

*Army*

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	<i>Mr. Richard Helms - 250</i>	<i>HT</i>	
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FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1		<i>WPK</i>	<i>25 Feb.</i>
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| <input type="checkbox"/> ACTION      | <input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY         | <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN    |
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REMARKS:

*By Hand*



Union of Ukrainian Veterans (UUV)

27 October 1948

R: General Konstantin RAEVSKY-SNOVSKY

IV-a-305.1

7833

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1. Reference is made to Orientation and Guidance Report, dated 9 July 1948, Section Five, Part VI, Paragraph 305, Sub-Paragraph a, Page 74.

2. On 22 October 1948 Major General Konstantin RAEVSKY-SNOVSKY, Chairman of the UNION OF UKRAINIAN VETERANS, contacted the undersigned for the purpose of proposing a plan to arm and deploy members of his organization against the Soviets in case of war. In addition to members of the UNION OF UKRAINIAN VETERANS, General RAEVSKY-SNOVSKY stated that he could muster an additional seven thousand (7,000) Ukrainians.

3. General RAEVSKY-SNOVSKY reported that he has been questioned many times by his adherents as to whether or not he was in contact with American agencies, and if he has been in contact with American agencies, what should be done by the UNION in case of war with Russia. General RAEVSKY-SNOVSKY stated that members of the UNION are demanding that some type of preparation be made for an emergency, and that an action plan be evolved at the present time.

4. General RAEVSKY-SNOVSKY stated that he wishes to contact a pertinent American agency, preferably an agency which could offer a definite plan of action as well as the arms with which to fight. In return, General RAEVSKY-SNOVSKY reported that he has ten thousand (10,000) veteran Ukrainians who will fight with the Americans, if and when an occasion arises. Also, General RAEVSKY-SNOVSKY stated that he has sufficient officers to mobilize and train these ten thousand (10,000) volunteers. General RAEVSKY-SNOVSKY listed the following individuals as being available for staff positions in mobilizing and training members of the UNION:

- a. Wessilij TATARSKI, age 45, former Lieutenant Colonel on Polish General Staff, now residing in ULM (L49/X66).
- b. Michael TITARENKO, age 50, former Colonel of Engineers in Soviet Army.
- c. Danilo DATZKO, age 48, former officer in Soviet Army, residing in AUGSBURG (M49/Y37).
- d. Iwan KOVAL, age 48, former Lieutenant Colonel in Soviet Army, residing in AUGSBURG.
- e. Nikolaus RIBATSCHUK, age 52, former Colonel in Polish Army, residing in AUGSBURG.
- f. Wessilij TSCHABANIVSKY, age 50, former Colonel and member of Polish General Staff, residing in ULM.
- g. Sergei KAFALINSKI, age 45, former Captain of Engineers, residing in ULM.

Edward J. Nelson, per wcc  
EDWARD J. NELSON, 7970 CIC Group, Reg IV  
S/K Augsburg

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IV-a-304.1 Subject: Union of Ukrainian Veterans (UUV) (C) General Konstantin  
RAEVSKY-SMOVSKY 27 October 1948 Continued

h. Konstantin KUCIV, age 46, former Lieutenant Colonel in Ukrainian Army, presently residing in ULM.

i. Danil SMITRUKO, age 45, former Capt in in Soviet Army, residing in ULM.

j. Ivan PRAPITSCHUK, age 42, former Lieutenant Colonel of Engineers in Polish Army, residing in ULM.

k. Michael SZARUCH PRO, age 40, former Lieutenant Colonel of Cavalry in Polish Army, residing in ULM.

l. Anatolij BASSILIEV, age 42, former Major of Cavalry in Ukrainian Army, and Infantry of Polish Army.

m. According to General RAEVSKY-SMOVSKY, the ten thousand (10,000) Ukrainians are located in the following areas:

- a. American Zone - NEU ULM (L48/X67)  
AUGSBURG (M49/Y37)  
MUNICH/Freimann  
MUNICH/Schleissheim  
PACHHEIM (L49/R73)  
GIENSEE (L51/D62)  
MITTENWALD (M48/D68)  
ROSENSTURM (M50/U15)  
SAYREUTH (M50/O75)
- b. British Zone - HANNOVER (L47/X32)  
BRAUNSCHEWIG (M53/X90)  
MUNSTER (L53/X59)  
HALLSTADT (M53/L67)
- c. French Zone - FREIBURG (K48/W03)  
WAGNER (L48/X50)  
LIEDAU (L48/C48)  
ETTLINGEN (L49/R53)  
MANN KAST L/Frankfurt (L-1/F67)  
EUFENHAUSEN/Stuttgart (L49/S02)  
WISSENHOFEN (L49/X77)  
NEU DART (M50/P78)
- d. Austria - GRAZ  
SALZBURG  
LINZ  
IN SENICK  
SPITAL a.o. Drau

6. Personal data respecting General RAEVSKY-SMOVSKY is as follows:

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IV-A-305.1 Subject: Union of Ukrainian Veterans (SUV) RE: General Konstantin RAEVSKY-SMOVSKY 27 October 1948 Continued

Full Name: Konstantin RAEVSKY-SMOVSKY, formerly known as  
Appolon RAEVSKY  
Date of Birth: 10 May 1894  
Place of Birth: OSTRIH, Poland  
Nationality: Stateless  
Present Address: Reinhardt Kaserne, NEU ULM (L49/167)  
DP Card No: 666016

SOURCE: General RAEVSKY-SMOVSKY

EVALUATION: A-2

7. AGENT'S NOTES AND COMMENTS:

a. General RAEVSKY-SMOVSKY appeared to be deadly serious in making the above proposals. General RAEVSKY-SMOVSKY pointed out that should no preparations be made for utilizing the UNION in case of war, members of the UNION would, of necessity, split into small guerrilla groups and defend themselves as best they could. Should the UNION do this, however, the Allies would lose the organized help of a considerable body of men.

b. The undersigned is of the opinion that General RAEVSKY-SMOVSKY should be contacted by the American agency interested, particularly in view of the fact that General RAEVSKY-SMOVSKY is well known and respected in Ukrainian circles.

c. Pending receipt of further instructions, if any, from higher headquarters case is considered closed by the undersigned.

APPROVED:

*William C. Cushman*  
WILLIAM C. CUSHMAN  
Special Agent, CIC  
Operations Officer

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R&A/R&A/WMS/ATK/WCM/md  
IN L DIV READING & FILES  
R&A READING & PS FILES  
OPERATIONS BRANCH

350.09 (CID/R&A/E&A)

Letter to General Clay from Nikola Kapustiansky

22 October 1948

1 Dep Tol Adv 22 Oct  
Dir 1948  
Intell  
Div

1. Inclosed is a letter addressed to General Clay from Nikola Kapustiansky, Minister of War in the Ukrainian Republican Government-in-Exile which is under the Presidency of Andre Livitsky. This letter was delivered to this Headquarters by Mr. Towch and recommends that the "Allies" take an active part in the fight against the USSR by "forming Ukrainian fighting forces under Ukrainian political and strategic command."

2. Kapustiansky is believed to have been a member of the Petlura forces which were active against the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine after World War I and is a member of the Andre Melnik (conservative) faction of the Ukrainian Nationalist Organization (OUN). Kapustiansky was also a delegate to the Ukrainian National Council which convened in Augsburg on 19 July 1948, and which was composed of the following groups representative of the Ukrainian anti-Soviet movement:

- UNNS (Ukrainian National Sovereign Confederation)
- UNDO (Ukrainian National Democratic Union)
- OUN-Bendera (radical faction of the Ukrainian Nationalist Organization)
- OUN-Melnik
- Union of Ukrainian Socialists
- Ukrainian Radical Democratic Party (a faction of the socialist wing)

3. Inclosed for your information is an extract from the "Declaration of the Ukrainian National Council," and a copy of an "Outline for an Independent Ukrainian State," prepared by General Alexander Titarenko, commander of the Ukrainian National Guard.

4. The most that can be said for the Ukrainians is that they at least appear to have achieved some degree of unity and that they alone of all the anti-Bolshevik groups have facilities for reaching into the USSR. The danger, however, lies in the extent to which the emigre groups are penetrated by the Russian Intelligence Service. It can safely be assumed that the KGB has not only planted within these groups short-range agents whose activities in a number of instances have been detected, but also, in anticipation of the very move which this group now desires us to make, has installed long-range agents with the specific mission of remaining inactive until the Western Powers take steps to utilize the groups against the USSR. Moreover, the Russian Intelligence Service is in an excellent position to recruit new sources of information, because of the residence of these groups in Germany, by exerting pressure on relatives in the USSR, and by threat of denunciation based on extensive black market activities conducted by individuals associated with the groups. Therefore, the problem of providing adequate counter intelligence

Letter to General Clay from Mikola Kapustiansky

22 Oct 1948

protection to any operation would be exceedingly difficult.

5. It is requested that the enclosed letter be forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief through SGS, RUCOM, together with any further comments you may wish to add concerning this subject.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION:

3 Incls:

1. Ltr to Gen Clay fr Mikola Kapustiansky, dtd 16 Oct 48.
2. Extract from the Declaration of the Ukrainian National Council, In exile, dtd July 48.
3. "Outline for an Independent Ukrainian State," prepared by General Alexander Titarenko.

WCM/md/2286

M/R: Mr. Powch was directed to this Division by SGS. The "Declaration of the Ukrainian National Council" was submitted by Col Hoffman of Detachment "R". It contains a statement of Ukrainian views on the USSR, and readiness to fight for a free Ukraine. The "Outline for an Independent Ukrainian State" which is in the Russian language, sets forth the means by which the Ukrainians intend to reach their objective. A copy of this document was sent to the D/A in July 48.

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The Executive  
of the  
Ukrainian National Council.  
Military Section

Munich, October 16th, 1948

TO : Gen. Lucius D. Clay,  
U.S. Military Governor in Germany

We have the honour to hand you herewith our project. The same is limited to a general outline and information. Should it be necessary we - Ukrainian Combatants and the Military Section entrusted to me - are prepared to submit detailed plans for the carrying out of this project.

As a liaison officer I nominate Mr. Andrew Powch of Munich, Rosenheimerstr. 4a/II.

*M. Kapustiansky*  
(M. Kapustiansky)

Major-General of the G.S.  
Head of the Military Section

## MEMORANDUM

The apparent impossibility to come to an understanding between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union is likely to lead to an armed conflict at some juncture in the future.

Both the West and the East are preparing to it quite earnestly and without any loss of time.

This conflict will have the character of a total war in the different parts of the world.

We think that for strategic, political, and economic reasons Ukraine will become one of the important arenas of hard fighting and extensive operations in the decisive phases of the coming world war.

For this reason we wish to outline herewith under which circumstances and in which way the Ukrainian people could, to our mind, join in the universal fight of freedom against despotism, and contribute by the blood of its sons to the successful outcome thereof.

The history teaches quite emphatically that :

1. owing to specific conditions it was always very difficult to inflict a decisive defeat upon Russia within her enormous territories,

2. these territories with their possibilities and a large population a/were the main sources of her power for a long-termed defensive campaign and of the almost ever successful final counter ~~and~~ offensive and

b/constituted her strategic and political weakness not allowing of a quick mobilizing, amassing, and then unfolding of greater forces so as to direct them to offensive operations on the enemy territories,

3. upon the whole, according to experience of former wars, it was not so much the outcome of the front operations, but often the internal state of things in the country such as unrest, death of the Czar, or the threat of revolutionary uprising, which compelled the Czarist Government to be inclined to terminate the fight not heaving profited to the full of all her power, means and possibilities.

4. To illustrate the above we wish to cite a few historic instances:

1812. Napoleon I having amassed an army of about 500,000 men in Poland against the Russian army of 130,000, was sure of his victory. For this reason he did not use any revolutionary mottoes that would ~~be~~ have been very dangerous to Russia, such as: 1) the liberation of the peasants from the serfdom and 2) calling to resistance and uprising the subjected by Russia



peoples, especially the Ukrainians.

This talented commander could probably not avail himself of these methods also because of his basing his campaign against Russia on Poland with her most reactionary in Europe nobility for which such mottoes and slogans would have been very undesirable. Thus, the not bringing into effect of affective propaganda in a fight against a powerful enemy became one of the main reasons of the routing of the great French army. The cause was decided in Russia's favour by the solidarity of the Czar and his Government supported by the then powerful Russian nobility and even peasantry, by the severe climate and the remoteness of the theatre of war in addition to the high morale of the army assisted by the partizans.

Russo-Japanese War 1904 - 1905. This war was finished at a moment when Russia, after a series of failures, contrived to increase the potential of the Trans-Siberian Rwy, and to amass on the Sepingal front in Manchuria quite a fresh army of 210,000 composed of well-trained young soldiers including considerable cadres of regular peace-time troops, instead of the old reserve-soldiers that constituted the main contingent of the Manchurian army. The Japanese army by then was already exhausted and weakened by heavy losses, besides the financial resources having dwindled so far that Japan could not have stood the strain of the war longer than for another three months. Having continued this colonial war, Russia could with certitude expect a change of military luck. But the revolutionary unrest of her population at home, particularly of the peasantry in Ukraine, compelled the Czar to stop the war by a peace-treaty of compromise.

World War I. During that war the Russian army fought with changeable luck till 1917 against the 50 % of all the forces of the Central Powers. Also her offensive against the Turks in the Caucasus developed steadily but surely. Several times her armies sustained heavy blows, but were not crushed, because the authority of the Czar and his Government was not yet shaken.

A striking illustration of the resistance and endurance of the Russian army was the year 1915. Although at this time it suffered a terrible lack of fire-arms, particularly of artillery projectiles, and even of infantry arms, it stood manfully and with many heroic sacrifices the terrific offensive of the combined Austrian-German shock army (Indendorff-Mackensen). In 1916 the same army, notwithstanding the heavy foregoing losses, could launch a successful offensive on the South-Western front and capture some 500,000 prisoners (Brussilow offensive).

In 1917 the Central Powers, exhausted by the blockade, were greatly weakened. Austria sought a separate peace treaty. Also the Allies were ready for a general offensive. Russia developed enormous forces having mobilized upto 15 mil. people and having acquired a sufficient amount of ammunition, technical equipment and the like... But, unexpectedly, the situation changes. The

revolution breaks out. The powerful Russian army, tired in the battles, loses the desire for fight just on the eve of the victory, although it still keeps the fighting line.

The Germans, taking advantage of this favourable situation, send to Russia in a sealed railway carriage a group of revolutionaries headed by Lenin. A regular "A-bomb" in propaganda this. Lenin & Co succeed in a quick undermining and a complete ruining of the Russian front. Soon the Germans are in a position to dictate to former Russia a peace-treaty at Brest-Litovsk. And it does not take long before the bolsheviks, having seized power in Russia, install a powerful government and begin to subjugate one after the other the many peoples of the former Russian empire under the rule of their Moscow dictatorship.

The greatest resistance- for three years - offered Ukraine. Thus, not the events at the fighting front and not the exhaustion of Russia, but the communist revolution brought about such a disastrous end of the war for czarist Russia.

World War II. In 1941, under the heavy blows of the German victorious troops, a huge, well-armed and trained Red Army, suffers a series of fatal defeats in the course of the first four months. Millions of Russian soldiers gladly prefer captivity, leaving to the enemy vast territories without any serious resistance. This was a protest of the Soviet man against the terrorism of the communist Government and its cruel system. The population of Ukraine refuses to fight for the regime of their usurper, the red Moscow, hoping in such a way to get the right to be independent. For the USSR a complete defeat seemed imminent.

On the other hand, the short-sighted policy of Hitler, his stupid tactics of annexation, as well as his inhuman and unpardonable handling of the war prisoners, soon causes a radical change in the Red Army. The peoples of the Soviet Union, above all the Ukrainians, begin to fight, with all means possible, against the new usurper. The outcome is generally known.

#### C o n c l u s i o n s :

There are many points about the World War II which deserve to be specially considered. The psychological attitude of the Red Army, as well as of the population of USSR, of Ukraine in particular, played a decisive role with regard to the initial victories of the Germans and also to their final defeat.

The USSR, as the heir of czarist Russia, is characterized by her many peculiar traits and propeties. But the ways and methods of ruling by the communists are far more intollerable and cruel. This internal weakness of the USSR makes its masses of population very susceptible to the influences of clever and

well-meaning propaganda, and can and must be taken advantage of in the campaign against its government.

In such a way it is imperative to look for a solution of the East-West problem not only from a strategic point of view, but, in a great measure, from a political and ideological standpoint.

In order to weaken the resistance and the fighting power of the huge Red Army and in order to provoke a defeatist spirit amongst the peoples of the USSR, it is necessary to win their confidence and impart a belief that the allied powers advance not as new usurpers, or restorers of the old czarist regime, but as their friends and liberators.

As the basic condition of success this way, political slogans ought to be proclaimed concerning the national and social liberation of the peoples of the Soviet Union and those ought to be adhered to by the allied powers both during and after the struggle against the USSR.

The second condition is: the Allies enable and favour the Ukrainians' taking an active part in this fight by forming Ukrainian fighting forces under Ukrainian political and strategic command.

## II

### The Ukrainian military and revolutionary power.

In the future World War all the nations of Western Europe will have to take part. We expect that also the political refugees from the USSR as well as those of the satellite countries will be drawn into this fight in its first stages whereas the peoples of East Europe will become involved in it later on.

Considering the geopolitical position of Ukraine, the number of her population (abt. 40 mil.), the traditions of a military and revolutionary fight against the occupying powers based on the unwavering will of our people for a free life, we have every reason to maintain that the Ukrainian people can and must play an important role in the general fight. The file and rank of the Ukrainian soldiers and revolutionaries could be of great help to the Allies in the different stages of the long campaign.

The following two elements will constitute the military potential of Ukraine:

1. The refugees, now in Europe: participants of the World War I and II, a considerable number of former officers and soldiers of the Red Army, the partisans as well as men of recruiting age. At the moment some tens of thousands of able bodied Ukrainians are working in the factories in France. Among them about 5,000 soldiers that had fought in the French army. Likewise the bulk of the former Ukrainian 1st Division, about 7,000 in number reside in England in addition to about 5,000 Ukrainian soldiers of the army of Gen. Anders.

2. The Ukrainians behind the Iron Curtain: insurgents and partisans, national underground forces, and soldiers of the Red Army. The latter present about 1/5 to 1/4 of the whole manpower of the Red Army (in formations drawn from Ukraine proper the percentage is higher). It is clear that on their attitude the fighting power of the Red Army will largely depend.

From the first mentioned elements (see 1) it is possible to form the cadres of a Ukrainian Legion (Ukrainian Expeditionary Corps).

This Legion will receive and train ideologically the masses of officers and soldiers of the Red Army who will change over sooner or later. In such a way the Ukrainian Legion will develop into an Army.

During the first period of the war this Legion will - by its revolutionary and insurgent detachments - constitute a connecting link between the Western Armed Forces and Ukraine especially with regard to landing troops behind the fighting line and by the acts of sabotage and the like in order to disorganize and demoralize the Soviet hinterland.

During the subsequent stages this Legion might be entrusted with the following:

1. Active participation in the fighting at the front,
2. Mobilizing the population and the training of able bodied men of Ukrainian nationality,
3. Guarding the Allied hinterland from the bolshevik acts of sabotage, partisans and the landing of Soviet troops from the air, especially along the line: the Carpathians - River Don - Caucasus - Astrakan.

This will mean a great saving of forces for the offensive into the North-East and East.

The participation of the Ukrainian Army in the fight for their own country will express and demonstrate the intentions and the good-will of the Allies and also fortify their stand and strengthen their prestige and authority in the eyes of the peoples of the vast USSR territories.

We consider that the favourable conditions for the organizing of the above Legion by the Ukrainians themselves ought to be created already at this juncture. The organization will take a considerable time, particularly for the developing and training of the <sup>technical</sup> and air personnel.

*M. Kapustiansky*  
(M. Kapustiansky)  
Major-General of the G.S.

M I L I T A R Y   I N T E L I G E N C E   S E R V I C E

FRANKFURT a/M.

[Nov. 1948] date?

Attached please find a plan concerning an antibolshevist organi-  
sation.

I should like <sup>to</sup> mention that as long as there is a communist terror in Russia, there will be not peace. The communist government gives money to those persons which serve them and is stirring the discontentedness. The people in the lands occupied by Russians, are anticommunists. This organisation mentioned on attached sheets is necessary in order to stir the discontentedness against bolshevism by radio, press and agents, to collect and to lead those people which are ready to fight against bolshevism. This organisation can not be made in the countries in question on account of the terror.

The organisation is to be made for Hungary in first line as it has a central situation, from there it would spread over Slovakia, Jugoslavia and Roumania. At the same time also the organisation of a partisan-activity would be necessary and the organisation of a correct information-service.

As long as the organisation of a resistance-movement and partisan movement is ready, radio and press propaganda is to be made for Hungary. In a land for which radio and press propaganda is made, the work of the terrorists gets uncertain, they begin to speak to the people which have been arrested and often try to help them. This will be the sure sign of fact that the situation is ripe. In this time <sup>the</sup> partisans can begin their activity /see attached plan/.

./.

By attached plan a lot of lives and materials could be saved and a successful activity could be organised, this is why I assume it necessary. Awaiting your kind reply I remain

Kanshofen, 27. th. nov. 1948.  
/Austria/

Most respectfully:



JOSEPH PEKLO

Kanshofen, Waldlager 18. b.

"  
Ober-Osterreich

/Austria/

PROPOSITION FOR THE ORGANISATION AND ACCOMPLISHMENT  
OF AN ANTIBOLSEVIST ACTIVITI FOR HUNGARY AND FROM  
THERE FOR THE EASTERN-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

The Hungarian emigrants living in Austria and Germany have a group which is the largest of all and the most united one as to its aims. This group is not engaged in any party-policy as it knows that the Hungarians to-day may have only one aim, since four years and this aim is the fight against bolsevism which threatens the entire cultured world and which terrorises our native-country and holds it captured.

The group in question knows what is to be done. In spite of the fact that it is living scattered over Austria and Germany, it has been held together since 3 years and is waiting for the moment in which it can begin the fight against bolsevism, with all of its experiences, will and resoluteness.

This group is composed of those classes of Hungarians which have always been fighting against this enemy of freedom and humanity and has brought great sacrifices during this fight. A lot of excellent experts of antibolsevistactivity, with great experiences are in this group. All of them are ready again to do their best for this noble aim. These personalities, many of which have been working in American Service for years, are guarantees for the fact that this plan is no plan of some dilettans, but a plan which promises real, great results.

For the purpose of propaganda there are lots of journalists, radiospeakers and experienced antibolsevist agitators.

For the purpose of gethering informations, the leader of the intelligence-service of the former Hungarian Ministry of National Defend who is an expert on the Soviet-Russian matters, is to our disposal with his fellow-workers.

On the military line the best former generals and officers, the best soldiers are waiting for the moment when they may begin the fight for the liberation of our country, as regular soldiers, or as partisans which are trickling secretly, single through the bordier, or springing down from aeroplans.

It is the opinion of this group that it is time to forward this offer and to make the U. S. Authorities acquainted with our exactly prepared plan and to carry out this plan if it receives the necessary material and moral-aid. All details of the plan are finished, all acting persons are selected, we are waiting only for the sign which tells us that we may begin with our fight against bolsevism. And we are awaiting this signal from the U.S.A., which is the leading power in this fight, defending the liberty of all nations



We consider it as not necessary to mention the great importance of the territory of the Carpathian Mountains and the Danube. It would be a very hard problem for the Soviet if in this part of Europe an antibolsevist revolution could be started. The 15 millions of Hungarians living there would be ready and able for such a revolution, as they are exasperated enemies of the bolsevist ideology. And this revolution could be a starting point for a general riot spreading all over Roumania, Jugoslavia, etc., on account of its central position. This riot, starting from Hungary and spreading over the neighbor countries would be a very important help for antibolsevist political and military plan of the United States.

Plan of the Antibolsevist Activity

I./ Political Activity.

II./ Military Activity.

I. POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

a/ In Hungary.

b/ Abroad.

A/ I N H U N G A R Y.

Activity in Hungary based on the connections with single persons, groups at home.

- 1./ Antibolsevist propaganda.
- 2./ Raising, helping and leading of a civilian resistance.
- 3./ Organisation of political and economical troubles and demonstrations.
- 4./ Sabotage.

B/ A B R O A D.

Emigration activity with the help of the U.S. ~~and~~ authorities.

- 1./ Control of the new emigrants, discovering bolsevist agents among them.
- 2./ Gethering of political, economical industrial and military informations from the new emigrants.

II. MILITARY ACTIVITY.

- 1./ Organisation for gathering of strat.

economical and public-administration-informations.

2./ Organisation of partisan activity.

3./ Training of the necessary men for above purposes.

MATERIAL AND MORAL AID NECESSARY FOR MENTIONED PURPOSES.

1./ Money /Inland-money and currency/ for the different organisations and for the carrying out of the necessary and wished tasks, according to monthly estimate.

2./ Feeding and secure shelter for the necessary organisations and formations.

3./ Cars and bicycles for the organisations, with gazolin.

4./ Material for a strong wireless set /20 KW or more/ and place for arranging it.

5./ Small, modern, portable short-wave sets for our agents, which are to be sent to Hungary.

6./ Press for printing pamphlets, circular letters, etc., with all materials necessary.

7./ Furnishing of passes, legitimations, certificates and other papers for the organisations in cases of necessity.

As to my person I should like to mention, that I was employed as leader of the Transport Section from the date of the establishment of the American Warehouse, Ranshofen, the 27 th. March 1946, to the liquidation, October 1948, by this American Installation, This fact is stated in a job-certificale which I have received from our Commanding Officer, Cap. John H. Harkins.

The Warehouse has been taken over by the Austrian Gournment and at the present I am still working there.

I came to know the aims and methods of bolsevism already in 1917, at the date of its origin, as I was prisoner of war of the first World-war there. - I have seen the shocking cruelties and the total annulling of freedom. There I had made up my mind to fight against bolsevism as long as I live. This I have done since 1918, when I came back from Russia as discharged prisoner of war. And this I want to do also in the future.

At the present I am 56 years old, but in full health and strength. During the hardest work-periods of the American Warehouse I often have worked 400-500 hours monthly. I offer you this indefatigable work-power and that power and that power of will and those practical experiences which are represented by our group, which wants to take part in your battle for the freedom of mankind.

Ranshofen, 20 th. Oct. 1948.

/Austria/

Most respectfully

*Joseph Peko*  
Joseph Peko.

Ranshofen-Braunau  
Waldlager 18.  
/ Upper-Austria  
U.S.-Zone.