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Memorandum.

September 20th, 1950.

To:

From:

Subject:

Further activities of General Lov Pechala.
Re my memorandum from July 24th, 1950.

1. A few weeks ago, the German press reported about a joint statement formally made by General Lov Pechala as Chairman of the so-called Czech National Group and by spokesmen of the Sudeten German refugees in the western zones on the other side. This statement expressed in a solemn form the mutual agreement of the two parties to work for the future resettlement of the Sudeten Germans in their former homes, for the material and moral satisfaction to be given by the Czechs and for the abolition of the ^{German} feeling of hatred and revenge. The statement referred expressively to the Czech, Moravian and Silesian areas only, thus pointing to General Pechala's systematic policy of Slovakian separatism, i.e. of the extreme rightist Slovakian aim of full political independence from the Czech elements of the Republic.
2. Last week, a report has been circulated in the German press that General Pechala, who launched the above-mentioned statement from his London Headquarters, has arrived to Germany in person and started informal talks with Sudeten German politicians in Bonn, under the pretext of exchanging informations about the development of the political situation in Czechoslovakia.
3. Both these news have got wide publicity in the Czechoslovakian Communist-controlled radio and press, which denounced Gen. Pechala as pro-German quisling, who has been chosen by the western Allies to sell the Czechs on the idea of a new German Protectorate under US sponsorship. General Pechala, it is claimed, wants to play the infamous role of the war-time No 1 collaborator Col. Bergraves and is now pacting with Sudeten Germans to restore not only their possessions but also their political supremacy in the Czech area.
4. The Czechoslovak Council in Washington /Council of Free Czechoslovakia/ which has no official contact with the Pechala group, has officially denounced any steps made by him and has reportedly declared that he is acting as mere private man with no political credit whatsoever. On the other hand, the Council has recently appointed its representative in Germany, General Bastich, who resides actually in Frankfurt and has got instructions that no official negotiations should be taken up with the Sudeten Germans at this time.

5. I have got reliable reports from DP camps all over the

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theater that General Prehala's untimely action has created a strong resentment against his movement which was just about to increase its following by a radical standpoint against Communist appeasement and by offers of recruiting a Czech auxiliary corps for the purpose of its participation in the Korean fighting. The German statement, however, has definitely turned the tide in the General's disfavor and it is generally felt that the only profit of his action will go to the Communists who are already busy to exploit this rare opportunity to blame the West of favorizing Sudeten Germans against the Czech nation and against the spirit of the Potsdam agreement of 1945.

6. I have to agree with the popular reaction that General Prehala's move has been a further proof of the political clumsiness of this good-soldier-turned-bad-statesman. I had some hopes that we would eventually be able to look into the Prehala ranks for some of the people we are planning to use for our future projects. Now, however, there is little chance left that a sincere Prehalist could be used without creating more political harm than profit with regard to the fact that the nation at home is still extremely cautious to agree with a wholesale return of the Sudeten Germans, as proposed by General Prehala. Besides that, the attitude of the General's movement toward Slovaks differs elementarily from the generally accepted concept of future Czechoslovakian political unity which appears a must in the light of the planned territorial concentrations of the future European political entities.

7. I have expressed my opinion about the political, economic and social implications of the Sudeten German problem as well as of the Slovakian question in my Memoranda No. 15 and 25 respectively /June and July 1949/ and I don't have anything to change on the principles expressed therein. With the new development of the German problem as the principal question of a European settlement it is more than ever apparent that a friendly and psychologically prudent solution of the Czech-German feud will have to be sought and found soon. The statement of General Prehala, however, isn't but a complete surrender to the Sudeten German claims, a reversal of historical facts and an absolute disregard to the psychological approach of the Czech people at home to this crucial problem. It does, e.g., claim the necessity of an expiation of the crimes committed by the Czechs on the Germans after 1945, but does not mention by one word the cruelties of the German occupation during the WW II. Neither does the statement pay attention to the completely changed economic and social pattern of the country and the reversals to be expected in this field after an eventual next war. Altogether, General Prehala's announcement is a flagrant proof of an absolute political incompetence and a regrettable lack of sound judgment.

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8. In his above-quoted Memo on this subject, this writer has expressed his belief that it might be possible to induce a working cooperation of General Prohala with the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, if the former would have dismissed his incompetent advisers and contributed to an appeasement by a softening of his utterances against the 1945-48 politicians and by an expression of a sincere wish for mutual understanding on the platform of an all-out anti-Communist struggle.

In the light of the above-said, however, a cooperation with the Council - actually the only semi-officially acknowledged representation of the Czechoslovakian exile - seems practically impossible as the Council could hardly expose itself to violent criticism both at home and abroad by negotiations with an avowed advocate of an unconditioned return of the Sudeten Germans.

9. As far as the interests of US Foreign Policy are concerned, it is fully acknowledged that the present situation between Czechs and Germans cannot be maintained for long if a pattern of a durable peaceful cooperation in the Middle European theater were to be hammered out. Undoubtedly, it will be necessary in the near future to tackle this problem and eventually to compel the Czechoslovakian exile representatives to take it up from their own initiative. Nevertheless, the spirit of such negotiations has to be quite different of General Prohala's approach. As far as their contents are concerned, the Memorandum 15 is still considered an elemental basis for a start of such talks. Their detailed specification, however, could hardly be drafted before a more progressed stage of the international development either by peaceful means or through an armed showdown is reached.

10. It is felt, further, that the actual situation requires the utmost confidence of the Czech and Slovakian elements at home in the support and sympathetic attitude of the Western powers. This feeling only can contribute to a vigorous and efficient defiance of the Soviet pressure in case of an aggravated international situation. The fact that the Communists have cleverly displayed General Prohala's statement as a proof of an American plot against the most vital interests of the Czech nation gives a sample of the methods to be expected from our foes in this peculiar field of propaganda warfare. We have to take in account the unfortunate reaction which an overt support to General Prohala and his group would evoke both at home and in the exile movement.

11. As far as the Western German propagandistic aims are concerned, it is felt that the Germans are today preoccupied by bigger issues than the Sudeten German question and that there is no immediate need of a settlement of this problem in or-

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der to secure the Sudeten Germans' loyalty and reduce their vulnerability to Soviet propaganda. The treaties, recently concluded between the Eastern German puppet state and Czechoslovakia and Poland respectively are a dependable safe-guard that the Sudeten refugees will not turn pro-Communists in the near future.- Reasonable Sudeten German leaders have, moreover, to agree that the so-called solution of their claims, as offered by Gen. Prehala, cannot be reached by simple mechanical statements, as any implementation of such agreements is bound to the political and economic facts of the given moment, facts which it is actually quite impossible to estimate.

12. We have further to value the propagandistic asset supplied to our efforts by the Communists in Prague by their wooing of the Eastern Germans, a policy strongly resented by the entire nation. The involuntary, Moscow-ordered honeymoon between Prague and Eastern Berlin is a very helpful proof of the complete subservience of the Czech Communists to their Soviet masters as well as a clear evidence that the Kremlin is anxious to secure Eastern German complacency at the expense of less powerful satellites, e.g., Czechoslovakia.- Any overt support, given today to such ill-advised and clumsy moves as General Prehala's recent statement, would forfeit the advantages offered by the forced fraternization of the Czech and German Communists to our own propaganda.

13. The recent activities and blunders of General Prehala give a strong warning not to indulge in any open support to his group. The advantages of an improved equilibrium of left and right inside the Council of Free Czechoslovakia -which could perhaps serve as an argument for his appointment to this body- would be by far balanced by the unfavorable public reaction and by the unfortunate fact that the Czechoslovakian public opinion will forthwith identify the General with a subservient policy of unconditional surrender to German claims.

14. Prehala notwithstanding, it has to be acknowledged that the general tendencies in the official Czechoslovakian exile are alarmingly drifting toward a continuously increasing influence of the Social Democrats, many of whom were plain Communist fellow-travelers in the 1945-1948 period. The influence of the British Labor Party is evident in this move, as the center of the Social Democratic activities is situated in London.-Paris, on the other hand, has shown a strong tendency toward independence in political matters, whereas the influence of the Social Democrats in the Washington exile center is rated as medium.-This writer is actually exploring possibilities of establishing a non-marxist counterweight to these tendencies, which have been recently spotted even in the composition of the RFE team in Europe.

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Though it would still be premature to draw any conclusions from the hitherto established facts, it may be already stated that there is a strikingly small number of liberal and right-wing politicians, journalists and public workers in the Czechoslovakian exile as compared with the busy and hard-working Socialist group. General Prchala's mistakes have, incidentally, helped to compromise the right-wingers among Czech exiles and expose them as advocates of a still-abhorred German appeasement.

A prominent personality among today's Czechoslovak non-Socialist and truly democratic exiles is Dr. Miroslav Mašín, former Czechoslovakian diplomat in Southern America who lives now in Montevideo, Uruguay and tries in vain to reactivate the formerly representative Czech conservative party, the National Democracy. He is, however, fatally handicapped by a complete lack of capable cooperators and selfless idealists.

Most of the other right-wing splinter groups can be discounted as political non-entities.

Thus, the right-wing camp in the Czechoslovakian political exile is represented exclusively by the formerly mighty Agrarian party which is, however, handicapped by its exclusively agrarian interests and could hardly appeal to the entire nation, being by itself a member of the so-called Green Internationale, a union of European Agrarian Parties which represent the interests of the free peasantry. It is natural that this type of a political party will hardly be able to compete with the Social Democrats for the labor vote and with the National Socialists, who have in the meantime growingly yielded to the marxist pressure for Socialist unification, for the middle-class vote.

15. As far as the people around General Prchala are concerned, there is no indication that a political personality of stature would soon arise from this group, fatally bound to Prchala's dictatorial management. However, I have got repeatedly serious hints as to the person of Dr. Jiří Bertl, one of Prchala's former principal adjutants, living in 5, Southwold Mansions, Witley Road, London S.W.9., who might be, according to my private informations, willing to renounce his Prchala affiliation and cooperate in a more serious political setting. Dr. Bertl is reported to have good contacts with the British Conservatives.

16. Also in London, Dr. Jan Stránský, son of the former Minister of Justice and Education respectively, develops a keen activity along the lines of the British Liberal Party and in the European Movement. Stránský is a former Czechoslovakian National Socialist member of Parliament, author of a successful London-edited book East Wind Over Prague

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and well established in the British upper classes through his marriage with a wealthy Englishwoman.

Dr. Jan Stránský in Europe and dr. Ivo Ducháček in the United States represent the most hopeful type of a young, progressive yet utterly non-Socialist and anti-Marxist Czechoslovakian politician in the Czech camp. Though it seems that the Slovaks have produced a few more of such promising candidates of political leadership, it is certain that this type is extremely rare at the present.

17. For the sake of completeness, the existence of the exiled People's Party, a Christian Socialist Catholic group has to be mentioned. This Party commanded strong popular support both before and after the war and is numerically strongly represented also in today's Council of Free Czechoslovakia. Despite its close affiliation to the Vatican policy-making circles and the appeal it has on the religion-conscious Catholics, the influence and prospect of the party are steadily diminishing as it is torn by internal feuds and complete lack of capable leadership. Created and held together as a middle-of-the-road party by the ignominious clerical politician dr. Jan Sránek, one-time Prime Minister of the Czechoslovakian exile Government in London during WW II., the people's party was up to now unable to overcome the loss of this spectacular leader.

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