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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

SUBJECT: Activities of General Nicolae Radescu During the
Period March 1947 - November 1948

1. The following information on the activities and contacts of General Nicolae Radescu during the period March 1947 - November 1948 was received from a usually reliable source residing in Western Europe who possesses a detailed knowledge of Radescu's affairs during that time.

2. General Radescu arrived in Paris from Cyprus, by way of Lisbon, on 7 March 1947. The French authorities had given him a ten-day transit visa on the understanding that Radescu would live in a private home so as to avoid registering with the police, would not contact Rumanian personalities during his visit, and would refrain from making any statement to the press. The French likewise attached the condition that Radescu's transit visa would not be renewed. Despite the understanding that Radescu would not see Rumanian personalities, he secretly talked with Grigore Gafencu, who came to Paris from Cannes for this purpose, Nicolae Ganeffil, Aristide Burillanu, George Antonide, Radu Pleasca, ~~Paul Gheras~~ and George Mart. General Radescu received 3,000 Swiss francs, for his personal needs, from Alexander Cretianu. A further sum of 19,000 Swiss francs, advanced by Cretianu, was sent to Cyprus to cover debts that Radescu and Barbu Niculescu, his secretary, had contracted during their stay there.

3. Radescu and Niculescu left Paris for Lisbon on 16 March, where they stayed with Professor Nicolae Harescu, an uncle of Niculescu's. During Radescu's stay in Lisbon, which lasted from March to November 1947, he received approximately 90,000 Swiss francs from Alexander Cretianu. The payment of this sum annoyed the National Peasant Party, which protested through Professor Augustin Papa that Radescu and Barbu Niculescu were spending too much money.

4. On 29 April 1947, leaders of the Rumanian emigration called a conference of the Rumanian Action Group (Grupul de Actiune Roman) in Geneva. The initiative for this conference was attributed to Radescu who had been advised by Nicolai V. Tillea, Grigore Gafencu, Brutus Coste and Professor Harescu to call it in order to secure his election as president of the Rumanian Action Group. It was impossible, however, for Radescu to obtain an entry visa for Switzerland. During Radescu's

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Barbu Niculescu 2081

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stay in Cyprus the British Minister to Bern had requested the Swiss Government officially to grant Radescu political asylum, possibly to avoid political difficulties with the USSR as a result of his presence in Cyprus. This request had been rejected by the Swiss Federal Council on the ground that a Power could not request a second Power to grant political asylum to the national of a third. The Swiss authorities, therefore, refused Radescu an entry visa on the ground that such a decision lay with the Swiss Federal Council. ✓

5. The conference met during the period 29 April - 6 May, at Gafencu's home in Geneva. Among those attending were Grigore Gafencu, Nicolae Caranfil, Grigore Niculescu-Buzesti (who also represented Alexander Grotzian and Mihail Paroskian), Constantin Visodanu, Vioral V. Tilea, Carlos Davila, Augustin Popa (who also represented General Hlasiu), and Brutus Coste (who also represented General Radescu). Coste and Titus Pogonaru served as secretaries of the conference.

6. The deliberations of the conference brought to light differences of opinion that split the participants into the two opposing groups that still exist in the Rumanian emigration. Radescu (his opinion was expressed by Coste), Tilea, Davila, Gafencu and Caranfil favored the immediate creation of a Rumanian National Committee and the election of a president, the Committee to begin functioning at once and each member to be assigned his particular responsibilities. Both Radescu and Gafencu desired the presidency of the National Committee, but Caranfil, Gafencu, Tilea, and especially Carlos Davila, refused to consider Radescu on the ground that he was senile and too inept to hold the position. These opponents of Radescu favored Gafencu for the presidency of the Committee. ✓

7. On the other hand, Niculescu-Buzesti, who held a document authorizing him to represent abroad Iuliu Maniu, G.I.C. Bratianu and Constantin Titel Petrescu, together with Visodanu and Popa, believed that so long as the opposition political parties existed in Rumania, a National Committee should not be created abroad, so as not to expose the King and these parties to Communist reprisals. (Niculescu-Buzesti and his supporters further believed that any president should be designated by the political parties in Rumania and approved by the King. They believed that the activity of the group assembled in Geneva should be limited to informing world public opinion of events in Rumania, such memoranda to be signed by all of the participants in the Geneva Conference as individuals. Only in the event that the opposition parties were suppressed and the King exiled, deported to the USSR or murdered, should a Rumanian National Committee be formed abroad.

8. A protocol that contained, in essence, the opinion of the Niculescu-Buzesti group was finally signed by all participants in the conference. On 6 May, Grigore Gafencu carried the protocol to Amsey, where it was signed by Radescu. Gafencu then brought the original

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protocol back to his home in Geneva, where the files of the action group were kept, and each signatory was given a copy.

9. During the sessions of the conference, while the question of the eventual president of a National Committee was being heatedly discussed, Niculescu-Buzesti declared that, although he had so far refrained from using his mandate from the leaders of the opposition parties, he was prepared to make full use of it to obtain the election of a neutral personality, who might be Radescu, but under no circumstances would he consider Gafencu, Davila or Tilca.

10. General Radescu left Amcey for Paris on 6 May and, on his return to the French capital, was able to secure a prolongation of his visa for ten days. It was during this period that persons in close contact with Radescu began to notice a change in him. The General showed himself to be considerably more ambitious, stubborn and authoritative in manner. It was evident that Berescu and Burta Niculescu had persuaded Radescu, during his stay in Lisbon, that he alone could head a Rumanian National Committee, and he was now very much disappointed at the outcome of the Geneva Conference. Radescu at once began a series of interviews with individuals outside the Action Group that had met in Geneva. Among the persons contacted by Radescu was Mircea Eliade, a writer and well-known Iron Guard sympathizer who was used by the Iron Guard as an intermediary. Eliade introduced Radescu to Aneste Crisu alias Marin, at that time Moria Sima's representative in France, and Father Vasile Boldescu, the head of the Iron Guard in France.

11. Radescu also contacted the group of Rumanians that had assumed the name "National Committee of Free Rumanians," and included Costel Constantinescu, George Rurt, Clotari, Colonel Ion Tomorevsan, Stala, Milcaia and Colonel George Leafu. Costel Constantinescu at this time edited the clandestine paper, *La Roumanie Independente*. Numerous members of this group had collaborated with the Nazi's and, more recently, with the "Rumanian National Front," a Communist-dominated organization in France. Costel Constantinescu had published some interviews in *L'Humanite*. He and his group had opposed the Cretzianu-Gafencu group that had worked for the Rumanian opponents of Communism at the Paris Peace Conference. Nicolae Caranfil unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Radescu not to see the members of the Costel Constantinescu group.

12. Radescu's interviews with members of the Iron Guard and the "National Committee of Free Rumanians" shook the foundation of the Geneva Protocol. Caranfil, Gafencu and Davila bitterly attacked him for having contacted the Iron Guard. At about this time Radescu admitted that he had at one time participated in the activities of the "Stalescu Crusade," a faction of the Iron Guard.

13. During his interviews with Iron Guardists Radescu promised to finance Iron Guard contacts with Rumania. After his departure from

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Paris, which occurred on 16 May, the Drop Guard asked Badeson to supply funds for the purchase of short-wave radio transmitters to be sent into Rwanda.

14. In September 1947, Cortel Combarthinsen announced in a special issue of *La Nouvelle Independance* that Badeson would shortly form a new political party, to be known as the "Christian National Party" (Parti National Christian). In a letter addressed to Colonel Tom Zimmerman, Badeson denied this intention and broke off relations with Combarthinsen.

15. When Badeson again returned to Paris, in early October 1947, he opposed the political parties and desired the immediate formation of a Rwandan National Committee under his presidency. He felt that nothing stood in the way of the formation of a Committee following the arrest of John Nkurunziza. Upon his return Badeson found Gerigne Gafrenu, Guatavirta Vlasdram, Gerigne Kilonson-Busseti, Kilonso Gurnicill and Augustin Rupa in Paris. He informed these men that he had come to Paris to organize the National Committee and would include in its membership other persons eligible in addition to those who had been present in Geneva. These men objected that, inasmuch as they were all going to the United States, Badeson should wait and continue the discussions there. At Badeson's insistence, they agreed to publish a newspaper in Paris, to be known as *La Vieillesse Rwandaise*. Although Badeson claimed this paper as his own, it was in fact financed from the Rwandan fund abroad.

16. During his stay in Paris Badeson organized a personal team composed of Mircea Klonso, Amos Gelin, Arthur Yaville Boldeman, Leonida Combarthinsen, ~~(Name Redacted)~~ Badeson and Ramus Tere. He left for London after a "ten days" stay, again disinterested at the failure to form a Committee. In early November 1947, Badeson and Arthur Kilonson left London for the United States.

17. On 25 January 1948, both General Badeson and Gerigne Kilonson-Busseti arrived in Paris from the United States. In the meantime Rikhall Parvaman had reached Paris from Kusa and Professor Virgil Vandanda and Matti Kallonen, National Peasant leaders, had escaped from Rwanda. Also King Rikhal had gone into exile, the signers of the Geneva Protocol agreed to form a National Committee with Badeson as president. However, the representatives of the opposition political parties, Kilonson-Busseti for the National Peasants, Parvaman for the Laborers, and Ion Nkusi for the Independent Social Democrats, opposed the inclusion of Virgil V. Tilen and Charles Davila in any Committee. Badeson, on the other hand, desired the inclusion of Tilen, Davila and certain other personalities. Rikhall Parvaman served as intermediary between Badeson and the representatives of the parties. It was finally agreed that the problem would be submitted to King Rikhal in London by Badeson, Parvaman and Kilonson-Busseti. An agreement to this effect, naming Badeson as Arthur president, was signed in Paris. The three men visited the King on 13 or 14 February, at which time Badeson presented to him a memorandum and a list of nineteen proposed members of the National Committee.

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Radescu's proposal contradicted the protocol signed earlier in Paris. Seeing that Niculescu-Buzesti and Faresanu disagreed with Radescu, the King asked the three men to attempt to compose their differences and see him again.

18. Radescu returned to Paris, where he remained until early March. He let it be known that King Mihai had given him a mandate to form a National Committee and prepared, without consulting the others, a press statement on the Committee and its agencies in Europe. According to the communique, the European agencies of the Committee would be headed by such individuals as Colonel Ion Lupcala, Petrus Tatu, Leontin Constantinescu, Gabriel Badarau, Nicolae Harescu and Mircea Eliade. This proposed communique quickly brought denials from Garunfil, Popa and Faresanu that the King had given Radescu any mandate relative to the Committee. The communique was never published. At the time Radescu stated in conversation that he would not agree to the omission of Tilea and Davila from the membership of a National Committee. He declared that he would utilize even immoral men or men without character in his leadership of the resistance abroad, since he could more easily control such men because of their past and that he would be very happy to get rid of the political parties, which desired to monopolize the resistance movement. King Mihai, he said, had been bought by the political parties and was serving them, while he, Radescu, alone was in a position to grant justice.)

19. On his return to the United States, Radescu wrote to Paris a series of letters attacking the political parties. Radescu's adherents began a campaign to increase his influence, attempting to prove to the King that the Rumanian emigration supported the General. In March 1948, the political parties decided upon the creation of the Council of Political Parties.

20. During May 1948, Barbu Niculescu, Radescu's secretary, visited Paris. He brought with him funds that Radescu had obtained from Nicolae Malaxa, the Rumanian industrialist, through Viorel Tilea. Niculescu made the following expenditures from these funds:

- a. Establishment of twenty scholarships for students in Paris;
- b. Payment of salaries to Radescu's propaganda team;
- c. Grant of funds to the Rumanian Orthodox Church in Paris;
- d. Grant of funds to former Rumanian officers through Colonel Daniel Ivanovici;
- e. Payment of \$6,500 to Major Constantin Maftei for the Iron Guard;

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f. Payment of an unknown sum to Father Vasile Boldeanu for the Iron Guard in France;

g. Payment of unknown sums to the Iron Guard in Austria through Colonel Ion Tomoroveanu.

Niculescu declared in conversations that General Radescu was determined to form a National Committee without representatives of the political parties, which, in any case, amounted to "zero to the square."

21. In July 1948, following his return to the United States, Niculescu wrote letters to Romanian refugees, declaring that the State Department recognized only General Radescu who, at the request of the State Department, had decided to form a National Committee. Such letters were received in Paris by Colonel Ion Tomoroveanu, Colonel Atanasiu, Leontin Constantinescu and Mircea Kliade, among others.

22. In August the situation deteriorated still further. General Radescu prepared a press statement on the Committee similar to the one he had written in February 1948. He was stopped from issuing it, however, by a telegram from King Mihai asking him to give up such plans for the formation of a National Committee.

23. Radescu returned to Paris in November 1948 and resumed his contacts with local editors. He denounced the political parties and accused Constantin Viesianu, Grigore Niculescu-Buzesti, and Alexander Gretsianu of "national treason in connection with the armistice of 1944," an attack on the coup d'etat of 23 August 1944 which overthrew Marshal Ion Antonescu and took Rumania out of the German camp.

24. During this visit Radescu saw the King at Villefranche, with Augustin Popa, Virgil Veniamin and Mihail Parcasanu. At this time King Mihai stated that he did not want to overlook constitutional prerogatives and that in case Radescu could not form a Committee of five party representatives and four neutral personalities, with himself as president, he, Mihai, would consider another formula with another president. During the audience at Villefranche General Constantin Petre-Lasar, aide to the King, was invited to be present. When, on the order of the King, General Petre-Lasar produced some of Radescu's letters by which the King wished to demonstrate to the latter his inconsistencies, General Radescu ordered General Petre-Lasar out of the room. After the audience King Mihai told Augustin Popa, "I have had to deal with General (sic) Antonescu, but Radescu is even more dictatorial in his manifestations."

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25. Although at the Villafranche audience Radeson had agreed to study the solution of organization of a Committee in agreement with the political parties, he would not agree to the exclusion of Tilon and Davila. On his return to Paris, he announced the formation of the "Democratic Union of Free Americans," stating publicly that the King and the political parties had agreed to the creation of this group. Radeson's action was rejected by the King and the Council of Political Parties, and some emigres who had already joined left the new organization.

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