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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET *2P*

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

ACCESSION NO. *KPL-22*
DATE RECEIVED IN S.A. *JUN 27 1947*

| TO | ROOM NO. | DATE | | OFFICER'S INITIALS |
|------------------------|--------------|---------------------|-----------|--------------------|
| | | RECEIVED | FORWARDED | |
| <i>1</i> FBK | <i>2281</i> | | | <i>ST</i> |
| <i>2</i> [redacted] | | <i>7/2</i> | | <i>ST</i> |
| <i>3</i> [redacted] | | | | |
| <i>4</i> [redacted] | <i>2261</i> | | | <i>[initials]</i> |
| <i>5</i> FBP 10 | <i>214</i> | <i>JUL 9 - 1947</i> | | <i>H</i> |
| <i>6</i> SPDS | <i>214</i> | <i>JUL 10 1947</i> | | <i>[initials]</i> |
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Date of Report: 16 June 1947

Passed to Embassy in the field. S.T.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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OSO Registry
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THIS COPY FOR WASHINGTON.

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16 June 1947.

Radescu, General Nicolae

TO: William Barnes, Esquire (Ames. Embassy, Lisbon)

FROM: Liaison Section

SUBJECT: Attached Document from General Radescu.

1. General Nicolae RADESCU, the former Prime Minister of Rumania, now living in Lisbon, has found certain similarities between his overthrow at VEHNINSKI's hands and the treatment accorded by SPIRIDOV to Ferenc NAGY, the recent Prime Minister of Hungary. Accordingly, RADESCU has decided to issue a public statement on the two cases; a copy of the original statement is attached.

2. In its original form the statement was given to representatives of the Associated Press, the United Press, Reuters, and some of the London newspapers. However, since it will probably not be published in its entirety by any of the newspapers, it is felt here that you may be interested in having the full text.

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encroachments made on Rumanian territory in 1940 by the Soviet Union and of the far-reaching and tragic consequences resulting from this unjustified dismemberment of my country, any Rumanian — whenever he has to refer to the Soviet Union — must overcome deeply hurt feelings. I shall nevertheless express my views on developments connected with Soviet policies without any trace of rancor. The statement I feel bound to give will be guided solely by reality and not by emotion. I shall speak as one who strove forcefully and loyally to establish friendly relations between his country and the Soviet Union but whose efforts to this effect received only one answer: "We are interested in only one thing: to communise Rumania."

The recent developments in Hungary should not surprise anyone: they are but a stage in the execution of a plan which the Soviet Government is pursuing systematically and with the utmost steadfastness of purpose.

The Rumanian people and I went through — two and a half years ago — the experience now occurring to the Hungarian people and to Prime Minister Nagy. If there is any difference, it consists only in the way in which the whole "coup" ended. Prime Minister Nagy did not have the chance to see from close quarters the Soviet fist descending over him; in our case, I went through the whole drama on the spot and yielded to the intrigues, the conspiracies, and the threats only when Vice-Commissar Vyshinski, Moscow's envoy, suddenly appeared in Bucharest and ordered the disarmament of the Rumanian home army. Once this was accomplished he forced King Michael, under the threat of Russian guns, to dismiss my Government and to appoint instead one selected by the Soviet Government.

It is most likely that after my dismissal I should have dearly paid for my stubbornness if I had not found refuge in the British Legation. Subsequently, the Vyshinski-appointed Groza Government twice attempted to show me what my lot would have been...But I had good luck and eventually escaped abroad.

As regards the means employed by the Soviet authorities to attain their goal, the setting up of a communist-dominated regime, they have been the same in Budapest as they had been in Bucharest.

In Budapest they charge Prime Minister Nagy with having plotted — in conjunction with other prominent leaders of the Smallholders Party, the party which had gained a substantial majority at the parliamentary elections, — against the republic. They even claim to have evidence in support of such an accusation. However, when asked by the American and British Governments to show this evidence, that is to make public what in their view had justified the ousting of a constitutional government, their only answer is that this evidence is in the hands of the present "Hungarian Government" and, inasmuch as the Soviet authorities do not intend "to interfere with the internal affairs of Hungary", they do not see their way towards asking that Government to comply with the Anglo-American demand. It is quite obvious that such evidence does not exist, and the contention to the contrary is but a pretext brought forward to justify what has been done.

What happened in Rumania was not greatly different.

The Rumanian communists, a very small but vociferous minority, had been organizing armed bands ever since the Soviet Army entered Rumania. These bands, led by communist members of my own cabinet, were let loose to spread anarchy throughout the land. In my capacity as Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, I naturally tried to check their activities, and, as I knew the source from which their orders were issued, although aware that my intervention would be fruitless, I requested the Soviet diplomatic representative, Mr Pavlov, to impose some moderation on their agents. I received the same

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answer which General Spiridov recently gave in Budapest; "these are internal affairs in which I cannot interfere". But at the same time he did not miss the opportunity of accusing me of not allowing the "people" to demonstrate, the "people" being the communist armed bands which were attempting by force to seize local government buildings (prefectures and town and village halls).

In the end, as the Soviets could not find a sufficiently serious pretext to bring about my dismissal — which they wanted chiefly because I had declared my intention of holding free elections at an early date — they organized, on 24 February, 1945, a "mass demonstration", designed to dislodge my Government by pressure from the streets. I gave orders that the demonstration should be allowed to take place without hindrance from the authorities. After a lot of noise, and in spite of various premeditated provocations, when towards the evening the affair was threatening to peter out without making any impression, the self-appointed representatives of the "people" resorted to a typical communist method: they shot eight of their own supporters, so that they could call me "the murderer of the people". I obtained evidence of this frame-up that very evening, by calling for an immediate autopsy of the murdered men. The findings of this autopsy were clear: the bullets extracted from the corpses were all of Russian manufacture. Neither the Rumanian police nor the Army had such munitions. I brought this fact to the knowledge of the whole world, and, so far, it has not been denied from any quarter. It cannot be denied; it was already widely known, and our authorities were in possession of full evidence that the so-called "Patriotic Defense", the armed communist militia, was provided with Russian weapons.

However, as it seemed that my new position of a "murderer of the people" was not a sufficiently convincing pretext to justify measures against me, Vyshinski and Groza invented another "crime": I was denounced for having prepared a plot against the Soviet Army. For this purpose I was purported to have brought seventy thousand troops from the provinces to Bucharest.

This was another trumped-up charge which demonstrates the complete lack of respect for truth in communist political machinations. Indeed, as a result of measures imposed by the Soviet military mission, the Rumanian home army had practically been suppressed, in disregard of the armistice terms, which contained no disposition of this kind. We were left, in February of 1945, with only three skeleton divisions of three thousand men each, a total of nine thousand men inside the country, while eighteen Rumanian divisions were fighting in Hungary and Czechoslovakia alongside the Soviet Army. The frontier guards and the gendarmerie (constabulary) had also been reduced to a third of their former effectives.

(When these measures were first taken, in November of 1944, I was Chief of the General Staff and objected energetically; it is from that occasion that the grudge which the Soviets had against me dates.)

These plain facts did not prevent Vyshinski and Groza from pointing out the existence of an army of seventy thousand in the capital as "chief evidence" of a plot.

Can anyone then be surprised, today, that the Hungarian Prime Minister has been "plotting" against his own Government?

But communist methods and tactics should be well known by now: systematic obstruction in successive international conferences; disregard for the pledged word; obvious intent to prevent a general settlement, at the same time tightening their grip, by methods devoid of scruples, on the countries situated in the zone over which they have gained control and which they are trying to extend further.

It looks, at last, as if today all the nations of the Western World have, with few exceptions, opened their eyes and have discovered the language which the communists are most likely to understand. There is still time to prevent mankind from being dragged into a new and worse disaster, by showing in a concrete form that the policy of concessions has its limits.

Thus, in my view, an effective answer to the latest challenge, that in Hungary, would be the continued recognition of the Nagy Cabinet as the only legal Government of Hungary.

The same principle should be applied wherever similar methods have been used to force unrepresentative governments upon freed or defeated nations. Such is the case of Rumania. Pending free and unfettered elections, exempt from foreign interference, the Government which was ousted in March of 1945 remains the only truly legal Rumanian Government. The Groza administration is the creation of Mr Vyshinski, which the King and the country were forced to put up with under extreme duress.

The majority of the members of the cabinet over which I presided belonged to the present opposition — the National Peasant and the National Liberal Parties — which at the elections last November obtained eighty-three percent of the votes cast, in spite of government pressure and abuses of every conceivable kind. The Groza Government had to resort to a complete falsification of the final returns — which were completely reversed after five days of secret plotting behind closed doors.

The communist leaders themselves openly admitted that the elections were not free.

If the present situation in Hungary should be brought before the UNO, it would seem logical to give the same consideration to the state of affairs in Rumania. The real returns of the elections held last autumn showed clearly enough what the will of the Rumanian people is. They proved unmistakably that communism has been rejected in Rumania and that the paramount wish of the country is to recover its freedom and independence.

There is one more point to which I want to call the attention of world opinion:

The process of subjugation to which Hungary is at present being submitted is being brought to a further stage in countries like Rumania, which underwent the same experience at an earlier date. The Groza administration is already preparing the total liquidation of the opposition, because the day for the withdrawal of the Soviet Army is approaching and it is aware that otherwise it could not survive after the departure of those who are its only support.

Thousands have been thrown into prison, and arrests continue at an increasing rate. Those in prisons or in concentration camps are being systematically starved or beaten to death. And this is only the beginning in the application of a detailed plan — fully known to us — to "liquidate all known or potential" leaders of any form of opposition or resistance to the present totalitarian regime. Meanwhile, other hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Rumanians, in the villages and towns, are being "liquidated" at a slower rate, as they are starving from lack of food because of the catastrophic economic conditions brought about by the exactions of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet Army, which lives on the land (Rumania having paid between September of 1944 and May of 1947 one billion four hundred million dollars, under various headings, to the USSR), and by the incompetence and utter corruption of the Groza administration.

This is a situation too serious to be ignored by the United Nations!