

VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATC. NO. EGMA-33275
200-124-39/

CLASSIFICATION
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TO : Chief, IO

DATE: 31 March 1958

FROM : Chief, Munich Base *OK*

INFO: Chief, EE
Chief, SR
COS, Germany

SUBJECT: GENERAL— DTDORIC/OKACTIVE/LCIMPROVE

SPECIFIC— Boris YAKOVLEV in "Der Stern" @ Nikolai NORMAN (DOB: 20 April 1903
(POB: Veshkeima USSR)

REFERENCE: A. EGMA-31743 - 31 January 1958
B. EGMW-5696 - 11 March 1958

MICROFILMED
AUG 20 1958
DOCUMENT

ACTION REQUIRED: None. For your information.

1. As we indicated in paragraph 1 of EGMA 31743, we had been provided by [] with a PBCHORD Memorandum (CAM-99) covering two attachments. The first was a letter written by Wolfgang SCHRAPS of "Der Stern" to the appropriate officer of PBCHORD, apparently in reply to the latter's inquiry about source material for the YAKOVLEV article which had appeared in the 16 November 1957 issue of "Der Stern" and which made some rather sensational charges about the espionage mission of this man once employed by Americans in Germany who, as a protective measure, had allegedly flown him to the U.S. where he ended up with a job in ODACID. The second attachment to SCHRAPS' letter purported to be a copy of the microfilmed material which was used as source material for the YAKOVLEV article.

2. We recall that the Headquarters' LCIMPROVE desk once found itself in a labyrinthine maze of YAKOVLEV traces when an effort was made to consolidate, analyze, and evaluate the file material on YAKOVLEV. Needless to say the task was insurmountable in the time available; so when we received this so-called source material for the "Der Stern" article, it appeared that at last we might have found a short-cut to the truth about YAKOVLEV.

3. Accordingly, the material as received from SCHRAPS was translated from the German and the result leaves anyone who may be interested stranded in the same cul-de-sac of indecision - the inevitable fate of whoever tries to render a verdict of good or bad about this controversial emigre. Just so that Headquarters may have in their files a copy of the material on which the "Der Stern" article was based, thereby being in possession of concrete evidence of the questionable reliability and objectivity of the source, we are transmitting under separate cover CAM-99 with one copy each of the German and the translated version of the two attachments (SCHRAPS' letter and the microfilmed material). Note that the German version contains certain

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(cont'd)

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charts which we did not attempt to convert into English.

4. You will also wonder, as we did, about the reference to Nick BARKOW in SCHRAPS' letter to PBCHORD. BARKOW is apparently responsible for the article. [] has tried unsuccessfully to get some identifying information on him and we have not been able to find traces in Munich Base files. Also, we have not been able to come up with the "results of BARKOW's investigation" alluded to in the fourth paragraph of SCHRAPS' letter. This investigative report is apparently something over and above the microfilmed material which we are sending under separate cover.

5. We understand from [] that no stir has been caused at PBCHORD over the YAKOVLEV article. Similarly, CABOLT was apparently entirely satisfied by [] statement that to the best of our knowledge the story in "Der Stern" was entirely false.

Approved: [] [] [] []

Attachments: A. German version
B. Translated version

Distribution:

✓ 3 - IO w/1 set Atts. USC
2 - EE w/1 set Atts USC
2 - SR w/1 set Atts USC
2 - COS/G w/1 set Atts USC

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~~SEPARATE OVER ATTACHMENT 6 TO EGI 33275~~

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... I am sorry I did not get around to sending you the documents promised any sooner. Due to the busy pre-Christmas schedule, I was unable to put in writing Nick Barkow's report on the Jakowlev case. I will now give you the gist of Barkow's investigation, which I already sketched out to you earlier over the telephone:

In about 1953 it was planned to have Jakowlew, who was then head of the Munich Institute, kidnaped by a girl ballet dancer. This plot was uncovered at the very last minute and Jakowlew flown to the United States, where he was given a position in the Foreign Ministry (sic).

After Khchreshchev's secret trial of Stalin (sic, but meaning after the beginning of the anti-personality-cult era) Jakowlew was at a reception given by the "Foreign Ministry" for a visiting group of Moscow architects. The leader of that group was Wlassow, who is the Chief of the Moscow Office of Building. (Construction). Wlassow seems to have recognized Jakowlew, because he addressed him with approximately those words: "I remember you from your activities in Moscow. But then you had nothing to do with the construction business." According to Barkow, this seems to have been the first occasion at which your people realized that something was wrong with Jakowlew. Wlassow, who seems to have unwittingly unmasked an important Sov agent, was flown back to Moscow via Paris the very next day. He was accompanied by a few guards.

I am enclosing copies of microfilms which I also used in addition to the results of Barkow's investigation, which he disclosed to me. The fact that Hans Wallenberg's name also appears, makes me doubtful as to the factualness of its contents. In these documents Wallenberg is accused heavily of Communist underground activity. - Please remember to return the documents to me. -

Once more all my best wishes for your sojourn in the United States,

Best regards,

s/ Wolfgang Schrapf

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SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN RUSSIAN EMIGRE CIRCLES

(Comments on a "chart" on the same subject)

The disruptive activity of the Soviets in the political life of Russian Emigre Circles was begun as far back as 1920 by the so-called "Young-Russian Movement" (Mladorossy). Shortly after the Revolution which spelled the end of the Russian National State, the prevalent mood in the entire emigration circles and especially among the younger people, was exclusively in favor of the monarchy; the martyrdom suffered by the Russian Imperial Family had greatly contributed toward this trend. The INO of the GPU (Foreign Office of the RIS) made it its objective to create an organization by her agents, which could absorb this group, anticipating the creation of an active anti-bolshevik mass movement, which it attempted to destroy by such means. Contrary to the attitude of the population of the Western countries in general, who mainly regarded the emigre groups as an unwelcome foreign body in their midst, the Soviets, from the very start, had no illusions about the meaning of the existence abroad of a large group of their sworn enemy, and especially so in the event of a hot war.

The Young-Russians appeared to be a monarchistic Movement, which attracted all the active elements among the Russian youths, and by this means furnished a clear picture to the Soviets of the strength of their enemies, and also put them in a position to bar any dangerous individuals from employment with an organization that constituted a real danger to the Soviet cause. The Young Russian ideology and their slogan "For Czar and Soviets", tried to justify the need for the Soviet System, which allegedly was accepted by the Russian people and was in accordance with their wishes. Proof of this was furnished by a theory which is being expounded in the West to this day, viz. the fact that the Soviets won the civil war, and that it can be concluded from that, that the Soviet Regime is the form of society desired by the Russian people. The Young Russians' ideology contended that it was sufficient to replace the Bolshevik leaders by the Imperial family (monarchy) and that the structure of the government did not have to undergo any changes. By this, they removed the philosophic and ethical basis of the anti-Bolshevik movement, which was undoubtedly the deeper psychological meaning of this Soviet provocation.

For about seven years, from 1923-1930, during the period of the Soviet's extreme weakness, especially military-wise and with respect to their internal organization, they were able to successfully still any anti-Bolshevik activities abroad (which under prevailing conditions could easily have spread into Soviet Russia). When in 1930 the entire leadership of the Young Russian Movement was traced as being a very definite part of the Sov Embassy in Paris and getting its directions from the Soviets, this development

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which as such was a setback to the Soviet cause, still contained the following elements in it which the Soviets could use to advantage:

1. They succeeded in disabusing the younger emigree circles of their pro-monarchist attitude which also caused them to abandon their active-anti-Bolshevist activities within such organizations.
2. Due to efforts in the same direction individual representatives of the Russian Imperial Family, such as Archdukes Kyrill and Dmitri, who were keeping in touch with the monarchist movement, became the object of criticism.
3. Soviet agents and other pro-Sov elements in the West were in a position to undermine cooperation between the West and Russian emigre circles by pointing out the infiltration of those circles by GPU agents.

At the beginning of the 1930 totalitarian ideology was riding high. Italy was prospering under Mussolini's dictatorship, both economically and in the fields of power politics. In Germany Hitler was getting ready to take over. Traditional anti-semitism among the Russian exiles, which constantly was nursed by the historical analysis of the reasons and causes of the Russian Revolution, made the people especially receptive for this aspect of National Socialism. Socialist ideas, which at that time had not been put into practice and thereby had not as yet had a chance of proving their insufficiency, were the fashion in post-war Europe. Any political party, which combined dictatorship and collectivism in its program could not fail at that time, in its appeal to the younger elements of the Russian exile group, especially since they had just recently turned away from their monarchist revival program.

The Soviets exploited this state of affairs by bringing under their influence the more active members within the emigre circles even after the coupe which had exposed the actual leadership of the "Young Russian Movement". In 1941 it was proven that one of the ideological leaders of the ten newly founded NTS (1930) (meaning...) Prof. Georgi Jewski, was acting under direct orders of the Soviet.

The fact that with the exception of the top leaders, who had been exposed beyond any doubt, most of the former leading members of the Youth Movement were again put into leading positions in the new organization, gave rise to certain doubts even in 1930, but all the intricacies of the "Young Russian Affair" were not uncovered until later. The official party program of the NTS, which had been put in print for the first time before WWI, proclaimed the ideas of the so-called "Solidarism" which contained all ideological factors of totalitarianism. They believed in Leadership, carried out by a group of Trained Leaders, and in a form of government based upon one leader;

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they believe in favoring state capitalism at the expense of individual enterprise and deny all ethical and religious principles; the latter element strikes one as strange especially in any Russian group, but which in keeping with the trend of the times, did not at first receive proper attention.

The leading member of NTS was soon suspected of being connected with the Freemason Movement; this suspicion proved to be founded on actual fact in 1937, when a direct connection between the NTS leaders Poremski and Rozhdestwenski with the Paris Headquarters of the Freemasons, located in Rue Cadet 16, Paris, was uncovered. It is also significant, that the NTS Branch Office in Germany dopped any outward signs of its connection with the freemasons in 1933.

Until the outbreak of WWII NTS variously attempted to send young Russian Patriots into Soviet Russia to carry out some propaganda mission. Of the few dozen people who seem to have actually been smuggled into Soviet Russia in this manner, not one single individual came back and there can be no doubt about their instant apprehension by the NKVD.

The two NTS centers in Paris and Belgrade were closed with the occupation of those two cities by the Germans. After the outbreak of the German-Soviet war German Intelligence investigated NTS-Soviet relationship, the closeness of which became quite apparent when the NTS head in Belgrade, Prof. Jewski made his exit from Belgrade together with the members of the Soviet Legation in Belgrade.

Despite these "persecutions", which are frequently brought to mind by the NTS leaders, especially in the presence of Americans, it became apparent as early as 1941, that the certain German authorities were giving preferential treatment to the NTS. After 22 June 1941 almost the entire Russian emigre colony in France (the largest in this area) attempted by all possible means to enter Germany in order to take part in the fight against the Soviets. These applications were turned down by the Germans almost without exception by the German authorities in Paris and it soon became clear, that National Socialist policy regarding Russia did not include the employment of Russian patriots. It was noted, however, that despite the accumulation of derogatory material collected by German Intelligence regarding NTS, it became steadily easier for members of that group to enter Germany, to the point where finally in 1941 the entire NTS Hdqs was moved to Berlin. Members of NTS were employed in the Ministry for Eastern Affaires and in the various propaganda offices, directed against the East and were also employed as interpreters, etc.

It transpired later on that the support the NTS received in this manner originated from the Bormann-Leibbrandt office of the NSDAP, whose activities during WWII were one of the model Soviet provocations. Reich-

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leader Bormann, in charge of supreme Party headquarters and Hitler's right hand in all matters pertaining to the Party was a man whose general approach to life did not differ from that of the Soviets and who was always pressing for more extreme measures. He had been a Soviet agent from the very beginning of his NSDAP career in the early twenties when he first joined the Party. By making sizable financial contributions to the Party, the origin of which never became clear, he made himself indispensable to Hitler.

Bormann disappeared without leaving a trace when the Soviets occupied Berlin in April-May 1945 and is now, according to reliable sources, living in the USSR.

Bormann's accomplice was Dr. Georg Leibbrandt, a native of Russia, and at the time of the Bolshevik revolution a member of the Menshevik Party. Bormann made Leibbrandt head of the Foreign Department of the NSDAP and after the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities made him Alfred Rosenberg's right hand in the newly created Ministry for Eastern Affairs.

The objective of the Bormann-Leibbrandt combined activities clearly was to suppress by all means at their disposal the employment of Russian anti-communists within and outside of Russia, which Moscow considered rightly as the largest potential danger to the success of their ideology.

Bormann and Leibbrandt were successful in their Soviet mission in that they managed to

1. have suggestions, made by Russian emigre leaders and especially by generals with experience from the civil war, turned down; participation of rightist circles within the emigre colony was always prevented; East-policy was interpreted and formed into a policy of exploitation and colonization in the course of which Russian patriots and seasoned anti-communist fighters were of course unacceptable;

2. Hundreds and thousands of Russian soldiers, who gave themselves up to the Germans without a fight and who were ready to take up arms against the Soviets on the German side, received inhuman treatment, and were left to starve in PW camps; their treatment was such that they, who had started out as potential allies, soon became to be some of Germany's fiercest enemies; a formation of Russian units in occupied areas was prohibited;

3. A division of Russia into separate countries became part of the official German propaganda line. Separate National Committees were set up who all conducted anti-Russian propaganda. By such means any cooperation with emigre circles was made impossible, and Red Army resistance at the front increased when the anti-Russian trend of Hitler's war became apparent to the Russian soldiers, they shifted their loyalty to the Soviet Regime.

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4. Occupied territories were looted and the population treated as inferior people; this provided the ideological background for the guerilla warfare behind the German lines.

Soviet provocations on a large scale, conducted right into the highest echelons at German Headquarters, first created terrible reverses, and eventually caused a turn of events in favor of Soviet Russia. When criticism became louder leading circles of the army as well as elsewhere - due in part to the demarches made by rightist circles within the exile colony - the disastrous implications (calamity) of German Eastern Policy became apparent and Bormann and Leibbrandt had to fake a change in their East-Policy course in order to stay in office. They could afford such a switch all the better after the Stalingrad disaster, when both the Eastern campaign as well as the war in general had to be considered lost for Germany.

During the first two years of the Eastern campaign (1941-43) Leibbrandt took all necessary measures, in order to insure that any such Russian-entrusted actions, as could not be prevented by him, were sure to be in the hands of those Russians who he could trust to continue the Bormann-Leibbrandt line. In line with this was the exclusive employment of NTS members in the various propaganda and Eastern Ministry jobs. Leibbrandt relied more and more on NTS to implement the Third Reich's policy toward Soviet Russia. During the years preparatory to the Wlassow-operation (1942-43), Russian emigres and German Intelligence ascertained that Leibbrandt met for consultation with Baydalakov and other NTS leaders each Thursday at some clandestine spot. NTS agents were employed as interpreters and camp leaders in camps of Russian PWs where they sifted the suitable individuals from the numbers of former high-ranking Soviet Officers, members of the Bolshevist Party (sic) or the "Komsomol" for recruitment into the NTS.

When a "Movement for the Liberation of Russia" was founded in 1943, it was from its very beginnings under the destructive influence of NTS. It was conducted in a manner least dangerous for the Soviets. Not a single one of the White-Russian generals who had made a name for himself during the civil war and of whom there were a fair number such as Peter Krasnow, a world-famous Cossack general, General Peter von Glasenapp, Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western White Russian Army in the civil war, and many others, became leaders in this movement. They could not be won over to the objectives of National-Socialism or "Solidarism" and refused to be made a tool of the Bormann-Leibbrandt group. A run-of-the-mill Soviet general, who had been in the Party in Stalin's services for many years, and who was only made to realize after he had become a pw, that Bolshevism was no achievement but an evil, was chosen to become the leader in the "Liberation Movement". Wlassow was an unknown quantity who, straight from the PW camp, was in no position to take a stand for his own political independence.

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Wlassow's entourage was chosen on the same principles, viz. average Soviet officers who had been members of the Boshevist (sic) Party. Not one single military leader from among the emigre group was asked to cooperate in the Russian Liberation Army (ROA). Even subordinate positions were filled with individuals who had worn Soviet Officers' uniforms only a few months ago. Wlassow's right hand man and second in command, Lt. Gen Zhilenkow, had been an important Party functionary before the war (leader of a District Committee in Moscow) and who had been put into a Soviet general's uniform and made commissar of a Soviet Army group. He was in charge of the political and propaganda office of the Wlassow Army.

When the Russian Liberation Movement was established after all, Bormann and Leibbrandt - upon orders from Moscow - pursued the following objectives designed to counteract any possible fruitful collaboration:

1. It should be avoided under all circumstances to have the Germans regard their Russian counterparts as equals and to have German policy revised into considering the true interests of the Russian nation; the race theory and the tremendous arrogance of the National-Socialist Leaders who considered all Non-Germans as inferior, played right into Bormann's hands. Under his influence, even as late as 1944/45 plans of conquest and exploitation of the Eastern Areas had not been abandoned. All this made an honest cooperation between Russian patriots and the German policy makers impossible.
2. By the same token no honest cooperation on the military side in the sense of a combination of German and Russian soldiers into units, was accepted. (permitted). To thwart such an objective was very easy since most of the Russians had been through German PW camps where - on orders from Bormann and Leibbrandt - they had been inhumanly treated. Their justified resentment of the Germans was diligently kept alive by NTS agents who saw to it that it never died down. The complete absence in the ROA of political and military leaders from the emigre circles, who could have approached the problems of Russo-German cooperation and the contemplated return to a semblance of normalcy without the stirred-up Anti-German feelings, facilitated the work of the Soviet agents.
3. The entire Russian Movement was supposed to become a propaganda movement only and exclusively Russian units were not to be established under any circumstances. The German military, who basically were anxious for units to be established, were always informed by the Intelligence units that this was impossible due to the poor morale and discipline and the anti-German sentiment among ROA. Obviously, Germany's enemies could not be handed arms and equipment. In this way a Russian military action on the Eastern Front, which could have made an incisive difference to the result of that campaign, was delayed until it was too late. One Division of the Russian Liberation Army was only created in 1945, another one was to be created, although at that time the number of Russian Volunteers counted as many as 100,000.

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NTS made every conceivable effort to undermine morale of the Liberation Movement. Its ideological basis was - as a result of the NTS agents' working - an explicit collectivist NRS program. Young people who had only just escaped from the destructive influence of the Atheistic Soviet System, and who were looking for new moral values and ideals, were again presented with a one-party system which was the aim of the so-called Liberation Movement, a dictatorship of the leader-group, made up of NTS functionaries who were replacing the Bolshevics. All of this ideology is foreign to the Russian mentality and the Russian people.

Religious Influence: Religious influence was excluded from any training of ROA members and from all propaganda activities of the "Movement" (headed by former Commissar Zhilenkow) directed at millions of Russians working in Germany. (Even the most recent edition of the NTS Program which appeared in 1948 and in which a much stronger effort at keeping up democratic appearances is made than before, no mention of God or Christianity is made in the entire document consisting of 18,000 words) Bormann and Leibbrandt had seen to it, that this program which differed scarcely from the National-Socialist Program, was well received by the German Party Leadership and received its support.

The ROA came more and more under Soviet influence and thereby forced many Russian patriots as well as many "new emigres" to prefer joining the German Army in order to fight the Soviets rather than the Russian Liberation Movement. Thefts, swindles and pillagings of the population became common and shady deals became a daily occurrence just as much as the drunken orgies of Wlassow's officer staff, which soon became the talk of the day amongst Berliners. Soviet agents could go about their business openly, and without interference. In 1943, a secret communist cell was created by the members of the ROA officer school at Dabendorf. At a secret gathering of this cell in some woods near Dabendorf in the summer of 1943 they took the loyalty oath to Stalin under a picture of his erected there. As a result Baschmanov, leader of this group and a former Soviet colonel, was shot by the German Security Service. The members of this meeting, however, who were almost all NTS members, were protected by the NTS and its German connections. Two of them were later on discovered to be Soviet spies and shot by German Security. The rest of them are still active in emigre circles in Germany (see chart: Jakowlew, Achminow, Krylow et al.) One of these, KAJOWLEW, subsequently became officer in charge of propaganda of the first ROA Division, to be employed against the Soviets at the Oder Front. He called on the ROA soldiers not to shoot at their brothers in the Red Army, for which he was court-martialed and received the death sentence; however, he received General Wlassow's pardon at the very last minute.

Anti-German propaganda, which saw to a constant re-invigoration of anti-German sentiment amongst the Russian soldiers, climaxed towards the end

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of the war and the almost openly proclaimed slogan: "Stalin is enemy No.1 and Germany is enemy No. 2". It would be outside the scope of this work to try to determine the extent of the justification of such a slogan. Without any justification, it stands to reason, however, that these slogans would not have had much success. It was the dilemma of Wlassow's Army of having the choice between a victory of the Soviets and a German victory over them. That, from the Russian point of view Hitler constituted the lesser of two evils is obvious.

In 1941 it was obvious both to Russians and Germans alike, that the Germans may be capable of overthrowing the Soviet Regime, but that they could not conquer and occupy Russia. A dependence of a post-Soviet regime on Germany as a result of a German victory over the Soviets, could only be temporary, and in this sense a victory by Hitler over the Soviets could actually be interpreted as liberation of Russia.

In the light of our present knowledge of the workings of the Nazi Regime it is clear that such a victory of Hitler in the East and thereby in general which would have put the National Socialist Regime on a permanent basis would have been a catastrophe for all of Europe. In 1942/43 this could, however, not be foreseen. But whoever did, such as the well known emigre leader General Peter von Glasenapp, abstained from any cooperation with the Third Reich, after having indicated to the Third Reich's ruinous Eastern policy. No member of the original emigre group would have been willing to play an undignified double role as intended by the NTS in which we would have to wear German uniforms as a pretense in order to prepare the treason and to give the German Army a stab in the back at the crucial moment. The Soviets and their agents such as Bormann, Leibbrandt and the NTS leadership in general had good reason to recruit only loyal Soviet Party members or their former generals for the "Liberation Movement".

People to whom a soldier's honor and an officer's ethics meant nothing and who had no moral qualms about anything, were easily converted into tools of a large-scale Soviet technique which doubtlessly was master-minded by some of the most brilliant NKVD officers.

Due to the situation as described above it was possible that General Bunjatschenko, Commander of the 1st ROA Division, (former colonel in the Soviet Army) refused to carry out General Schoeners' orders of an attack on the Soviets on the Oder Front, and upon his own counsel retreated with his armies into Bohemia, where subsequently his division combined with the section of the Czech Communist guerillas and "liberated" Prague. It was not until recently that all the details of this unequalled act of treachery on the part of the Soviets, supported by NTS agents on Wlassow's staff, were unravelled by Soviet emigre members in Germany. Victor Baydalakov,

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a NTS leader, clearly admits all this in a propoganda article written for Colliers on 23 February 1952. (Quote: "They are Sticking Stalin with a Pitchfork", by Robert Shaplen).

There is an element of tragedy in the Wlassow Movement due to its having raised the hopes of millions of anti-communists of liberation of their homeland from the Soviets for so many years, and in that tens of thousands of Russians gave their lives for a cause which in reality was nothing but an act of Soviet double-play. By this means the Soviets were in a position to achieve to objectives which were decisive for their eventual victory;

1. They averted the danger of successful cooperation between the Germans and Russian emigre groups, which, properly employed, would have meant the doom of the Soviets; this cooperation was undermined by setting the stage for mistrust which made any success impossible from the start. The Wlassow Movement was of no advantage for Germany, on the contrary, the German Army found itself forced to release a number of Russian volunteers for the ROA. At the crucial moment, those units put in action at the Oder front proved to be not fit for combat and eventually joined forces with the Czech communists.

2. Honest Russian anti-communists, who collaborated with the Germans - to no effect either for Germany or themselves - were tagged collaborators. The Soviets managed to have them extradited and thus managed to liquidate (do away with) hundreds of thousands of competent anti-communist fighters, who would have been invaluable in the present political situation.

After the war NTS made attempts at getting the remains of the Wlassow Army into its fold and to infiltrate other emigre organizations. Since the NTS connections with Third Reich officialdom was pretty well known, it appeared to remain comparatively inactive. However, in order to obtain control of the political trend among the refugees, NTS undertook what turned out to be a very typical bolshevic cover-maneuver in the spring of 1947: some 30 or 40 NTS members pretended to leave the party, some were even blackballed under all kinds of pretenses. They reappeared as party-unaffiliated individuals, however secretly supported by NTS, within the emigre community. During the difficult post-war days when most of the well known personalities in the emigre world had a black record due to their definite anti-communist activities during the war and the danger of their persecution by the Soviets as well as by the Western Allies; as these people were forced to retire from their official postions, the NTS agents gained influence at UNRRRA-IRO, at the various military governments set up in Germany and elsewhere. NTS immediately established contact with leftist groups within the US military government in Germany, in order to strengthen their position.

When in 1948 rightist emigre groups finally combined under General Glasenapps leadership and again for the first time since the war made an

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official appearance on the political stage, they were confronted with a solid resistance by the various leftist organizations created by NTS, and by those rightist organizations which were under free-masonic influence and whose aim it was to split up and make ineffective the emigre circles. The newly created leftist organization SBONR (abbreviation for "Fighting Unit for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia) and SWOD (Union of Soldiers for the Liberation Movement) had the very same former communists and Komsomol members working for them, who during the war were members of the NTS and were the leaders of the pro-Bolshevist destructive Wlassow Army. (see chart: Jakowlew, Krylow, Legostajew, Achminowetc). Their libel campaign against rightist groups was supported by the supposedly unaffiliated NTS agents, under the leadership of a group of former communist professors from the USSR (see chart: Filippow, Iljinski) and of a few free-masons who went under the cover of being monarchists, as well as by journalists such as Michailowsky and Meyer (see chart Nos. 15 and 16). When NTS emerged from its retirement again onto the political scene, it also sided with the leftist bloc. NTS was especially active in Munich where its leader was a former Bolshevich party functionary from Charkow, named Budanow.

However, the rightist groups under the leadership of Gen. Glasenapp continued in their efforts to consolidate all elements, and thus increased their political momentum. The more important ones of the rightist organizations within the emigre life since 1948 in West Germany are as follows:

1. "Central Representation of the Russian Emigres in Germany" (ZPRE) President, Dr. Nikolaus v. Fabricius. The only legal and officially recognized group representing the interests of the Russian exiles, and elected at an emigre congress, Hdgs in Munich.

2. "St. Andrews Union" (SAF) its President, Cossack General Golubintsev, successor to Glasenapp who died in 1951, Hdgs in Munich.

- (a) a military and political organization, made up of members of the Wlassow Army, of Cossack units, of white-Russian officers from the civil war days and sundry anti-communists.

3. "Panrussian Movement" (RONDD) President, Eugen Arciuk. Its main object is to fight separatist tendencies and advocates a unification of the entire area of Russia. A political party.

When the leftist groups found themselves hopelessly outnumbered despite NTS and freemason support, they found active and efficient help in the U.S. Marxist emigre groups around Kerenski, supported by the same Jewish financial circles in the U.S. who in 1917 financed the Bolshevich Revolution, then under the leadership of Jacob H. Schiff and now under his grandson John Schiff) as well as by leftist circles at Harvard University, energetically provided succor of those leftist organizations in Germany. The present center of Marxist activities is the so-called

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"Institute for the Study of Russian Culture" (founded by the branch of Harvard University) whose head is Jakowlew, former communist and NKVD functionary in the USSR. The leading members of the Institute are all former Bolshevik party functionaries (see Chart: Achminow, Budanow, Fillipow, Iljinski, Lagodin and Awtorchanow). One of the achievements of the Institute is the work on "The Theory of Ersatz-Capitalism", an open justification of Bolshevism. One collaborator at the Institute is Hermann Achminow (former Komsomol-leader in Leningrad), who in June 1950 gave a lecture on the Bavarian Radio whose subject was an apologia of communism.

Since 1951 two emissaries from American leftist circles, both Marxist Jews from Russia, Eugene Lyons and Isaac D. Levine, developed a very great activity in Germany with the objective of getting all of the emigre circles here under Marxist control. Their first attempt was the creation of SBONR (Council for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia) in Stuttgart. Two US Marxist organizations became members of this organization under leadership of Kerenski and Nikolajewski (the latter had been a collaborator at the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow until 1924 and its representative abroad until the beginning of WW II) another freemason group in Paris under Melgunoff, the neo-communist organization SBONR in Munich and NTS, which finally openly associated itself with the Marxist groups. None of these organizations have a sizeable membership, and are mostly made up of the same few dozen Marxists and leftist-liberals who with the aid of money from obvious sources, and with the support of the leftist press in the US, try to create the impression that they are truly representing the Russian emigres.

The leftist bloc failed to consolidate after three conferences in Fuessen, Stuttgart and Wiesbaden, where personal differences could not be ironed out and where it proved to be impossible to make even a small group of the emigres into their followers.

At the present time Isaac Don Levine and his brethren in Germany are trying to win more followers for their cause. They are exploiting the financial difficulties of some of the ex-officers and members of the intelligentsia who cannot find work elsewhere, in order to recruit them into a new network on a Marxist pattern devised by political circles of that type in the United States. The newly created "Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia" is the result of one such effort and represents a typical Marxist propaganda device; they manage to have responsible individuals in public office unsuspectingly lend their names to this cause in the belief that they are furthering a worthy effort, which however, in reality only promotes the shady deals of the real forces whose names don't even come out in the open. Admirals Kirk and Standley and Generals Wedemeyer and Donovan are among the people who signed their names

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among the 72 signatures which they managed to have put under the proclamation for this "Committee", all of whom acted in the belief that they were helping the Russian people to rid themselves of the Bolshevich tyranny. The real forces and financiers behind all this, however, are John M. Schieff, Herbert Lehmann, David Dubinsky and such, and they will see to it that even in the event of an overthrow of the Soviet Regime the Russian people will again come under some Marxist tyranny, which in its essentials will hardly differ from the Bolshevist one.

One of the first steps taken by this Committee was the establishment of a propaganda radio in Germany, which started its activity in the Munich area the end of May 1952. In the same manner in which the Kirk-Committee is in reality headed by the same people that head AmComLib (Committee for a Free Europe) in that manner the new "Russian" radio differs in no way from RFE.

The same as in RFE, all the "anti-communist" work is guided by Soviet agents and loyal communists, and former NKVD functionaries, members of the Bolshevich Party and of the Komsomols are the ones responsible for the "enlightenment" of the Russian people from behind the Iron Curtain. The choice of personnel for all these positions was left to Jakowlew from the very beginning, who recently has become the central figure of the leftist bloc which receives all its support from US-Marxist circles. Jakowlew made some (fnu) Wasiljew his personnel chief, whose real name is Gottlieb and who is a Jew and Communist from Charcov. The latter was active for the NKVD in Charcov before the war, and was acting for the Soviets in Southern Russia while it was under German occupation; while using the name Bogoljubow he pretended to be working for the German Security Service in Charkov and Odessa, and later on became one of the Soviet agents on Wlassow's staff in Berlin. In 1945 he made his appearance in Prague and Salzburg under the assumed name of Wasiljew, where together with other Soviet NKVD officers he was in charge of making the arrests of and seeing to the extradition of anti-communists to the Soviets.

MEMORANDUM


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SUBJECT: Suspicion of Surveillance


DATE: 29 Apr 1958

DATE RECEIVED: 28 Apr 1958

SOURCE: ~~Andrei~~ MALITSKIY

DOB/POB: 31 May 1931 in Malin, USSR

Address: Agnestrasse 43, Munich 13 GERM



On Several occasions within the past month, Source has seen individuals who he suspects were surveilling him. In most cases this has taken place in the area in front of Nordbad where Source regularly takes the American Committee bus to work between 12:30 and 1:00 PM. On two occasions, about Easter time, two men appeared to show interest in Source and kept their eyes on the bus as far as Source could ascertain until it was no longer in sight.

On Monday, 7 April, while Source was waiting for the bus, a poorly dressed old woman approached him and asked why the Nordbad was closed. She also asked where she could get washed up. Source, whose knowledge of German is limited, says he was able to determine that the woman spoke with a very thick accent that he would describe as Slavic (however, it is quite possible that this was a good legitimate German accent of the type with which Source is not acquainted). When the old woman left, Source noticed that she joined one of the men he suspects of surveilling him.

During the period 14-18 April, Source says one of the men was there at the usual time every day. He sometimes appeared as if he were trying to approach Source head-on but Source always evaded him.

Source has requested a telephone number he could call in case of emergency. He has been told that if there is any real and immediate danger, he should get in touch with the German police.

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