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GRA	IGIN	SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT									
COMPLETELY RELIABLE		FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE		PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE USER national. An outstanding scholar of the language and culture of Mongolia and other areas of the Eastern USSR. He has been an observer of the Soviet and European scene for many years and displays an interpretive understanding of the Soviet mind at work. He has traveled extensively in Asia and Europe and has a wide acquaintance among Soviet scholars and scientists. The German military deported him from the USSR to Germany in 1943. He is now in the US as a refugee and is on the faculty of a major university.

- Elevation of the respective diplomatic missions of USSR and Mongolian People's Republic to embassy rank is evidence that the Soviets attach considerable importance to the development of MPR as a recognized power. Following the appointments of MER diplomatic missions to East Germany there will be similar appointments to all USSR satellites. These steps ere Soviet inspired and have the inevitable objective of division of the world into parts dominated by the Soviet. The total of these parts will eventually give USSR the balance of world power. In the race between the Western Powers and USSR (since the end of World War II) for allies the Soviets are leading by a fairly substantial margin. Developments in MPR or Inner Mongolia have not attracted much attention in the US because of the relatively small population residing in what has been considered arid steppes. The Soviets on the other hand have long seen the importance of these arid steppes as an eventual military barrier and source of raw materials.
- The change in USSR/MFR diplomatic relations is evidence that MFR will not be annexed by USSR in the immediate future. Such action will not take place until a Greater Mongolia is established which will embrace all Mongolians. To accomplish formation of a Greater Mongolia it is necessary to establish MPR as a power and have her recognized in the UN. This will give MPR the prestige necessary to draw in the Mongols now residing in areas under Chinese control, namely in Manchuria, Jehol, Chahar, Ningsha, Suiyuan and Sinkiang.
- Attitudes of the Inner Mongolian cliques have necessarily changed since the Communist victories in China. Prior to this, one group of Inner Mongols advocated formation of an autonomous government without definite territorial commitments. All they wanted was a government with laws based on their nemadic economy which would apply to all persons residing in areas principally inhabited by Mongolians. Such a government was to function under the territorial sovereignty of China. It would provide a means to stop Chinese colonization within Mongol leagues and banners, restrict the exploitation of Mongols by Chinese traders and control tax excesses by Chinese officials.

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It was hoped that the formation of a democratic government under these conditions would appeal to Mongols in MPR, and inspire them to join an all-Mongol union free of USSR's Communist influence. This group was made up of Inner Mongolian leaders who, under the Japanese, were instrumental in establishing an autonomous government at Pailingmiao in the late 1930's. These leaders were former noblemen, lamas, militarists and educated Mongols. Many of the latter were Japanese exchange students. As a group their standard of living was much higher than the arats (nomadic herdsmen) and naturally opposed any form of government which would take away their wealth or social position. Being aware of the fate of Mongols in MPR who had enjoyed similar advantages they could not accept a union with communism as its foundation. Because of their Japanese sponsorship this group suffered severe personal indignities at the hands of MPR and Soviet troops in August 1945. This made them all the more anti-Soviet, but still it did not deter their desire to take in MPR Mongols. The basic desire to preserve their ethnic integrity caused them to forgive the MFR Mongols for their part in the ante-war atrocities. Now their position is untenable and as a political force they are impotent. They will, as individuals and as a group, remain anti-Chinese and anti-Soviet. Their only hope is eventual victory by the Western Powers over UBSR which conflict they feel is inevitable.

- 4. Another group or clique of Inner Mongols is comprised of nomadic herders inhabiting the steppes of China. They have long desired to join their kinsmen in MPR. The advantages given their counterparts in MPR are appealing. Among the advantages were the exclusion of Chinese traders in MPR in 1930, the establishment of educational facilities, government sponsored husbandry projects and preservation of pasture lands. These same advantages were provided the arats of Inner Mongolia under the Japanese, so during this period they were politically indifferent. Preservation of their racial identity is a vital issue, thus will turn to almost any ideology which gives them the greatest opportunity.
- 5. With exception of those Mongolians who have materially benefited because of their direct association with the Chinese, either Nationalist or Communist, all will welcome the opportunity of joining MPR now. The average Mongol does not consider political issues when judging a Chinese. Since the Chinese have never helped the Mongolians in any way they have no reason to believe that the Chinese Communist. Government will be any different. Economic advantages alone are enough to orient Inner Mongolians towards union with MPR. Adding the ethnic issues makes their eventual union a forgone conclusion.
- 6. USSR is very much aware of all aspects of Mongol life, as Soviet scholars have devoted years of study to the subject. Soviet trained Mongol propagandists have been working among Inner Mongolians for many years, especially in Dzungaria [MW Sinkiang] and in the Hulun Nor region [MW Manchuria]. These areas will be the first to join MFR, with Ala Shan, Yin Shan and Shilingol following suit. When this will transpire, will depend upon how long Chiang Kai-shek's government is able to hold together. As long as the Nationalists are recognized by the UM no efforts will be extended openly by USSR to encourage the ethnic defection. When the Chinese Communist Government is recognized as the sole master of China the Inner Mongolians will express their wish to join MFR. Naturally the Soviets will not object to such a wish because it has been their objective for twenty odd years. Since China proper is still an unknown quantity all ethnic and territorial advantages will be taken as the opportunities are presented.

 Admission of the Chinese Communists to the UN will speed up the Mongol unification and of course MFR admission would add impetus to the process.
- 7. The united Greater Mongolia will exist as a formally independent state for several years. It is very likely that the Burist-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Republic will also become a part of Greater Mongolia. In 1940 and Spring of 1941 (just before the German invasion of Europe) there were strong rumors that Burist-Mongolia would leave USSR and join MFR. I was in Ulan Ude during July and August 1940 and May 1941. I talked with members of the local government and party committee about this subject. Among them was the director of the Burist-Mongolian Scientific Institute and Gombo Belgayeff, chairman of the Republican

Art Committee. Mr Ignatyeff, secretary of the Republican Party Committee told Mr Belgayeff confidentially that the Politburo in Moscow had decided to unite MPR and Buriat-Mongolia. It was intended that the product of this union would become a Soviet Union Republic, with the capital at Ulan Bator. Execution of the plan, however, presented difficulties because the Chinese government would have had grounds to accuse USSR of territorial intervention. At that time China did not recognize MPR's independence. Now the situation is favorable. MPR is recognized by China as being independent and communistic, so there could be no grounds for objection to such a union.

8. Chinese Communist objections to Inner Mongols joining MFR is doubtful. Such an issue would not be a bone of contention because control functions in Chinese border areas are difficult. To appease the CCP immediately the Soviets will make industrial, political and military concessions. These points are secondary, however, in the over-all picture because according to the Marxist conception the state will cease to exist after communism is universal and a World Union is established. Knowing that China will sconer or later become a member of the World Union, the leaders (if they follow the Marxist theory) could not possibly object to steps in that direction by any of her provinces or people. Also the CCP leaders know that the Soviet Union is the core of the future World Union, so USSR could not err.

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