

Project Outline Clearance Sheet

Project Title _____ Amendment No. _____ Project No. _____

Developed by: [] (E-1)
Case Officer Organization Date

Reviewed by: _____
Foreign Branch Chief Date Division Chief Date

Concurrences: _____ Date

_____ Date

Approved subject to conditions below: _____
CPO Date

Conditions of approval: _____

*Approved by
PRC on 9 Aug 51
By ADPC on 28 Aug 51*

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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PROJECT: QKBROIL

CLASSIFIED BY [unclear] ON [unclear] BY [unclear]
7501 22 Dec 55
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Plan [unclear]

1. References:

- a. NSC 58/2
- b. Memorandum for ADPC, Subject: Rumanian Plan, dated 8 February 1951.
- c. Memorandum of Conversation between ADPC, Members of OPC, and Mr. John Campbell of the State Department, dated January 1951.

2. Objectives:

- a. To fortify the hope of liberation among the Rumanian people and to foster their will to resist communization;
- b. To establish a clandestine underground for the implementation of U.S. policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Orbit. This apparatus should be capable, on short notice, of hampering any Soviet/Satellite move against Yugoslavia, Greece, or Turkey, and of serving as a nucleus for effective wartime resistance;
- c. To undermine by a combination of covert operations, including psychological warfare, the political, economic and military structure of Communist Rumania;
- d. To develop an NCPE Political Center (Rumanian National Refugee Organization) as cover for overt activities and a covert operational support arm for projected OPC operations.

3. Considerations:

- a. NSC 58/2 has defined U.S. policy toward the Eastern Europe Satellites under present conditions as follows:

"50. As the most feasible course of action available at this time, the United States should attempt, by methods short of war, to disrupt the Soviet/Satellite relationship and bring about the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of preponderant Soviet power and influence from Eastern Europe."

"54. The United States should do what it can practicably, particularly through covert operations and propoganda, to keep alive the anti-Communist sentiment and hope of those making up the non-Communist majorities in the satellite countries. To do less would be to sacrifice the moral basis of United States leadership of free people."

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b. It is apparent that the unhampered control which the USSR has exercised over Rumania in the past six years is drawing the country more and more into the fabric of Soviet life, to the detriment of U.S. security interests and policy goals. The USSR is not only consolidating its hold over a supine Satellite, dominating its national life and exploiting its economic wealth, but is also directing and supplying the buildup of Rumanian military strength considerably beyond the limits established by the Rumanian Peace Treaty. After thorough purging, the Rumanian Armed Forces now total some 252,000 and already possess aggressive capabilities. This army is being further strengthened with Soviet equipment as well as a steady flow of new recruits. In the event of hostilities, Rumania would constitute an essential Soviet rear-echelon support area in Southeastern Europe. The serious possibility that this strengthening of the overall Soviet military potential in Southeastern Europe is being carried on with aggressive aims necessitates a determined effort to neutralize Rumania's capability to further Soviet designs in the critical Balkan area.

c. The Rumanian people are held in line by repressive Communist police and political controls which have ensured a pace of sovietization exceeded only in Bulgaria. Over the past five years, Rumania's traditional orientation toward the West has been vigorously undermined. As Rumania becomes progressively more isolated from the Western world and absorbed into the Soviet complex, the confidence of the people in eventual liberation must continue to dwindle and their will to resist be replaced by increasingly passive resignation.

d. It is not anticipated that the Rumanian people can summon sufficient psychological and material strength to overthrow their regime under existing circumstances. Nevertheless, their detestation of the regime and its sponsors represents a basic vulnerability of Soviet control which, if properly exploited, would impede the utilization of Rumanian resources as either a covert or overt base of Soviet operations in the Balkans. Despite the severity of Communist repression in Rumania, worker dissatisfaction has resulted in passive obstructionism, sabotage, and even sporadic revolt. Peasant antipathy toward the regime in a predominantly agrarian country is reportedly widespread, although inhibited by Communist penetration of the countryside and by a generally low cultural level. Remnants of former political parties maintain some clandestine organization and are occasionally able to communicate with the outside. Disaffected racial and religious minorities also lend themselves to systematic exploitation. Resistance bands are known to exist in the fastnesses of the Carpathian and Transylvanian mountains and have carried on sporadic operations.

e. Given adequate encouragement and support, Rumanian resistance is believed capable of assuming more significant proportions and of providing important assets with which to harass and undermine the Soviet military potential in Southeastern Europe. OPC's active encouragement,

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organization and support of such resistance would be in full conformity with the objectives outlined in NSC 58/2.

4. The Proposal:

It is therefore proposed:

- a. To undertake and implement all steps necessary for the early establishment of OPC underground nets inside Rumania;
- b. To initiate and develop at the earliest possible date large-scale, covert propaganda and psychological warfare among the Rumanian people;
- c. To unify the Rumanian refugee groups into an effective overt-covert adjunct of OPC operations, and to encourage the formation of a representative organization as the organic symbol of Rumanian national unity;
- d. To undertake economic warfare against the Rumanian Communist regime.

5. Discussion:

a. The immediate assignment of the requisite funds with which to proceed with this project will permit the concurrent development of several essential lines of action. In order to achieve the basic OPC objectives listed under (2,b) and (2,c) above, steps leading to the creation of underground nets should be initiated immediately, inasmuch as a minimum of 5 - 6 months will elapse before the personnel can be processed, trained and infiltrated into Rumania. The PW campaign outlined in paragraph (4,b) above should also be undertaken at once, since it is probably the primary method with which to achieve the first tangible results in bolstering the morale of the Rumanian people and in preparing them to accept and assist the OPC operations which will follow.

b. If eventual OPC assets are to be properly integrated at a given moment, the following lines of action should be undertaken simultaneously:

- (1) Preparation and initiation of a coordinated PW program against Rumania. (Tab A for Phasing) This will necessitate the immediate enlargement of covert broadcasting facilities established under BOFIEND and QKSTAIR, in order to extend these clandestine broadcasts to Rumania. As soon as additional personnel for the transmitters now in Greece are available on the spot, the beaming of black transmissions to Rumania can be coordinated with those presently directed against Bulgaria. Propaganda leaflets in Rumania can be airdropped by the aircraft now at the disposal of JBEDICT, as soon as the requisite editorial personnel

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can be processed and the leaflets composed, printed and flown to Greece (3 - 4 months). Additional equipment and trained personnel for broadcasting, such as are envisaged in project LCSCREAM, together with the necessary aircraft will have to be provided if large-scale PW activities are to be deployed against the combined Balkan targets.

(2) The development and strengthening of a Rumanian refugee organization within the framework of the NCFE to serve as a cover and covert supporting arm for OPC operations should keep pace with preparations for launching extensive PW operations. The Rumanian refugees have so far been unable to unite into a single, effective organization. The formation of such a group is considerably hindered by personal rivalries, factionalism, and the hesitations of King Michael in assuming a more positive role in its creation. Initially, however, the present National Committee and/or its rival the Free Rumanian Association could provide adequate cover for OPC activity.

(3) Establishment of underground nets (see Tab A for Phasing). If a skeleton underground organization is to be established in Rumania within 18 months, the recruitment, processing and training of 20 - 50 agents must be undertaken immediately. The first contingent of 20 agents will be trained at the OPC school in West Germany, and upon completion of a six-week training course, this group (forming the first two reconnaissance teams) will be flown covertly to the safehouses in Greece. Methods of infiltration into Rumania are now under study and may vary, depending upon the degree of success obtained in reaching an eventual agreement with the Yugoslav and Turkish []. In view of the cover and concealment possibilities afforded in West-Central Rumania, four secure bases and a total of 40 agents can probably be established in that area during the first twelve months from the start of the project. The utilization of a small sterile plane (possibly a helicopter) is being considered in order to facilitate rapid movement within Rumania and as a means for emergency escape or communication. The bases and radiating nets subsequently established would provide the framework around which to organize the various internal covert activities, including psychological and economic warfare, and at the appropriate time, such sabotage operations as may be derived from the Covert Annex to the JCS War Plan. With a view to handling the larger contingents of agents required in the subsequent development of its resistance force, OPC is currently studying the possibility of establishing a holding and training center on one of the Aegean Islands. The projected OPC post [] will assist in the procurement of agents and may be used, whenever Yugoslav cooperation has been obtained, as a dispatch point into Rumania via Yugoslavia.

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(4) Preparation for Guerrilla Activity. The recruitment of up to 500 agents during the coming year would provide a sufficient nucleus to activate under wartime conditions guerrilla forces of approximately 15,000 combatants. The development of such a large group of resistance agents will necessitate extensive support facilities, which can be combined and to a certain extent combined with those established for correlative and similar projects under QKSTAIR, BGFRIEND, and LCBUNNY. The establishment of an important arms depot at an OPC base in the Mediterranean area, as proposed under LCBUNNY, will supply the weapons for the Balkan guerrilla groups. Limited stocks are already on hand in Greece with which to arm the preliminary reconnaissance teams.

(5) Preparation of Economic Warfare. The technique and information acquired in the two country projects now in progress will be equally applicable to covert economic operations in Rumania. Specific intelligence with reference to targets and operational requirements in Rumania would be supplied by the reconnaissance teams. The present project envisages the completion of preliminary arrangements and the execution of small-scale economic warfare operations. Large-scale warfare operations which may involve significant expenditures, particularly in the later phases, will be covered by special separate projects.

6. Recommendations: It is recommended that:

a. The necessary authority be granted to initiate and pursue this project to its logical conclusion, namely the establishment of an effective underground organization in Rumania within the next eighteen months. Many of the details of this project will have to be worked out in more definite terms as the project develops. Whenever the planning for the establishment of an all-Balkan holding center for guerrilla agents has been completed, these plans will be formulated in a separate project.

b. The sum of \$630,000 be approved and immediately assigned for the salaries and expenses of the operational, administrative and headquarters personnel for the Fiscal Year 1952.

c. The sum of \square be approved for Fiscal Year 1952 for the procurement of the necessary supplies, equipment, arms and ammunition, safe houses, aircraft, etc, required in the support of their activities as indicated, and to provide for normal contingencies which may arise as the project evolves, thereby assuring continuity in the Project's development.

7. Risks:

a. As the scope and intensity of OPC's activities against the Balkans increase, it must be anticipated that the USSR will redouble its

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charges that the U.S. is using Greece as a base of aggressive operations. The presentation of such charges before the UN by the USSR might force the Greek Government, or any other pro-Western government similarly involved, to review its position and could result in demands for a sharp curtailment of U.S. personnel and their activities. However, the initiation of this project against Rumania would probably be no more conspicuous than that of the projects now in progress against Bulgaria and Albania. Soviet propaganda on this score has already reached such a peak that little more could be added if OPC operations in their early stages were also directed against Rumania from Greek soil.

b. In the course of 1951, a satisfactory working arrangement may be reached with the Yugoslav Services, even though of limited scope. This would presumably permit some use of Yugoslav territory and facilities and would therefore reduce part of the pressure on Greece. The development of auxiliary bases on the Satellite periphery would also tend to reduce the effectiveness of any Soviet arraignment of Greek cooperation with the U. S.

c. It is entirely possible, however, that the Yugoslav and Turkish Governments will be reluctant to risk provoking the USSR by allowing their territory to be used for extensive operations against contiguous Satellites. In this case a secure secondary support base, despite its greater distance from the scene of operations, would be necessary. Present plans call for the establishment of such bases on one of the Aegean Islands and ultimately in North Africa.

8. Communications: See Appendix B for the Commo Annex.

9. Current Status:

a. On 26 January 1951, a mission was dispatched to Florence, Italy, for the purpose of enlisting the support of former King Michael of Rumania in covert operations against the Rumanian Communist regime. Michael was invited to the United States for a short unofficial visit in order (1) to discuss the projected operations and (2) to effect the unification of Rumanian emigre elements into an advisory group to assist in such operations. Despite the King's initial enthusiasm for these proposals, certain political or personal influences were brought to bear on him with the result that the conditions specified by his most influential advisers regarding his visit could not be accepted by OPC. It was therefore decided to abandon the matter temporarily, and to proceed with the problem of initiating covert operations under cover of the Rumanian refugee organizations presently available. Consideration is also being given to the possibility of launching overt operations in the name of a Rumanian resistance group operating in the name of Maniu, presently imprisoned under life sentence in Rumania, who continues to have a large and devoted following.

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b. During the project development, 4 staff employees and 3 contract agents, plus 3 Rumanian agents, have been taken up for processing as an initial overseas staff for the Rumanian project. Each of these individuals possesses a knowledge of Rumania and the ability to speak Rumanian. The services of two Rumanian consultants can also be obtained for assistance in the project development on a part-time basis.

c. OPC's support base [] from which clandestine operations are now being successfully conducted against Bulgaria and Albania, can serve as a sound foundation for extending these operations to Rumania. A number of subsidiary projects, such as BGSPEED, LCHUNNY and LCSCREAM, which are designed to augment the assets of [] and permit operations of greater scope and variety than hitherto, are either in progress or in an advanced planning stage. The two 500-watt shortwave transmitters operating against Bulgaria are to be reinforced with one or two additional 500-watt transmitters. [] which is presently undermanned, is being brought up to its full T/O complement. Action is also being taken to secure additional sterile aircraft for the dissemination of leaflets and airdrops of agent personnel.

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PROJECT FINANCIAL DATA

(This data may not exceed SECRET classification)

20

Project Cryptonym QKBROIL Fiscal Period Covered June 1952 thru 30 June 1953

[]

Case Officer

EE-1

Responsible Staff or Division

A. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

(Indicate number and type of personnel required and estimated total compensation for salary, allowances, travel and related employee benefits.)

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Estimated Total Compensation</u>
Staff Employees	10 @ 14,000	\$ 140,000
Staff Agents	30 @ 7,000	210,000
Career Agents		
Agents	50 @ 5,000	250,000
Consultants	3 @ 10,000	30,000
Detailed personnel	10	
Miscellaneous		
TOTAL	103	\$ 630,000

B. SUPPLIES, MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT, AND SPECIAL SERVICES

(Indicate the type and estimated cost of materials and special services required to support the project. Attach a list of special equipment requirements, if available.)

1. Communications equipment (10 kws transmitter agent sets etc)
2. Arms and ammo, parachutes, operational equipment etc for approximately 2,000 men -
3. Aircraft (2 helicopters or equivalent light aircraft including 1 year's operational expenses.)

Total Estimated Cost []

C. OTHER OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

(Indicate volume and nature of such expenses, such as (1) maintenance of two operational houses abroad, (2) hire of approximately 10 foreign nationals for procurement of information, (3) spot purchase of information, etc.)

1. Maintenance of holding area and remuneration for 500 Rumanian recruits per year
2. Safe houses (four) necessary indigenous personnel, etc.
3. Contingencies

Total Estimated Cost []

D. SUBSIDY OR PROPRIETARY PAYMENTS

(If funds are to be turned over to individuals or groups in large lump sums to be expended by the individuals or groups at their discretion to accomplish an agreed-upon objective, explain the type of financial accounts, factual verification, or statements, if any, other than a receipt for the lump sum, which will be obtained from such individual or group.)

Total Estimated Cost \$ _____

E. FUNDING REQUIREMENTS


(Show approximate dates funds will be required, if known, and indicate whether funds will be required in U. S. dollars, specific types of foreign currency, checks, bonds, gold, or some special type of negotiable instrument. Indicate any special security requirements or special methods of transmission anticipated in connection with funding the activity.)

F. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS

(Within security limitations, list any other facts or circumstances which will enable Special Support Staff to lend adequate logistic support to this project. Indicate specifically the "Rush" or "Time" factors involved.)

G. Funds required for use in Field
Funds required for use by Headquarters

Total (This amount is also total of A, B, C, and D above)



OPC Form 404a
9 November 1950



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a. Establishment of the Underground

The establishment of underground nets in Rumania will comprise the following developmental phases, to which all activities proposed in this project will tend to conform:

Phase 1: (a) Agent-recruiting, processing, training; (b) infiltration, reconnaissance, the setting up of reception and operational bases; (c) the development of supply routes, schedules, and of communications both laterally and to OPC support bases outside the country. Of the first 20 trainees, an initial 10-man Reconnaissance Team will be charged with the task of choosing and securing an advance reception base, which action will be initiated by a preliminary reconnoitering group of 3 men. The second 10-man team will be airdropped to the main reception base within one month after the arrival of the first team; during this interval a second base will also have been established. (6 - 9 months from start of project)

Phase 2: As new trainees are funnelled into Greece and Rumania, reinforcement of the teams already securely established and deployment of smaller units to (a) cover primary OPC objectives in the area, (b) obtain operational intelligence, (c) make local contact with existing resistance bands and groups, and (d) provision these with communications equipment, arms and other supplies. The over-riding consideration during this phase will be to keep the organization in existence while working to expand it; no operation should be undertaken which would unduly risk the discovery and destruction of the main bases. (9 - 12 months from start of project)

Phase 3: Initiation of the "active phase" of the underground, during which time its existence is to be brought to the general knowledge of the Rumanian people, gradually at first and accelerating as conditions permit. This will be accomplished through the dissemination of printed propaganda and clandestine broadcasts, by word of mouth, isolated acts of sabotage or violence, and through facilitating and publicizing the escape of selected individuals. The activities of resistance groups as contacted are to be brought into harmony with those of the OPC nets, which will fully utilize the assets available to the native underground. In the initial stages of this phase, at least, great care will be exercised to differentiate between the "active" nets and those whose existence must be protected at all costs. As agent assets accumulate, certain of these will be infiltrated into municipal centers where they will take up residence and seek to penetrate party, industrial and administrative organs. (12 - 18 months from start of project)

Phase 4: (a) The initiation of widespread industrial sabotage and economic warfare, (b) the fomenting of large-scale popular resistance to Communist policies, (c) the institution of a reign of terror against officials and members of the Rumanian Communist Party, and (d) in its ultimate stages, the initiation of guerrilla activity. In the event of a localized war against Yugoslavia or of a general conflict, Phase 4 will

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be compressed into Phase 3 insofar as capabilities permit. It is planned that within 18 months of the start of this project, the OPC underground nets in Rumania will be sufficiently established, diffused and equipped to carry out important resistance activity in the strategic Western half of Rumania.

b. Psychological Warfare:

The deployment of PW operations will be coordinated with the progress of the underground nets, unless the outbreak of hostilities necessitates a speed-up prior to the scheduled completion of the skeleton underground in the first 18 months. In general, PW activity during Phase 1 will aim at bolstering popular morale, fostering the people's hope in ultimate liberation, and undermining Communist leaders, policies and propaganda. This phase will comprise black broadcasts from Greece and adjacent areas, as well as spectacular airdrops of propaganda leaflets. In Phase 2, all propaganda activities will be intensified and sharpened, stressing the importance of individual participation in the resistance and pointing up the need for solidarity and action against a common enemy. Within 15 months of the start of the project, this phase will move, if deemed advisable at that time, into detailed accounts of the resistance movement, the exploits of which will be magnified and glorified. The printing and distribution of handbills, leaflets and proclamations will be conducted from the bases inside Rumania, being expanded as the underground nets progress. PW will be reinforced by terroristic activities against party and state officials by "active" agent teams. It is planned by the end of the first 15 months to have sufficient PW assets available inside Rumania and within close proximity to permit extensive PW operations in the event of hostilities.


c. Economic Warfare

OPC clandestine economic operations conducted within Rumania will be launched in Phase 3 of the creation of underground nets and will be accelerated as OPC assets multiply inside the country, reaching a peak in Phase 4.

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COMMUNICATIONS ANNEX

PROJECT QKEROIL

1. PURPOSE:

(a) Objective:

To provide reliable and rapid communications necessary for the adequate and timely support of Project QKEROIL with the maximum efficiency in the utilization of communications facilities including materiel and personnel.

(b) Tasks:

(1) To establish short wave propaganda broadcasts into Rumania, originating from OPC broadcast transmitters in Northern Greece.

(2) To establish w/t circuits from agent groups in Rumania to a radio base station in Greece.

2. REQUIREMENTS:

(a) Short Wave Broadcasts:

(1) Equipment

Two additional 500 watt broadcast stations will be added to the two broadcast stations already operating in Northern Greece.

(2) Personnel

Four communications technicians are manning the two present broadcast stations. Steps have already been taken to provide seven additional technicians to operate the four ~~stations~~ broadcast stations. This will permit two trucks to operate 24 hours every day of the week and two trucks to operate 8 hours every day of the week.

(3) Training

The additional communications technicians selected for QKSTAIR and QKEROIL projects will be trained to the extent where they will be capable of maintaining their communications equipment, act as radio operators, and be proficient in the particular cryptographic systems assigned to the projects. In the event it becomes necessary to send a number of the selected personnel overseas prior to the completion of their communications training, arrangements will have to be made to have these people complete their training in the field.

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(4) Broadcast Frequencies and Schedule

(a) The senior OPC staff officer for the QKEROIL project will determine the time and duration of all broadcasts.

(b) The BGRHYTHM communications officer [] will provide recommendations as to the frequencies employed for all broadcasts based upon current propagation data between broadcast stations and the target area.

(b) Agent w/t Operations:

(1) A stock of w/t agent equipment and cryptographic materials will be made available to the BGRHYTHM communications officer in Greece for issuance to Rumania agent groups.

(2) Training

(a) OPC will be responsible for recruiting QKEROIL w/t candidates, to be trained at the OPC school in West Germany, and furnishing interpreters for the QKEROIL communications training program.

(b) Primary responsibility for the conduct of appropriate communications training activities, both radio and cryptographic, shall rest with the Chief, European Communications Activity. Close coordination will be maintained by the Chief, European Communications Activity and the BGRHYTHM communications officer in Greece on all communications training matters.

3. SPECIAL PROBLEMS AND COMMITMENTS:

(a) It will be relatively easy for the enemy to ascertain that QKEROIL broadcasts originate at a location outside the target area from a clandestine station. Jamming on part of the enemy can be expected with intensity varying as to the effectiveness of the broadcasts. Counter measures against enemy jammers will be taken by the BGRHYTHM communications officer []. Techniques presently being used and perfected against QKSTAIR jammers will be employed.

(b) For security reasons and for better operational control, agent groups will have only electrical communications with the base radio station in Greece. If necessary, agent groups may communicate with each other electrically thru the base radio station in Greece. For example, if group A desires to send a message to group B, group A will encipher the message and transmit the cipher text message to the base radio station. The base radio station will decipher the message in the cryptographic system held in common with group A. The base radio station will then reencipher the message in the cryptographic system held in common with group B. The reenciphered message will then be transmitted to group B.

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(e) Primary interest in this project is vested in the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination. Accordingly, cables originating at the Home Office for this project will be released by ADPC (or his agent) after being coordinated and authenticated by appropriate OPC officers and the Chief of Communications as required.

4. IMPLEMENTATION:

(a) Short Wave Broadcasts:

Steps have already been taken to provide OPC with additional communications equipment and communications personnel for the expanding propaganda broadcast program into Iron Curtain countries.

(b) Agent w/t Operations:

(1) Upon approval of project QKEROIL, the training of agent personnel selected for the project will be implemented under the supervision of the Chief, European Communications Activity.

(2) Agent w/t equipment required by the project will be made available to the BGRHYTHM communications officer in Greece by Chief, EUCA.

(3) Cryptographic material required by the project will be made available to the BGRHYTHM communications officer in Greece by the Chief of Communications.

(4) Signal plans will be prepared by the QKEROIL communications officer in Greece. Technical assistance, if required, will be furnished by Chief, EUCA. Back-up signal plans will be prepared by Chief, MECA.

(e) It is expected that as the project develops and operational details crystallize, an appendix to this communications annex may be required.

5. COMMUNICATIONS RESPONSIBILITY

(a) The Chief, EUCA will exercise general responsibility for providing communications support of this project for the Chief of Communications.

(b) Local responsibility for detailed planning and implementation of all communications aspects of this project will be performed by the BGRHYTHM communications officer in Greece under the general direction of Chief, EUCA.

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