


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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

~~Secret~~

26 January 1973
No. 0354/73

Copy № 45



NR Record

The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents.

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
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


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20 Portuguese Guinea - Guinea

NR Record



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Portuguese Guinea - Guinea
REBELLION IN ABEYANCE

Amilcar Cabral's assassination in Conakry on 20 January has almost certainly stalled the anti-Portuguese insurgent movement he headed. It also has plunged nervous President Toure into a new frenzy of defensive activity motivated by concern both for the rebel movement and his own regime.

Toure, who had given the insurgent forces under Cabral wide latitude in Guinea, has acted quickly to control the situation. While Toure rai's against imperialist plots, the Guinean military has moved to disarm insurgent elements throughout Guinea and taken control of the Conakry installations of Cabral's organization. Rebel personnel in the capital reportedly have been divided into small groups and placed under the control of Toure's party.

No conclusive evidence identifying Cabral's killers is available as yet, although Toure has announced that the commander of the rebel "navy" has confessed. Toure predictably has placed basic responsibility on the Portuguese, who have, just as predictably, denied all responsibility. In a radio interview on 22 January, Toure charged that most of the assassins were members of the Portuguese colonial army who had pretended to desert to the rebels. On 23 January, Toure claimed the commander and "others" had been captured by the Guinean Navy the day after the assassination while fleeing to Portuguese Guinea in commandeered rebel boats. Toure claimed they had several hostages, including a top Cabral aide, Aristide Pereira. Toure also has asserted that a move is under way to "uproot" a "fifth column" within the rebel organization.

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 Two rebel patrol boats apparently did leave Conakry harbor shortly after the assassination. [redacted] the fugitives actually were captured by a Soviet destroyer from the contingent that has been protecting Toure since the 1970 Portuguese-backed raid on his capital. Toure requested Soviet help when the Guinean Navy proved unable to complete its mission.

Toure's public treatment of the affair is intended, above all, to refute the damaging explanation, offered by Lisbon and widely accepted in press accounts, that Cabral's murder resulted from factionalism within the rebel movement. In fact, available evidence points in that direction and also suggests that Toure's prompt control measures were motivated by concern that warfare might break out between the factions, presenting a security hazard to his own regime as well as further weakening the nationalist cause.

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[redacted] the killers probably were disaffected rebels. [redacted]

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[redacted] in the two weeks prior to the assassination, long-standing frictions between mulatto Cape Verdians, who are dominant within the rebel leadership, and mainland black Africans, who make up most of the rank and file, grew much worse. [redacted]

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[redacted] the mulattoes and blacks were kept separate by the Guineans.

Toure's take-charge attitude, plus rebel dependence on the Guinea base, means that the Guinean President will have a strong say about the insurgents' future leadership and direction. No successor to Cabral has emerged, and Toure is in command. The two most likely successors are Luiz Cabral, Amilcar's brother, and Pereira. Luiz headed the rebel office in Dakar and Pereira the Conakry office. Toure's restrictions on the insurgents during the sorting-out period makes rebel military initiatives unlikely and can only adversely affect their stated intention to declare an independent rebel government.

Meanwhile, Toure, despite his concern over the various problems raised by the assassination, is clearly bent on exploiting the event to propagate the nationalist cause and enhance Guinea's prestige. He evidently intends to stage another spectacular funeral like the one he put on last year for Nkrumah. [redacted]

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