

Questions on Stay-behind nets, BOB:

- a. What are the Pastime targets listed in order of priority?
- b. Can briefs be made available in German?
- c. How many nets should BOB set up? How many long range. How many emergency?
- d. How many sets should BOB install?
- e. By what dates should we complete various phases of the program?
- f. What size should the nets be?
- g. Can a system for supplying signal plans etc to finished w/t operators be devised?
- h. Should signal plans be supplied for buried radios?
- i. Can we notify agents now of the locations of radios and caches?
- j. What types of radios should be used? When will they arrive?
- k. What items should be cached? Can we be supplied packaging material? Can Wash supply us with items for caching?
- l. Can some means of devising activation dates be determined now?
- m. Should not other means of communication be investigated?
- n. Can we have the agents train with on the air practice?
- o. Can some means of shielding the sets be devised?
- p. Can we be supplied with lists of former w/t personnel?
- q. Should we use former BOB or present CIC agents for Pastime?
- r. Should we provide new identities for agent cover for Pastime conditions?
- s. What methods should be used to train Pastime agents?
- t. Could use be made of present experience from OPC operations?

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1. The principal need at the present time is a more specific statement on the purpose of our stay-behind mission. In addition to a general definition of what is meant by stay-behind and for what purposes and eventualities the program in Germany is designed, we must also have a comprehensive study indicating which targets we shall be expected to cover. We should go to future customer agencies for this information. If our stay-behind program is primarily designed to furnish OB information, then we must perforce go to the Military for an outline of targets. This is the only action we can take which will give us assurance that our energies are not being dissipated on secondary areas. While in all probability we ourselves could make up a fairly common-sense list, the war plans for the defense of Europe, the strategic bombing projected for rear areas, and perhaps plans for future liberation must of necessity be taken into account in drawing up such a list. EUCOM does not maintain a level of staff-planning commensurate with the task of turning out such a study and would only forward our request to higher headquarters where it would receive less attention and take more time than if the approach were made directly. NATO would perhaps be as sound a place to put our question as any, save that our liaison there would be complicated by the international nature of the staff and perhaps be less secure. ZIPPER has already drawn up a list of targets, and as it has apparently been done by men of fairly high caliber from a military point of view, it is very likely a sound one. At the same time it too does not take into account our military planning in Washington. It should at the very least be sent to the field for comments if not corrections. (In any case, BOB would like to see it as soon as possible, especially if it represents Washington thinking. We have had nothing of this sort to date.) The best solution is for G-3 in Washington to give us an idea of what they would want under stay-behind conditions.

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2. We would want this directive not only to name specific targets on a strict priority basis, but also to give us the coverage desired for each target. Thus one city might have to include a specific RR junction, highway nets, an airfield, etc.

3. Continuous liaison is recommended along these lines. In addition to knowing where we must locate teams, we shall need to know what the teams we do set up outside the target areas should cover. The difficulties inherent in recruiting PASTIME teams in East Germany require us to concentrate on getting proper personnel rather than on the targets. Thus if one team is not on a listed target we shall want to know what its members specifically can do for us in their area. There may be cases where the locale is so unprofitable that it wouldn't pay to recruit anyone for stay-behind, no matter how able he may be.

4. On the basis of the targets assigned and on the agents we hire, we shall need detailed briefs in German. These must be both specific for individual agents on a single target and general for use in training head agents. In Berlin we do not have the staff or agent personnel necessary to develop these. We should like to have copies of the KIBITZ material of this nature shipped up to us. If ZIPPER has the same sort of thing we should also like to have that. ZIPPER has mentioned outlines of field problems which have been used for dry runs which we could also put to good use.

5. As soon as the target problem has been solved, we shall be in a position to determine the minimum number of nets we require in West Berlin, in East Berlin (if any), and in the East Zone to be set up by BOB. A specific target number of this nature would be most helpful at this time in determining what part of our effort we must expend on PASTIME.

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6. Next, a break-down of desired nets into the two categories, emergency and long-range, indicating how many of each. The emergency-nets have not been spelled out: For what purpose are they to be used, early warning or otherwise? What categories of previously trained W/T operators would be considered "clean" enough for this work: Registered hams? Previous intercept service? Must such short-term agents receive new cover identities at this time to fulfill such a role? If hams, etc., are considered useful, then the ideas contained in paras 22 and 23 below should be considered.

7. If we can decide as general policy approximately how many sets we should assign each team, we can then determine from the foregoing how many radio sets we shall need for a) Berlin: for agents, for neutral custodians, and for VULTURE burial, b) the same for East Berlin, and c) transport and hiding in the Soviet Zone. Having thereby determined the number of sets, we need next to settle which types we should use in each case. This point is discussed below in para 14.

8. An additional aid in determining the extent of our effort would be a time schedule for Berlin showing target dates for completion of the projects involved in recruiting teams and setting up their physical plant. I realize only too well that recruiting agent personnel cannot be done on a calendar basis, but such a schedule should serve to indicate how elaborate we should be.

9. I should like to repeat that all of the foregoing should be taken only as a guide and should be used as such. Each case will of course present problems requiring adjustments from the general stay-behind set-up which will have been outlined on the basis of targets to be covered. This will finally spell out the "ultimate role of BOB in the stay-behind" program, a phrase which has been written into memos, but never made clear.

10. The targets, types of location, personnel, and problems involved will also aid in determining the size of the nets. The choice seems to be between the ZIPPER method of 2 per team or the KIBITZ method with rather more per team. BOB figures that a W/T agent, head agent, 2 cutouts and letter drop are about par for the teams we are considering setting up now.

11. Some system should be devised so that upon completion of agent training a signal plan, crystals, and pads can be made automatically available to the W/T operator. In addition, permission should be obtained in writing for Berlin Operations Base to give the agent this material at the present time. I would be interested in finding out why the staff personnel in charge of KIBITZ are against the policy of giving these items out now. Security is outweighed by the conditions which will prevail upon the sudden outbreak of hostilities.

Some decision should also be reached regarding signal plans, crystals, and pads for neutral burials (our BOB-VULTURE sets which will not be assigned to an agent). I suggest that one set of these items be buried per two neutral radios. Signal plans should be separate from crystals; both separate from the radios; burial procedure and paper work similar to VULTURE burials to date. The important point here is that we need the items immediately for burial.

There is also the question of sets buried with a custodian, not an operator. I believe that these sets, even if in a house, should come under the VULTURE program. These should also have the signal plans, etc., perhaps on the same radio of 2 sets to 1 plan.

12. I believe that perhaps closer stay-behind cooperation and coordination in Washington between ZACADDY and ZACABIN would result in more direct support

in the field. ZACADDY support to date has been excellent, but our contact has always been loose and informal; "undefined" would perhaps be a better word.

13. Although the above items are the most important, the same reasoning should apply to cached items. It is our belief that while it is sound to have staff personnel bury radios, weapons, money, etc., in the ground, it is necessary also to give the locations to the agent for whom the items are intended. (This will of course not apply to neutral caches.) Permission should be granted in writing by finance to notify agents of locations of money caches, and the same from ZACADDY for radio locations.

14. A decision should be obtained in writing outlining which types of radios are to be used in PASTIME operations.

a) Which type should be buried for agents located in Berlin? (I recommend either RS-6s or RS-1s depending on the difficulty agents will have in setting up their sending stations. If they already have stations in houses, RS-1s can be built in. If they must dig up and transport sets, then RS-6s. In any case these questions must be solved by technical people who know the ranges.)

b) Which type for neutral caches? (Perhaps  $\frac{1}{2}$  RS-6,  $\frac{1}{2}$  RS-1.)

c) Which type for burial for agents in East Zone and sector?

(Perhaps RS-6 alone for ease in transporting. I do not believe it feasible to attempt transport of RS-1 over the border on account of weight and size.) Incidentally, I do not think we should bury radios indiscriminately about the East Zone unless we have a W/T operator or reception center with drop zone already in mind. It has been an extremely difficult business getting any sets out there at all. This will cancel all our thinking to date on the WRINKLE project and will lead us more toward the type of operation we are now running with CATALINA 2.

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15. It would be very helpful once the above has been decided for all the pressure possible to be put on ZACADDY at Headquarters to deliver the sets (RS-1 and 6) to Germany. Even if our entire present order of 50 RS-6's could not be delivered at once, deliveries of 10 at a time would be most advantageous if sent at once.

16. For caching other items than radios, we should first have Washington

- a) give us lists of what is desired in each cache, or give us lists of equipment which have been buried by other stations;
- b) we should be told for what purpose the caches are specifically required if we are to determine ourselves what goes into each location;
- c) Washington should approve our burials to date of the items which have been put with the radios: 3 pistols, ammo (150 rounds), gold - 100 Louis d'or -, pistol cleaning set. In addition perhaps similar caches should be buried apart from the sets; and
- d) having once determined what goes into the caches we can then be told how these should be packaged and buried.

Proper packaging equipment should be forwarded to us at once. We do not have the technical knowledge, time nor proper machine shops for manufacturing packaging material. Some steps seem to have been made in this direction by providing extra boxes for the RS-6. New plastics in Berlin are good, but melting, etc., is too great a problem. Desiccants should be included in any packaging equipment or directions sent to us.

One very important item is the provision of foreign make weapons and ammo. At BOB we ordered 12 Belgian automatics (plus ammo) in early May 1951 and were still waiting by December 1951. This was not due to any lack of effort or efficiency on the part of Karlsruhe but rather because no system has been set up by Washington for liaison with western European nations for a

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continuous supply. I do not believe that having the serial numbers registered will bother us, as these can be filed off by any gunsmith. Impetus on this project should come from Washington.

In Berlin, we have profited greatly by informal liaison with [ ] and [ ] We feel that their experience in the practical field has proved extremely profitable. At the same time we are not aware whether our burial procedures meet with Washington approval. Here again "undefined" is the word.

17. Some method must be provided for determining an activation date for each team. We must plan on not being able to contact our personnel when Berlin is either taken or evacuated. BOB plans to have the W/T agents instructed to open radio contact with us 3 weeks after contact with the case officer is broken off or made impossible due to whatever eventuality may occur. We plan to use this method for both immediate and long-term teams. ZACADDY has an excellent plan for putting asterisks on certain dates of the signal plan so that the agent opening contact will not have to try every day - nor will the Base have to listen to every assigned call. We should be interested in having ZACADDY investigate using normal broadcast bands for giving a stay-behind agent an activation signal. This may include trying to get BBC cooperation or assigning us some special band which will then be used later in some station we contact after the beginning of the war.

Another question is whether or not the immediate nets should be activated at a different time from the long-range nets. If immediate teams are to be used for early warning, some means must be made for activating them before hostilities. The decision to broadcast would probably have to be made in the field in this case, so that one would have the reverse situation of a net trying to activate the base.

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Perhaps activation of our nets could be accomplished by some other means than a predetermined date or by a radio signal. Dead letter drops, overt mail signal, or personal contact are other methods in this category.

18. We would still like to have a simple plan for filing the stay-behind teams in some manner so that the individual team will be between two covers.

19. Perhaps some means of PASTIME communications other than radio should be investigated. We in Berlin cannot arrange border crossing couriers or some system of using the mails, secret inks, etc. However, any thinking along these lines would be appreciated. Perhaps we could tie into some other communications system of this sort in Western Germany as a secondary channel for our teams, should radio fail.

20. We should like permission in writing from ZACADDY to have our teams go through a dry-run procedure which will start with digging up a set and end with on-the-air contact with a ZACADDY base either in Berlin or West Germany. I believe ZACADDY is against this sort of thing on the grounds of security. Their idea is that the sending of a W/T agent will be monitored and thereby "fingerprinted" on the occasion of a practice session. I disagree on two grounds: a) when on-the-air operations actually begin, they will hear the agent anyway, and b) the value of having a team go through entire procedure to get the bugs out more than offsets the slight security risks involved.

I would like to have the same permission for all W/T operators to end their training period with a sizeable number of hours spent actually on the air in contact with a base in West Germany. This was done in the case of CALAMUS 2a and proved extremely valuable. Of course the Commo objection to this on grounds of security as noted above is more valid than in the case of isolated dry-run broadcasts.

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21. We would like a long ZACADDDY brief on just how the W/T agent can shield his set from interfering with regular radio sets in his building or in the safe-house from which he will be sending. It is out of the question for him to go about fussing with his neighbors' radio sets. If this problem cannot be solved, then we must decide to send only from isolated sectors of the city in Berlin (a most difficult task).

22. If, as mentioned above, we deem it advisable to hire W/T recruits from groups of low security because of their previous records in W/T work, then perhaps some of the following moves should be considered:

a) Have the lists of former German intercept personnel who are now or were in the past located in Berlin, sent to BOB. These could come from AFSA (German element), ASA EUCOM, or from ZACANARD (who may have already obtained these lists). KOB has also followed up this line and we would appreciate any Berlin leads they may have uncovered. If we do not actually use these individuals themselves, we might very likely find that they can put us on the track of others who have not been registered on any lists, or at least indicate people to us who may be interested in W/T work, but who have never had the opportunity to follow up their inclinations. We advocate continuing to follow up the Bomblies case with this in mind.

b) Have the leads to former German army signal corps personnel located in Berlin sent to KOB. KOB has obtained these from FLOCK.

c) KOB has also been in contact with West German Trade Union chiefs who may very well have personnel available in Berlin for PASTIME work and with whom they should very likely wish to remain in contact during the war; especially as when all Germany is liberated, Berlin will become the capital once more. We would appreciate any and all help from KOB on this.

23. Additional possibilities which might be looked over or considered are:

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a) CIC informants which have been dropped, or who can be switched to a PASTIME mission after hostilities begin. As has been pointed out in the files, the members of the police and civil service who will most likely be shot or jailed would be sound members of an underground movement if we can provide them with another identity now for them to move into when the time comes. Penetration of the VOPO and SED might also be of interest. Informants in the East Zone who cannot be used or trained for a specific PASTIME mission might serve as possible safe houses for reception or sending purposes.

b) By the same token we should have a continuing project here in Washington of looking over all dropped agents for possible recontact for PASTIME, if only to use them as VULTURE custodians. Possible examples of such personnel are CALABAR 8 and 9 who were once regarded as recruitable for stay-behind W/T operators.

24. The development of new identities for stay-behind personnel is a project that should receive close attention, not only for the registered type of W/T operator as mentioned above, but also for agents we have dropped or still have on our payroll. If, let us say, CAISSON 1 were to be used as a head-agent in our PASTIME program, then he would immediately have to leave Berlin under an assumed identity at the start of open warfare and carry on operations in West Germany. This is another item which BOB cannot handle. Not only do we lack the personnel for this time-consuming work, but also we lack the mobility necessary to move about properly setting up the new documents and background cover-stories. This should be handled by a special team. The files indicate that [ ] has done much thinking and has taken practical steps along these lines. However, he has found it a very difficult business

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to handle this item in addition to all his other work. We should bear in mind that large sums of money will have to be given to the agents now, or cached for their use to enable them to carry on in the initial period of adjustment after the new identities have been assumed.

25. Some thought must also be given to the problem of training agents for stay-behind work. While BOB could conceivably train the agents once a training program has been set up, they do not have the means to design the courses, create training aids, and carry out the necessary background research that goes into the creation of such a program. While the training manuals on PASTIME we have received to date are fine, they are based on global thinking for stay-behind purposes and are therefore not of much use in providing the specific material we need for Germany. A Burmese stay-behind would have to concentrate on staying alive in the jungle; a Berlin stay-behind will have to concentrate on such items as avoidance of D-Fing. As pointed out above, a special team could be set up for training. Security is a consideration, but as both ZIPPER and KIBITZ use indigenous personnel for their work, I believe the training team would be practical. Perhaps if we had one such team for all stay-behind projects, we would have a more cohesive program and better control of the operational procedures and techniques involved. The saving in personnel would be another favorable factor.

26. It might be wise to set up a continuing liaison with present ZACABIN/ZACACTUS stations which have been dropping W/T operators and agents into Eastern Europe. If they can tell us on the basis of their experience what they would like to find in the way of reception facilities for their agents, we would have a sound idea of the program we must set up now for dropping

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agents into Germany later. Suitable types of drop zones, location of safe houses, personnel, and equipment, are only a few of the items for which their practical experience would be of service.

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