

~~SECRET~~

OSA-0067-67

14 April 1967

## MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

SUBJECT: Project CHIGOE

1. The security responsibility for Project CHIGOE has been vested with the OSA Security Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency since December 1965, when long-range goals envisioned CHIGOE as an operational asset of OSA. The project has not moved in this direction and the Director of OSA no longer retains an operational interest in the program.

2. At this time CHIGOE is considered a tactical reconnaissance system which the United States Navy will utilize and operate within the framework of the DOD. The sensitivity of Project CHIGOE does not exceed Secret level when typical DOD classification benchmarks are used. It is the Agency's relationship to the project that has caused it to be handled at a higher classification level.

3. Although certain technical guidance for CHIGOE still emanates from CIA's Office of Research and Development, the future of the program clearly rests with the United States Navy. When CHIGOE is operationally deployed, the vehicle will be under the complete control of the United States Navy. It is appropriate, therefore, that all aspects of security responsibility for Project CHIGOE be transferred from CIA to REWSON including the personnel security, physical security, and operational security of the project. Industrial security also should be transferred to REWSON at such time (approximately mid-June 1967) when the current array of CHIGOE contracts with Ling-Temco-Vought, Texas Instruments, and Electromagnetics, handled by OSA's Contracts Division expire; the Dalmo contract is currently under OL cognizance. At that time REWSON should absorb industrial security for CHIGOE, while the security of contracts, handled by the OSA contracts officer, will be in accordance with previous Memorandum of Understanding with REWSON dated 18 January 1967.

4. It is the expectation that REWSON will maximize efforts to protect the fact of CIA involvement in Project CHIGOE.

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
---

~~SECRET~~

S E C R E T

OSA-0067-67

Page 2

5. Upon arrival and receipt of this Memorandum of Understanding, the United States Navy will assume security cognizance of Project CHIGOE.

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

JOHN PARANGOSKY

Acting Director of Special Activities

*M. D. Carmady*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
REWSON Project Manager  
Office of the Chief  
Navy Material

14 April 1967

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

OSA-0067-67  
Page 3

OSA/SS/[redacted]mpr (14Mar67)

Distribution:

- Orig - D/SA
- 1 - DD/SA
- 1 - REWSON Proj Mgr/Navy
- 1 - General Counsel
- 1 - C/SMS/DDS&T
- 1 - C/OL/Security
- 1 - ORD
- 1 - D/O/OSA
- 1 - D/M/OSA
- 1 - D/R&D/OSA
- 1 - Compt/OSA
- 1 - C/CMD/OSA
- 1 - SS/OSA
- 1 - RB/OSA

(b)(3)

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

## MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

1. As a result of a meeting held on 13 December 1966 in reference to the role of the Security Staff, Office of Special Activities, DD/S&T, in support of the U. S. Navy's REWSON effort, the following points of agreement were reached:

- a. OSA Security Staff Responsibilities
- (1) To insure that adequate physical security protection is afforded to the Contract itself;
  - (2) To issue appropriate security clearances and to brief only those individuals in the particular organization or firm who will be made knowledgeable of the activities of CIA in support of the U.S. Navy's REWSON effort. CIA activities will include only the actual preparation of the contract and subsequent payments of the contract.

b. The U.S. Navy Office of Naval Material will be responsible for all other aspects of the contract security-wise which will include the security of the personnel involved and the actual physical security protection of the product itself.

Chief, Security Staff  
OSA

(b)(3)

Approved

John Parangosky  
Deputy Director, OSA

Approved

*M. D. Carmody*  
Martin D. Carmody, USN  
REWSON Project Manager  
Office of the Chief  
Navy Material

(b)(3)

S E C R E T