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Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

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TO : Chief, EE (Attn: Chief, SR)

DATE: 3 April 1953

FROM : Chief of Base, Munich *prist*

(Attn:

GP

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/QKACTIVE

SPECIFIC *0* Prist visit to Europe, 9-24 March 1953.

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1. The following is a summary analysis of the views expressed by Prist during his recent visit to Munich, Lampertheim, Frankfurt and local reactions to those views, and CSOB evaluation of the results of the visit and recommendations for future action.

2. Prist's direct contact with CSOB was limited to two sessions, one of only 40 minutes duration (cut short because of a last-minute appointment for him to meet Dr. Conant) with on 11 March and one of three hours with on 14 March. (Both times he expressed a desire to go for a drive to the mountains with later, but his full schedule never permitted it.) Hamish met with Prist alone for almost three hours on 12 March and for two hours on 17 March (at which time Prist asked him to leave as soon as possible for N.Y.) Prist's only other meetings with U.S. officials were the brief introduction to Dr. Conant (who was making his first official visit to Munich) and about 90 minutes with Thayer and followed by another hour with alone. The latter meetings were reported to CSOB by All of his numerous sessions with AECHORD personnel and emigres are being fully reported by AECHORD through their channels and are covered briefly herein.

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3. The subject matter covered may be broken down as follows:

A. Political.

(1) Philosophy. During his early meetings, Prist gave first attention to his paper "The Role of the Soviet Emigration." During his first session with CSOB on 11 March, he asked if it had been given wide circulation and whether there was any opposition to it, defensively championing it as official policy. Time did not permit extensive discussion then. Later that day, he startled Dr. Conant by asking if he had read it and what he thought of it. Hamish, however, (whose January paper Prist had read and praised) was able to engage in a lengthy discussion on philosophy through lunch at Prist's room the following day. He reported that there seemed to be little basic disagreement between them, except that Prist was often not consistent. For example, after Hamish thought that Prist agreed fully on the principle of gradual growth and they were seeing eye to eye regarding the approaching plenum, Prist suddenly maintained that PBAFFIRM must take the position that it wants no federalists in the Center. After a bit of discussion, Prist finally

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acknowledged the justice of having both nationalist and federalist Ukes in, but insisted without any further reason that PBAFFIRM must officially disapprove of federalists.

By the time Prist hit Thayer that afternoon, he said very little about the "unification" aspect of the paper, taking the position that he knew very well that the primary purpose of the project is cold war PW and that he was taking off from this basic assumption and projecting a little thinking into the future. He admitted that the paper had probably caused more confusion than it had resolved. By Saturday afternoon, 14 March, Prist complained to Lane that it was downright insulting to him that so many people misunderstood his paper and did not give him credit for realizing that the basic purpose of the project is cold war PW.

Prist told Thayer that he is preparing three more philosophical papers on problems in the emigration that he would receive soon. He complained to Thayer that he had to distribute most of the copies of this paper himself because KUBARK held it up, apparently, feeling that they should comment on it.

(2) Strategy. When Prist approached the outstanding issues directly, his course seemed clear. He accepted unconditionally the idea of one Center along present lines, and flatly ruled out two separate centers or a center of nationalities without the major Russian groups. He accepted the present Center as a satisfactory foundation on which to build and recognized the need for expanding it slowly and carefully. In various comments, however, he indicated that he did not stick to such a clear line, as though he were in the process of reorienting his thinking. In his repeated emphasis on "balanced admissions" it was apparent that he was not thinking only of gradual broadening by taking in moderate groups at first, but was worried about fitting the extreme groups in immediately. Although he admitted the justice in having both represented in the Center, he repeatedly indicated that he wanted no federalists and insisted without reason that PBAFFIRM must officially disapprove of them.

(3) Tactics. The same tendency toward inconsistency was noticed in Prist's approach to the specific problems facing him. His answer to the Karlsruhe proposal was a clear affirmation of support for one center only, the present Coordinating Center, and he agreed with his AECORD advisors that the two federalist Ukrainian groups already considered accepted should come into the Center at the next plenum. However, his contradictory stand that the Committee does not approve of federalists, and especially of Gulay, came out in almost all of his talks with caigres and caused considerable confusion.

To Thayer, Prist emphasized the need for starting a newspaper at the earliest possible moment. The paper would be closely supervised by Americans to insure high quality, and it would eventually build up a

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following which could be considered as something like a new "non-partisan party". Then, if the present Center should collapse, the survivors would simply pick up the following of the paper to build the new center. Thayer questioned the concept of the subscription list of a newspaper constituting a party, but they did not get into detailed discussion of this subject.

B. PBAFFIRM/AECHORD Administration.

(1) The main administrative problem which he faced was that of the overall direction of AECHORD, and the solution which he adopted, the separation of the three chief components of the operation into semi-autonomous units (the "three-headed monster," as Thayer called it), has been the most controversial feature of his visit. Most of the AECHORD personnel, other than Mathenet and his partisans, received the plan with incredulity and grave misgivings (although Disharoon complained that Fentost was apparently so completely cowed by Prist that he wouldn't take a stand on anything). CSOB expressed mild skepticism to Prist but did not register strong objections because he obviously did not welcome comment. Thayer made a strong case of his objections, however, telling Prist that the operation thus far has suffered most from a lack of coordinated control and that in his position of general responsibility for such an American operation here he wanted a strong executive with whom he could deal and not representatives of three almost completely independent outfits. Further, he was sure that the German Government would take the same view. Prist's only defense was that he had no strong executive to send and that the only solution he could see was to put each part under a good individual boss and limit Fentost to the sole responsibilities of general representation of the Committee in relations with Bonn and the local authorities and general housekeeping. Thayer charged that these were the very types of responsibilities for which Fentost is least qualified and also expressed strong doubts as to the ability of Mathenet to run the large radio operation. The matter was left at this inconclusive stage.

(2) The radio structure was discussed at length, both with regard to the American administration and to relationships between the Americans and emigres. In both cases Prist bought Mathenet in full measure. He admitted that Mathenet might not be a strong administrator, but he understands the project and the end product toward which we are working, which is more important. Besides, he said, Mathenet can be controlled adequately by means of the budget. When Hamish, Thayer, [] and the AECHORD political staff all expressed alarm at the degree to which Mathenet has executed a pendulum swing in recent weeks from his former "protection" of the radio from too much American interference to his present insistence on more American control, Prist supported Mathenet strongly. "Mathenet should be dictator of the Radio," he repeated to all. "It is imperative that the quality of the scripts be maintained and Mathenet is justified in taking all measures necessary to do so." This was the one point on which all felt him to be most adamant.

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(3) Prist announced his intention to make Lambie chief of the political staff on his first day in Munich at a meeting of all personnel having anything to do with political problems, including Fentost, Disharoon and Whitcomer. Wolstein was quite upset at the sudden jolt without advance warning and asked to talk to Prist alone after the meeting. Wolstein reported later that Prist then apologized humbly for having been so thoughtless and added: "That's another reason why I've got to get out of this job. I make too many blunders like this." Prist recounted to CSOB his "terrible hassel" in getting KUBARK to let him hire Lambie, and defensively praised him as a tower of strength as an independent thinker. (Earlier he had asked [] evaluation of Lambie and seemed quite satisfied when [] spoke of him as a thorough, independent thinker, although obviously not the strong, dynamic, incisive type.)

(4) Prist complained to [] about KUBARK's miserly attitude on funds for the project. "And this fellow [] even tries to save money on this piddling operation. I just told him that he can't count every penny on a job like this!"

(5) Apparently based largely on his Navy background, Prist went all out in buying the present manager of the Lampertheim station, although the other AECHORD personnel agree that he is incompetent and should be relieved when possible.

(6) Thayer proposed that Prist use Hamish as a relief for Fentost. Prist apparently considered the possibility but remarked to Thayer and to [] that he wasn't sure he could trust Hamish to carry out orders if he did not agree with them. [] urged Hamish as senior advisor to Prist in N.Y., but Prist cut them off by starting to take offense at the inference that it was he who most needed help. Prist philosophized generally on the subject of discipline and obedience several times with Hamish before finally deciding to accept him.

(7) Prist made the point to everyone that he is very unhappy with this job, is staying at it only because he feels it to be his duty, and is eager to resign just as soon as a relief can be obtained.

(8) Regarding plans to move, Prist said that no one in CDACID would give him a definitive answer as to which locations would be acceptable. He felt that the radio set-up at Oberwiesefeld should stay there for some time in view of the extensive investment, but is well aware of the necessity for starting work on the permanent transmitters.

C. Command relationships.

(1) Prist was outspoken to everyone in his determination to remain independent of KUBARK control. He told Thayer that everyone in Washington knows that he was given top authority on this project and that KUBARK's only

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responsibility is for logistic support "except the boys at KUBARK who think they can give me policy guidance". But Prist knows that KUBARK only gets its policy from ODACID and there's no reason why he can't get his directly from the same source.

(2) Prist accepted completely the definition of CSOB's responsibility worked out in agreement with Spivak and attached hereto. He questioned regarding the intended role for Boemi, insisting that no attempt be made to review scripts before broadcast and that the word "assistance" be the key and not "guidance", with all of which CSOB was in complete agreement.

4. From a political point of view, it is believed that the net result of Prist's visit can be considered positive, despite a certain amount of confusion caused by the tendency toward inconsistency. He was somewhat--though far from completely--reassuring to those of the "Russian State" bloc who had feared that PBAFFIRM had sold out entirely to the separatist camp. And he did manage to effect the name change, although the feat came within a hair of wrecking the Center. On the other hand, he presented a strong denial to those of the separatist groups--especially the Karlsruhe representatives--who thought that PBAFFIRM was ready to ditch the present Center in favor of the one which they envisaged or of two separate centers. The "Russian State" partisans are now waiting to see PBAFFIRM's declaration of intentions proved by its actions with regard to the coming 30 April plenum. At the same time, it is believed that the "nationalists" feel a great deal of satisfaction in having established direct contact with him and having found that he is not suffering from the "Great Russian" orientation they had feared, and they are looking forward to future cooperation more hopefully than ever before.

CSOB also believes that the educational results of the trip for Prist and ~~that~~ the constructive effects of Yamish's new role as Prist's right-hand man will result in much closer coordination and consultation between PBAFFIRM and AECORD in future policy planning and operational direction.

5. The effect of Prist's solution of the administrative problem within AECORD is much more questionable, however. CSOB shares Thayer's view that the generally chaotic administration which has characterized this operation thus far has resulted largely from lack of enough strong centralized control and coordination. It is difficult to see how this will be improved by further decentralization. A primary source of trouble will be, of course, the large, complex radio organization. CSOB has the highest regard for Nathenat's competence as an advisor, guide and judge of effective anti-Bolshevik radio propaganda. At the same time, the evidence of his lack of administrative ability is abundant, and Prist's answer that he can be controlled by means of the budget is obviously completely unrealistic. A smaller, less complex operation might muddle along under the direction of a person of good intentions but little dynamism, but this sprawling monster of almost 300 varied characters needs a strong executive guiding hand.

CSOB urges that priority attention be given to recruiting good executive

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personnel for AECHORD. A strong relief for Fantost might be able to pull the others along with him, but it is most probable that the operation will also need a good executive for the radio and a few others as administrative officer, manager at Lambertheim, etc.

[]

Attachment (1)

Approved:

W/M

Distribution:

2-SR w/2 Att. []

1-COM w/1 Att. []

1-MOB w/1 Att. []

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CSCB/COM Responsibilities for SKACTIVE Project:

1. Primary Mission responsibility toward AECHORD is:
 - a. Provide CE protection to the Center and emigre components of the radio and other Center projects;
 - b. Insure protection of current clandestine Redsox/Redcap operations in Germany affected by any AECHORD activities or plans;
 - c. Provide any emigre personnel or activity data procured through Agency channels;
 - d. Provide advice on political or propaganda matters as requested by AECHORD or considered useful to AECHORD;
 - e. Provide a transmission channel for classified or highly sensitive information between Prist and Fentost.

2. The German Mission is responsible for providing advice as appropriate, but not for direction on matters other than security. Recommendations on any aspects of AECHORD activity will be forwarded by COM to KUBARK headquarters. CSCB will closely monitor the activities of AECHORD and will forward such coverage to COM and Agency headquarters.

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