

**SECURITY INFORMATION**

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD  
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLAN INCIDENT TO  
REDUCTION OF COMMUNIST POWER IN FRANCE

(Code Name: "~~SLAVEN~~")  
*MID IRON*

ANNEX A

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The French Communist Party (FCP) is the largest single political party in France. Its strength derives from its:

1. monolithic party structure built around a core of trained militants;
2. domination of the largest labor union which enables it to exploit economic discontent and threaten the social and economic stability of the nation;
3. partisan press which reaches large segments of the population with Communist propaganda;
4. financial resources which make it the wealthiest political party in France.

The FCP can be weakened by:

1. more rigorous application of existing anti-Communist legislation;
2. revision of existing legislation which allows the CGT a majority on Social Security boards and Comités d'Entreprise, use of public facilities and funds, and control over longshoremen's hiring halls.
3. strengthening a non-Communist labor unions and the independent left political party.
4. exploitation, propaganda-wise, of its subservience to Moscow and its extra-national nature; emphasis on the repressive and anti-individualistic aspects of the Soviet system which run counter to French tradition and national psychology.

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ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION FOR  
REDUCTION OF COMMUNIST POWER IN FRANCE

PART I

1. Analysis of Strength of Communism in France

(a) Subsequent to World War II (1945-50)

The French Communist Party (FCP) reached the zenith of its strength and influence in the period immediately following World War II. By 1947 Communism had penetrated all phases of French national life; Communists not only sat in the Cabinet but appointment of key personnel controlled the Ministries of Industrial Production, Transport, and Aeronautics, as well as many municipal councils; they represented the largest group in the National Assembly and the second largest in the Council of the Republic (1946 election). Communists had infiltrated the police forces, while the largest labor union, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), numbering 6,369,000 members, had been subverted into an arm of the Party. Through their numerous front organizations, Communists were able to influence such specialized groups as war veterans, sports enthusiasts, women's associations, and the like. A large segment of the population was reached by the Communist press which had been built up into one of the largest outside the Soviet Union. Communist propaganda was spread through such Party organs as L'Humanité and Ce Soir, 75 unofficial weekly and daily papers scattered throughout the country, and 25 national magazines which closely followed the Party line.

In this period the FCP was the largest single political party in France. In the November 1946 elections to the National Assembly Communists polled 5.5 million votes, or 28.2 percent of the total vote. Communist Party strength was estimated at 850,000 card-carrying members, with permanent professional cadres of 30,000.

Even more effective, perhaps, than the monolithic Party structure has been the tentacular Communist grasp on labor through the intermediary of the CGT. When the Communists in 1946 succeeded in capturing the CGT's Confederal Bureau, they acquired their most important instrument for profoundly affecting the economic and political life of the nation. The insurrectionary character of the 1947 and 1948 strikes is immediately traceable to Communist manipulation.

(b) Current Period

Since 1947 the FCP has been notably weakened. It still remains a threat to the democratic regime and to US interests in France, but its effectiveness in terms of ability to impose its foreign and domestic policies on Centrist governments is being curbed. Communists have been expelled from the Cabinet and have been weeded out of the more important positions in public administration and the national economy including the Ministries of Industrial Production, Transportation and Aeronautics, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the police and the armed forces.

Successive French Governments during the last four years have instigated various anti-Communist measures: they have expelled foreign Communists living in France, imprisoned Communist mine-strike leaders, revised electoral laws for the National Assembly and the Council of the Republic so as to cut down a large percentage of Communist parliamentary representation, and made more flexible the legislation governing treason.

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At the same time, the FCP has experienced a loss of membership, a reduction of its financial resources, and a small loss of popularity among the masses. The current strength of the Party is estimated to be 600,000 members, which represents a decline of 250,000 adherents since 1946. Paid Party officials have been reduced from 30,000 to 11,000. A small part of this membership loss can be attributed to defection but much of it is the result of Communist weeding out of "soft" or opportunist elements from their ranks.

There has also been a significant decline in the strength of the Communist-dominated CGT. As a result of the Communist attempt in 1947 to use the CGT as an instrument of political coercion, some non-Communist elements of the CGT seceded and formed separate trade unions closely aligned with the French Socialist Party, which the FCP regards as its greatest adversary. Many individual workers also left the CGT but joined no other union. Current membership is estimated by the US Embassy in Paris to be about 1,500,000, as opposed to the CGT claim of 3,615,440 members. Nevertheless, the CGT remains the largest and most dynamic French labor union, though it can no longer call nation-wide strikes without the support of the non-Communist unions.

Despite this decline in the Party and the unions, and despite the anti-Communist measures taken by the "middle-of-the-road" governments, the FCP remains the strongest single political party in France; it receives the largest popular vote, is the best disciplined and organized of all parties, commands the greatest financial resources and operates the largest partisan press and propaganda machine. The FCP enjoys the position of defender of the interest of the laboring class, the poor peasant, and the lower middle-class. It likewise draws much support from youth movements, and serves as a focal point for many dissident elements in the population which are opposed to the present policies of the government.

In the June 17, 1951 national elections the FCP received 4,926,530 votes or 25.7 percent of the total vote. This amounted to a loss of 562,000 ballots in comparison to the 1946 national elections and a percentage loss of 2.9 percent. However, the geographic distribution of the Communist vote shows the FCP to have the greatest nationwide strength. Its candidates received 30 percent or more of the popular vote in more than one-third of the voting districts, and polled more votes in 43 out of the 90 metropolitan districts than any other political formation. The revised electoral law governing the elections was only partially successful in reducing Communist representation, since Communist deputies still hold 101 seats (instead of the 180 they occupied in the 1946-51 period).

(c) Analysis of Strength Projected through 1952

In the light of the present domestic and international situation, little can be expected in the way of reduction of Communist strength in France in 1952. Should no satisfactory solution be found to adjust the real wage of the worker to rising prices - and none appears in the offing -- the unity of action campaign now being instigated by the CGT will undoubtedly bear fruit. Furthermore, as the cost of the arms program makes itself felt in the form of additional taxes, Communist peace propaganda may find more receptive audiences.

(d) Deviationism

Communist deviationism in France is so weak as to be currently of little consequence. In the June 17 elections the Independent French Communist Movement, led by Darius LeCorre, polled only 21,233 votes. These were taken primarily not from the Communist Party, but from the Socialists and Trotskyites.

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## 2. Psychological Vulnerability

There are a number of characteristics of the French population which might be exploited to weaken the appeal of Communism:

(a) Private ownership of property is a deep-seated ambition among all classes in France. Any program having as one of its aims collectivization of farms should be especially unpopular with the French peasant. It is significant that Communist leader Duclos, at the last FCP Central Committee meeting, made a special effort to picture Communists as protectors of private ownership and to reconcile the Soviet kholkoze system with proprietorship.

(b) Fundamentally, the French possess a strong feeling of patriotism which is capable of rising above class or party. While these feelings have suffered the counterweights of two world wars in which French manpower was dangerously weakened, pride in French achievement and national superiority of culture are active forces which might be used to foster the re-birth of other aspects of national power.

The French feel superior to most foreigners. They feel that they should be, if they are not, universally admired for their unique contribution to western culture. French Communist boastings of Russian technical and social superiority, and their aim to make the world over in the Soviet image, might be exploited.

(c) The French are socially conservative, the family, especially, being a very strong institution.

(d) The Catholic Church is an important element in cementing a highly stratified society, but of the 98 percent of the population nominally Catholic less than one third are practicing Catholics. Many workers see no conflict between being Catholic in religion and Communist in politics or economic thought. It is possible, however, that the influence of the local Church hierarchy could be brought to bear on the women, of worker families, who still attend church. Women in France are still more conservative than men, despite the relative success of the FCP among women.

## 3. Calendar of Special Events for France.

(See Appendix I)

## 4. Means Available to Break the Strength of Communist Labor Unions

(a) One of the major sources of strength of the Communist-dominated CGT is its majority among the elected Social Security and Comites d'Entreprises labor representatives. If the CGT could be put in a minority position in these sectors, it would be appreciably weakened while, conversely, the non-Communist unions would be strengthened. This would, however, necessitate changes in present laws and decrees which govern the election of Social Security and Comites d'Entreprises representatives. Under the present national legislation, they are elected by lists of candidates, according to the system of proportional representation. An electoral system could be devised which would result in parity for each of the unions, thereby enabling the combined non-Communist unions to out-vote the CGT. The first phase of the election would allow union workers to elect delegates who, in turn, would elect from among themselves, in equal numbers for each union, the members of the Comites d'Entreprise.

(b) Existing legislation enables the CGT to retain control over hiring halls for longshoremen. A revision of legislation designed to break this control would materially weaken the CGT.

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(c) A more stringent enforcement of existing laws dealing with dissemination of propaganda, with sabotage, and with demonstrations affecting public order could be applied against CGT officials and demonstrations.

(d) Recognition of CGT representatives as bargaining agents at the factory level could be refused since they have indulged in political agitation on the grounds that the CGT is not strictly a labor union. Refusal of recognition has been used, with some success, by management in dealing with the maritime unions.

(e) The weakest point in the CGT armor is its anti-national orientation. A propaganda campaign designed to show up the CGT as a political instrument of Moscow would seriously embarrass a portion of its membership. Not all CGT members are Communists or Communist sympathizers. Many adhere to the CGT because they view it as the only real trade-union in France that is capable of protecting the worker's interests. A poster campaign, possibly by Paix et Liberté, aimed specifically at non-Communist members of the CGT might be effective in influencing them to withdraw their membership.

(f) French trade unions with no foreign allegiance and strong enough to wrest real wage advantages from management and government would act as a tremendous attraction both for non-Communists in the CGT and the unorganized workers. The most effective way of weakening the CGT, however, is to strengthen the non-Communist unions. Until greatly reinforced non-Communist trade-unions are in being, an attempt to "break" the CGT, with which the non-Communist unions now feel constrained to adopt some measure of unity of action, would be regarded by French workers as an effort to "break" labor itself.

#### 5. Means Available to Strengthen Non-Communist Labor Unions.

The non-Communist labor unions in France could be strengthened by financial aid, by Government and Confédération Nationale du Patronat Français (CNPF) partiality in wage negotiations, and by encouragement of organic union and unity of action on specific workers' demands between the Force Ouvrière (FO) and the Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC).

(a) [redacted] No appreciable aid, however, has gone to the CFTC, the second largest labor union in France. In the past, [redacted] have been used to pay expenses at the confederal level and have not been of direct benefit to the local organizations. Future aid going directly to lower union levels could be used to spark recruitment drives, pay the expenses of trained organizers, and finance non-Communist labor propaganda. Only about three million out of the total of eleven million French workers are organized. Aid used specifically to win over the unorganized should bear more positive results than that given in the past. Any financial aid given to the FO or the CFTC should be extended discreetly, however, in order to avoid association of these unions with the US in the public mind. The allegation that non-Communist unions are subsidized by the US would seriously limit their effectiveness.

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(b) The non-Communist labor unions could be strengthened by partiality on the part of the government and the CNPF in wage negotiations. By and large, in the past, the CGT has won the largest concessions from employers. Non-Communist unions feel unsure of their ability to wring benefits from management and government and have felt obliged to follow the lead of the CGT or allow it to outbid them in wage demands. If employers were to favor

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non-Communist unions in wage negotiations, it would give the non-Communist unions at least an appearance of effectiveness which they now lack in the eyes of the workers. This policy of partiality has been practiced to a limited extent in the past by local employers. It could be greatly extended, if the majority of employers were willing to refuse to deal with CGT adherents.

(c) One of the greatest causes of weakness of the non-Communist labor movement is that it is divided while the Communist-dominated CGT functions as a well-disciplined, monolithic organization. Organic unity between the two largest non-Communist unions, the FO and CFTC, would greatly strengthen the non-Communist labor movement. Unfortunately, organic unity must remain a long-term objective. There is little possibility of such a union in the near future because of the closeness of the CFTC to the Catholic liberals and the deep-seated anti-clerical feeling that exists in the ranks of the non-Catholic unions. As a long-term objective, however, organic union of the non-Communist worker syndicates merits attention and encouragement.

(d) A more immediate objective exists in the encouragement of cooperation and unity of action between the FO and CFTC on specific workers' demands. In the past they have acted in unison, mostly on the plant level, only after the CGT had taken the initiative. The result has been that the Communist-dominated union has usually received the credit for any advantages gained. A case in point is the current unity-of-action campaign based on labor dissatisfaction with the government-fixed minimum wage scale of September 8, 1951. The CGT in the month of August, while other union leaders were on vacation, formulated its program with respect to the minimum wage. As a result, when the High Commission on Collective Agreements met, the non-Communist unions, for lack of a program of their own, accepted the CGT program and subsequently have presented a common front on this issue. This docility on the part of the non-Communist unions adds to the prestige and influence of the Communist-dominated union. Dynamic joint-planning, cooperation, and unity of action on specific issues could be encouraged between FO and CFTC

Any of these means for strengthening non-Communist unions, however, are palliatives. These unions are essentially weak because of their inability to win real-wage advantages for the worker. They suffer from lack of dynamic and imaginative leadership, lack of tradition and long-established organization, and perhaps most important, from the basically passive nature of the postwar governments where the interests of the wage-earners are concerned.

The non-Communist trade unions, however, do not labor under permanent disadvantages, whereas the CGT, tied to the political dictates of Moscow, can never hope to free itself from its anti-national and political taint. Today the great mass of French workers find neither the Communist-dominated CGT nor the non-Communist unions to their liking. Hence, the non-Communist unions have an unlimited opportunity for expansion in the over-hauling of their programs, in younger and more aggressive leadership, and in unity of action.

#### 6. Vulnerability of Communist Press (Including Newsprint Import Restrictions and Allocations and Restrictions on Replacement Parts for Press Equipment)

There is a current shortage of newsprint in France which will have to be made up from US-Canadian sources. It is estimated that France will have a 30 percent deficit in its current newsprint needs. If the deficit

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is to be made up, 28 percent will have to come from the US and Canada. France is, moreover, faced with a serious long-term newsprint shortage, and in the coming years she will be increasingly dependent on external supplies of pulp-wood.

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Newsprint is at present allocated by the Société Professionnelle des Papiers de Presse (SPPP) whose members are appointed by the government and include representatives of both the newspapers and government. This organization has the over-all responsibility for fair distribution of the available newsprint to all newspapers according to their needs and on a strictly professional basis.

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An example of the adverse type of reaction was evident in the recent Beuve-Méry affair. When pressure was put on Beuve-Méry because of his neutralist views in Le Monde, he offered his resignation, whereupon some of the ranking correspondents on the paper, although pro-American in their own views, threatened to resign if he were removed on the grounds that the principle of freedom of the press had been impugned.

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#### 7. What Are the Specific Communist Institutions in France

Institutions and activities of Communist origin are the Communist front organizations, the Communist central training school, CGT training centers, and the Banque Commerciale de l'Europe du Nord.

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##### (a) Front organizations

The number of Communist front organizations in France is too large to list here. Those that concern themselves especially with indoctrination and reach groups which are not already converted to Communism might receive special mention:

(1) Travail et Culture is an adult education effort among workers, organized on a plant basis locally, principally in the Paris region, and employs indoctrinated workers as leaders. "Culture" does not confine itself to lectures but uses pictures, photographs, books, movies, outings, and other pleasant coatings for the pill of indoctrination.

(2) Peuple et Culture, whose efforts are similar to those of Travail et Culture, also aims at preparing workers for higher degrees in the College de France. It seeks to influence students through the use of a Marxian interpretation of literature, history, and philosophy.

##### (b) Communist Central Training School

The Ecole Centrale des Cadres du Parti Communiste Francaise gives general political and Party training to selected cadres destined to become future Party leaders. The school is located at Viroflay.

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CGT training centers are [redacted] as centers of Communist indoctrination. [redacted]

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(1) Institut Supérieur Ouvrier is an institute for workers directed by the CGT in the departments. Each institute is autonomous but the instructors are directly responsible to the Confederal Bureau of the CGT.

(2) Journée d'Etudes are CGT training programs organized on a departmental basis for militants and workers who want to become militants. One theme, such as "peace", is covered each day. Discussion is permitted, but the official conclusion must be agreed upon. Comrades who attend are rated for attitude and interest shown. Attendance is voluntary.

(3) Ecoles du Soir are usually for younger people and those who are not yet militants. About 20 to 25 attend at a time. Indoctrination is stressed. These lectures are organized on a "local" or "syndicate" basis.

(4) Ecoles de 15 Jours are fifteen-day courses organized by departmental unions and federations. Since the CGT has not been able financially to institute these courses in all industries and unions, they have been limited to the metallurgical, building and mining industries in the Paris, Pas-de-Calais, Nord, Alsace-Lorraine, Marseilles, Toulouse, and Bordeaux regions. Since many patrons fire workers who take off for these fifteen days, the CGT frequently follows the practice of not reporting where the worker is going and soliciting financial assistance for him and his family from fellow workers, although the collections often come too late to enable a worker to decide to enroll and go to the course. Those who attend this course are only militants, who come when they can and more than once.

(d) Banque Commerciale de L'Europe du Nord.

This bank acts as a clearing house and depository for French and Foreign Communist funds. [redacted]

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[redacted] The Bank has been the scene of several bombings.

8. What Communists Hold Posts of Responsibility in Public Administration or National Economy?

Communists have been weeded out of the more important positions in public administration, but still play a prominent role in the national economy of France through their control of the CGT and by virtue of their membership in the National Assembly. The more important among these are Jacques Duclos, Etienne Fajon, Benoît Frachon, Andre Marty, Leon Mauvais, Waldeck Rochet, Laurent Casanova, Georges Cognoit, Pierre Courtade, Florimond Bonte, and Auguste Lecoeur. A short biographical sketch and evaluation of each is listed in Appendix II.

9. What Soviet and Cominform periodicals are circulated in France?

The scale and distribution of L'Union Sovietique, La Litterature Sovietique, La Femme Sovietique, Ogonyok, Krodkodil and the cominform journal, For A Lasting Peace, For A People's Democracy, are prohibited by order of the Ministry of Interior (Dec. 27, 1950 and Jan. 6, 1951). Communist propaganda, however, gets wide distribution through the French Communist press, which has an estimated 7,000,000 readers.

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Communist propaganda also reaches France by radio ("Ici, Paris" via Prague; also programs beamed from Belgrade and Budapest and Warsaw). The FCP makes extensive use of posters, pamphlets, etc. During the three weeks prior to the June 1951 national elections, Communist propaganda costs for the campaign alone were estimated to have been somewhat over \$700,000. Some observers place the figure for total annual expenditures by the Communists for propaganda purposes at \$150,000,000, including an estimated minimum of \$30,000,000 for overt publication and dissemination of printed material by the Party and by Soviet and satellite organizations.

10. Circulation, Financial Strength, etc., of Anti-Communist Propaganda Media in France

The largest medium for the dissemination of anti-Communist material is the non-Communist press. USIE material is used by Franc-Tireur, Populaire, Figaro, Aurore and possibly other dailies. As a means of judging the importance of this medium in terms of number and types of French men and women reached, the following table is given for purposes of comparison:

	<u>Circulation</u>
Communist <u>Humanite</u> , addressed chiefly to workers -	175,000
Independent Left <u>Franc-Tireur</u> , also chiefly to workers -	141,000
Independent Left <u>Combat</u> , addressed chiefly to intellectuals	55,000
Socialist <u>Populaire</u> , read by some workers and others -	29,000
Independent <u>France-Soir</u> , probably addressed to business and white collar class	585,000
Moderate <u>Aurore</u> , to business groups chiefly -	284,000
pro-Government <u>Figaro</u> , to business and white collar class	355,000

One of the most effective anti-Communist media in France is Paix et Liberte which puts out posters, tracts, and radio broadcasts. Its attack on Communism is aggressive, specific, and thoroughly French. Its campaign material is prepared by Frenchmen and relies chiefly on satirical treatment of themes handled.

Paix et Liberte receives help from the French Government (free office space and roughly 800,000 francs a month), and from members of the staff of Figaro, Combat, and Franc-Tireur.

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Other specifically anti-Communist organizations are:

(a) BEDES (Bureau des Etudes et de Documentation Economiques et Syndicales) 20 rue Guersant, Paris 17c. Its financial strength is unknown but is derived from business managements and law circles. The effectiveness of its weekly bulletin and other publications is considerable since it has direct organizational contact with the Socialist trade union, Force Ouvriere, particularly in the field of publication of the latter's provincial press.

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(b) BEIPE (Bulletin d'Etudes et d'Informations Politiques Internationales), published by the Association d'Etudes et d'Informations Politiques Internationales, an anti-Communist research bureau. Financial strength is unknown. The effectiveness of certain specific pamphlets (showing to the French the complete contempt which Moscow has for the French and effectively exposing Soviet propaganda methods) has been evaluated as "arousing a great deal of curiosity and interest" in those circles to which it is principally distributed: Paris lawyers, provincial movie theaters, editors, and schools.

#### 11. Economic Vulnerability Pattern

The French worker's dissatisfaction with his inadequate standard of living and with his inability to improve his status contributes to his receptivity to Communist doctrine. It follows that Communism can be attacked by reforming all those areas of the French economy which inhibit an improvement in the workers' standard of living.

An increase in the number of workers' houses, and in the amount of consumers' goods - even more, an over-all increase in production - would clearly be a contribution. The present French economy, however, has not been able in recent times to solve the riddle of increasing production and wages at the same time so that increased goods could go to the worker. Instead, wage increases have usually led to price increases, while production of workers' goods stagnated. It is unlikely that the French economy can solve this problem without outside aid.

The French economy requires substantial foreign aid to help it increase its industrial capacity and its housing. Foreign aid could be conveniently extended in part in the form of sharing the French military burden of Indo-China and of defending Western Europe, as this would release production which would be available for consumers. Foreign aid would, however, be dissipated without basic reforms of the economic system itself. These reforms must be directed at improving the efficiency of the economic system, and at shifting the distribution of income toward the working class.

#### 12. Which Seaports in France Are Dominated by Communist Waterfront Unions?

(a) The Communist-dominated CGT does not "dominate" any major French port in the sense that it has not been able to carry out its program of stopping the handling of MDAP material by calling prolonged work stoppages among dockers. The CGT is, however, the largest and best organized of the French dockers' unions in all major ports and can carry out strikes of limited duration.

(b) Ports in which the CGT is strongest:

(1) La Pallice. There has been only one major political protest strike in La Pallice. The strike lasted eight days, but an American military ship was unloaded by non-striking dockers.

(2) Bordeaux. Bordeaux is the main supply port for US military shipments. There is an active CGT dockers' union in Bordeaux but it has not been able to carry out any major work stoppages in the unloading of US ships carrying military supplies. There is a sufficient supply of non-union labor to unload ships should the CGT refuse to do so.

(3) Marseille. There are 4,200 dockers in Marseille. One thousand of these belong to the CGT, but only 300 are considered to be "hard-core" Communists. The FO and CFTC each have about 600 members among the dockers, and the remainder belong to no union.

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(4) Le Harve. An active Communist kernel has carried out demonstrations, but there has been no serious work stoppages. [redacted] no more than 20 percent of the longshoremen are Communists or fellow-travellers. However, there is a strong pacifist sentiment among all the dockers that cannot be ignored. The Consulate has recommended that MDAP shipments not arrive for unloading at Le Havre.

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(5) Cherbourg. There is no serious Communist problem among the dockers of Cherbourg. In January 1950, 256 out of 279 dockers voted in referendum in favor of unloading US ships carrying military supplies.

(6) Calais and Dunkerque. In both ports the CGT is strong enough to call short strikes against the handling of military supplies. Both ports are relatively unimportant as far as US military shipments are concerned.

### 13. Analysis of Communist Strength in Maritime Unions of France

Communists are not sufficiently strong in the maritime unions of France seriously to hamper shipments of materiel. Communist cells are known to exist in many of the larger ships and are perhaps more numerous among the crews of smaller vessels. The Communists have not, however, been able seriously to delay the sailing of ships carrying military supplies.

The Communist hold over French seamen appears to have been exaggerated. In 1950 in a referendum strike vote based on legitimate wage demands, the CGT suffered a serious set-back. Ballots were passed out to several thousand seamen but only 983 bothered to vote. Of these 714 voted in favor of striking.

The CGT Maritime Union in Marseille, where CGT activity has been concentrated, has recently been under attack. The Ministry of Merchant Marine has instructed its Marseille office not to receive CGT representatives of the Maritime Union; the Ministry has also forbidden CGT organizers to board ships under its jurisdiction in Marseille. Private shipping companies have followed suit.

The Mediterranean Committee of The International Transport Workers' Federation is currently carrying out an anti-Communist campaign among the Seamen's Unions.

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