

<b>DISPATCH</b>		CLASSIFICATION <b>C O N F I D E N T I A L</b>	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. <b>EGMA 60445</b>
TO INFO	<b>Chief, KUWOLF</b>  <b>EE        COS/G</b>		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. <b>200-124-39/3</b>
FROM	<b>Chief, Munich Operations Base</b>		DATE <b>5 November 1962</b>
SUBJECT	<b>CAMOG/DTDORIC/QKACTIVE/Operations Transmittal of Letters</b>		RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
			<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING
			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED	<b>FYI</b>		<input type="checkbox"/> INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
REFERENCES(S)			
<p style="text-align: center;">Forwarded under separate cover are two letters to PBAFFIRM which might be of interest to Headquarters.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Attachments (2 letters), usc <i>- attached RID/AN 14 NOV 1962</i> <span style="float: right;">[ ] [ ]</span></p> <p>Distribution:  2 - KUWOLF, w/atts  1 - EE, w/o atts  2 - COS/G, w/o atts</p>			
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FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION <b>C O N F I D E N T I A L</b>	PAGE NO. <b>1</b>

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO EGMA 60445

Wilbur Schramm

Munich,

October 19, 1962

Mr. Howland Sargeant  
President  
American Committee for Liberation  
30 East 42nd Street  
New York

Dear Howland,

I have now spent a week at the American Committee headquarters in Munich, and, as always, have learned far more from the people of the committee than they could possibly have learned from me.

v There has been no time to write a formal paper for you. There has been too much to absorb, too many people to talk to. Therefore, I am afraid that our idea of assembling a small group to consider a paper will have to wait until a later time. However, I should be more than willing to take part in a kind of meeting that might substitute for the one you envisaged. For example, if you wanted to assemble a group of four or five when Max next comes to the States, to talk about what Audience Research is now doing and what more it could do, then I could save time for the other participants by having become familiar with the operation and by steering the meeting toward the key questions. I should be delighted to have such a meeting at Stanford, or to take part in it on the East coast.

I want to set down, in the next few pages, a few notes on my experience in Munich. My impression is that your Audience Research department is doing a careful and thorough job, and exercising considerable ingenuity and imagination. My impression is, furthermore, that no recent discovery of social science, or no tool transferred from western audience research, is likely to make any magic change in the amount of information that becomes available on your audience. Barring some unexpected new source of intelligence, what seems to be called for is a continuation of the careful sifting of data, seeking out of sources, and insightful interpretation.

Every time I come to Munich I am impressed by the cruel conditions under which audience research has to be done here. By the rules of the game, 95 per cent of all the sophisticated methods available to field researchers in western countries are foreclosed from use. I described the process of RL audience research to some members of the RL staff the other day as being about like a man fishing in a murky lake without any hook on his line. He is unable to see any fish, and practically unable ever to catch a fish. Only occasionally, by being very attentive, he may feel a fish brush against his dangling line. This is the kind of job Max Kallis is trying to do.

For this reason, we must be careful not to ask too much of the results of RL audience research. We have no reason to suspect that our contacts represent a probability sample. Therefore, we have no right to apply the usual statistics of reliability, and no scientific right to ask questions about size of audience or size of segments within it. We must be very careful in saying anything about the "profile" of the audience. Really about as far as we can confidently go, on the basis of the contact evidence we have, is to say that at least these kinds of people are in the audience.

But the importance of such information should not be underestimated. The impressive thing about the audience mail and interview contacts of RL, as they now sum up, is the many different kinds of persons who have identified themselves as listeners. They are young and old, workers and farmers, from many different parts of the Soviet Union. They are not solely intellectuals or solely non-intellectuals. Indeed, Kalis has done a very clever thing in analyzing the mail for literary quality and correctness. This literary rating is a good reflection of education. The significant thing about it is that the letters are almost evenly distributed over the four levels stipulated. In other words, there is no reason to think that RL attracts people of one educational level only. In this as in other respects, the outstanding thing about the evidence is the diversity of the people who, according to the best evidence we have, are in RL's audience.

Now, I should like to invite you to reflect on this apparent diversity. Does it not seem to mean that the RL audience is very unlikely to be one ethnic or religious or educational or geographical minority? Is it likely to be an audience that holds attitudes and beliefs which are at great variance with all the rest of the Soviet people? And if there are many different kinds of listeners, are there probably not different images of Radio Liberty, or at least is not the image likely to be very broad? Is the audience image of the radio not likely to be at variance with the stereotyped evil image which the Soviet media and party try to inculcate? I shall not carry this speculative analysis any further, but suggest that you might find it interesting to consider some of the further implications.

The audience data, within their diversity, suggest some disproportions which are of interest. Remember that what we are saying now is not scientific conclusion, but rather merely a speculation on the best evidence we have - suggestive rather than absolute, a guide line until we get something better. Take, for example, the location of the audience. Here is the latest RL estimate of receiving sets in different states of the Soviet Union, plotted against the RL listener evidence of all kinds for the first two quarters of 1962, and against the sources of audience mail for the year ending June 30, 1962;

	<u>Receivers (millions)</u>	<u>Listener evidence, first 2 quarters, 1962</u>	<u>Audience Mail July, 1961 - June, 1962</u>
R.S.F.S.R.	11.2	61	37
Ukrainian SSR	3.2	48	55
Byelorussian SSR	.3	6	7
Moldavian SSR	.2	1	3
Lithuanian	.3	11	10
Latvian	.4	5	3
Estonian	.2		1
Georgian	.2		1
Azerbaijan	.3		
Armenian	.2		
Kazakh	.5		
Uzbek	.5		
Kirghiz	.1		1
Tadzhik	.1		
Turkmen	.1		

To the extent that this table is reliable, therefore, it appears that the RL listeners who revealed themselves during this recent period have been concentrated in the western and the Baltic provinces; and by comparing the amount of evidence with the number of radio receivers in each province, it can be seen that the proportion of listeners who have revealed themselves has been considerably higher in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania and Latvia, than in the Russian Republic itself. Can we believe that this is a true miniature of the RL audience? No, because it may merely reflect the ease with which we can make contact with the audience. But it is at least a suggestive guideline. We can't believe it in the same way we believe a measurement made on a scientific sample, but we can believe it more confidently than an armchair estimate. It is at least a good guess that the audience is disproportionately concentrated in these provinces.

The point I am making is that we have some suggestive guidelines in the evidence, but no data such as we usually expect when we ask for a "profile" of an audience, or the "image" of a station or an institution in the west.

We can, therefore, make an educated guess that the audience is diverse, and a somewhat shakier guess that it may be concentrated more heavily in certain parts of the Soviet Union than in others. We are still shakier ground when we try to say anything about what a broadcast does to the audience. In general, the evidence is encouraging. There is reason to believe the station is getting through, at some times and some places, despite the jamming. Audience mail is heavy for this type of station operating against the extreme opposition RL faces. Mail and interviews indicate that at least some people in the target areas are grateful for the

broadcasts. Everything indicates that the Soviet government and party are not grateful for them. But we must not try to build great claims of effect on such small foundations. Rather the procedure must be, as in the past, to make (a) the best analysis we can make of conditions, attitudes, and needs in the Soviet Union, and of how RL's broadcasts fit into them, (b) the best analysis we can make of the slowly growing heap of direct contacts with listeners, (c) use (b) to illuminate and inform (a) and then feed back into broadcasting policy and practice.

Let me direct your attention to one or two little nuggets in Max's evidence which should be very encouraging to a person like you who is responsible for an international broadcast. This is something that Max is probably too modest to tell you about himself. It comes from some interviews he obtained with a group of repatriates from the Soviet Union. I understand that the fact of the existence of these interviews is not something we talk about at present, and therefore I shall not identify them further. The interesting part of the data, from our present point of view, relates to how much these people knew about events outside the Soviet Union, and what attitudes they formed toward western policies or Cold War contentions, during the time they were in the Soviet Union. The central fact is that the people in this group who listened to western broadcasts not only knew much more about events outside the U.S.S.R., but also had formed attitudes which were much more favorable to our policies and points of view.

This, of course, does not prove causality. We don't know, from that evidence alone, whether these people were simply more alert and better informed anyway, and therefore listened to western broadcasts, or whether the western broadcasts made them better informed, or whether there was some interaction. But let us analyze the situation a little further. Were the listeners previously better informed and more alert? The best evidence we have concerning that is their educational level. Better educated people usually read more, and are more interested in public affairs and distant events. Therefore, let us hold the educational level of these people constant, and see whether there is still a difference between listeners and non-listeners to western broadcasts. Here is a table which we put together from Max's data. In reading it, you should compare, in each educational level, listeners with the non-listeners.

Education	3 years or less	3 through 6 years	More than 6 years	Knew of Hungarian uprising?			Knew about Soviet volunteers for Egypt?			Does U.S. have Peaceful intentions?			Who controls U. S. Government?			Are U.S. bases aggressively intended?			Who started Korean war?						
				Listeners	Non-Listeners	Unascertained	Listeners	Non-Listeners	Unascertained	Listeners	Non-Listeners	Unascertained	Listeners	Non-Listeners	Unascertained	Listeners	Non-Listeners	Unascertained	Listeners	Non-Listeners	Unascertained				
3 years or less	28	15	5	0	1	0	16	4	4	5	7	10	0	18	16	0	4	8	0	19	1	8	20	1	7
Listeners	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Non-Listeners	1	0	0	4	4	8	4	4	8	1	0	15	4	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	3	13	1	0	15
3 through 6 years	66	3	23	2	12	0	56	2	3	10	40	5	2	8	41	0	17	10	2	40	4	22	51	1	16
Listeners	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Non-Listeners	2	0	0	2	3	8	6	3	10	5	2	8	5	0	6	0	2	6	0	0	2	13	4	0	11
More than 6 years	23	5	1	0	0	0	20	3	1	5	13	3	1	9	14	0	9	2	2	14	1	8	18	1	7
Listeners	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Non-Listeners	1	0	0	3	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	3	2	0	3	0	1	3	0	0	1	5	1	0	5

This is a very interesting table, because it makes clear that the listeners had different knowledge and attitudes from non-listeners, regardless of education and of the different reading habits, interests, and alertness that go with more education. So we are a little more confident that perhaps listening to western broadcasts does make a difference. But there is another element, at least, that might enter into this interaction. That is political alertness; some people may simply be more alert politically, and therefore will seek more political information in all ways. The best way we have to control that element is to divide the sample into individuals who had once been Partisans and those who had not. We can suppose, with some confidence, that the Partisans would retain more political interestness and alertness than the others. So let us continue to hold educational differences constant, and see whether it is only the Partisans who show a difference between attitudes and information in listeners and non-listeners. Here is the table, put together from Max's data:

Education	Knew about Soviet volunteers in Egypt?			Does U.S. have peaceful intentions?			Are U.S. bases aggressively intended?			
	Knew	Didn't	Unascertained	Peaceful	Qualified	Unascertained	Aggressive	Non-aggressive	Qualified	Unascertained
<b>3 years or less</b>										
Partisans:										
Listeners	4	4	13	13	2	6	0	16	0	5
Non-Listeners	3	3	1	1	0	6	0	0	2	5
Non-Partisans										
Listeners	5	1	3	3	0	6	0	2	0	5
Non-Listeners	6	1	2	0	0	6	0	0	1	8
<b>3 through 6 years</b>										
Partisans:										
Listeners	46	6	6	35	5	18	2	33	4	19
Non-Listeners	2	2	2	2	3	1	0	1	2	3
Non-Partisans:										
Listeners	8	0	2	6	2	2	0	6	0	4
Non-Listeners	0	1	8	2	0	7	0	0	0	9
<b>More than 6 years</b>										
Partisans:										
Listeners	16	0	2	10	2	6	1	13	1	3
Non-Listeners	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
Non-Partisans:										
Listeners	4	0	3	3	1	3	1	2	0	4
Non-Listeners	2	0	2	1	1	2	0	0	0	4

If you will look at that table, comparing in each case the listeners with the non-listeners, you will see that wherever a comparison is possible the same difference appears: the listeners regardless of education and of Partisan political activity know more than the non-listeners about foreign events and have more favorable attitudes toward the West.

There is another element which might enter in. It is the different role played by the sexes in some cultures. That is, in some societies women are not expected to seek political information or have political ideas. It is, of course, true that there are different proportions of women in the listeners and the non-listeners. Therefore, we continued to hold education constant, but also compared the male listeners with the male non-listeners, and the female listeners with the female non-listeners. I shall spare you having to read another table. The result was exactly as before. Regardless whether the listeners were men or women, they knew more than the non-listeners about events in the West, and held more favorable attitudes toward the West.

These are not necessarily the only variables that enter into the relationship we have found. But what we have been able to do is to eliminate several of the most powerful variables that -- apart from listening to western radio -- might make for these attitudinal and knowledge differences. In other words, it looks as though the act of listening has more to do with the situation than do the personal elements in the situation. It is very hard, therefore, looking at these data, to say that listening to western radio does not make a difference. And it seems to me that the implications of this little bit of evidence out of your Audience Research Division ought to be immensely encouraging to you in your responsibility as a Western broadcaster.

Now let me turn to a part of the Audience Research activity where we can speak more positively. This concerns the panel evaluations. Max and I have talked this over at great length, and I went to a meeting with the Radio people which mostly concerned the same problem. I don't believe there is any essential disagreement with the following position:

1. Program evaluation is essential. Lacking the feedback a western station gets from direct audience contacts, you need the best possible substitute for it, in order to keep from playing blindman's bluff.

2. However, you probably need two kinds of program evaluation. One is chiefly for the use of the men who are building or re-building programs, and consists of close study of several consecutive appearances of the same program. This is difficult thing to get done with the kind of panels you have available. It requires panelists qualified for the particular program, and special questions related to the program. But it is clearly useful, and I should think you might start on it with analyses of several programs in the next few months.



3. There is also a second kind of panel evaluation you need, which might be called quality control. As the preceding type is mostly to help programmers and producers, so this second kind is for the general guidance of the administrators and supervisory board of RL. As the preceding type should concentrate on single programs, so this latter type should concentrate on the programs as they hopefully are heard -- that is, a segment of broadcast time. This, too, is very useful; and, in fact, I don't believe you could sleep well at nights without the assurance that it is going on.

(The present panel evaluations attempt to do both these tasks, but are perhaps more useful for quality control than for individual program study, inasmuch as they may pick up only one appearance or a few scattered appearances of a given program. In any case, you know some of the problems of getting critical information into the "blood stream" of a production organization, and you know therefore that criticism which is desired by the user, and which he helps to order, will be more likely to be accepted than criticism which seems to come from the outside. This itself would be a good reason to try the evaluations of individual programs - number (2).)

4. However, if you are going to use quality control, you may as well use the method of quality control which American industry has almost universally adopted - that is, probability sampling of the output. Max knows how to do this, and there is a good chance that it might save you some of the time presently given to evaluation. Max can tell when the results reach the point of stability, and determine on that basis how large a sample is needed.

I have one more thing to say about evaluation. During this last year, Max synthesized all previous panel evaluations of the programs into ten "rules" or "most common faults." This is an important development, because it represents a move from the empiricism and changeability of individual criticism toward the stability and broad applicability of theory. I don't think you ought to lose that advantage. Why not have a special evaluation sometime this year? Assemble a panel to study a week of RL in terms of how well these ten common faults are being avoided. If the record is clean - fine. If it isn't, which faults are still being found? And then get out a short version of the "ten commandments" with examples, for all new programmers -- and perhaps for old ones, too.

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This letter is already too long. Let me conclude by saying simply that I think you have a solid Audience Research operation, working under great difficulties. I see no changes in methods that would make a sudden and spectacular difference, and I think your Director is well aware of the chief targets, the road toward them, the ways those roads can be made a bit smoother and more direct. It is always helpful to expose the problem to new eyes, and for that reason such a meeting as I suggested might be useful. But I feel you can be confident that work is going forward in a solid and intelligent way, no claims are being made that should not be made, and the effort is in good hands.

Sincerely yours,

Wilbur Schwann

WB/mc

cc:    
Mr. Bertrandias

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SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO EGMA 60445

AMCONFIDENTIAL

October 24, 1962

Mr. Andre Yedigiaroff  
American Committee for Liberation  
30 East 42nd Street  
New York 17, N. Y.

Dear Andre:

I am enclosing herewith our narrative for the  
President's Annual Report.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

[ ]

MR/mc  
Encl.

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DRAFT

Audience Research

In the few summer weeks from July to September this year more than 25 million copies of Soviet daily, weekly, and monthly publications carried virulent attacks on the American Committee. These attacks were not by any means limited to minor, regional publications, but consisted in some cases of four or five-column articles in such key Party organs as Pravda, Izvestia, and Kommunisticheskaya Pravda. Neither paper nor ink was spared in the Party propagandists' attempts to warn readers of the urgent need to be on their guard against the anti-Soviet activities of the American Committee.

In the midst of stern economic difficulties, particularly in agriculture, the psychological climate in the Soviet Union during the summer of 1962 was marked by a clash between the popular pressures for relaxation and liberalization on the one hand, and the tightening-up of political control at governmental and Party levels on the other. Within this context, Soviet media attacks on the American Committee fit as clearly into the pattern of Soviet defensive behavior as do the increased jamming of Western broadcasts, the apparent intensification of Soviet censorship, and the significant reduction in Soviet tourism to ~~the~~ Western countries. Under these general conditions research into the foreign radio listening behavior and psychological make-up of Radio Liberty's audience in the target areas faced new odds in the course of the last twelve months.

Despite these difficulties, however, over 30 per cent more evidences of listening to Radio Liberty were obtained during the period between November, 1961, and October, 1962, than in the comparable period last year. This brings the number of Radio Liberty listener reactions gathered during the past 12 months to 573, which is significantly more than the total number of reactions to BBC Russian-language broadcasts, recorded by the BBC audience research staff during 1961.

Just over half the reactions to Radio Liberty programs recorded this year are mail responses from listeners in the target area; these represent an almost 100 per cent increase over the total volume of listener mail that reached us last year. Despite evidence of increased mail interception, 203 letters or postcards were received in just under a year. In the month of February, 1962 the rate was more than one letter a day, whereas in February, 1961 five letters reached us, and in February, 1960 none. This marked increase in mail responses, moreover, was accompanied by a number of brave and encouraging actions by Soviet citizens.

A listener in the Lithuanian SSR, for instance, enclosed two ballots from the March 18, 1962, elections to the Supreme Soviet in an envelope mailed to Radio Liberty. On the ballot forms he had crossed out the names of the official candidates and had substituted instead the word "Liberty". An equally heartening message was received from a listener near Moscow, who wrote:

"You put an end to my spiritual searchings and sufferings. It is a pity that our liberty and democracy will stop this piece of paper at the frontier barrier..."

In a similar vein a listener from the Soviet capital writes:

"Need I say how pleasant it is to hear a native Russian voice, when one suddenly feels the breath of humanity, of pervading hope, of a searching and a craving to find the path for which we are all looking as equals...I want to thank you noble initiators of such a sensible work..."

Evidence that Radio Liberty's broadcasts are having a growing and lasting impact in the target area is shown in two letters received during the past few months. In one, dated September 12, 1962, from a group of listeners in Kiev, we read:

"Personally, and on behalf of my friends, I should like to thank you very much for your work...Your talks and advice are being remembered and are giving us strength and hope in a better future. Do not spare your efforts for us young people; they are worth more than gold. Do not grudge your work - our goal is the same. We believe that this hell will come to an end, and that you, yourself, will live to realize the fruits of your work."

In another letter, mailed on May 16, 1962, in Warsaw, a group of Soviet listeners writes: "Many people listen to you, particularly military personnel in the suburbs of the so-called people's democracy. People here, especially the intelligentsia, are thinking in a new way from Soviet they notice a great deal but talk little - they are afraid. Something that has lodged itself in our minds, however, cannot be ripped out by any means." These letters are only one of many references to group listening that appeared in mail received from the target area during the past year. Group listening, in this connection, is not limited to the mere fact of two or more Soviet citizens hearing a Radio Liberty program on a single receiver. Our censored mail has shown that members of listening groups not only sit down together to hear the broadcasts, but they also spend a good deal of time discussing the content of individual programs. This has led, in some cases, to valuable criticism and suggestions being fed back to the programming staff from the listeners. In fact, an important feature of mail responses and of Radio Liberty's reply series are the stimulating dialogues that have been started between the station and a number of its regular listeners. In their letters these listeners take part in a spirited discussion with Radio Liberty contributors and other listeners and occasionally supply the station with additional ammunition for its theses. These dialogues have the

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dual advantage of stimulating interest in the programs and of providing useful information on prevailing opinions and attitudes in the target area.

Feedback, however, is not limited to mail responses alone. It is received also from Soviet citizens who are interviewed in Western countries; it comes, via Western visitors to the USSR, from Soviet citizens in their own country, from Soviet defectors, and from non-Russian repatriates returning to Western countries from the USSR. In all, personal contact with more than 1000 present or former residents of the USSR provided the basis of the feedback information that reached us during the past year.

Most of this data came from Moscow, Leningrad, and Western parts of the USSR, from the Ukraine, the Baltic republics, and the satellite countries. In addition, many cases of listening to Radio Liberty and reactions to the programs were reported in such remote places as the village of Vozhayevka in Amur Oblast near the Soviet-Chinese border, Glukhovka in the Maritime Krai near the Sea of Japan, Frunse in the Kirghiz SSR, Krasnoyarsk in the heart of Siberia, Armavir in Krasnodar Krai between the Sea of Azov and the Caspian Sea, Uralsk in the Kazakh SSR, and Stavropol in the Northern Caucasus.



Data gathered in the course of the year reaffirmed previous findings indicating that the majority of Radio Liberty's listeners are under 40 years of age and that they are represented in all major occupational groups. We find them among students and among retired persons; among the technical, scientific, and cultural intelligentsia; among industrial and agricultural workers; among members of the armed forces and merchant fleet; among the non-employed and among entertainers. This feedback is probably the most encouraging and most important news of the year. The story of the role that Radio Liberty is playing in the shaping of public opinion in the USSR today is shown both in the vigor of the statements made by the few who dare to write or speak out frankly and in the fact that these audience responses come from scattered demographic areas and from diversified sociological population groups.

The impact of Radio Liberty broadcasts on Soviet military personnel emerged again and again. Several of the letters received by the station during the past year came from Soviet soldiers stationed in Eastern Germany or Poland. A Soviet major from Zhdanov, Ukrainian SSR, revealed that, although he himself listened to Radio Liberty, the men in his unit were forbidden to tune in to Western stations. He went on to say that during the first six months of their service recruits are lectured regularly on the evils of foreign radio listening, and added: "The six months are a protective measure. Of course,

not all of the recruits have heard Western stations, but those who have contaminate the others, and this we have to stop."

A recent study on the foreign radio listening habits of Soviet citizens, conducted by an American Committee team at the Eighth World Youth Festival in Helsinki, emphasizes previous audience research findings to the effect that communists are as likely to be found in Radio Liberty's audience as non-communists. During this festival, which was held between July 28 and August 6, 1962, more than 500 Soviet citizens were contacted by our field team, and the topic of foreign radio listening was discussed with 121 of these. Of this latter group, 51 persons admitted listening to Radio Liberty. Two revealing findings in this connection were that the majority of these respondents appeared to be staunch supporters of the Soviet regime, and that listening to Radio Liberty was admitted more frequently among Party officials and professional men such as lawyers and doctors than among members of any other occupational group.

The question of Soviet jamming of foreign radio stations was a frequent topic of discussion both in audience mail and in conversations with Soviet citizens. Whereas strong jamming of Radio Liberty was confirmed by listeners located in widely scattered areas of the USSR, increasing evidence was received that many Soviet citizens have developed anti-jamming devices

and adapters to improve the audibility of Radio Liberty programs. A recent visitor to the Ukrainian SSR reported, for instance, that wires were used in conjunction with "some kind of acid" to minimize jamming. Similar results were claimed by a December 1961 returnee from the Soviet Union who described a method of tuning in two sets simultaneously on the same wave length. As in the past, the only listeners who failed to condemn jamming were a few Party officials or members of the teaching profession who claimed that it was necessary in order to protect the younger generation from the dangers of foreign radio listening. Most of those listeners who wrote letters to the station appeared to share the views of a group of Soviet citizens who wrote in May, 1962:

"The people are exasperated not by what you are saying, as Khrushchev maintains, but by the fact that Western broadcasts are jammed. Let them (the jammers) rage; the truth cannot be stifled."

#### Program Evaluation

One in five of the Russian-language programs broadcast by Radio Liberty during the past twelve months was submitted to outside reviewers for critical evaluation. In all, a total of 76 days programming was reviewed in this way. Forty of these programs were auditioned and reviewed by an average of 20 Soviet Affairs specialists or former Soviet citizens who left

the USSR within the last six years. This year our panel of former Soviet citizens was strengthened by the addition of three new members, two of whom left the Soviet Union as recently as 1961. One of the new additions is a high-level Soviet engineer who defected from his assignment with UNESCO, another is a film-producer who arrived in the West only 10 months ago, and the third is a Russian-language teacher who worked in Soviet schools until 1960.

Altogether 4465 separate programming parts were reviewed by our evaluation panels during the year. We are at present working on a scheme to streamline this routine program evaluation effort by introducing a quality control system based on the random selection of audition days. Concurrently, special evaluation studies of programming series are being prepared to meet the needs of the programmers in gathering detailed reactions to such regular features as: "The Land Awaits" and "Russia Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow." It is expected that these series can be improved as a result of detailed analytical reviews by a number of panelists.

The program evaluation effort during the past year was not limited to routine reviews by panels. A number of outside consultants also contributed to this work and made many worthwhile suggestions for improving the effectiveness, content, and delivery techniques of the station's daily output. A Harvard University historian specializing in Soviet minorities, Professor Richard Pipes, reviewed blocks of programs emanating

from Radio Liberty's Moscow desks and made some encouraging programming suggestions. Professor Ithiel de Sola Pool of M.I.T., who specializes in American-Soviet relations and communications media, set down his impressions of a number of the station's Russian-language scripts.

A staff study, entitled "Obvious and Hidden Flaws in Radio Liberty Russian Programs" attempted to synthesize panel evaluations over a ten-month period and to move from the empiricism and changeability of individual criticism toward the stability and broad applicability of theory. One of the benefits gained from this last analysis of over 2600 individual evaluations of specific program parts, based on 127 days of Radio Liberty's Russian broadcasts, was the provision of a yardstick for measuring future programming performance. It is intended that sample programs should be tested on these lines every six months.