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<b>DISPATCH</b>		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGMA-44835
TO Chief, EE      Chief, SR	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 200-6-1 FF # CE/1181		
INFO Chief of Station, Germany Chief of Base, Frankfurt      Chief of Base, Berlin	DATE 24 September 1959		
FROM Chief, Munich Base	RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)		
SUBJECT EQUAL/LCIMPROVE/CARETINA/UPSWING/Operations. Further CARETINA Reports on Rote Kapelle Personalities	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING & Att.		
	<input type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED		
ACTION REQUIRED See Paragraph 3.	<input type="checkbox"/> INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY		
REFERENCE(S)			
<p>a. EGMA-44213, 17 August 1959</p> <p>b. EGMA-43172, 14 July 1959</p>			
<p>1. CARETINA has been questioned about his superior in the RSHA, <u>Generalmajor der Polizei und Gruppenfuehrer Heinrich MJELLER</u>, who was chief of Amt IV of the RSHA and who assigned CARETINA to head the Sonderkommando Rote Kapelle in Paris in 1942. MJELLER has been the subject of some speculation; primarily whether he was a Soviet agent and whether he actually died during the last days of the war. CARETINA thinks the suspicions are nonsense and outlines his reasons in the attached. He also is convinced that MJELLER shot himself during the final German collapse in Berlin and cites his evidence for thinking this.</p>			
<p>2. We have attempted to obtain from CARETINA as clear a picture as possible of the background for his decision to defect to the Soviet Union with his double-agent KENT. The attached gives some of the complicated events and reasoning behind his action. The original CARETINA reports were condensed because much of his ramifications are unnecessary and self-evident. CARETINA's explanation of why he and his colleagues in the RSHA took the action they did is somewhat redundant today. The background on Otto Friedrich BACH and Robert IFFNER is of interest because both men have appeared in UPSWING/UJDRIZZLY reports. It would not have been surprising that the Soviets would show a post-WW II interest in BACH inasmuch as CARETINA used the names of the two as sources for intelligence material he transmitted to the Director in Moscow over his radio play-back.</p>			
<p>3. It is requested that Headquarters send us any information on the alleged French-American conference which is the subject of the "Phoenix Case" reported in attachment and any identification of the French Air Force Colonel FAERY. Traces are requested on:</p>			
<p>a. Otto Friedrich BACH, born 22 December 1899 in Stuttgart, most recently reported to be Administrative Director for the Berlin Rundfunk. We have the following documents in our files: EGMA-17457 of 29 September 1954; EGMA-11339 of 28 October 1954; EGMA-12224 of 13 January 1955; and several memoranda for the record which are presumably only in MB files.</p>			
<p>b. Robert IFFNER, Luftwaffe paymaster for the Luftwaffe sanatorium at Cligny during WW II, prior to WW II director of large German tobacco firm. We have no traces on IFFNER except that his name was included in the target list presented by UPSWING during the UJDRIZZLY conference of February 1955.</p>			
Approved: _____		DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2003 2005	
Attachment: CARETINA Report h/w			
Distribution: 3 - EE w/l copy att h/w      2 - COS/O w/l copy att h/w 2 - SR w/l copy att h/w      2 - FOB w/l copy att h/w      2 - BOB w/l att h/w			
NIQ:php			
FORM 10-57 53b (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PAGE NO. <input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED

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Attachment to EGMA-14835

Gruppenfuehrer MUELLER

1. My information on MUELLER is based on the ten or twelve times I personally discussed with him various professional matters. I actually saw him on numerous occasions but not always to talk to. The following impressions are based on my personal contact with MUELLER and on information obtained from my colleagues who knew him.

2. When HITLER came to power in 1933, MUELLER was reportedly an official of the Munich Police with the rank of Inspektor or perhaps lower. MUELLER was in the political police in Bavaria. In February 1933, the first days of the Third Reich, HIMMLER became Polizeipraesident of Munich and HEYDRICH was made Chief of the Political Police for Munich, perhaps for all of Bavaria. At this time HIMMLER was 32 years old and HEYDRICH was 26 years old and neither had any knowledge of police work. They were forced to depend on the trained police officials, especially on the political police. MUELLER was the political police specialist in Communism and the best informed police official on the subject. He helped HIMMLER and HEYDRICH clear out the Communists and when HEYDRICH went to Berlin to organize the RSHA, he took MUELLER with him. MUELLER eventually became the chief of Amt IV of the RSHA (Gestapo). I don't know when he was appointed, but in early 1940 I consulted with him as the Amtschef IV. He was one of the men responsible for the destruction of the Communist Party in Germany.

3. It seems to me absolute nonsense to suggest that MUELLER was a Soviet agent. Had this actually been the case, the Soviets allowed him to destroy the entire Party strength and organization in Germany over a period of thirteen years in return for relatively insignificant political information. This does not agree with the Bolshevik mentality. The Soviets will sacrifice whatever is necessary to attain long-range goals, but never would they have allowed total annihilation of their own organization, one of the most powerful of their apparatus outside of the Soviet Union.

4. MUELLER was responsible for directing the executive branch of the political police. Under the jurisdiction of this branch were the three functions, counterespionage, countersabotage, and counterassassination. During the war the three functions increased in importance as a result of enemy activity. In peace time, the political police rarely operated abroad, only in counterespionage operations, but during the war the political police extended their operations into all of the German "influence" areas (occupied areas). MUELLER was not directly concerned with double-agent and radio playback operations. He supervised the whole activity but as an Amtschef he could not possibly have had the time to direct individual operations. The actual control and guidance was in the hands of Referat IV A 2, which was headed by von KOPKOW (Horst von KOPKOW). Necessity forced MUELLER to agree

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to the use of radio play-back operations. There were only two thousand officials (German military and security officials) in France where the population was forty-two million. As a specialist in Communist activity, MUELLER realized that he had insufficient strength to cope with the new Communist nets which would always replace the ones the Germans eliminated. The ranks of the French Communist Party were endless. It was a different matter with the radio play-backs against England, because the British could not draw on a large reservoir of agents such as the French Communist Party. Consequently when MUELLER ordered me to head the Sonderkommando Rote Kapelle, he outlined the problem we faced in trying to handle the constantly renewed Soviet and Communist nets. The ultimate pattern of the play-back operations against the Soviet espionage nets were my own doing rather than MUELLER's. We both realized that, in order to gain and retain control, the operations had to be as realistic and factual as possible.

5. I showed MUELLER for the first time in August or September 1944 the Moscow Director's plan that KENT and two of his close German co-workers allow themselves to be captured by the Allies who would turn them over to the Soviets. He discussed the plan with HIMMLER who said, "I cannot allow one of our men to go over to the Soviets because the Bolshevist concept of world domination would be too fascinating." Circa November 1944, I approached MUELLER again but he turned down the proposal (that CARETINA go with KENT to the Soviets). He explained later that he was hoping that the Ardennes offensive of December 1944 would be successful and the German army would re-enter Paris. The third time I discussed Moscow's and my proposal with him, the Red Army was only 50 kilometers from Berlin. The situation was so hopeless at that time that all previous arguments against the proposal were meaningless. An Allied bombing force of 3,500 planes had attacked Berlin on 3 February 1945. The city was in flames. There were no telephones, teletapes, only a radio set for communication. MUELLER's office had had an entire wall destroyed and he was sitting in a room filled with rubble. The attack of the 3,500 bombers and the presence of the Red Army 50 kilometers from Berlin had been an impressive lesson in the unity of the Allied operations and the hope of avoiding an unconditional surrender was gone. MUELLER said, "The only line of action and the sensible thing to do, is what you propose, which is to upset the East-West alliance and accelerate the dissolution of their pact." He was not concerned with how the Alliance was to be disturbed, only that it should be disturbed. His thoughts during those final days were most likely concerned with his obligation to the Fuehrer. He was too sensible to be a fanatical follower of HITLER but, because of his position, he had no alternative.

6. I asked MUELLER to get me the file of the "Phoenix Case" which I planned to take with me. MUELLER knew nothing about the case because it came under SCHELLENBERG's jurisdiction. He did, however, ask for the file during

a meeting with SCHELLENBERG and sent me to STEIMLE, SCHELLENBERG's deputy, the next day. STEIMLE told me that the files had been moved, but he would try to obtain the one I wanted. STEIMLE brought the file to me in April 1945 when I was in Heiligenberg on Lake Constance.

7. During the initial phase of my interrogation in Moscow, June 1945, ABAKUMOV's Jewish interpreter, whose name I do not know, told me that he had just come from Berlin. He showed me some stationary with the letterheads of "Der Fuehrer" and Reichskanzler, which he said he had taken from the ruins of the Reich's Chancellery. In addition to telling me that everything lay in ruins, he said "Your chief is dead. He shot himself in the head." I didn't understand to whom he was referring and asked whom he meant by "my chief". He answered, "Gruppenfuehrer MUELLER", and went on to say that they, the Russians, had found his body in a subway shaft of the Kaiserhof subway station and it was undoubtedly suicide. I asked if he were certain it was MUELLER and he said that the body had all of MUELLER's identity documents on it. In addition, the Soviets had found witnesses who knew MUELLER to confirm the identification. The Soviets did not doubt that MUELLER was dead. During my interrogation, I frequently answered a question from the Soviet interrogator by saying that MUELLER would know much more than I on the matter. The Soviets would ignore my suggestion with the statement, "MUELLER is dead". Based on all evidence I have known, I have never doubted that MUELLER was dead.

The "Phoenix Case" and Other Material Given to the Soviets

8. When we withdrew from France in August 1944, we were presented with serious problems regarding the continuation of our radio play-back operation against Moscow. Moscow could easily have become suspicious if KENT had simply informed the Director that he was withdrawing to Germany with the Germans. There was a good possibility that the Soviets would want to contact him through their liaison officer attached to the Allied forces entering Paris and to make future use of KENT's knowledge and experience in France. We, however, did not dare to leave him behind. "SOLYA" (General Waldemar/Vladimir OZOLS) and his entire network were left in France (Station Comment: OZOLS was not aware of the German control of KENT, according to source, and therefore could not betray the radio play-back operation to the Soviets.) At the last moment the Director in Moscow instructed KENT to withdraw with the German forces from France.

9. The first stage of our withdrawal was to a lake which lay west of the Vosges mountains and where we (the Germans) had a camp for English PW's. We arrived at the lake during August 1944. While there Moscow sent KENT a request for the names and descriptions of KENT's German co-workers in order

that Moscow could determine which Germans would be useful in Germany after the war. With Berlin's approval, we sent the names of those alleged sources already known to Moscow, my pseudonym PAULSEN, and some fictitious names. Among the names already known to Moscow and which we sent in response to this request were:

a. Otto BACH, who was in the German Handelskammer in Paris during WW II and whose name, unbeknownst to him, had been given as the source of considerable economic and political intelligence which we transmitted to the Director.

b. Robert IFFNER, who in civilian life had been the deputy director of a large tobacco firm and during the war was the paymaster for the Luftwaffe Sanitorium in Clichy. I had given his name to the Director as the source of intelligence which we had actually obtained from debriefing wounded English airmen hospitalized in Clichy. IFFNER was not aware that his name was used.

(Station Comment: It should be noted that both BACH and IFFNER have appeared in UPSWING's UJDRIZZLY complex which indicates that UPSWING suspects both of some Soviet sympathy or activity. BACH was last reported to be Administrative Director of the Berlin Rundfunk. Source stated in Attachment A to EGMA-43172 of 14 July 1959 that his Soviet interrogators questioned him on BACH. In the material photographed from source's briefcase (Attachment to EGFA-19090 of 26 November 1957), the following appeared on BACH: BACH was an old Social-Democrat, son-in-law of the former Prussian Arbeitsminister WISSEL, and a trade union man who had been with the ILO in Geneva after 1933. He was naturally tantalizing material to use in my radio play-back (source did use him). KENT had told his Soviet interrogators that he had seen BACH in conversation with BICKLER (SS-Standartenfuhrer Hermann BICKLER, head of Amt VI in Paris during WW II). As a result I (source) was harrassed by a strange interrogator in Moscow for several weeks trying to make me confess that BACH had been an Amt VI agent. This occurred toward the end of 1947. I now believe that the Soviets wanted to get something on BACH, either to cause his removal from his position or to blackmail him. I never did admit that BACH was ever used as an agent.)

10. Moscow replied almost immediately to the above message with instructions to KENT to turn himself and his two best German collaborators over to the Allied forces. Moscow stated that the plans for future work in Germany would include the two German collaborators. I discussed the message with BICKLER, chief of Amt VI, SIPO and SD, and with (Karl Albrecht) OBERG, the security and police chief in France who is still imprisoned in Caen, France. BICKLER and OBERG belonged to the very small group of Germans in France who knew of the Rote Kapelle operation and who had provided me with intelligence to be used in the operations. By this time we were aware of the Western plans for Germany, i.e., Morgenthau plan, arrests, extinction of Germany, etc. I decided that something

could be done to make the future of Germany less gloomy. I knew from my experience that the Soviet mind is ruled by a deep-seated distrust. If Soviet distrust of the Allies were sharpened and a wedge driven between the Allies and the Soviet Union, the Allied concentration on Germany might be diverted which would give some hope for a future for Germany. OBERG and BICKLER agreed with me. They were the ones who suggested that the "Phoenix Case" be prepared to hand over to the Soviets.

11. My legend for going over to the Soviets was that I had been sent to Paris by the chief of the German Kriminalpolizei, Arthur NEBE. NEBE had been involved in the 20th of July 1944 plot, a fact which would be useful in Moscow. The attitude of the German people was, at that time, favorable to the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union had not declared war on Germany but had been attacked by Germany. The Western Powers, on the other hand, had declared war on Germany and the hatred was directed toward them. This had been factually reported to Moscow. I was going to add to the intelligence already transmitted to Moscow examples of conversation between English and American pilots whom we had captured. These conversations had openly discussed how the ranking officers of their countries were worried about the pro-Communist policies of Roosevelt. This was a challenge to the Soviet Union. In addition, I had the files on the "Phoenix Case".

12. The "Phoenix Case" involved a French Air Force Colonel FABRY, who was a friend and colleague of PETAIN. FABRY was asked by the Americans to make a trip to Madrid for conferences with the Americans. He was to be accompanied by French resistance and political leaders. This occurred, as I recall, in February 1944. FABRY and his group went to Madrid and one of the men in his group, allegedly a resistance member, was a German Sicherheitspolizei penetration agent. Furthermore, the material which FABRY carried with him, actually in his wooden leg, was prepared by Karl BOEMELBURG, chief of Abt. IV of the SIPO and a Communist specialist. The material was compiled from BOEMELBURG's agent reports and clearly stated how much influence the French Communists were exerting in the French resistance under the cover of nationalism. I never knew whether FABRY was aware that a member of his group was a German agent, nor whether he knew that the material he carried originated in a German office. FABRY conferred either with the American Ambassador in Spain or with a special envoy from Roosevelt with a name similar to MORRISON, possibly with both. The purpose of the conference was to determine whether a French government, similar to the one of 1939, could be established in France. The Americans did not want to pave the way for STALIN in France and wanted some kind of guarantee that France would not become a Communist country. If the likelihood existed that France would have a Communist government after an Allied invasion, it was questionable whether the Allies were justified in mounting an invasion. FABRY showed the Americans the material which BOEMELBURG had prepared, which showed clearly that the Communists were dominating the resistance. Roosevelt, who was informed of the proceedings of the

conference by cable, asked by cable whether FABRY were the same man whom he had met in 1919 during the negotiations for the Versaille Peace Treaty. Informed that it was the same man, Roosevelt invited FABRY to fly to Washington in a plane which would be dispatched for him. FABRY declined to make the trip. Roosevelt then informed the conference that due to the existing internal political situation in France, an invasion was doubtful.

13. The file which I carried with me to Moscow on the "Phoenix Case" carried hand-written notations on the margins from such men as HITLER and HIMMLER. During my interrogation in the Soviet Union, I told my interrogator that BOEMELBURG claimed that one of the members of FABRY's group had been a former French Communist Party Central Committee member. In the report on the "Phoenix Case" was also the American statement that during the Sicilian landings, the Americans had been forced to shoot at a Communist uprising in Sicily. This was caused by the fact that all preparations had been left to the English who did not handle the preparations properly. The Americans requested the French to keep their discussions secret from the English.

For Carding

Heinrich \*MUELLER, Gruppenfuhrer und Generalmajor der Polizei  
DOB: 28 April 1900  
POB: Bavaria, Germany

Hermann Christian \*BICKLER @SCHMIDT, @WINKLER, @ MAIR, Pietro  
DOB: 28 December 1904  
POB: Hottweiler/Lothringen, Germany

Head of Unit VI in Rome