STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO   :   Chief, FBM   DATE: 19 September 1949

FROM   :   COMMO

SUBJECT:

    1. [   ] has shown us a draft of 1 September 1949 entitled, "Plan for Staybehind Operations Germany." On the draft we have made the following comments:

    (a) A somewhat clearer definition of Staybehind is needed, that is, whether it is after a peaceful occupation, an armed occupation, a revolutionary change of government, etc.

    (b) We should be interested in seeing a comprehensive definition of a Staybehind operation without an agent. We make this comment in a hope of clarity, not in a critical or negative spirit.

    (c) Under 2-c, we should like to point out that to change the location of an agent transmitter is not a standard security device, but sometimes it is highly inadvisable and that its importance can easily be over-estimated.

    (d) The point is that signal plans and ciphers are not to be buried together.

    2. At [   ] suggestion we are breaking his document down into the following categories. This is a breakdown from two points of view, first, when and under what conditions the operation is to function, and secondly, the organizational content of the operation personnel-wise one step out from the radio operator.

    3. The first four categories may be regarded as normal and complete. They are:

    (a) Category One. The operation consists of one or more agents, a radio operator, signal plan and cipher materials, and is to be activated now, in peacetime. We can place under the same category one agent having more than one radio operator, or a group of agents having a single operator.

    (b) Category Two. The operation consists of an agent and ciphers, but there is no radio operator or radio equipment, some non-electrical means being employed for the transmission of intelligence. (We are not including those operations which are not even in need of cipher and, therefore, fall completely outside the interest of the Communications Division.)

(c) <u>Category Three</u>. The operation is the same as in Category One, but it is to be activated immediately after the outbreak of hostilities.

(d) <u>Category Four</u>. The operation is the same as under Category One and Three, but activation will be delayed more or less long after the outbreak of hostilities, and will be upon direction from the agent's control.

4. The following two categories may be regarded as compromises:

(a) <u>Category Five</u>. The operator is trained as an agent or the agent is trained as an operator in order that we may have a one-man operation. Activation is immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities.

(b) <u>Category Six</u>. The operation is the same as under Category Five, except that the operation will not be activated until later upon direction of the control.

5. The following three categories are incomplete, and the operations are useless so long as they remain in these categories:

(a) <u>Category Seven</u>. There is an operator fully equipped with signal plans, ciphers, and radio gear, but he has no agent, is not trained as an agent, and has no contact with an agent. It makes no difference when he is activated since he has nothing to be active about.

(b) <u>Category Eight</u>. The operation consists of equipment buried under the more or less remote care of some sympathetic individual who is neither agent nor operator.

(c) <u>Category Nine</u>. The operation consists of buried equipment.

6. While there seems to be no point in revising our old report sheet forms at this time, when there are so few operations to list, and before it is possible to review the over-all nomenclature muddle, the Communications Division would like when it does revise these report sheets to include, in addition to the material already there, some space for definition of the operation in terms of whether it is to serve an agent or agents, its operator is to be trained as an agent, or there is no completely prepared intelligence function. This information is needed by us for several reasons, including to enable us to plan the ciphers and to estimate the probable actual load of activated circuits.

Respectfully