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20 December 1966

Project CHIGOE

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is as follows:

To bring Project CHIGOE into proper focus by summarizing in one paper the chronology of the developing program as it affects OSA with special emphasis on the responsibilities of SS/OSA.

To distinguish CHIGOE from other "usual" OSA programs with an analysis of the security problems which its "unusual" nature has created.

To recommend a course of action for SS/OSA in an effort to preclude a future reoccurrence of security problems inherent in CHIGOE and other "hybrid" projects.

II. CHRONOLOGY (Based upon SS/OSA file material)

A. On 19 November 1965, two DD/S&T representatives visited officers of LTV Electro Systems, Inc., at Greenville, Texas. [redacted] and Lt. Colonel William A. Seward, representing Office of Research and Development (ORD) and Office of Special Activities (OSA) respectively, provided LTV with an initial presentation of proposed modifications to a P2V7 aircraft to provide a multi-sensor platform. [redacted] outlined requirements to modify a P2V7 aircraft as a first-base strike reconnaissance aircraft with a follow-on employment as a hunter/locator vehicle for a near real-time hunter/killer team. An agreement was made whereby LTV would submit a basic proposal preliminary to a formal bid. [redacted] was identified as the Program Manager with OSA providing support for aircraft procurement, crew selection and training and definition of communications and defensive systems requirements. Among other things, OSA was to provide operational guidance for the entire weapons system, coordinate with the military for the use of overseas test areas and determine operational procedures. Further, OSA was to, "Determine what, if any, security requirements exist and, if they do exist, provide security guidance and control to OSA, ORD

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Page 2

and LTV."¹.

B. Lt. Colonel Donald E. Songer D/FA, OSA indicated to his components on 15 December 1965 that CHIGOE was a joint ORD/OSA program designed to develop and test a group of sensors in a suitable aircraft. The joint nature of the effort would require some inputs, for planning purposes, from OSA offices. He further advised, "It is intended that the operational model will be used by OSA for the collection of intelligence data."² (b)(3)

C. [redacted] SS/OSA, reported on [redacted] 17 December 1965 briefing of OSA personnel which indicated the program would be managed by the Agency with [redacted] as Program Director. The Agency would be the primary user of the system with OSA identified as its operational instrument. Further, The Department of Defense would be kept fully advised regarding the progress of CHIGOE with a view toward offering the completed operational system to the DOD for its use. [redacted] continued, "Security classification for the overall CHIGOE reconnaissance system is 'TOP SECRET' because of its primary use by the Agency. During the preliminary proposal and development phase, a hold down system should be initiated to restrict knowledge of the total system and its parts within the Agency on a need-to-know basis. Necessary coordination outside the Agency will only be done with the concurrence of the program director and OSA/SS." Regarding Agency security control of CHIGOE, [redacted] reasons that, "...if this aircraft becomes operational, its reason for being, that is collecting intelligence by means of an aircraft flying over denied territory, appears to come under the purview of the NRO." He then outlines the ways in which CHIGOE appears to correspond with normal BYEMAN projects.³ (b)(3)

D. On 22 December 1965, [redacted] met with OSA Operations, Contracting and Security representatives to establish security procedures for the system integration and field testing phases of CHIGOE. [redacted] recognized that no final decision had been reached on inclusion of CHIGOE in the BYEMAN system but agreed that the BYEMAN security format would be used, beginning at the time the system's integration contract was let. [redacted] understanding of this format was that those then working on CHIGOE planning or sensor equipment or who would be concerned with subsequent installation, testing and operations, would be identified and brought up to the first step of "Security Access Approval". Conversely, persons dealing only with sensor fabrication at the contractor facility would not be so upgraded.⁴ (b)(3)

(b)(3) E. On 14 January 1966, [redacted] met with [redacted] and Lt. Colonel Seward to clarify a reported policy approval of CHIGOE. OSA responsibilities for CHIGOE were (b)(3)

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SECRET

Page 3

spelled out as follows:

"OSA is to prepare an estimate of costs and personnel requirements for both Headquarters and field units in all of the several phases:

- a. Proof of concept
- b. Flight test
- c. Initial operations
- d. Full operations"

understood that OSA was to prepare to support and operate the CHIGOE aircraft and to support the flight test phase which includes the use of contract flight crews and coordination with the U.S. Navy for procurement and supply of aircraft spare parts. Colonel Seward wrote, "It is very clear that DD/S&T intends to include CHIGOE (or an appropriate later version) as a capability to be operated by OSA as an Agency asset".⁵

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F. Recommended security controls for CHIGOE were made a matter of record on 11 January 1966 when Colonel Seward wrote, "Because of its basic intended use and its developmental connection with other similarly oriented systems, it should be seriously considered for control within the BYEMAN system at some future date." He mentions also that the interrelationship between some CHIGOE sensors and IDEALIST sensors prevent CHIGOE from being placed under normal CIA security control, i.e., Logistics Security. When CHIGOE is operational, utilizing the current aircraft or any other aircraft, it would seem to fall clearly under the BYEMAN system, i.e., an aircraft for over-flying denied territory collecting intelligence. Seward compares CHIGOE with other BYEMAN programs and concludes by recommending that BYEMAN security rules and standards be observed.⁶

G. OSA's CHIGOE estimates were presented to ORD on 21 January 1966. The basic document contains, among others, certain pertinent assumptions by Director OSA as follows:

- (1) OSA will support CHIGOE in the test phase through completion of the "proof of concept".
- (2) OSA will operate CHIGOE in the operational phases.
- (3) "Proof of concept" ends at the completion of the overseas test phase when the analysis and the evaluation are ready for presentation to the Agency and DOD.
- (4) CHIGOE security will be controlled by SS/OSA and entry into the BYEMAN system is not contemplated.

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Page 4

- (5) OSA will use contract flight crews and contract maintenance support for the operational phases.
- (6) The first OSA flight crew will participate in the "proof of concept" flight plans.
- (7) A full-time CHIGOE Project Officer is required in OSA.⁷

H. On 4 February 1966, [] met with Dr. Wheelon with the result that LTV was to be awarded the CHIGOE contract. This meeting developed also that the U.S. Navy would be included in the support operations for CHIGOE development and spells out the coordinations to be accomplished by OSA with the U.S. Navy to implement such support.⁸

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I. A meeting was held in [] office on 16 February 1966. Representatives from ORD, OSA and U.S.N. were present. This meeting represented a status report on CHIGOE development and indicated that at that time the U.S. Navy had entered the CHIGOE program in a rather large supporting role. A recommendation was made that a Commo facility be established at LTV to handle CHIGOE traffic. OSA Contracts Management Division was designated the responsible office for handling CHIGOE contracts at both LTV and Texas Instruments, however, Office of Logistics would remain responsible for contracts with other companies involved in CHIGOE hardware production. OSA's role, other than as contracting office, was to provide security and some material support during Phase 1. Lt. Colonel Seward was assigned the task of monitoring the continuity of Phase 1 (Research and Development). During Phase 2, if it materialized, OSA would probably be responsible for the development, staffing and budgeting for Project CHIGOE.⁹

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J. Colonel Seward's memo dated 21 February 1966, reflects that on 4 February [] briefed the DDS&T on the status of CHIGOE. LTV would be awarded a Phase 1 contract to design and price the development of an SP2H aircraft to ORD specifications; any Phase 2 contract would be awarded on the basis of design study results. Prior to this writing, project plans anticipated OSA using the first SP2H vehicle as an operational aircraft. This was not now considered feasible due to the estimated cost of a one-aircraft capability and, "The charter now is to 'prove the concept' with the first aircraft and then return it to DOD for use in whole or in part as they see fit." If CHIGOE proves out, then OSA, by direction of DDS&T, would undertake a development program to establish and operate a low altitude multi-sensor vehicle as an OSA project. OSA support during Phase 1 included security support, guidance and control. Plans for Phase 2 presumed an OSA

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SECRET

Page 5

operational project.^{10.}

K. This paper documents ORD's request for a Commo link at LTV for Project CHIGOE. Paragraph 5 states,

"CHIGOE will not be formally included in the BYEMAN system although OSA Security will exercise the same measure of control. The finished product being an overflight reconnaissance vehicle, it is inevitable that it should be put in the BYEMAN control system. A formal request has been made to so include the CHIGOE system under appropriate security safeguards and hold down procedures."^{11.}

L. A meeting was held at Main Navy on 4 March 1966 regarding U.S. Navy support for Project CHIGOE. The C/SS/OSA briefed participants that the Project would not be included in the BYEMAN system but would follow the same criteria. Security control would be exercised through OSA Security and from the Navy side would be funneled through Captain Wilson's office at REWSON.

[redacted] ORD, were present at this meeting.)^{12.}

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M. In this paper, Colonel Songer requests Program Staff, OSA, to provide clarifications of the support which D/FA/OSA will be required to provide CHIGOE. His message notes that the U.S. Navy apparently will support flight test operations both in the U.S. and in the deployment overseas.^{13.}

N. On 14 March, [redacted] requested OSA to provide a draft of OSA's proposed support plans for CHIGOE so that he could present an integrated CHIGOE package to the U.S. Navy.^{14.}

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O. On 23 March, General Ledford emphasized that OSA would support ORD during "Proof of concept" with one aircraft and would plan for the development of a CHIGOE capability, based on ORD's data from the CHIGOE program. OSA Program Plans for Fiscal Year 1968 included an estimated \$45 million dollars to develop and employ a suitable airframe with a multi-sensor array. According to this paper, the "Proof of concept" phase with the single SP2H aircraft now at LTV was to be "funded solely by ORD." OSA would support Phase 1 as far as possible without an exchange of funds, primarily in the area of obtaining supplies and assistance from other government services such as the USAF. The United States Navy had agreed to support Phase 1 and presumably the follow-on Project, assuming both came to fruition. The Security Staff OSA was directed to provide security guidance in accordance with previous arrangements.^{15.}

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SECRET

Page 6

P. ORD, OSA and USN personnel met at the Naval Air Test Center (NATC), Patuxent River, Maryland, on 28 March 1966, to discuss CHIGOE support required by ORD. [redacted] described the CHIGOE "proof of concept" phase as having as its objective the production of a working model of the sensor array and aircraft, with its technology to be made available to the DOD, and specifically the U.S. Navy, as required. In addition to the scheduled equipments planned for CHIGOE, [redacted] advised there was a magnetometer system in the planning stages which might be ready by the end of 1966 as an active system. This was not really a part of the CHIGOE basic configuration, however it would be added on when and if it proved feasible to do so. The CHIGOE timetable is spelled out as follows:

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"The first flight of the CHIGOE aircraft is now planned for some time in July 1966. The LTV tests in the U.S. are to be completed by December 1966 and then the overseas will begin in January 1967. The overseas test area will be in the ARPA site in Thailand. Additional flights will probably follow over Laos. For this reason, [redacted] desires to have Navy crews fly the overseas flight test."

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The memo goes on to state that [redacted] will need a Navy flight crew at LTV in early June 1966 with a commitment to the program for at least one year. The crew would consist of 6 to 8 flight crew members plus 20 to 22 ground personnel. Crew integrity through the entire test period was required.

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Regarding CHIGOE security, Seward writes:

"Since the SP2H aircraft and the Navy personnel to support it and fly it will be assigned to Patuxent River, there is serious question as to whether or not the Agency should have any part in security control of this Project. The real underlying need for security cognizance of Project CHIGOE is to protect the Agency involvement and additionally to protect the OSA's involvement in this and other similar types of endeavors. It is now proposed that OSA Security control the the security aspects of CHIGOE while the aircraft is at LTV. Security responsibility and control should revert to the Navy with perhaps some procedural requirements assistance from the program manager. It is here inferred that the program manager would necessarily have to seek security guidance from someone else, either OSA or Central Security. As this program continues, there seems to be less and less valid reason for OSA to control

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SECRET

Page 7

security of this program. The follow-on system is another matter."16.

Q. [redacted] briefed the DD/SA and other OSA personnel on 30 March 1966 concerning the current status of CHIGOE at a meeting convened to resolve some of the uncertainties vis-a-vis OSA participation in CHIGOE, and in particular, the first-phase of the Project. [redacted] noted the decision of the DDS&T to contract with LTV and mentioned that the expense involved in a wholly Agency supported program had resulted in the solicitation of U.S. Navy support. Since the Navy was willing to support CHIGOE, Dr. Brewer is looking to it for general support except in the case of peculiar items or services which OSA is better able to provide, such as procurement of USAF items and cable service. Discussing security, the guidelines spelled out indicated:

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"CHIGOE Security will be controlled and administered by OSA so long as the SP2H aircraft is at LTV. Once it leaves, (July 1966) security responsibility will revert to the Navy. The only remaining interest of OSA will be to protect Agency association with this development and the possibility of a follow-on system under Agency auspices. OSA will maintain security cognizance over those persons in the Navy who now know, or who in the future may know of the Agency connection to CHIGOE. [redacted]

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[redacted] also indicated that a communications link will be set up between Headquarters, Main Navy, (REWSON) Patuxent River and LTV. Message traffic will funnel through Headquarters communications control and communications security control will remain with OSA. OSA would be privy to CHIGOE I data and would plan CHIGOE II as an OSA development with the D/SA assigning responsibility for CHIGOE II planning as soon as possible. It was further indicated that ORD would deal directly with USN for Logistic support.17.

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R. On 4 April 1966, Dr. Wheelon issued the System Program Directive for CHIGOE to ORD and OSA. This directive presumably pulled together all thinking on CHIGOE. It positions ORD as the CHIGOE Project Manager for developing the system and directs ORD to participate in a DOD-sponsored study and development of a side-looking synthetic aperture radar which will penetrate foliage and evaluate air-borne magnetometer and other specialized devices. It continues:

"Office of Special Activities, DDS&T, is directed to provide operational support for the

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Page 8

development and test phases and to plan for eventual Agency use of the multi-sensor system as an overflight intelligence collection capability. Because of the sensitive nature of Agency overflight operations, OSA will provide streamlined contracting support and will assume security guidance and control during the system integration and all subsequent phases. Until it proves necessary to do otherwise, CHIGOE will not be included in the BYEMAN system, but will, nevertheless, be afforded the same close security control."

Doctor Wheelon goes on to state:

"It is recognized that both the wide range of capabilities being provided and the national interest require that maximum use be made of this system. Close coordination is to be maintained with those DOD components who concurred in Agency development of the concept, and others who are identified during the program as potential users, with the understanding that parts of the Agency multisensor technology may contribute to their specialized needs."

Due to the urgent national requirement for this particular type of system, Dr. Wheelon directs, "...that the total DDS&T capability in this area be combined into the CHIGOE air-borne system, and that the results be evaluated by potential military users as soon as possible. The target date for production of the operational multi-sensor program is December 1966, and the first operations are to be directed toward areas of U.S. involvement in South-east Asia."

Finally, Dr. Wheelon directs:

"OSA will cooperate with ORD in the preparation of appropriate documentation, such as an initial system Package Program, so that development, test, evaluation and replication can proceed in a valid and logical manner. The System Package Program will include preliminary operational estimates and planning factors based on the assumption that OSA will integrate this air-borne system into an existing OSA Project, to provide a basic long-term Agency capability in this specialized field of overflight collection."¹⁸

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SECRET

Page 9

III. CONCEPT ANALYSIS

A. Available evidence indicates that what is now known as Project CHIGOE was born as an in-house ORD study underway early in 1965. Sometimes during the summer of that year, the lack of timely, tactical intelligence in combat situations was recognized by the U. S. military and intelligence community. Deeper U. S. involvement in Viet Nam against transient, guerrilla type operations in heavily foliated areas, handicapped local commanders' so that normal military tactics to locate and destroy the enemy's hit and run capability were largely ineffectual. A coordinated quick reaction reconnaissance-strike capability was needed. Accordingly, the DCI directed DD/S&T to seek the answer to the problem. ORD's in-house study was funded and accelerated to prove the feasibility of the R&D effort to fill this need.

B. Project CHIGOE came under the direction of [redacted], of ORD. They moved quickly to establish the system requirements for CHIGOE and in the fall of 1965, pinpointed LTV, Inc, Greenville, Texas, as the logical prime contractor to undertake prototype development. Several other companies were tentatively tabbed as individual component fabricators. Also at about that time, the decision was made to use a U. S. Navy P2V, as the airborne systems platform, primarily because it was large enough to house the system and was available in large numbers.

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C. In late 1965 ORD combined with OSA in what became a joint venture, with OSA providing materiel support for CHIGOE development and testing. At that point in time [redacted] represented CHIGOE as a multi-sensor airborne platform to be utilized as a first base strike reconnaissance aircraft, with a follow-on capability as a hunter/locator vehicle for a near real time hunter/killer team. This means use of the CHIGOE aircraft and systems to spot targets, then quickly relay target data to local tactical air commanders for immediate air strike action.

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D. Early ORD/OSA discussions indicated to OSA that, if the CHIGOE concept proved sound, the vehicle (or a later version) might benefit OSA's manned aircraft recon-

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Page 10

naissance program. Col. Songer, then D/FA/OSA wrote in December 1965, "It is intended that the operational model will be used by OSA for the collection of intelligence data." In January 1966, this point of view was strengthened when ORD asked OSA to prepare cost estimates and personnel requirements for all phases of CHIGOE development, including flights testing and subsequent operations. Specifically, the estimate included provisions for use of OSA contract pilots and ground crews for test and operational use. In addition, a full time OSA Project Officer was programmed.

E. There were indications during these early planning meetings that the Department of Defense (DOD) was to be made privy to CHIGOE data as the program progressed and that the completed proved system would be turned over to DOD for its own use. The ramifications of this intent would not become fully apparent to OSA until a little later.

F. Concurrent with OSA's acceptance of a supporting role, the question of security cognizance, a natural concomittant of OSA's contracting and materiel support, began to be explored more fully. Of primary concern was that CHIGOE was (at this stage) a blending of two DD/S&T offices with radically different experience pertaining to security control and guidance precedures. ORD, as a DD/S&T component normally divorced from special programs and operations, usually turned toward the Office of Logistics Security Staff for its security guidance. OSA, deeply immersed in special operations, relied almost entirely upon BYEMAN Security Standards using OSA Security Staff for security policy guidance and implementation. In addition, OSA had an in-house security force whereas ORD had no permanently assigned security representative.

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SECRET

Page 11

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H. What finally emerged from the various meetings and discussions, more by direction than by rational thinking, was a compromise "Bigot List" type of security, which was to control CHIGOE by the application of BYEMAN Standards so far as possible without actually placing CHIGOE under BYEMAN Control. Many factors contributed to the partial breakdown of this hybrid security system as the Project progressed. These will be enumerated later.

I. The CHIGOE concept changed radically in February 1966 when [] advised OSA that the USN was entering the CHIGOE loop (apparently with the approval of the DD/S&T) in a large supporting role. Heretofore, USN had facilitated the procurement of the P2V aircraft for CHIGOE modifications. From this point in time, OSA's role in CHIGOE materiel support matters diminished. The USN assumed more and more importance in logistical support of the Project. OSA's input, except for contractual and security support, seemed related to downstream use of the proved CHIGOE concept, rather than to the developmental/testing phases moving forward during 1966. The ORD/OSA merger had become the ORD/USN/OSA triumvirate.

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J. In March 1966, the USN role in CHIGOE was firmly established--plans were going forward for USN TWX links with OSA and LTV; a rather ill-defined security channel at REWSON was outlined to coordinate with SS/OSA on matters of CHIGOE security from the USN side.

K. The change in support roles caused the D/FA/OSA to request clarification of D/FA's role in the Project. Coincidentally with this, [] requested OSA to define its plans for CHIGOE so an integrated CHIGOE package could be presented to the USN. OSA's clarification came

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SECRET

Page 12

on 23 March 1966 and noted that initially, OSA would support ORD's CHIGOE Program during "proof of concept" in the area of obtaining supplies and assistance from other U. S. Government agencies and so far as possible, without an exchange of funds. Funding for CHIGOE was solely ORD's responsibility. Downstream, OSA plans included an estimated \$45,000,000 for FY 1968 to develop and employ a suitable airframe with a multi-sensor array. Security and contracts cognizance remained with OSA.

1. On 28 March, ORD, OSA and USN representatives met at NATC, Patuxent River. The CHIGOE timetable spelled out there indicated the CHIGOE aircraft was scheduled to make its maiden flight in July 1966, with a completion date (modification and domestic tests) in December 1966. After that, the aircraft would move overseas for flight testing, probably at the ARPA site in Thailand, and later over Laos. Both flight and ground crews would be USN personnel. The USN's expanded role in CHIGOE support was spelled out as well as ORD's intent to look to USN for total support, even to the extent of reverting to USN security control of CHIGOE when the aircraft left LTV. Lt. Col. Seward, recording this meeting, wrote, "As this program continues, there seems to be less and less valid reason for OSA to control security of this program. The follow-on system is another matter."

M. The implications of the NATC meeting, above, were soon reinforced by [] when he briefed D/FA/OSA, indicating that OSA Security would prevail while CHIGOE was at LTV. Once it left (July 1966) security responsibility would revert to the USN, with SS/OSA's remaining mission to protect the agency association with this development and the possibility of a follow-on system under Agency auspices. (b)(3)

N. Finally, the DD/S&T System Program Directive was published on 4 April 1966. It affirmed OSA's role in providing support (type and amount not specified) for the development and test phases of CHIGOE and to plan for eventual Agency use of the multisensor system as an over-flight intelligence collection capability. Streamlined contract and security procedures were directed during system integration and all subsequent phases. CHIGOE

SECRET

SECRET

Page 13

would not be included within the BYEMAN system but would be afforded the same close security control. CHIGOE funding by the Bureau of the Budget amounted to \$2,800,000 for development and initial testing. Close coordination with potential DOD users was required. OSA would proceed on the assumption that this airborne system would be integrated into existing OSA projects, to provide a basic long term Agency capability in the specialized field of overflight collection.

SUMMARY

The original concept of the CHIGOE Program, that of developing and testing an airborne sensor array, remained constant throughout 1966. What did undergo a radical change, however, was the role OSA was to play in support of CHIGOE. OSA's role was influenced by two policy decisions:

1. The possibility of a CHIGOE-type system being integrated within existing OSA programs;
2. A decision to proliferate CHIGOE data within the DOD for its use.

OSA planning for CHIGOE addressed itself to the first decision while it appears that ORD visualized CHIGOE as a CIA/DOD partnership. These different approaches had little effect on OSA from a contracting and materiel point of view. However, this dichotomy of intent eventually caused serious degradation of security control.

Entry of the USN as the major CHIGOE supporting Agency, with a corresponding decreasing reliance upon OSA, naturally drew ORD and USN tighter together as the program progressed. This worked to the detriment of cooperation between ORD and SS/OSA despite efforts by the latter to offer its service as a control mechanism to the former. The following discussion of security control in the two primary areas of U. S. Government and industry will elaborate on the above. Part of the problem can be attributed directly to the reassignment of the OSA Program Monitor early in 1966 and the failure to name a successor. The physical distance between ORD and OSA was a contributing factor.

SECRET

SECRET

Page 14

IV. SECURITY IMPLEMENTATION

A. During the week of 2 May 1966, OSA security officers visited the three contractors with which OSA had negotiated contracts in connection with the CHIGOE Program. These companies, all located in Texas, were LTV Electrosystems, Greenville; Texas Instruments, Richardson; and Electromechanics Company, Austin.

1. Due to an earlier visit to LTV by [redacted] the May visit consisted primarily of a reaffirmation of BYEMAN-type security ground rules which we expected to implement at this company as well as conducting thirteen CHIGOE briefings at the top management level. These briefings were "after the fact" since it was learned that [redacted], during his earlier negotiations at LTV, made no pretense about his connection with CIA and, as a result, top management and approximately forty other individuals who had worked on LTV's CHIGOE proposal were witting of Agency sponsorship. It was apparent that the normal BYEMAN hold-down concept had been violated from the beginning of this program and the damage was irreparable--CIA was "blown" to a large group of LTV personnel as the CHIGOE sponsor. It was decided that approval requests on those people witting of CIA involvement would be forwarded to Headquarters and that appropriate briefings would be afforded by the security coordinator at LTV when approvals were granted. In addition, approximately 250 LTV employees would be engaged on the CHIGOE contract and appropriate approvals would be obtained on these individuals as quickly as possible.

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NOTE: During April-June 1966, SS/OSA had examined CHIGOE from the viewpoint of streamlining security (in line with the DD/S&T Program Directive). ORD's intent to have USN assume security cognizance of CHIGOE, coupled with the growing interests and influence of the DOD in the program, led SS/OSA to adopt a modified access approval approach. This took the form of eliminating the two-level approval (in this case the PSAA-2) from the normal one, two and three levels employed in BYEMAN programs. Other than for top management personnel requiring sponsor identification, all other employees on the project would require only a one-level approval. The ensuing influx of USN, USAF and U.S. Army personnel at LTV provided a natural "DOD" cover for the Agency.

SECRET

SECRET

Page 15

2. Texas Instruments presented no major security problems with regard to CHIGOE. Working through "I" cleared contacts and requiring only a minimum number of new approvals for CHIGOE, a BYEMAN-type security was established rather easily. Due to at least weekly contact between T. I. and LTV personnel regarding CHIGOE developments, arrangements were laid on between the companies' security coordinators to facilitate visits between the plants by the representatives involved.

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B. Application of BYEMAN-style security standards within U. S. Government (mainly DOD) on CHIGOE proved to be an entirely different proposition compared to the relative ease with which such standards were implemented in industry.

1. Of primary importance was the manner in which ORD promoted CHIGOE within the DOD. Proliferation of the fact that CHIGOE was progressing and details regarding its progress were communicated through briefings of high level DOD civilian and military officials. SS/OSA managed to have a representative present at

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SECRET

Page 16

several such briefings, but it was readily apparent that earlier unmonitored briefings had occurred and that ORD would continue its practice of briefing anyone and everyone who showed the slightest interest in CHIGOE or who could help the program—without notifying SS/OSA. As indicated above, ORD did invite SS/OSA participation at several briefings; however, the representative was afforded no opportunity to explain the security ground rules attendant to CHIGOE. The most that was accomplished was to have each briefed participant sign a project secrecy oath, and then back this up with a formal approval through liaison between the various service BCO's and SS/OSA.

2. Several face-to-face sessions with the Project Manager attempted, unsuccessfully, to indicate to him that SS/OSA could be a project control mechanism valuable to ORD. Although ORD was sympathetic to this view, in reality little cooperation was forthcoming regarding advance notice of briefings and news of visitors, either CIA or DOD, to contractors. Fortunately, excellent liaison with company security contacts afforded SS/OSA a channel by which visitor notification could be passed and to some degree controlled. The criterion that DOD visitors to LTV, T.I. and [redacted] must have at least a U. S. Government Secret clearance^{(b)(1)} was eventually established and has worked. Acceptance^{(b)(3)} 10 USC 130 of this level of clearance was based on the eventual takeover of CHIGOE by USN for its "MUDDY HILL" operation, controlled at a Secret level of access.

3. SS/OSA has maintained CHIGOE under a "Bigot List" control system within the "I" Branch, SS/OSA. CHIGOE approvals, briefing oaths and a card index comprise the records. This record is not complete by any means, but represents SS/OSA's best effort in the face of the limited cooperation received from the Project Manager.

4. SS/OSA's prime concern in recent months has been the monitoring of increasing DOD visitors to LTV. With the approach of domestic and overseas testing, largely staffed and logistically supported by the USN, the need for re-evaluation of CHIGOE security cognizance, OSA's role in the program and the downstream planning for an OSA CHIGOE-style system is apparent. The attachment to this paper outlines ORD's proposed plan for domestic and overseas testing.

SECRET

SECRET

Page 17

V. SECURITY PROBLEM AREAS/RECOMMENDATIONS

A. The major sources of irritation and frustration from an SS/OSA viewpoint in connection with Project CHIGOE stem from the following problem areas.

1. From the very beginnings of Project CHIGOE, as it emerged from an in-house ORD study into an accelerated hardware program, the exposure of CIA's sponsorship to large numbers of personnel within U. S. military and U. S. Government was a "fait accompli." This was due in a large part to ORD's "full speed ahead" attitude upon receiving its DCI directive. It may also stem from the normal ORD modus operandi in its usual contracting with industry, i.e., CIA association held at a Secret level only.

2. The concept of an ORD/OSA partnership pitted two dissimilar security systems against each other, so to speak, resulting in a less than adequate hybrid security system. The differences between Office of Logistics and Office of Special Activities security systems, although striving for the same goal, are many and educating ORD to the latter was not at all successful.

3. The failure of ORD to comply with its clear and stated understanding of the BYEMAN-style security requirements grafted to CHIGOE caused a serious breakdown in the effectiveness of security control applicable to U. S. Government and industry. This breakdown was abetted by conflicting policy, namely that CHIGOE would be secured a la BYEMAN-type controls, yet also that DOD would be kept apprised of all development. While these two goals are not completely opposed to each other, poor ORD/OSA communications did provide a fertile ground for security breakdown.

4. The dual contracting/security responsibility for CHIGOE, split between Office of Logistics and OSA, never really permitted centralized security control of the entire CHIGOE industrial set-up.

5. The loss of an effective OSA project officer to monitor ORD/OSA relationships seriously hampered monitoring of the developing program.

6. The rather quick switch from OSA to USN for almost total CHIGOE logistics support and the lack

SECRET

SECRET

Page 18

of USN security coordination likewise rendered monitoring of the USN's role ineffective.

B. From an SS/OSA point of view, security control of a special project which is wholly OSA controlled is quite different from securing a program which combines the talents of two DD/S&T officers; one designated the Managing Office; the other (OSA), the Supporting Office. In the former, all OSA components complement each other through rapid decision making and dissemination of project goals, techniques and areas of responsibility. Even in joint OSA/OEL ventures, security problems are minimized, since OEL historically relies upon OSA for complete support and "buys off" on SS/OA control techniques. In the latter type program, and there is every indication that this type is becoming more and more the norm rather than the exception, a sizeable barrier to effective security arises from the Managing Office's unfamiliarity with SS/OA style security. In CHIGOE, another cause was lack of firm guidance and direction to the Managing Office regarding the scope of SS/OA's responsibility. The following recommendations will go far to eliminate in future joint programs the causes of friction and misunderstanding which arose during CHIGOE.

RECOMMENDATION #1

That the Managing Office, or the DD/S&T, issue as early as possible in the program planning stage, a preliminary Project Plan, setting forth the program goals and areas of responsibility in both of the offices involved.

(Hopefully, such a preliminary policy paper would allow SS/OA an early start on exploring its security responsibilities and at the least establish early that SS/OA is to be the cognizant security office).

RECOMMENDATION #2

In concert with SS/S&T and Managing Office representative, SS/OA should establish early whether or not the program will be controlled via the BYEMAN Security Control System.

(In CHIGOE this problem was haggled over for about four months before a firm decision indicated whether SS/OA could apply the philosophy of BYEMAN control and utilize the existing BYEMAN control mechanism, or whether it should devise a "bigot list" security system. One way or the other, SS/OA should receive a go-ahead early in the program, so that the

SECRET

SECRET

Page 19

Managing Office can be educated to the security ground rules and weaned from its usual reliance upon Office of Logistics Security Staff).

RECOMMENDATION #3

That the final DD/S&T Program Directive specifically point out that SS/OSA has full security cognizance over the program and direct the Managing Office to seek out and cooperate in all security matters with SS/OSA.

(This is necessary so that there be no doubt in the Managing Office that SS/OSA has full top level authority to secure the project. Fullest cooperation between the parties should be specifically ordered, not merely implied).

RECOMMENDATION #4

That a written understanding, drawn between the DD/S&T components involved, direct that information about shifts in goals, techniques and intended involvement of other parties, such as other U. S. Government agencies in the program, be immediately communicated to OSA for dissemination and evaluation as to the effect on OSA planning.

(This understanding, presumably between Director, OSA, and the Management Office, will assist in preventing, as happened in CHIGOE, a rapid unannounced shift in support from OSA to USN, with a subsequent weakening of communications between the former partners in favor of the new partner. The shift went largely unnoticed in OSA, except for SS/OSA, for several months in 1966. Full disclosure of such intent would allow all OSA components to re-evaluate their roles).

RECOMMENDATION #5

That a program monitor be designated as OSA focal point to coordinate all matters and that if a replacement is required he be named promptly.

(Col. Seward, the original CHIGOE monitor, was reassigned in April 1966. No replacement was apparently named to follow the program until October 1966, when D/OSA indicated that D/Ops was designated OSA contact point for operational matters).

RECOMMENDATION #6

That channels of access to D/OSA or DD/S&T be established so that any dereliction on the part of Managing Office representatives can be brought to the attention of their superiors forcefully.

SECRET

SECRET

Page 20

(In CHIGOE, the breakdown at the working level between [redacted] and C/SS/OSA violated written understandings by [redacted] and Chief, ORD, as to SS/OSA's role. A memorandum by DD/S&T or by D/OSA might have gotten SS/OSA and ORD back together whereas SS/OSA discussions with [redacted] failed to accomplished this purpose).

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