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 DATE: 14-Sep-2020  
**WASHINGTON 25, D. C.**

11 JUL 1961

**TO: Director**  
**Federal Bureau of Investigation**  
**Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich**

**FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)**

**SUBJECT: Peter JABLON-JARY, was.**  
**INTERNAL SECURITY - R**

1. Reference is made to previous correspondence concerning Subject, your file number 65-59007. Another Office of this Agency furnished the following information concerning Subject which may be of interest to your Bureau:

a. On 29 April 1961, Subject contacted a representative of this Agency in New York City and stated that he had information of "great value to the United States" which he was willing to supply for a "fee." Subject indicated that the information concerned the USSR, Cuban and United States relations and was obtained from a Soviet national to whom he had "access" in New York City. On 2 May 1961, Subject again contacted our representative in New York City and on this occasion he offered to provide the previously mentioned information "free of charge." Our representative subsequently agreed to meet Subject that same day.

b. 2 May 1961. Subject advised that he was born on 22 July 1922 in Poland and is currently employed as an elevator operator at 205 East 42nd Street, New York City. He advised during the meeting that during World War II he was a member of the Ukrainian Bandera organization and was attached to the intelligence unit of this organization. Subject claims to be a former newspaper writer and to be well known to the editorial staffs of Novoye Russkoye Slovo, a Russian language daily newspaper, and Svoboda, a Ukrainian language newspaper, both printed in New York City. Subject would not disclose the identity of his source other than to state that the source is a Soviet citizen attached to "an official Soviet group in the U.S." and one who is "highly enough placed to have access to the highest degree of Soviet security information." During this meeting Subject supplied the following information which he claimed had been given to him by his "Soviet source":

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*Mattingly*  
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(1) Source said Premier Khrushchev rejected a Chinese Communist manifesto in November 1960 in which the Chinese restated their contention that peaceful coexistence between the Communist Bloc and capitalist nations is not possible and that war between communism and capitalism is inevitable. In addition to the manifesto, the Chinese presented a plan which involved the final discreditation of the US in world opinion. This plan was, according to the Soviet source, a carbon copy of the John Foster Dulles blueprint for "The Brink of War" containment policy of the US. Suddenly, in January 1961, Khrushchev re-discovered the Chinese plan which the Soviet source claims that Khrushchev considered.

(2) Subject said that his Soviet source told him that in early April 1961 a directive arrived in the US, received by the Soviet mission and/or Embassy from the "Soviet seat of government" in which the Soviet position in respect to the US vis a vis Cuba, Laos, Congo and South Asia was outlined for Soviet representatives in the US. This directive followed the Chinese plan in that it called for continued pressures to be brought to bear to cause the US to take positive military action in any one or all of these trouble spots. The plan followed that if and when the US takes military steps involving US troops in any of these areas, "Volunteers" would be provided by countries of the socialist camp to aid in fighting off "American aggression." The Soviet plan does not anticipate that any of the volunteer support of communist activities in any of these areas would bring about the defeat of American Military support; however, the fact of American military action against a tiny country, such as Cuba, Laos or any other target area would be played up by Soviet world propoganda nets to help in discrediting the US in world opinion.

(3) Immediately after the defeat of rebel forces by Castro, Soviet Missile activity was intensified in Cuba. Subject's Soviet source said that Khrushchev's warning to the US that US intervention in Cuba would mean that rockets would rain down on the US, may be true, but these rockets would be launched from Cuba, not from the USSR. The Soviet source also advised that the only way open to the US to destroy Castro was the following: Ignore Cuba and Castro; Castro's approach to the socialization of Cuba is the approach of a Tyrant and the people will themselves revolt, and quickly; harrassment of Castro troops, military installations and militia must continue in the form of well-organized rebel activity; Guantanamo Bay should be evacuated by the US before Castro delivers an ultimatum for US withdrawal. This withdrawal must be publicized to the greatest degree possible throughout the world to bolster

*Cuba  
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world opinion in favor of the US. All installations at Guantanamo Bay must be demolished by American crews prior to withdrawal to prevent the further use of this installation by SovBloc "volunteers."

(4) The Soviet source allegedly advised that the USSR does not actually have the missile capability which Khrushchev talks about in his warnings to the US and the West. On the other hand, he does, presently have the capability to destroy all major targets in the US within ten hours of early warning of hostilities between the US and the USSR. This capability lies in the "Soviet secret weapons," military space vehicles armed with hydrogen warheads. According to the Soviet source, such military space vehicles are armed and on the ready for launching in the USSR. Each space vehicle is already provided with direction for re-entry to attack pre-designated targets in the US. Subject's Soviet source stated that American and British intelligence estimates of Soviet atomic submarine capabilities are in great error. He states that the USSR now has eleven operational atomic submarines at sea. He also states that Soviet developments in the atomic aircraft field have progressed to the point that such aircraft are now being operated in the training stage. He also states that American radar will not be able to detect such aircraft.

c. Source stated that the reason for Khrushchev's change of heart was brought about by new Soviet estimates of US capability for attack and retaliation. Soviet scientists have advised Khrushchev that in all-out attack, the US will be able to destroy from twenty-five to forty-three percent of the Soviet production facilities and population. But, they add, recovery from such an attack would be possible.

d. Subject said that he would be able to continue to provide additional information but would insist on receiving compensation for any future "intelligence."

e. On 12 May 1961, Subject called our representative to tell him he spent over an hour with this Soviet on the evening of 11 May. He said he believed he could obtain further information from this Soviet, if sufficient vodka was administered, because the Soviet liked to drink. Subject said he would provide us with the name of the Soviet, but not over the telephone, and that he would be willing to introduce someone to him.

f. On 15 May 1961, Subject telephoned our representative and stated that he wished to see him to relay some "very important information which has to be delivered as soon as possible." Our

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representative waited for him at the appointed spot but Subject did not appear. On 16 May Subject called our New York office and stated that he still had very important information to relay. When asked why he had not appeared at the appointed place the previous night, he said that something had come up which prevented him from meeting our representative but that he did not wish to discuss this over the telephone.

g. On 17 May 1961, Subject met with our representative. On this occasion he stated that he would not disclose the identity of his source under any circumstances. He said that he had "multiple sources," all of whom are assigned either to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., or the Soviet Mission to the UN in New York City. He said that the source of the information was one of the "highest ranking diplomats of the Soviet Mission to the UN." He disclosed that one of his Washington sources was born in Lvov and is Ukrainian. The Washington source is approximately 28 years old. |||

h. Subject stated that he was providing information which is "100% accurate." He said he has nothing to lose or gain and that he was not providing information because of any special love for the US or any hatred for the USSR. He also stated we might think that he is or has been a Soviet agent but that "I am not now nor have I been one, but there is no assurance that I shall not be. It makes no difference whether I work for you or the Soviets." He stated that he knows the identity of a number of Soviet intelligence agents who are now in New York City, one of whom he claims to have known for more than twenty years. He appeared to be bitter about his present economic situation and stated, "The last ten years have been empty and without profit to me in any way. The dreams I had for the future in the US never materialized." He added, "It makes no difference to me whether I remain in the US or not. In fact, you can deport me tomorrow, if you like." He said that he would "stake his life" on the accuracy of the information he has provided.

i. On 17 May 1961, Subject supplied the following "intelligence" from his Soviet source:

(1) One of the questions to be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev will be the Berlin question, and Khrushchev will not budge on the Berlin issue. He will insist on Allied withdrawal from West Berlin. He will risk war on this issue, since he has been warned by the Chinese that he must not back down on this question. The Chinese have promised that they will provide all necessary military support to implement Soviet moves on this question. The source also stated that he is very sure that

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Khrushchev will make concessions to President Kennedy concerning Communist withdrawals in other areas if the President agrees to Allied withdrawal from West Berlin. He also stated that if the President refuses to withdraw, eight weeks from 14 May 1961, Soviets will declare Berlin a free city and use military force to accomplish their aims. The source stated that Khrushchev would not take this course of action, but Chinese pressure is so great that if he does not take a firm stand and take Berlin, Khrushchev himself will lose face and position in the Communist Bloc. The source stated that Khrushchev is opposed to war and has a personal fear and hatred of war, but he cannot and will not back down on the Berlin issue. The source indicated that Khrushchev will make firm commitments to the US on other issues in exchange for American withdrawal from Berlin.

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(2) Subject stated his Soviet source advised him that Soviet intelligence personnel in the US have gone through a "massive reorganization" during the past six months since the arrest of the "Soviet agent," Igor MILEKH. The present policy is to use intelligence agents who do not have official status in the US. Khrushchev has insisted on this change, since he does not wish to be embarrassed by the arrest and forced departure of diplomatic officials, UN representatives or official Soviet representatives in the US. Subject stated that he knows the identity of a number of "Soviet agents" who were forced to return to the USSR during the past six months due to the reorganization.

2. This Office has advised our New York City representatives that Subject has previously claimed to have information concerning espionage activity in the United States and when he was subsequently interviewed he stated that he had no such information. This Agency contemplates no further contact with Subject.

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