

DCI BRIEF ON SOVIET CA ITEMS

## 1. CIA Support to Ukrainian Group

-- May 16 SCC meeting, which discussed the move of our Ukrainian group to Europe, requested additional details. These details are included in Tab A. Tab A includes a statement on the organization which has been released to the Principals and some added background for your personal use in briefing the group. The key points include:

- The organization (ZP/UHVR--Foreign Representation, Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council) was established in 1946, a CIA operational relationship has existed since 1949. The primary action element is Prolog Research Corporation, set up in New York City in 1953 with a publishing affiliate in Munich.

- The organization is a moderate Ukrainian group which has maintained a low profile in Ukrainian emigre disputes and has sought to work effectively with a wide spectrum of emigre organizations. It has sought to avoid taking any specific emigre political line while advocating a policy of self-determination for the Ukrainians, rather than separatism.

- The principal activity of the project is publishing books, pamphlets and a monthly journal in the Ukrainian language (Suchasnist) and infiltrating this material into the Soviet Ukraine.

- The move of the Prolog office to Munich would consolidate the operational headquarters presently located in New York with the publishing office now in Munich. Also it would lower the profile and alleviate concern about possible domestic fallout. The move would involve the transfer of two or three people, at least one is an American of Ukrainian background.

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DATE 2007

SECRET/SENSITIVE

20 J. 78

-- Authority is requested to add \$500,000 to the FY 78 program budget for the Ukrainian group, by reprogramming of Agency funds. This would cover the costs of the move and permit a limited increase in operating funds to cover the loss of dollar purchasing power and to permit a modest increase of the group's Ukrainian language publishing distribution in line with Presidential approval of an increase in such activity.

-- We recommend deferring any consideration of asking this group to expand its efforts to reach other Soviet national minorities until the State Department's policy paper has been considered.

## 2. State Department Paper on Soviet Nationalities

-- The 16 May SCC meeting tasked CIA to pursue purely exploratory efforts to determine whether special activities involving publishing and distribution aimed specifically at Soviet Muslims would be feasible and productive. It also tasked the Department of State to produce a basic paper on Soviet nationalities which would, inter alia, examine policy and possible overt options. (State paper, see Tab B)

-- An analysis of the substantive aspects of the paper is being prepared by NIO/USSR.

-- The paper includes several recommendations:

- a. Develop an interagency statement of the problem, based on inputs by DoD, CIA and NSC comments on the attached study.

COMMENT: This is essentially an analytical issue and could be handled via the equivalent of the PRM process with NIO participation with other interested parties.

- b. Increasing USG understanding of Soviet nationalities.

COMMENT: This is an absolute necessity and we can endorse this strongly. It is long overdue.

The proposed working group is a good idea, CIA participation would be useful. A deadline of one month may be unrealistic.

c. Increasing contacts and flow of information between US and Soviet nationalities.

COMMENT: As in "b." this is essentially an "overt option", but also highly commendable and we recommend that it be endorsed. An action paper would be helpful and CIA participation appropriate. Timing may be too tight.

d. Covert Action programs

COMMENT: A review of current CIA programs vis-a-vis Soviet minorities would be limited to Ukrainian project which has already been reviewed. We have had operations targeted against other minorities, but these were essentially in the early and mid-50's. While it would be theoretically feasible to dig back into history and comply with this request, there is some question about the relevance of this sort of historical examination. We are principally concerned--in a covert action mode--with the Muslim minorities, possibly a review could be directed exclusively to that target. If other areas are identified, such as the Baltic states, we could delve into the historical files. To some degree we would have to maintain care concerning sources and methods if we were to examine, as the State paper suggests, "all private organizations partially or fully funded by USG involved in covert action" in the minorities area since World War II.

e. Policy Considerations

COMMENT: The State paper concludes that after the assessments recommended above are completed, that an interagency group draft for SCC approval,

US policy guidelines toward Soviet nationalities. Agree. (N.B. The various problems highlighted in the State narrative suggests that they see so many pluses and minuses that a policy of inaction may well be the bottom line. State has indicated that no new covert action programs be initiated in this field until the review is completed. We agree, but we also believe that CIA should continue its exploratory work in the field, as noted at the 15 May SCC meeting. We also would note that the SCC has requested an expansion of covert action programs dealing with the USSR and it was in this context that the program dealing with Soviet nationalities was offered.)

-- Operational comment on the 13 page analytical paper, Nationalism in the USSR: paragraph III-A (pp 2-3) holds the clear implication that minority-oriented programs, overt or covert, could exacerbate internal tensions and lead to greater internal repression. CIA's intentions in any new program (as in the case of the Ukrainian program) would be to promote greater ethnic and cultural consciousness, rather than an agitation for separation or violence. A process of greater awareness of the various political forces within the USSR, a development of more internal checks and balances, a pressure for decentralization, greater moderation and (ultimately) liberalization is at the heart of the other aspects of our multiple activities directed toward the USSR, as approved by the SCC on 16 May 1978.