

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]
~~No Foreign Dissem~~

(b)(3)

SC-01904/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
28 January 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Pueblo Sitrep No. 14
(As of 0700 EST)

1. There is still no hint of Pyongyang's conditions for the release of the ship and crew.

2. Pyongyang, in an editorial in the official Nodong Sinmun, reiterated on 28 January its rejection of UN consideration of the Pueblo case.

3.

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5.

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~~No Foreign Dissem~~
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6.

[Redacted]

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7. Boris Batrayev, a KGB officer with the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi, has supplied more material to US newsmen [Redacted]

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[Redacted] there to cover Premier Kosygin's visit (see Pueblo Sitrep No. 12 for the account of Batrayev's first contact with US correspondents). On 27 January, Batrayev suggested that Pyongyang may wish to swap the Pueblo and its men for North Koreans charged with terrorism in South Korea. He hinted that Soviet efforts to persuade Pyongyang to release the ship in return for an admission of guilt and perhaps payment of a fine had been unsuccessful.

8. Batrayev implied strongly in his second conversation [Redacted] that despite a hands-off posture which Moscow must maintain toward the problem in public, the USSR is interested in working behind the scenes to resolve it. He said Moscow was gathering information on the crisis and was interested in finding out from the US and North Korea what each wanted and what each would give up to achieve a peaceful settlement.

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9. Batrayev apparently also is the source of news reports to the effect that Kosygin told Indian Prime Minister Gandhi that the Pueblo incident could have been a "genuine mistake,"--without saying on whose part--and that the dispute is a "routine matter." There is no other reporting to support or confirm Batrayev's assertions.

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10. Peking's first commentary on the Pueblo situation, in broadcasts on 28 January, stated that it was watching developments "closely." Referring to US contingency measures, it declared that US "war provocations" would not cow the Korean people.

11. Soviet Naval surveillance of the US Task Group in the Sea of Japan continued as of 3:00 AM EST. The Kildin class Missile Destroyer #983 is reported at a range of 11.5 miles from the Task Group. Although it is not mentioned in the report, the intelligence collector Gidrolog probably remains in the general vicinity of the Task Group.

12. On 27 January, a Soviet naval aircraft, probably an AN-12 based at Nikolaevka, flew from the Vladivostok area in the Soviet Far East to Pyongyang. It is unusual for such Pacific Fleet aircraft to be used for international flights and the flight was possibly related to the Pueblo incident. It may have been bringing Soviet personnel to examine the Pueblo and whatever equipment was not destroyed. The aircraft returned to Nikolaevka on 28 January.

13. The North Korean Air Force has deployed 10 possible Il-28 light bombers from Uiju airfield in Northwest North Korea to Sunan airfield North of Pyongyang and to Sondong-Ni airfield approximately 35 miles North of Wonsan. In addition, the North Korean Air Force continues to maintain a high state of readiness. Patrol activity is still heavy, particularly in the Wonsan area, extending some 30 miles into the Sea of Japan.

14. Three USAF squadrons, a total of 43 fighters and fighter-bombers, are due to arrive in South Korea between 28 and 30 January.

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