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TO INFO	Chief, EE C/SR, FROB, COS/G, BOB	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 200-6-1 FF CE-1181	
FROM	Chief of Base, Munich <i>mfu</i>	DATE 18 December 1959	
SUBJECT	LCIMPROVE/CART/CARETINA/OPERATIONS CARETINA's Report on the HEYDRICH Assassination	RE: "43-3"-(CHECK "X" ONE)	
ACTION REQUIRED	None, for info and files	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING	<input type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED
REFERENCES	EGMA-42334, 28 May 1959 <i>8.1</i>		
<p>Attached hereto is a translation of the report on his investigation of the assassination of HEYDRICH which CARETINA prepared for MB in March 1959. This report is a much more detailed version of that given orally to <i>[redacted]</i> in August 1956. (EGQA-81010)</p>			
<p>APPROVED: <i>[redacted]</i></p>			
<p>Attachments: The HEYDRICH Assassination</p>			
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<p>COPY FILED IN <i>200-6-1-1</i></p>		<p>PAGE NO. <i>1</i></p>	
FORM 53b 10-57 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	<input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED

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ATTACHMENT TO EGMA-46295

The HEYDRICH Assassination


Background to the Assassination:

1. Active resistance by the Czech people at the beginning of World War II was almost nonexistent, with the exception of the 28 October 1939 demonstration at the Wenzel Platz in Prague. In relation to the size of the country and its population, there was a negligible amount of sabotage affecting the German war effort. However on 22 June 1941, the day war broke out between the Soviet Union and Germany, the situation changed drastically. Almost immediately the effects of organized sabotage were felt. These grew to such proportions within a few weeks that the department concerned with combating sabotage in the armament industries was unable to do more than just record each case. The average was eighty cases of sabotage daily. The objectives were dynamiting of bridges, railway lines, repair shops, depots, razing of grain depots and warehouses, lumber yards and industrial depots, and destruction of electric power lines. The armament industry's heating and boiler plants were hardest hit, and placed the industry in more danger than a government can allow during times of war.
2. The wave of sabotage was quelled by chance. The department concerned with combating Communism, during one of its raids on an illegal Communist Party meeting, found a cache of newly-distributed sabotage material. The material had been made by members of the illegal Communist Party working in Czech factories and was extremely up-to-date. Despite the fact that Czechoslovakia had become a protectorate, the Czech Communists had always upheld the Stalin-Hitler pact, probably on Moscow orders. Now however since Russia was at war with Germany, the Czech Communist Party became the purveyor of sabotage against the Germans. "X-day" had arrived and the battle-ready cadres obeyed Moscow's commands and went into action.
3. The German leaders in the protectorate were forced to squelch the dangerous turn of events. Freiherr von NEURATH, who at that time was the Reichsprotektor and a diplomat of the old school, was regarded as unsuitable to enforce stricter measures and to bring about the desired results. Therefore von NEURATH was placed on "sick leave" and Reinhard HEYDRICH was summoned by Hitler to be deputy Reichsprotektor.
4. HEYDRICH started out by declaring martial law for a ten to fourteen day period. Both General ELIAS, who was Ministerpraesident of the protectorate, and the Oberbuergermeister of Prague, received death sentences from a people's court because of their illegal contacts with the Benes exile government in London. General ELIAS's sentence was to be commuted when it was learned that he had broken off contact six months prior to his arrest. However, after HEYDRICH was assassinated, Hitler ordered the sentence carried out. After this first martial law period ended, HEYDRICH negotiated with representatives of industry, agriculture, economics and labor and demanded that the Czech people stop interfering with the German war effort, pointing out that for Germany the war was a very serious matter whereas the Czechs did not even have to send any soldiers to the front. HEYDRICH went on to say that while he was prepared to help and advise the Czechs in any matter wherever possible, he was also forced to stop any resistance they made. A short time later

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HEYDRICH actually did carry out various social measures, most of which were especially favorable to the working classes, and the situation in protectorate became so calm that no sabotage cases were noted until the spring of 1942.

5. I don't know if it was coincidence or whether the Benes exile government and the English war leaders realized that complete serenity existed in the Czech protectorate. In any case, about the time HEYDRICH arrived in the protectorate, the first Czech parachute agent dispatched from London landed in Tschaslau on 4 October 1941. He had received orders to contact the Czech resistance movement and deliver radio sets and coding material to it. He and his contacts were captured by the Gestapo in Prague on 25 October 1941. He stated that he had personally been seen off from London by General INGO, the Czech Minister of War of the Benes exile government.

6. With this parachute agent began a new era of Western-directed disturbances. Later the Russians too tried to get into things in Czechoslovakia again with the Rote Kapelle. The quieter the situation became in Czech territory, the more numerous were Western parachute agents. By spring of 1942, a whole flood of parachute agents had landed but almost all were captured in due time.

The Assassination:

7. After Czechoslovakia became a protectorate, great numbers of former Czech army members went to England via Poland-Danzig, Hungary, the Balkans, Algeria, Cairo, and Istanbul. We Germans even managed to slip Czech "refugees" into the ranks of the Czech legions stationed in those areas so that they might reach England. On reaching England, the most capable men were selected from these ranks and trained to be parachute agents to carry out military missions within the protectorate. After six weeks of basic training, these men received a fourteen-day survival course at the English radio and paratroop school in Manchester and then a six-week course at the English sabotage school, Camusdarrach, in Hallaig, Scotland. At the latter, they received training in the Morse code, cartography, demolition, use of poisons and bacteria, and hand to hand fighting. After completing this course, they spent one week at the Czech radio station, "Woelding", at London, Villa Tunney Neuk. Then the trained agents were returned to their Czech troop units and awaited orders. Prior to receiving missions, they would meet at Villa Pallasis in Dorking, about 40 km. southeast of London. Usually they would leave on their missions from the English Bedford airport. Their assignments were to establish intelligence networks and to carry out espionage and sabotage. There were two primary objectives: one was to assassinate HEYDRICH and the other was to make preparations for the bombing of the Skoda works in Pilsen.

8. On 29 December 1941, GABCIK and KUBIS who had been ordered to assassinate HEYDRICH, jumped out of a long-range bomber over Pilsen. Leutnant BARTOS, who was chief of the agents in the protectorate, and two other men jumped out of the same plane over Kolin. BARTOS, the two assassins, and Stabskapitän MORAWEC, chief of the Czech resistance organization, were to have been the only persons informed about the plan. However, because of the necessary preparations involved, a few others had to be made witting. In all, probably twelve people knew of it.

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London had issued strict orders prohibiting the use of GABCIK and KUBIS for any other mission, but that for which they had been designated.

9. The preparations the parachute agents made for the bombardment of the Skoda works, which had been set for the night of 24 April 1942, revealed how difficult their situation in the protectorate was. Even though numerous agents had been parachuted in from London, Leutnant BARTOS had to use GABCIK and KUBIS for the Skoda works target because he was unable to get any help from the Czech people or the resistance organization!

10. Finally action against the target got underway. Two sheds were set aflame, one in front and one in back of the Skoda works, as markers for the bombers. A "Rebecca" direction-finding apparatus, was set up. All was in vain. The bombs missed their target because the two sheds were not set on fire simultaneously since not enough men were on hand to be at both locations at once. The Czech people had realized from the news broadcasts originating from the exile government in London that those in London were completely misinformed about the true situation in the protectorate, therefore they did not want to aid the parachute agents. Leutnant BARTOS pleaded with Benes to stop the news broadcasts because they harmed more than helped the agents. Benes refused.

11. Because the number of people knowing about the planned assassination had to remain small, GABCIK and KUBIS also encountered difficulties in their preparations. They were not even allowed to use fellow agents. Stabskapitän MORAVEC, who was to orient them in Prague and procure their assistants, had accidentally been shot on 20 March 1942. Now the two men stood alone! Finally former Gau-obmann and Sokol leader, ZELENKA (cover name HAJSKI), came to their aid. He gave them a place to hide as well as the names of reliable men they could use for their mission. ZELENKA was an old hand at the intelligence game and worked for the Czech Ministry of Defense at the German-Czech border at Bodenbach.

12. Safe-houses, some selected by London and some selected by parachute agents after they were in the protectorate, were located in the following cities:

- 10 in Prague
- 12 in Pardubice
- 6 in Lidice
- 2 as well as the radio transmitter, in Lecaky
- 3 in Pilsen
- 3 in Koeniggratz
- 9 in Bernertitz
- 1 in Belgrad
- 1 in Wemce

In all, there were 47 safe-houses which was not a large number for the work at hand. One of the reasons for the existence of so few safe-houses was the fact that we Germans had developed extremely successful methods with which to combat parachute agent drops, and were able to capture the agents soon after they landed. We had listening devices scattered throughout Czechoslovakia.

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When an airplane flew over one of these posts, its speed, range, and direction would be recorded on a large chart and reported to a central alerting station. If, as the reports on the airplane came into the central station, a slack in speed was noted, it would indicate that the airplane had dropped either agents or equipment. The suspected area would be immediately alerted by telephone and the necessary military and police units would be summoned for search operation. Within two hours of the parachute drop, we were able to carry out well-organized search activities. Although we almost always captured the agents or found the dropped equipment, some of the agents were able to elude us but would be forced to flee without their valuable material. Neither England nor Moscow ever became aware of our methods and therefore kept using the same procedure in parachute drops throughout the war.

13. From the material we captured, we realized that the agents had not only been given intelligence and sabotage missions but assassination and terrorism missions too. Explosive charges which could be attached to automobiles by magnets were dropped as were also charges of black bakelite material which could be attached to telephones. When the receiver was lifted, the charge would be set off and was powerful enough to kill. The first bombs were also included in the captured material. HIMMLER saw the modern explosives on his visit to Prague on 1 May 1942. He realized that the material would be useful against armored equipment in close-in battle. This is how the English unwittingly helped the Germans develop an effective agent for armored warfare.

14. Our suspicions of a planned assassination grew stronger as an increase of this type of dropped material was noted during April and May of 1942. We checked our CE methods thoroughly. Security measures for HEYDRICH were strengthened. Although he was in agreement with the measures in general and although he had been told Hitler had ordered a body guard, he refused to accept one. He felt it would be detrimental to German prestige, but his refusal may also have stemmed from his arrogant pride and athletic prowess. He believed that no Czech would harm him. We notified Berlin of his attitude, a fact which exonerated us after he actually was assassinated.

15. GABCIK and KUBIS had selected several sites for the assassination but were repeatedly frustrated in their attempts by our tightened security measures. HEYDRICH and his family lived in a manor house in Jungferbrezan near Prague. The two assassins began planting themselves at various points on the road from HEYDRICH's home to his office in Prague. Gathering rabbit food, they studied his daily habits on his way to work. HEYDRICH became accustomed to seeing the men on the road and they, in turn, would greet him in a very respectful way. The men were aware that it would be impossible to carry out any attempt on open highway because the car in which HEYDRICH would be riding would be traveling at too great a speed and the open fields would not allow them a sufficient avenue for escape. Therefore they chose to carry out the deed in the suburb of Prague-Lieben, where there was a hair-pin curve which necessitated extremely slow driving.

16. On 27 May 1942 at 1032 hours, the open car bearing the license number SS-4 the men had come to know so well, reached the curve. HEYDRICH, wearing the uniform of an SS-Obergruppenfuhrer, and the chauffeur were its only occupants.

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GABCIK stood at the edge of the road at such a point that the car would pass within half a meter of him. He had an English Sten machine gun hidden under a raincoat hanging over his arm. When the car came abreast of him, he drew out the gun and pulled the trigger. At the most he was only a distance of one meter away from HEYDRICH. The gun jammed! Had it not, HEYDRICH would have been riddled by bullets. In fury, GABCIK threw the gun down, turned and ran.

17. HEYDRICH's chauffeur, had received instructions that at such times he was not to stop the car but that he was to step on the gas and drive on as fast as possible. However, he was used to obeying HEYDRICH and when the latter said, "Stop", he obeyed the command which was contrary to instructions. The car was just coming to a halt when KUBIS, who had been hiding behind a lightpost about five meters away from GABCIK and had seen the machine gun attempt fail, threw a bomb which hit its rear fender. Actually, in order for the bomb to reach the car, KUBIS had had to run behind the slowly moving car. This was very dangerous for KUBIS since the bomb had such a highly sensitive fuse that only one revolution in flight would detonate it.

18. The bomb splintered the side of the car, causing shrapnel to penetrate the rear seat. Here again, security measures had been ignored by HEYDRICH, i.e. a steel plate should have been installed behind the back seat. Two fragments of shrapnel entered HEYDRICH's back, carrying with them strands of horsehair upholstery, one of which penetrated HEYDRICH's spleen.

19. After throwing the bomb, KUBIS ran to his bicycle. He was blocked by Czechs on the street who had seen the incident. Trapped, he began to shoot wildly at the crowd with his Colt pistol and was successful in dispersing it. HEYDRICH took an aluminum pistol, 7.65 caliber, out of the glove compartment, jumped out of the car, and ran after KUBIS who was only a few meters ahead of him. He shot after KUBIS but nothing happened. The gun was unloaded! KUBIS escaped without any difficulty.

20. HEYDRICH's chauffeur meanwhile was chasing GABCIK who had been forced off his bicycle and was fleeing on foot. Running fifteen meters behind GABCIK, the large chauffeur in SS uniform had almost reached GABCIK when the latter began shooting with his Colt pistol. The chauffeur drew his gun to return the fire but in his excitement, pressed the button which released the magazine in his Walther pistol. With this type of pistol, if the magazine slips out even a few millimeters the gun does not function. The chauffeur did not have the self-control to stand still a few seconds and check the gun. He threw it aside and ran on unarmed. GABCIK ducked into a shop, planning to escape through the rear door. But there was no rear exit, and he was forced to retrace his steps. He collided with the chauffeur at the door of the shop and shot him in the knee. The chauffeur, needless to say, was unable to continue his pursuit and so GABCIK, too, escaped without any hindrance.

21. HEYDRICH, immobilized with pain, had crawled back to the car and was lying on the seat. Alone and badly wounded, he was a helpless victim to

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any other attack. None came. A Czech woman stopped a delivery truck and helped HEYDRICH into it for transport to the near-by hospital. He easily could have been kidnapped.

Investigation and solution of the assassination.

22. The day of the assassination was shortly after Whitsunday and everything was quite calm in the protectorate. Even a large joint meeting of several hundred leading men from the Abwehr, including CANARIS, and from the security services, including HEYDRICH, held a short time previously had not given rise to any disturbances. On Whitsunday, a bomb had been thrown at the German book store in Prague but since the only damage done was to the windows, the incident was not regarded as significant. The origin of the home-made bomb could not be discovered. Similar small disturbances were recorded throughout the city during this time but none posed a serious threat to the Germans and were therefore treated rather lightly. In retrospect, these bombings could have been trial-runs for the assassination but it was war-time and in comparison with military events these small incidents were scarcely noticed.

23. A few minutes after the assassination, Kommissar ZENFY, the liaison officer between the Czech and German police, telephoned and informed us that he had received a report that a high ranking Wehrmacht officer had been injured in a bombing. His action was probably prompted by fear. Such reports of alleged bombing attacks on Army officers had come often and regularly and mostly there was nothing to them. The Gestapo had grown accustomed to receiving them and did not take them seriously anymore. Usually we would wait for details on such attacks to come from the Czech police before we went into action. However, the Referent of the anti-assassination department finally decided to go to the vaguely described scene of the attack and went with two other officials to the police station which had originally reported the bombing. There they learned that the injured was allegedly the Reichsprotector and that he had been taken to the hospital at Bulovka.

24. At the hospital, neither the doorman nor any other employee knew of such a patient being admitted. The men decided to search every room on the surgical ward until they found HEYDRICH. They finally found him in the ante-room to the operating room. He was sitting on an operating table, stripped to the waist and bleeding from two back wounds. Two nurses were applying ice compresses to his forehead and temples. HEYDRICH turned his head, recognized the official, and asked for his briefcase. He had planned to fly to headquarters that morning and had secret material in it. The official was unaware of its whereabouts but soothed HEYDRICH by telling him that the briefcase was secured. This statement turned out to be a fact because a Czech passing HEYDRICH's bombed car had seen the briefcase lying on the seat and brought it to the hospital. The officials were told by a surgeon that an operation would take place immediately, and it began within ten minutes. However, HEYDRICH, died nine days later of blood poisoning.

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25. From a police standpoint, the situation was gravely critical. If the assassination attempt had been carried out by an organized group, they could repeat the attack in the hospital. Until an SS guard battalion could arrive, they could only guard the entrance to the operating room. Immediately the chief of the Gestapo was informed about the assassination attempt. He refused to believe it and regarded the whole thing as a joke. His attitude was a direct result of the calm which had existed within the Czech protectorate.

26. Finally, everyone was convinced of the validity of the report and investigation began. The scene of the attack was blocked off and photographed, the few eye witnesses were questioned, the injured chauffeur, who meanwhile had also been brought to the hospital, was questioned, evidence at the site was collected, and as far as was feasible, the escape route of the assassins was plotted. The following items were found at the scene:

- 1 woman's bicycle
- 1 briefcase containing five bombs, four of which were fused.
How easily the assassin could have grabbed the unfused bomb!
- 1 man's summer coat
- 1 Sten machine gun, English manufacture, and numerous bullets
for a Kynoch pistol, 7.65 mm.

The bombs in the briefcase contained the plastic explosive material familiar to the Germans as the type manufactured by the English, contained English insulating tape, English detonators, and English fuses. The fuses were readily identifiable as the type used by the English in the African campaign. Since the machine gun was also an English make, no doubt existed as to where the assassination had been engineered.

27. HEYDRICH's deputy, Staatsminister of Bohemia and Moravia Karl Hermann FRANK, whose official title at that time was SS-Gruppenfuehrer, passed the scene of the attack on his way to visit HEYDRICH in the hospital. He asked me, in my capacity as chief of the investigative commission, "And what do we do now?" I was quite concerned about the possible after-effects to the attack and answered, "Herr Staatsminister, do you want to retaliate or do you want us to solve the case?" Without hesitation, FRANK answered that he wanted the case solved. Unfortunately, later events showed how very legitimate my question was.

28. The first step in the investigation was to block Prague off. The Wehrmacht was able to cordon the city so well that it was impossible to leave it officially and extremely difficult to leave it unofficially. Everyone was allowed to enter; no one was allowed to leave. Train traffic was suspended for twenty-four hours. Because of the precise screening of individuals at the road-blocks on those streets still open to traffic, the two assassins were actually kept within the confines of Prague. That evening, 36,000 homes were searched by 12,000 men from all units, including the Czech police.

29. We had little hope for success with these measures and carried them out to show the Czech people how dangerous it was for them to harbor the criminals. We found out later that the house in which one of the

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assassins had hidden actually was searched but the military men doing the search were unfamiliar with criminal work. They had been told only to check the identity documents of each occupant; it never occurred to them to look for unusual hiding places. When the assassin heard the searchers coming, he crept out the air-shaft in the bathroom and hung suspended from the sill for almost ten minutes until they left.

30. That night, around 650 people were taken into custody because their identity documents were not in order. Some of these people were wanted by the Czech police and detained, but the others were released because they were not connected with the assassination.

31. Staatsminister FRANK summoned the Referent concerned with parachute agents, the chief of the Gestapo, Standartenfuehrer BOEHME who was chief of the Sicherheitspolizei and Sicherheitsdienst, and myself as chief of the investigative commission, for a first report at 1500 hours on the day of the attack. FRANK opened the meeting with the words, "This whole thing is a big mess. The Fuehrer has ordered that we shoot 10,000 Czechs in retaliation". All of us, including even the Gestapo chief and the brutal BOEHME, were distressed at these words because we realized full well the enormity of such a command. I asked the shocking question, "Why Czechs? Let's shoot Germans instead". FRANK reprimanded me for joking at such a crucial time. I went on to explain my words, "Gruppenfuehrer, I meant my statement in earnest, not as a joke. It has been confirmed by the evidence found at the scene of the attack that assassins were using only equipment of English manufacture. Who told you they were Czech? They could just as easily have been German emigres parachuted into Czechoslovakia or Englishmen carrying out commando tactics." FRANK asked if this was true. I showed him the material compiled from the first stages of the investigation. After reviewing it, he telephoned Hitler and got him to rescind the order.

32. This was a pointed illustration of what results one side can win if it correctly evaluates and calculates the "mentality" of the other side. If Hitler's atrocious order had been carried out, the after effects of the assassination would have taken on gigantic proportions and would have led to continuous unrest in the protectorate. Even if we criminologists were able to stop this mad deed, the future showed that further collaboration between the criminologists and the political leaders was virtually impossible.

33. Immediately after the assassination, reinforcements for the investigative commission were summoned from Germany. The Ordnungspolizei also received reinforcements for the purpose of searching specific areas, but they also carried out other work without the knowledge of the investigative commission and probably on direct orders from the political offices. Such parallel investigations were harmful to good work. The reinforcements knew neither the Czech language nor the working conditions in the Protectorate and their usefulness was therefore limited. The investigative commission responsible for solving the assassination grew to a strength of 1200 men through these reinforcements. All department

chiefs and their subordinates were placed under me, as commission chief, for supervision and coordination.

34. As the clues came in, they were to be passed on to that department which would normally handle the matter where they were worked on and the information forwarded to the central investigative commission. There a decision would be made whether the clue had been thoroughly investigated or if further investigation was needed. Everything which was unrelated to the assassination would be returned to the department ordinarily responsible. The investigative commission worked around the clock in concentrated effort.

35. All technical aids of criminal police were used. The Kriminal-technische Institut of the Sicherheitspolizei in Berlin analyzed the shrapnel, ammunition, coat, and briefcase found at the scene of the attack. Its analysis was so comprehensive that a twenty page, typewritten report about the completely clean and empty briefcase resulted. In the report were its findings that rabbit food had probably been carried in the briefcase and that the previous owner probably had been a seamstress who made silk dresses. This analysis proved extremely helpful in later investigation. A geologist analyzed the dried earth on the wheels of the bicycle. From his analysis a specific area of the Protectorate was pinpointed where the bicycle had been used. A special commission of the Kriminalpolizei reconstructed the entire "biography" of the bicycle within forty-eight hours.

36. Within the investigative commission itself, a Schnellkommando of the most qualified men, was set up, which investigated those leads requiring speed. For instance, they were able to capture a suspicious-looking cyclist seen in a crowd in the city of Prague, with its one million inhabitants, within two hours even though the report on him had not come in until half an hour after he had been spotted. A special search commando was also set up. Its members would appear in all imaginable places, such as at swimming pools, street cars, markets, nightclubs, train stations, to check identity documents. We learned later that the tactics of this search commando forced Leutnant BARTOS, chief of the parachute agents, to order all his agents in Prague, and there were seven of them, to go into hiding in the catacombs of the Karl Borromaeus church.

37. There was always friction between the Sicherheitsdienst and all other departments of the Polizei, the Gestapo, and other organizations, and often the reports originating from the Sicherheitsdienst were unreliable because they were written for tactical reasons. Therefore the investigative commission set up a mobile intelligence commando of Czech speakers to mingle with the population and obtain an accurate estimate of the true national temper. This was absolutely necessary and proved decisive.

38. The courts martial drew up a set of laws which in part were urgently necessary. However, coupling them with capital punishment and with the threat of annihilating whole families led in the end to fear and desperation among the Czechs. I repeatedly tried to explain to the responsible persons that the Czechs had received, through the Czech legionnaires of

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World War I, a pointed lesson of how they were to conduct themselves in order to come out well in the future. The legionnaires, deserters from the Austro-Hungarian army, who like the Mafia served the ideal of an independent republic, later formed the leadership of the first independent Czech republic. Every Czech saw in this the reward for previous activity. Therefore even today no Czech can ignore the plea of someone who is being persecuted, and capital punishment only creates martyrs and drives the people into a desperate mood. For these reasons, we of the investigative commission felt that the whole affair was being treated incorrectly, but we were told to stay out of politics. We later had evidence substantiated by facts, but this could not be proven during the first days of the investigation.

39. The German and Czech governments offered a 2 million Reichsmark reward for the apprehension of the assassins. The people were well informed about it through an exhibition of the material used in the assassination in one of the largest stores on Prague's main street and through movies, newspapers, radio broadcasts, and posters. Every person over the age of fifteen had to be registered with the police. All identity documents with the stamp of "Bruenn" had to be renewed within 48 hours because all parachute agents from England had only that type of documentation. KUBIS had suffered injuries to the left side of his face and to his left eye from the blast of the bomb. Every one of the 7,000 physicians in the Protectorate had to sign a sworn statement that he had not treated a man with such injuries. We discovered later that the woman physician who did treat KUBIS actually signed such a statement too. Each family in the Protectorate received a pamphlet with pictures of objects found at the scene of the attack and a description of the attack, and were ordered to report anything they knew. The result? All our efforts were in vain because of the threatened penalties of the courts martial. Executions were being continuously carried out of those persons who disregarded the new laws of the courts martial. One cannot carry out successful criminal work under the terror of retaliation.

40. KUBIS was able to flee from the scene by bicycle. Because of the facial wounds he had suffered, it was simple to reconstruct his flight route since many persons recalled seeing a man on a bicycle holding a handkerchief to the left side of his face. Some women talking on the street saw him park the bicycle on the street corner and continue on foot. About 10-12 minutes later the women saw a girl about fourteen years old come to get the bicycle.

41. When our search for the girl brought no results, we began a house search within the radius of an eight minute walking distance from the point where the bicycle had been left. (12 minutes walk for assassin plus girl - the assassin's destination must presumably have been within half that distance.) This area was cordoned off by Waffen SS in the early morning hours and every girl who could be taken for fourteen years old was provisionally taken into custody. A total of some 300 girls were brought to our offices. Each girl had to enter a room singly, walk around a bit, so that she could be observed through two projection windows by the two women who had seen the girl. All but twelve were eliminated thereby. The others were reimbursed for their travel fare and food and released. The remaining twelve were taken to the street

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corner and had to re-enact the pick up of the bicycle again observed by the two women witnesses, and the number of suspects was narrowed down to five. All of the girls were then released, with apologies, but the homes of the five suspects were placed under close observation. We were curious as to the reaction of the Czech people to this maneuver. Our mobile intelligence commando had been unaware of the proceedings but three hours afterwards, brought us a report that the SS had taken thousands of young Czech girls from their homes and put them in brothels.


42. After ten days had passed, the chief of the Gestapo summoned me and reprimanded me sharply because the assassins were still at large. Although the chief was not directly involved in the investigation, he nevertheless feared dismissal. I stated that only my post would be in jeopardy and besides, the political offices were to blame that the Czech people refused to cooperate with our investigative efforts. My arguments were in vain. Finally, Reichskriminaldirektor Arthur NEBE, chief of the Reichskriminalpolizei, came from Berlin to inspect the work of the investigative commission. He did a thorough inspection but in the comradely manner usually prevalent among fellow criminologists; he was quite satisfied with the work the commission had done. He stated in confidence that this would not be the last assassination if the present stupid politics continued to be carried out. NEBE aided the investigative commission greatly by, after listening to our explanations and pleas, ordering the political offices, the chief of the Gestapo, SS-Standartenfuehrer BOEHME, SS-Gruppenfuehrer FRANK to lend support to our efforts.

43. Fifteen days had passed since the assassination. After NEBE's visit, I was able to present the material gathered so far. Comparing this assassination to other cases, had a two million Reichsmark reward had been offered in Berlin, we should have received at least 100,000 tips from the people. However, in this case, our mobile intelligence commando repeatedly confirmed the opinions of the criminologists that fright and fear were preventing those persons who would have come forth for various reasons from cooperating with us. My material also showed that we had investigated over one thousand clues and that only 309 overt and anonymous reports had come in from the Czech population during the fourteen days following the assassination.

44. With the help of the Kriminalrat of the German criminal police in Prague, LYSS, I took a step in the form of an ultimatum to have the martial law rescinded. On 15 June 1942, FRANK finally consented to declaring an amnesty which would extend until 2000 hours on 18 June 1942. During the amnesty, every Czech was to have the opportunity to report on matters which would otherwise have been penalized. The results were staggering. Within three days we received over 2000 personal reports, many of which would have led to the apprehension of the assassins. I will give a detailed account of their capture which took place on 18 June 1942, further on in this report. First I want to relate the story of the destruction of the town of Lidice, which forced us to get an amnesty declared.

45. A girl working at the flashlight factory in Schlan received a letter from her boyfriend living in Lidice, in which he stated that many parachute agents coming directly from London were hiding in the town. For some unknown

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reasons, the girl told the owner of the factory, one PALA, about it and showed him the letter. PALA became frightened and passed the letter on to the Czech gendarmarie in Schlan. Probably PALA feared provocation. He was sixty years old and had experienced much vileness in his life. He most likely was trying to guarantee his safety by passing the letter on. (Source comment: After the war, PALA was arrested by the Czechs who beat him so unmercifully that he became deaf. He was still in prison in 1954.) The Czech gendarmarie probably had the same fear of provocation because they passed the letter on to the Gestapo in Kladno. This was the beginning of the destruction of Lidice.

46. The chief of the Gestapo office in Kladno reported the matter to Prague headquarters twice. First, he informed the special department concerned with parachute agents. Kriminalrat SCHULZE, chief of that department, confirmed through other captured parachute agents that the men hiding in Lidice could not possibly have been involved in HEYDRICH's assassination. The investigative commission, on receiving an oral report from SCHULZE's department, dropped the matter because it was obviously not relevant. Secondly, the chief of the Gestapo office in Kladno reported the matter privately to his close friend, SS-Standartenfuehrer BOEHME, commander of the Sicherheitspolizei and Sicherheitsdienst in Bohemia and Moravia. Certain types in the Third Reich disregarded all rules in a loud-mouth fashion. They had little or no conscience and were the grave-diggers of humanity and German prestige. Unfortunately both BOEHME and the Gestapo chief belonged to these types.

47. BOEHME was the blood-hound of the protectorate. He was born in 1911 and had received Volksschule education. During the grave unemployment era prior to 1933, he joined Nazi party in Dresden. He took a leading part in the street and hall battles so prevalent during that time. He was, for all his youth and immaturity, the right hand of KILLINGER (who, as German ambassador in Bucharest, committed suicide in 1944) and SA-Obergruppenfuehrer BENNECKE, chief of the SA in Dresden in the troubled times prior to 1933. After the Nazi's came to power, BOEHME rose rapidly. He was sent to the SD-Hauptamt in Berlin and became department chief of the "black front" (Otto STRASSER and company). When STRASSER fled to Prague and began transmitting anti-Hitler propoganda, BOEHME undertook to destroy the radio station. Engineer FORMIS, chief of the radio station in Prague, was shot and the station destroyed. Reportedly BOEHME was shot in one leg during his escape to Germany and limped from that time on. BOEHME was regarded as especially deserving because of this deed. Since no one was satisfied with the small amount of education he had had, BOEHME took a course for leading Gestapo officials. During the course he met and befriended the man who later became chief of the Gestapo in Kladno.

48. In 1939 when the Germans marched into Austria, HEYDRICH, in his capacity as chief of the Sicherheitsdienst, made some error. BOEHME immediately came forward and claimed the mistake as his own. From that time on, BOEHME was HEYDRICH's protege. In 1939 BOEHME became chief of the Sicherheitsdienst in the protectorate. As such, he possessed more influence and power than the chief of the Gestapo. A short time later, BOEHME was named commander of the Sicherheitsdienst and Sicherheitspolizei in Bohemia and Moravia. With

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this promotion he became superior to the chief of the Gestapo and the chief of the German Kriminalpolizei. He was the man feared most by even the highest officials because of his recklessness and brutality and his good relationship with HEYDRICH. He used to drive through heavily-populated Prague at least 100 km. per hour in his red sportscar. He was a man who, just because he did not like the answer he received from a porter at the finest Prague hotel, beat the man with a telephone receiver, and had him put in a concentration camp where he died shortly thereafter. I left Prague soon after this incident and lodged complaints against BOEHME for this outrage of office. Proceedings against him were carried out. This is the portrait of an especially brutal barbarian of those times.

49. BOEHME received the report about Lidice from the Gestapo chief in Kladno on 9 June 1942. HEYDRICH, his great protector, was dead and BOEHME knew that because of his past, he had only enemies to reckon with. His career was at an end. All the leading men in the protectorate, including Staatsminister FRANK and the entire Czech protectorate government, had left on this day to take part in the funeral planned for HEYDRICH on 10 June 1942 at the Reichskanzlei in Berlin. In the absence of these men, BOEHME was deputy in charge and particularly responsible for all police matters. We never did learn whether he was drunk with power or whether he wanted only revenge for the death of his chief and master when he formulated his terrible plan for Lidice. He always had possessed an instinctive understanding of the the internal laws of a dictatorship and knew how to manipulate^{them}. So he went over FRANK's head and reported to HIMMLER about the agents hiding in Lidice, and simultaneously submitted his proposals for action against the men worded in such a way that HIMMLER would find the proposals acceptable. Word of the preparations being made leaked to the investigative commission. I went to the Gestapo chief, asked him about the matter and, on receiving a hesitating answer, argued with him to intervene and stop this insane plan. I pointed out the political ramifications to him, warned him that a martyr symbol would be created, mentioned the terrible wave of enemy propaganda which would assail us, and told him that under such conditions we could never solve HEYDRICH's assassination. Nothing helped. The Gestapo chief was too much of a coward to intervene because he feared the brutal BOEHME himself.

50. Reportedly HIMMLER showed BOEHME's plan to Hitler shortly after the latter had stated to Czech Staatspraesident HACHA in the presence of Czech Ministerpraesident KREJCI and Staatsminister FRANK, that he was firmly resolved to evacuate the Germans from Prague and bomb the city should any other difficulties arise in the future. Hitler gave his approval to the Lidice proposal and now BOEHME was acting with the direct authorization of the Fuehrer. FRANK did nothing when he heard about the plan for Lidice because he had been witness to Hitler's statement to HACHA and he was not inclined to oppose Hitler's attitude. Therefore, instead of returning to Prague by train, he drove back by car. When he arrived, Lidice was already in flames.

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51. Because of the impression caused by this incident, ~~and because~~ it was finally possible to get the above mentioned amnesty declared by Staatsminister FRANK. On 16 June 1942 Karel CURDA, born 10 October 1911 in Stara Hlina reported in on the basis of the amnesty. Extremely upset and frightened, he claimed that he had seen the briefcase left behind at the scene of the assassination before. He was brought before me and shown a display of twenty similar looking briefcases. Unwaveringly he chose the one the assassins had used. Due to his extreme agitation and stuttering, it was difficult to understand him. But after a calming talk with him, I learned that he himself was a parachute agent who had been dropped on 28 March 1942 over Teltsch, Bezirk Iglau. He had been a platoon leader in the former Czech army. He had resolved to turn himself in to us because he wanted to protect his relatives and because the exile government in London was completely misinformed about the true situation in the Protectorate and thus gave its agents missions which were contrary to the interests of the Czech people. CURDA stated that he had seen the briefcase at the time GAECIK was repairing it at the SVATOS home in Prague and that Frau SVATOS was a seamstress who made silk dresses which would later be sprayed with minute glass and pearl fragments to create a shimmering effect. Previous analysis of the briefcase had already brought these facts out. CURDA also revealed safe-houses at the home of Frau MORAVEC, who owned the bicycle used by KUBIS, and at the home of one ZELENKA (cover name HAIJSKI) who was a teacher as well as other houses in Prague and throughout the country.

52. CURDA was interrogated in detail. He had to disrobe and was given other clothes to wear. In his clothes we actually did find a poison capsule of the type given parachute agents. CURDA claimed that he had wanted to aid his relatives by coming to us and had planned on taking the capsule afterwards. CURDA was unable to give any information about the two assassins, but due to the information he gave us on safe-houses and collaborators, we were able to take action in the early morning hours of the following day. The action began at a synchronized time despite the disadvantages, i.e., when the doorbell rings at 5 A.M., it is either the milkman or state security, and those people who were endangered could prepare themselves. But in such cases it is difficult to have enough time for street arrests, which is the better method because people are usually not equipped to commit suicide because of the surprise of the arrest. However my officials did not know many of these people by sight and an early arrest of one individual could result in others being warned by telephone. We had to make the best of the situation and take a chance that our plan would work.

53. Both ZELENKA and Frau MORAVEC answered their doors with the poison capsules already in their mouths. We couldn't prevent them from biting the capsules and both died within two minutes. At the time we appeared at the MORAVEC home, Frau MORAVEC's son was on a trip within the protectorate. We caught him two hours later on a train. During his interrogations, he first denied knowing anything about his mother's activities. Since he refused to change his story, we finally decided to tell him of his mother's suicide and show him her body. At that, he broke down and told us his mother had instructed him to hide in the catacombs of the Karl Borromaeus church in case of danger.

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Since other persons interrogated also mentioned these catacombs, it was obvious to us that a thorough search of them should be made because we still had no knowledge of the exact whereabouts of the two assassins.

54. Around midnight of 17 June 1942 we began our preparations for entry into the catacombs. In order to have exact information on the lay-out of the catacombs, we got various individuals such as the chief of the municipal construction bureau, the chief of the department for church construction, an art historian, chief of the sewer networks, etc., out of bed. These men were all unable to help us but we could not release them until after our operation was over. We had to reckon that the men hiding in the catacombs would be well armed and desperate. We also had to surmise which avenues of escape they would try to take. Waffen-SS were called in to form three large rings around the church. The exit of every canal emptying into the Moldau River was guarded. A search crew for the surrounding buildings, cellars, and roofs was on hand.

55. At 0415 hours on 18 June 1942 the circles formed by the Waffen-SS began to close in. The priests were brought out. They denied knowing anything about hidden agents. Dressed in civilian clothes, the first commando entered the church and found the sexton sleeping in an adjacent room. He too denied any knowledge of hidden agents. However, the windows of his room had heavy iron bars which had been cut off from one of the windows; he was unable to explain their absence.

56. Two minutes after they had begun searching the nave of the church, the commando was fired upon from the choir loft. Immediately the machine guns set up at the entrances of the church returned the fire, forcing the assailants in the choir loft to take cover and preventing them from taking good aim as they shot. In the dim morning light, accurate aim was difficult anyway but one of the assailants had managed to shoot a member of the commando in the hand. Then the assailants threw a bomb into the altar area which did no harm but set the drapes on fire. It was impossible for us to reach the assailants because the only way to the choir loft was by a narrow spiral stairway. Anyone climbing these stairs would have been an unprotected target. Furthermore the choir loft afforded the best possible location for shooting downward. There was no other recourse for us but to use hand-grenades on the assailants lodged in the loft. Their fire slowly died as we threw the grenades. When it had ceased, shock troops wearing steel helmets preceded the civilian-dressed commando up the stairway.

57. Three assailants were found in the choir loft. Two were dead. The other was KUBIS, the man who had thrown the bomb at HEYDRICH. The two men who were dead had taken poison capsules. KUBIS, the only one of the three injured by a grenade blast, probably also had intended to take poison but had been unsuccessful because of unconsciousness. We took him to a military hospital at once but all medical means failed to save his life. Twenty minutes later he was dead and our first key witness was gone, a heavy loss for us.

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
58. GABCIK, the man who tried to machine gun HEYDRICH, still eluded us but we had hopes of finding him in the catacombs. Chaplain PETREK who had followed the battle from the sacristy of the church, now admitted to us that he had hidden seven men in the church. Since three of these were now accounted for, we logically assumed that the remaining four were in the catacombs. We learned that the three in the choir loft had gone there to sleep because they had found the cold of the catacombs too unbearable. When our men closed in on the church, the three had been caught unprepared and had been unable to retreat to the catacombs. The chaplain cooperated with us and gave us the lay-out of the catacombs. To our astonishment, we learned that there was no other exit but through the church. The four agents hiding in the catacombs were in a trap.

59. The catacombs were directly under the church. Their walls contained vaults in which former leading church functionaries were buried. The agents had opened some of these vaults, removed the remains, and used them to sleep in. The entrance through which coffins had formerly been lowered had been cemented shut from the top. Only a small shaft remained open through which a not too large person could squeeze.

60. Our main problem was how to get the agents out. We wanted living witnesses, not corpses, and we needed the information they could give us. We sent the priest to the shaft to plead with the men to surrender. They answered that they refused to acknowledge any priest who had betrayed them, that they were Czechs and Czechs never surrender! The men below were well armed and in a secure place. Anyone of us had only to put his feet in the shaft and he would be shot. We offered them various terms of surrender but they refused them all. I thought perhaps if we forced them to remain in the catacombs for a long time, one of the men would have a change of heart and convince the others that surrender was the only choice they had. I wanted them alive at all costs because collaborators we had captured the previous day and who had lived with the assassins for a long time, had stated during their interrogations that both KUBIS and GABCIK had been personally decorated by Churchill and then personally seen off at the London airport by Benes. How much more significant would be the information GABCIK had to offer!

61. It would have been simple to kill the men but we chose to make their hiding place unpleasant for them and thus force them out. To accomplish this we had the fire department run water hoses into the catacombs and flood them. The situation became highly unpleasant for the agents. They had a short ladder in the catacombs, used it to climb to a window overlooking the street which had been forcibly opened by us previously, shoved the hoses back out, and opened wild fire at the Waffen-SS troops. The Waffen-SS accustomed to a different type of warfare at the front, immediately returned fire and it was only with great effort that we were able to stop them. The fire department again flooded the catacombs. When the water level reached one meter, tear gas was thrown in. However the gas was very light, rose to the top, and seeped through the floor into the church, where the sufferers were our own men guarding the catacomb entrance. The fire

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department next turned the hoses on full force and flushed out those vaults it could reach.

62. Perhaps the soaked and freezing men in the catacombs had lost some of their will to resist but the battle had raged for six hours now and the fog was still not in sight. The high-ranking officers and commanders of the troops involved in our attempt were beginning to get impatient. I then ran up the military hospital and spent some twenty minutes talking to a physician there. I wanted to know if there was any type of gas to induce unconsciousness we could use on the men in the catacombs which would not rise to the top but which would diffuse laterally and enter the vaults. I was willing even to use a gas bomb which exploded to some slight degree. However, the physician informed me that there was nothing of this nature. Returning to the scene, I found the so-called shock troops of the Waffen-SS preparing to enter the shaft to the catacombs. I immediately talked to the highest commander of the Waffen-SS present, I believe it was SS-Brigadefuehrer von TRUENFELS. He took a very uncomradely attitude about the whole thing, such as to say, what did I, a lowly civilian have to say about anything when the mighty armed forces were on hand. The ensuing argument finally brought about his apologetic reply "Gruppenfuehrer FRANK gave the order for the men to enter the catacombs". I then turned on FRANK, denounced his stupid order, explained to him that living persons were of the essence and that if we had wanted corpses, we could have killed the men six hours ago without the help of the troops who would suffer losses in their attempt. All we would have had to do was to attach a grenade to a stick and hold it down the shaft. Its explosion would have shattered the lungs of the men. I then learned from FRANK that it had been SS-Brigadefuehrer von TREUENFELS who had initially requested permission to send shock troops into the catacombs "because we are discrediting ourselves". FRANK, a civilian, had capitulated when confronted with militaristic bravado and was now ashamed to rescind his order.

63. So, a unit entered the catacombs. Three men were shot and were taken to the military hospital. In order to save the other SS-men, we were forced to break open the entrance to the catacombs. Before we could get in, the four agents shot themselves. Among them was GABCIK. Half an hour later, a radio message came from HIMMLER who had been informed, which said in essence, "Promise the assassins anything but take them alive."

64. Since we could foresee that the Czech broadcasts from London would contradict our statements that HEYDRICH's assassins were dead, we had to be extremely thorough in gathering proof that the two actually were among the seven dead men. The corpses were prepared for viewing by the Gerichtsmedizinischen Institut of the Prague University. The bodies were numbered from one to seven and the witnesses were required to identify them. Twenty persons who had known or had seen GABCIK and KUBIS before or after the assassination, definitely identified their two bodies. In total, more than fifty proofs were collected that the two assassins were among the seven dead men. We had also found eleven pistols in the catacombs and choir loft. Among those were two Colt pistols with the serial numbers of

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539,370 and 540,416. Ballistic analysis by the Kriminaltechnische Institut proved that the bullets found at the scene of the assassination had come from those two guns.

65. The investigation and all the ramifications of the assassination lasted until the end of September 1942. As expected, the Czech broadcasts from London continuously claimed that since the Gestapo had not found the assassins, ~~it~~ had shot some Czechs in the Karl Borromaeus church and named them as the assassins in order to maintain its own fearful prestige.

(SOURCE COMMENT: Even former chief of Amt VI, RSHA, SCHELLENBERG, claimed in the memoirs he wrote in Italy shortly before his death ca 1952 that MUELLER, chief of Amt IV, RSHA, had been unable to capture HEYDRICH's assassins. Therefore he had his agents in Prague gather up 120 Czech partisans, place them in the Karl Borromaeus church, and had them shot; SCHELLENBERG also stated that after the war it was learned that the assassins coincidentally were among those 120 Czech partisans. SCHELLENBERG was either poorly informed or made such a statement because he had had poor relationships with his fellow department chiefs. In any event, this example should prove that one should not believe all one reads.)

Such propaganda forced us to prove at least to the German and Czech public that the assassins were actually dead, and it was suggested that a trial be held which would bring out the true facts. Propagandaminister GOEBBELS forbade such a trial because he had gotten his fingers burned once before with the Gruenspan trial, and because he feared that a trial would lead to a national Czech demonstration which would be picked up by international newspapermen and this would be catastrophic. However DALJEGE managed to get Hitler's approval for a trial a few months later. Hitler ordered that the clergy of the Karl Borromaeus church be separated from the rest of the complex and brought before the court-martial and that the press be invited to the proceedings. In the trial the mistresses of KUBIS and GABCIK were interrogated. They testified that they had lived with the men for a long time and that the unfused bombs had been hidden under their beds. When one of the women became pregnant, she had an abortion done in the "greater interests" of carrying out the preparations for the assassination. The women also testified how they had become acquainted with the men, regarding their living together up to and a few days after the assassination and finally told of identification of corpses. The clergy from the church also testified about the time spent with the assassins when they were hiding in the church and also described the events leading to their death.

66. The Karl Borromaeus church was a Russian Orthodox church. Its congregation was not very large. The church was founded for the Russian Orthodox war-brides the Czech legionnaires brought from Russia after World War I. Since the legionnaires were the leading class of the first Czech republic, a great number of prominent Czechs belonged to the congregation. The bishop at the church, a former priest ^{in a prison} of insane asylum, admitted at the trial that he had engaged in active espionage against the Germans for the Russians since 1939, and had sent his intelligence

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information to Russia in his official church reports. When his chaplain, PETREK, told the bishop that Czech agents were hiding in the church, the bishop asked only if they were orthodox and opined that there would be trouble because of them. During the time the agents were hiding in his church, the bishop sent his condolences to the Germans for HEYDRICH's death, and even went to the Reichssicherheitshauptamt in Berlin to express his sympathies personally and to carry out clerical conferences. In order to secure the safety of the agents hiding in the church, Chaplain PETREK had given the two sextons 50 RM a piece and, wearing his full vestments, had sworn them to secrecy at the altar. The clergy of the church tried to justify the fact that they had hidden the agents there by stating that the orthodox church had always been a haven for political refugees. However the priests, the sextons and the elders all received death sentences from the court. I believe a total of seven death sentences were handed down. After this trial ended, no further trials or executions were carried out.

57. After learning that GABCIK and KUBIS were dead, HIMMLER ordered that all their relatives be arrested and shot. As terrible as this order sounded, it was not taken seriously by the officials concerned. First of all, GABCIK's relatives could not be touched since he had been a Slovak and no German arrests could be made on Slovakian territory. Secondly, KUBIS's relatives lived in Moravia and were of so great a number and so widely scattered, that many of them had been German citizens for quite some time already. Some of them belonged to the NSDAP and several of them were even Ortsgruppenleiter. HIMMLER's stupid order was openly laughed at, but we did lock up what relatives we could until the matter was settled. The department chief who had received HIMMLER's order and I talked the matter over with FRANK, and we were able to obtain the release of all the relatives.

58. The radio used by the assassins to contact London and all the material fell into our hands during investigation of the entire agent complex. Among the messages decoded by us was the following:

A message had gone to the president in London asking him if a man with the cover name of "JINDRA" would be permitted to send a message to the president over this line. An affirmative answer was received from London and the following message was then sent:

"To the president,

Judging from the preparations being made by two friends, I assume an assassination of H. is being planned. This assassination will not accomplish anything and will only bring trouble to our people. It will not only place our hostages and political prisoners in jeopardy, it will also endanger thousands of lives, place our nation under unimaginable oppression, and simultaneously destroy the few remaining fragments of our organization. It would make it impossible for us to do anything here to help our allies. I therefore beg you to call off this assassination and tell our friends of your decision. If an assassination is necessary for foreign political reasons, let it be the Quisling, E.M.

Jindra"

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By E.M. the Czech Minister of Propaganda, Emanuel MORAVETZ was meant. Even though JINDRA repeated his warning, BENES did not rescind the order for the assassination. BENES did thank JINDRA for his frank statements and promised him a decision in the matter at a later time.

69. It behooved the Germans to find the author of the message. The man who could have given us pertinent information, Leutnant BARTOS, who had been the chief and radio operator, was dead. Finally we learned that the Czech Professor VANEK from Bruenn could be identical with "JINDRA". VANEK had been the object of a two-year search by the Gestapo in Bruenn because of his activities as a Sokol leader. The search for him began. We knew he had been born in circa 1906 but had little else to go on. Around the middle of August we found the first trace of him but he managed to elude us and it was not until September 1942 that we finally took him into custody. He was living black and running a pension belonging to an officer friend who had flown to England. We arrested him at the entrance to the pension. He was placed in our car and when we greeted him by his true name and his cover name, he merely said, "Ah so, you must be the Herr MUELLER of the German police who has been looking for me for eight weeks." He was extremely well informed about us and knew each department in our organization, the number of people were employed and all sorts of other details.

70. After the initial shock of being arrested wore off, he became quite sensible and spoke freely to us, especially when he was shown the radio message he had sent to BENES. He gave the impression of belonging to the middle class who felt that Germany would be defeated and feared Communist development in Czechoslovakia after the war. He was of the opinion that the Allies should not use the Czech people as a factor in war strategy after they had so outrageously forsaken the Czechs in 1938/1939. He felt that mobilizing the Czech people for partisan warfare against the Germans would lead to more bloodshed than that suffered by soldiers in normal combat, and since the Czechs were free of military service, there was nothing better for them to do for the moment but wait for developments. Furthermore, he knew the armament potential of Czechoslovakia was so important for the Germans that they would not hesitate to use any means to retain this territory. VANEK was also aware of Hitler's belief that whoever holds the Czech territory, the European heartland, rules all of Europe. Analyzing all the facts, VANEK had come to the conclusion that any Czech resistance to the Germans was pure suicide. He also related conversations with GABCIK, KUBIS, and other parachute agents. These men had repeatedly stated that they had been misinformed by London about the true situation in the Protectorate, that they too believed the Czech people should wait out the lull but that they, as soldiers under oath, had to carry out their missions. They had pleaded with VANEK to try to get London to rescind the assassination order.

71. VANEK was a highly educated man who placed the welfare of his people first. He was deeply convinced that it was futile for the Czech people to take part in the war because this would lead only to senseless killings. After being in our custody for only twenty-four hours, he was prepared to make an agreement with us. His terms were that in exchange for all his contacts to

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England, including his radio station, he and his Sokol organization be allowed to influence Czech internal policies through Administrator FRANK. Furthermore all of our parachute agents who were either Czechs or Slovaks were to be interned, not executed, for the remainder of the war.

72. I trusted VANEK and saw the great advantage of such development. We would be able to run radio playbacks and never be caught unprepared again. We could keep London satisfied and unsuspecting by sending fictitious reports of successful missions. We at the investigative commission never thought that any objections to the agreement would arise, but here we erred in our thinking. The chief of the Gestapo learned of the agreement, summoned me, denounced me for my unauthorized meddling in political matters, and ordered that VANEK be immediately handed over to the Gestapo. So VANEK was demoted to an insignificant captured Sokol leader. For two years, that department of the Gestapo concerned with the illegal Sokol movement, interrogated VANEK in a petty, humiliating manner about his friends in the Sokol movement. I do not know his ultimate fate. The Gestapo chief in effect aided the enemy by thus preventing us from discovering what further steps the BENEŠ exile government was planning. He gave no justification for his action. It was only his anger that things belonging to his special province were acted on behind his back that prompted him to act so stupidly. This instance, just as the matter of Lidice, reveals again the danger and stupidity of a dictatorship.

73. The final report on HEYDRICH's assassination was written by me. As has always been and will always be the case in criminal investigations, the report contained not only our successes but also our failures. I had to point out why most of the people who helped the assassins belonged to the Sokol organization even though there were others much more anti-German than they. The Sokol was an association founded by Sudeten Germans. Its goal was civic and physical training. In 1940, the association was disbanded by the "Czech government", that is, ostensibly not on German orders. Then the Gestapo seized all the material belonging to the Sokol and in due time, took highly respected men of the association as political hostages. These acts by the Gestapo caused an embittered reaction and brought about illegal, organized Anti-German Sokol activity. In effect, the Gestapo had activated its own enemies.

74. Because I included this in the chapter of my report regarding Czech motivations, the Gestapo offices became very angry and demanded that I revise my account. They feared that this report, which would be disseminated to high offices, would bring about unpleasantness. I refused to change the report because, as I explained to the Gestapo, a final report on an assassination should contain an objective account of the whole investigation. Furthermore, I told them that a report written in a politically biased vein was not within the province of a special commission set up to carry out criminal investigation.

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75. Because of the disagreement between myself, BOEHME, and the Gestapo chief regarding VANEK and my final report on the assassination, I decided to go to Gruppenfuehrer MUELLER, Chief of Amt IV, RSHA, in Berlin and plead my case. MUELLER told me that I was right as far as VANEK was concerned but that he was unable to help me. He went on to say that HEYDRICH's successor had still not been named and he felt that he was not powerful enough to countermand any orders the Gestapo had given in Prague. Regarding my final report on the HEYDRICH assassination, MUELLER said I should not give in to Gestapo pressure because I was not bound to obey them. It was obvious from MUELLER's attitude that he did not wish to create any difficulties for himself by taking a stand in this matter which would later be disapproved of by HEYDRICH's successor.

76. Because MUELLER took this position, the situation was unaltered. Therefore I went to NEBE and related the matter to him. He stated that MUELLER's waiting attitude typified the entire situation. It was expected that HEYDRICH's successor would make an extensive reorganization and everybody was therefore being extremely cautious. However, NEBE felt that changes which would be made by a strong appointee, whether he was a positive and reasonable man or not, were less to be feared than that he might turn out to be a colorless person too weak to maintain control.

77. Next I enlisted the help of friends in the Abwehr to arrange through the High Command that I be called into the army, and thus two weeks later I was serving on the Eastern front as an Unteroffizier. Subsequently, I became the object of a proceeding on grounds of desertion. The APO number to which I had been assigned was classified, a measure taken by the Abwehr to make it more difficult for the Sicherheitspolizei to fight for retention of its officials, and since the subordinate command posts in Berlin had somehow been by-passed they were unable to find me.

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