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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

SR/EX

NO.

EGMA - 7139

DATE

5 August 53

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. SR/1				and	
2.					
3. DC/SR				✓	
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8. TP/AN	GA 50		18 JUL 1972		
9. DP/ES-4					
10. CA/BI	2E13				
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

AUG 17 1953

1-3: For your info. Don't you think that it should be shown to the Admin?

Not shown to Admin.

Please classify to 200-124-39/3

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE DATE 2007

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP  
The following action is authorized:  
De-sensitize

Sign: [Signature]  
R.O. #41  
Note: 17 July 72  
coordinate

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200 724-39/3

SR

VIA: AIR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

Security Information

DISP. NO. ECMA-7139

SECRET CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE
ATTN: Chief, SR
FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/Operational

DATE: 5 August 1953

SPECIFIC— OAEACTIVE/Personnel Problems in AECHORD Political Staff

1. This is written in amplification of paragraph B of SMUNI-4762 and of various AEACTIVE contact reports. During [ ] visit, the personal characteristics and qualifications of the four senior political advisors (AEAFFIRM and AECHORD) then in Munich were fully discussed, with complete mutual understanding and agreement. The same subject was discussed rather fully with [ ] before the latter's departure from Munich, and he appeared to share the same evaluation, although describing some rather strong Prist opinions regarding the personnel involved, as reported by several SMUNI cables. Accordingly, we found it difficult to understand the cables from Prist on 30 July indicating that he would positively recall Wolstein within a few days and also wanted Hamish to come back at the "earliest possible date".

2. In our evaluation, the strengths and weaknesses of the persons involved are approximately as agreed during the discussions mentioned above, except that the stature of Lambie has been reduced -- both in our eyes and those of a large part of the emigration -- by his performance during the past six weeks or so.

3. A sort of "last straw" in discrediting Lambie has been his conduct with regard to the SBONR split. There seems to be little doubt that the split could have been avoided in the first place if Lambie had joined Wolstein in trying to prevent it. The Russian rump, in fact, accused Lambie of having connived with Nikolayevsky and Krylov (whom he has known personally since his Regensburg days) in bringing it about. Lambie admitted to [ ] that he took no action to prevent it because of Prist's desire that the "Troika" be broken up by any means.

4. After the split occurred, the best possible picturing of the Krylov wing -- as in the [ ] memo of 9 July -- would not give it more than about equal stature with the Antonov faction and, as Ormerod pointed out to Lambie, the pending subsidy would have made an excellent instrument for applying pressure on the two factions to reunite. Yet Lambie independently granted the July subsidy to the Krylov wing (leaving Wolstein to learn about it through the emigres some time later). Again, Lambie admitted frankly to [ ] that he was supporting the Krylov faction because he liked them better than the other faction "which is really being

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run by that reactionary Pozdnyakov". Since the granting of the subsidy has become known, Lambie no longer commands the respect and confidence of the members of the Russian rump.

5. The most unfortunate part of the situation is that Lambie's close identification with Nikolayevsky and Krylov does not particularly improve his stature with the nationalities (other than the Georgians). They have repeatedly made it clear to the AEAFFIRM and AECHORD personnel and to Aestar that, while they have naturally accepted Nik-Krylov as Russians willing to play their game, the relationship is quite embarrassing and distasteful to them because their people are so strongly anti-Marxist, or even anti-leftist.

6. We have made every effort not to be unduly critical of Lambie. Allowance must be -- and has been -- made for the fact that he has been in a very difficult position, thrust into the local scene by Prist as an "anti-dote" to Wolstein, whom Prist considered hopelessly pro-Russian, and kept under great pressure by Prist to accomplish ends which were often not clearly defined or seemed unreasonable. Had these conditions not been so unfavorable, and had the top man in AECHORD been stronger and more competent, Lambie might have developed into a mature, well-balanced political advisor. But the facts are that these conditions not only did exist but continue to exist; and, under the circumstances, Lambie is not capable of carrying on as top political negotiator and it would be foolhardy to yank both Wolstein and Hamish from Europe.

7. In our opinion, it is imperative to retain Hamish in Munich over both Lambie and Wolstein until the present stalemate is broken and the political situation is stabilized. Both men -- and the emigre leaders as well -- have great respect for Hamish and would be quite satisfied to work under his direction. Even more important, Hamish could develop, broaden and train them for the future. After a couple of months of such teamwork, if Prist still desires it -- and if Hamish concurs -- Wolstein could be withdrawn. If conditions are quiet enough and Lambie has been rehabilitated, Hamish might also be withdrawn shortly thereafter, leaving Lambie in charge, -- but this would have to depend on a careful evaluation at that time.

8. KUBARK owes a great debt of gratitude to Wolstein for his continued devotion to duty in spite of an almost always obvious lack of confidence and cooperation from his superiors and repeated indignities heaped on him by them, and the debt continues to grow. CSOB has endeavored to be completely objective in evaluating him, and its evaluations have been generally very favorable. Although his Russian background naturally colors his outlook to a certain extent, he has consistently and quite successfully, we believe, striven to balance it. He is much less successful in balancing his strong dislike for the leftists, or "Marxists", but it must be recognized that this only mirrors the emigration at large, and especially the sentiments of the most recent defectors. Except for the Socialist Liga and Georgians, Wolstein has enjoyed excellent personal relations with almost all of the nationalities in the old Center and with many of those not in it. We greatly prefer the

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solution outlined in paragraph 7 above, but if it should become necessary to leave either Lambie or Wolstein as top man in Munich, we would have no hesitation in recommending Wolstein. Further, it is suggested that if Wolstein is withdrawn before the situation is fully stabilized here, he be kept in ready reserve, because we may well have urgent need for him to help to put the pieces together after the complete collapse.

9. In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the above evaluation of Lambie and Wolstein is based not only on discussions with the men themselves, but on the comments of Aestar (who is a former colleague and long-time personal friend of Lambie's but who concurs fully with the above), of Fantost (who was out for Wolstein's scalp at the end of last year but who also concurs in the above) and of the emigres with which CSOB has direct operational contact.

E

*man*

5 August 1953

Distribution:

- ✓ 2 - SR [ ] DIRECT
- 1 - EE
- 3 - COM [ ]
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