peace, once let out of the bottle, will not be all that easy to re-cork. Also, given the innate Vietnamese penchant for paranoid suspicions and elaborate conspiracy theories, even the Party faithful will wonder to what extent the hoax drew on, or was stimulated by, the activities of real live dissidents within the Party apparatus.

Once awareness of the hoax has begun to percolate outside of North Vietnam, carping editorials are certain to be written and critical questions raised in Congress and elsewhere. If the operation is approved, the President will have to be braced for the domestic static it is certain to generate in time.

Scheduling. Our plans are being developed against a target time frame of fifteen days from the date of approval, i. e., we would like to launch on or about D + 15. Given the unavoidable leak potential, it is clearly desirable on security grounds to move as promptly as possible. It will require about two weeks after approval is given however, to get the necessary scripts written and taped, the aircraft deployed, and all the intricate machinery phased and ready to fire on the necessary synchronized schedule.

William H. Sullivan  
Chairman  
Ad Hoc Group