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5 June 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe
Attn: Commo
Acting Chief of KOB

Operational

Stay-behind Preparations

REF: MOKA-27982 and WASHF-42177

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1. With Washington approval we are planning for the setting up of two pilot models of stay-behind communications bases. Essentially, we feel that inasmuch as the stay-behind agent will have to set himself up in business, we can be of great assistance by preparing his first base of operations for him at this time while we still have freedom of movement and more or less ready sources of supply. We have in mind then two types of operations, one rural and one urban, the setting up of which will provide practical knowledge to us as well as serving operationally later.

2. For the rural type operation we have chosen KIBITZ 10 whose location on the eastern border of the Amazon could likely be the first station to activate. In addition to his personal qualifications as a stay-behind agent, the terrain suggests that we look to his team as a drop zone reception team. As facilities for this operation, we are inclined toward setting him up in a garden house which will also serve as safe haven for personnel or material reception. Operationally, a transmitting station must be continually moved from place to place on the assumption that enemy intercept has zeroed in on any one transmission period. We are then faced with a tremendous risk of having to transport and set up the equipment again and again until the agent runs out of safe places where he can practicably make his transmissions. In the first place, we therefore wish to set up the garden house with concealed communications equipment for receiving purposes, transmitting only sufficiently to acknowledge receipt of transmissions to him. However, there remains yet the problem of repeatedly making transmissions, each time from a different location, as long as these locations remain safe. As an alternate, we would wish to set up the agent in such a manner that he could continue to operate his equipment from one safe place but with leads running to alternate antennae secluded in remote distances from the operational site. Then, instead of having to move the whole set (with batteries or generator) for every transmission, an accomplice need only splice in a removable section of wire between the concealed lead to the concealed antenna. In this case of KIBITZ 10, the proposed site of his operations is on the bank of a small stream which branches out through the entire countryside as well as through the village. One could lay the leads from the operations base

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along the various branches of the stream to any number of antennae.

3. The question is, what sort of equipment and properly shielded leader wires could be made available to this type of operation, and for how great a distance could these leads be run?

4. As for the urban type of station, the basic routine of having to move from one transmitting site to another remains the same, with the same end of running out of secure apartments and attics from which to operate - or getting caught lugging the transmitters through the streets. Again the risk could be minimized by having one secure place for receptions only and moving only for transmitting. And again, this could be improved upon by transmitting from a more or less fixed base with well concealed equipment, and transmitting from alternate antennae. In this case of urban operations one need not be concerned with distances between base and antenna, though the security police locate the antenna on the neighboring rooftop and start tearing the house apart looking for the transmitter, there remains time enough to clear out of the actual base. However, in urban work we are more concerned with ground transmissions which are often picked up on normal receiving bands by neighboring radios. In the case of hams, as they receive these complaints, they go about the neighborhood shielding the complainants' radios against this interference. We should be attacking this problem now. The clandestine stay-behind won't be able to do much about it later! We suggest selection of sites in principal cities where we will be having operations. After selection of these sites it would seem wise to install overt ham operations in the immediate vicinity until we get the ground leaks blocked. Or, is there a way to shield the transmitter directly?

5. We will appreciate your assistance in these problems, as with others as we come to them, so as to provide the stay-behind agent a maximum of security and longevity.

6. Attached for your information is an unedited copy of a dissertation on stay-behind activities prepared by KIBITZ 13. He still thinks that he alone is setting up our one and only stay-behind program and this accounts for many points which get a general treatment. We wish to emphasize that this is a think piece and in no way reflects that we adopt it as policy. It might be useful to you because: a. several observations are shrewdly taken and b. we have a sensible discussion of the problems of a stay-behind program seen through the eyes of a German.

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KOB Note to FDM: The attachment may prove useful for your proposed revision of "Suggestions for the Organization and Management of Stay-behind Systems (February 1951 Edition).

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