

VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DI FCH NO. EGQA-81010

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE

Info: SR

DATE: 14 August 1956

FROM : Chief of Station, Germany

POB
BONN
FOB

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/CARE/LCIMPROVE

SPECIFIC— Debriefing of CARETINA

1. Attachment A, forwarded herewith, is the debriefing of Subject by . Unfortunately, due to factors beyond our control, this is only a partial debriefing of Subject's general background and wartime experiences. The debriefing came to an abrupt end when Subject reported to he had accepted employment with a German agency, effective 1 September, at 1500 DMW per month. Subject was told by this German agency he could continue to talk to the Americans, but only on his experiences in the USSR.

2. Subject and parted good friends. Subject said that if this offer falls through for one reason or another, he would very much like to continue his contact with the Americans. He was not given any means for recontacting us, but we feel certain that if he desires to seek us out, he would probably do so through

Approved:

Distribution:

- EE-3 w/att A. Att B usepcov
- SR-2 w/att A. Att B usepcov
- POE-2 w/att A. Att B usepcov
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FORM NO. 51-28 A
MAR. 1949

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

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SUBJECT: Partial Debriefing of CARETINAA. PRICAMELE:

1. [] arrived in Frankfurt 24 July 1956, talked with [] on the 25th during which time [] phoned through to CARETINA who was sojourning in Munich and arranged for [] to visit CARETINA at the latter's home, time to be coordinated telephonically over the weekend.

2. [] took off on 28 July for Stuttgart to await [] call, which came through that night. [] said CARETINA would return Sunday 29 July from Munich and would be too tired to see [] until 1 August. [] jumped the gun and visited CARETINA at the latter's home in the afternoon of 31 July. While CARETINA was cordial he at first claimed he could not speak with an American about his career because the German services might learn of it and he would have had it. After some hours of discussion, CARETINA agreed to talk unofficially. He also showed interest in working for the "American" service and was particularly interested in getting support for operations to develop leads into penetration by the Soviet I.S. into German government organs, such leads to be developed out of the extant Rote Kapelle types.

3. On 1 August [] spent about 6 hours with CARETINA again in Ludwigsburg and planned a breakdown of a debriefing to consist of CARETINA's autobiography, his relationship to the Heydrich assassination in Prague in 1942, structure of the German RK Kommando in France, specific operational mo of the Germans and the RIS, study of cases, viz doubling Kent, Trepper, etc., German DP'ing techniques and successes, etc. This undertaking CARETINA began on 2 August while [] ran up to Frankfurt to report progre

4. On 3 August CARETINA spent the day with [] in the latter's hotel (Raugh, Sophienstrasse 35, Stuttgart) working out CARETINA's autobiography, his connection with the investigation of Heydrich's assassination, an overall birds-eye view of the work of Sonderkommando Rote Kapelle in Paris and a rough draft chart of the Kommando's structure. CARETINA left happily that evening intending to return on 4 August although he said he was expecting a visit from a "friend" some time on the 4th or 5th and would not arrive in Stuttgart until after the morning's mail arrived.

5. On the 4th of August CARETINA telephoned [] to say he was ill and that his friend had arrived for a visit. He would phone when the friend had gone. At 7:45 p.m. on 5 August CARETINA phoned [] he was on his way to Stuttgart. On arrival he bemoaned the probable anger of [] and [] at what he had done. The "friend" was a representative of a German Intelligence service (definitely not CAVATA for which CARETINA claimed he never would work and for which he has only distrust), who CARETINA thinks was sent to him because he had put in a request for a job with the German element of NATO and the German service, (possibly UPSKING), had decided to act. A concrete offer to work with this service after 1 September at a salary which CARETINA claims will be DMW 1500 monthly was made and CARETINA accepted. To [] he explained that while he would have preferred to work with the Americans with their greater resources, if he refused this offer the German service would obviously be suspicious of him and make his future impossible. CARETINA mentioned that he had told the representative of the German service that he had been talking with an American and asked him if he might continue; he was told he might even come to Frankfurt if invited to discuss his experiences since 1945 in the Soviet Union but he must not talk with the Americans about his Sonderkommando operations during the war.

6. There was not much for [] to do beyond trying to make friends more completely with a potential member of the UPSWING organization. The fact that CARETINA is very favorably impressed and even asked in detail [] advice on his decision, can be considered one of the few plusses in this operation. After thorough discussion [] and CARETINA adjourned to supper and several beers before parting about midnight 5 August, with CARETINA in the end voicing his hope of being permitted to work with the Americans when he takes over the duties of his future position. [] returned to Frankfurt the morning of 6 August with the following material on CARETINA: 1. Career; 2. Investigation of the Assassination of Heydrich; 3. CARETINA's account of the operations of Sonderkommando Rote Kapelle (was to have been the basis for detailed debriefing); 4. Draft chart of structure of Sonderkommando R.K. with explanations largely from [] memory.

B. CARETINA

1. CARETINA was born 28 July, in Berlin. His father was an agricultural inspector and his mother the daughter of a farmer and master craftsman. He is of evangelical faith. On his parents request CARETINA left school at 14 in the "Untersekunda year" to become a voluntary trainee in mechanics with the purpose of becoming a mechanical engineer. Before 1933 CARETINA belonged to a youth group, the Christian Pathfinders. This experience impressed him deeply and opened up, he claims, an entirely new spiritual field of development. In this group he was drawn into the struggle against the anti-God movement of the CP and thus, from the age of 20, he had to come to grips with Communist ideology. There came a drive to study theology; after independent preparation CARETINA entered the Friedrich von Bodelschwingh religious preparatory school in Bethel in 1933. He studied in Bethel, Breslau and Berlin for five semesters, during which he was a member of the "Bekennende Kirche" and served 10 months in Infantry Regiment 29 in Guben, finishing this required Army service as a reserve officer candidate. For monetary reasons and lacking a government scholarship, CARETINA gave up his theological studies. He was also partly motivated by the divisions in the Evangelical church regarding what the church's attitude toward the Hitler government should be.

2. In 1937 CARETINA became engaged to the daughter of a master craftsman and through friends in his church met Martin NAUCK, the son of a preacher and in 1936 a resident of Tuebingen, who in 1937 was chief of personnel of the Berlin Kriminalpolizei. This led to CARETINA's getting appointed as candidate for a job in the Berlin Kripo. In 1938 CARETINA married his fiancée and present wife, Hannah BAILER. They have four children: Michael born 21 January 1940 in Prague; Markwart born 27 April 1941 in Prague; Reinhart born 2 February 1943 in Prague; and Sabine born 26 September 1945 in Timmsdorfer Strand.

3. On the 20th of June 1939 CARETINA passed his Kriminalkommission examination. After a test period he became a criminal commissioner on 1 January 1940, as well as a lifelong official with the Berlin Kripo. In the summer of 1940 CARETINA was officially posted to the "Geheime Staatspolizei" for criminal police duties, which included responsibilities in the following fields: information, prevention of sabotage in industry, of corruption in the Nazi Party, and of murders with a political connection. CARETINA was the responsible "Referent" in the Heydrich case in Prague in 1942. By rapid clarification of the entire matter he received a promotion to "Kriminalrat" (criminal police councillor). Also in the Heydrich investigations CARETINA got into substantial differences of opinion with the Gestapo brass about working methods. Army high command friends were able to get him out from under by recalling him to Army service as a Reserve officer candidate with Regiment a.b.V 800 Brandenburg with which he spent 4 1/2 months on the Eastern Front. At the end of 1942 the Sicherheitspolizei issued special orders requiring all especially

trained and expert former Sipo personnel be transferred from the Army back to the Sipo. As a result CARETINA was transferred at the end of January 1943.

4. In Berlin CARETINA then received orders to go to Paris and take over the "Kommando" for combatting Soviet military espionage nets (R.K.) in Western Europe; Switzerland, France, Holland, Belgium. The choice fell to CARETINA because, following the squabbles about methods of work in the Heydrich case, historical fact and full developments had proven CARETINA to be right. He commanded the Paris Kommando until the last days of the war. The results of his work, he feels, were that in Western Europe areas open to him, the entire Soviet espionage service lay in German hands. Final proof of this he learned in Russian captivity.

5. On 2 May 1945 he became a Russian Prisoner of War and was flown to Moscow. There a Troika court sentenced him to 25 years work camp. His years of demands for a fair trial were unsuccessful. He returned to Germany via Friedland on 12 January 1956. His present address is given in Attachment B.

C. INVESTIGATIONS OF THE ASSASSINATION OF HEYDRICH

1. Following the outbreak of war with the USSR on 22 June 1941, there was an immediate increase in sabotage acts in the then Protectorate. CARETINA was referent for sabotage protection in Bohemian armaments industry and with five million inhabitants to cover, he was overnight not able to cope with the increase in sabotage. With the military staff assigned to him he could only record the cases which at times amounted to 80 or more daily: fires in supply depots, caused by the newest arson devices; fires in grain depots; in wood depots; in plants; blasting of rail lines and of railway repair shops and destruction of electric power lines and towers, etc.

2. This was a serious danger to the armaments industry and CARETINA came to the conclusion the sabotage was being directed and handled by the illegal CP of Czechoslovakia under Moscow's command. There had been no CP sabotage in the Protectorate before June 1941. The Germans were forced now to stop the continuance of sabotage by stricter laws. Old time diplomats like von Neurath were not considered strong enough for the job on hand and Heydrich was ordered by Hitler to protect industry.

3. Heydrich started out by setting up martial law and court martial for about two weeks. General Elias, Ministerpraesident of the protectorate government and Oberbuergermeister of Prague were sentenced to death for anti-German activities and for their secret contacts with Czech government in exile in London. After this two week period Heydrich called together representatives of industry, agriculture, workers, etc., and explained that they need expect no casualties in the war but Germany must demand that the Czech people not throw any monkeywrenches into the war effort mechanism. Any opposition by the Czechs would bring an all-out German effort to break it.

4. The measures effected by Heydrich among industrial workers especially, regarding pay, sick leave, vacations, working hours, compensation, etc., and his readiness to make positive changes for the good had much to do with the quieting of the situation and the fact that as a result no acts of sabotage were recorded in the spring of 1942. Instead, parachute agents were dropped from England, along with arms, means of communication, and sabotage material. CARETINA was able to arrange the mopping up of the parachuted agents and material dropped for them by calculating the speed of a plane between individual lists posts. When the speed diminished it could be assumed the planes were circling for drops and the areas where drops were expected would be alarmed within a few minutes.

5. From a study of the material accompanying parachute agents, CARETINA became convinced that not only were sabotage acts intended but also the assassination of Heydrich.

He warned the latter who took no precautions, according to CARETINA, and was arrested on 27 May 1942. The investigating commission, to which up to 1200 men were assigned, was directed by CARETINA. He claims his first question within 15 minutes of news of the assassination to Staatsminister Frank was, "Do you want retaliation or do you want to find out the facts?" Frank supposedly replied, "The latter, naturally." Special measures to deal with the situation were necessary. Within a half hour of the assassination Prague was cut off from the outside world and on that evening 36,000 houses were searched by a force of 12000 men. Despite 2,000,000 RM offered in rewards for leads to the guilty parties, only about 300 tips were received in two weeks. CARETINA felt no cooperation was obtained because counter-measures by the Germans were severe and the Czechs were fearful and desperate (courts were executing the guilty, for example, two hours after sentence had been passed). CARETINA suggested the courts martial be stopped for three days. The result, he claims, was that over 2,000 people came to the police with information. Of this, much was of real value so that all those active in the assassination plans and most helpers were picked up. One of the most important tips was to a W/T station that worked for the underground group which arranged and carried out the assassination. When the station was invaded the key to its messages was picked up. CARETINA remembers that one message was directed to President Benesch in London in the name of the Czech resistance movement; astounding to CARETINA, this message begged Benesch to cancel the orders for the assassination of Heydrich. The message was signed in the cover name of "Dschindra" (Real name not remembered by CARETINA.) In another message Benesch promised an answer after checking. His answer was to be given at 5 p.m. on 27 May 1942. Heydrich was assassinated at 11 a.m. of the same day.

6. CARETINA became interested in "Dschindra" who was among the conspirators who had been picked up. Various ones of them told CARETINA that Dschindra had agreed with the preparations for the assassination but changed his mind and decided that an assassination would be a mistake and the Czechs in England were wrong in ordering it. He recommended the assassination be given up but his collaborators had received the order and would carry it out unless they received word from Benesch that the order was countermanded. At this point, Dschindra transmitted the message. CARETINA discovered that Dschindra's anti-Benesch attitude was caused by his belief that the Czechs should live in peace with the Germans and not be pushed to sabotage and other actions galling to the Germans. Among other things Dschindra told CARETINA that the end of Benesch' provocations would be Communism in Czechoslovakia.

7. After considerable testing of Dschindra, CARETINA decided on a plan for cooperation with him. Dschindra would put at CARETINA's disposal all of his communications links and CARETINA would agree to intern, not kill, all Czechs parachuted in as agents. In addition, Dschindra, a top leader of the Czech underground, would get influence through Frank with Czech interior politics and CARETINA would hold hostages from Dschindra's underground as guarantee for Dschindra's loyalty.

8. This agreement with Dschindra would have been a big step toward keeping the Protectorate free of parachute agents. But CARETINA's agreements and arrangements with Dschindra were turned down by his superiors and he had to turn the man over to the political people in the Sipo. CARETINA got badly spanked for his daring. Since he was already on the fire because he had pointed out in writing mistakes his superiors had made which hindered his police investigations in the Heydrich affair, CARETINA lit out for Berlin to see Mueller, head of Amt IV of the RSHA and try to rescue both Dschindra and himself.

When Mueller couldn't help, CARETINA went to OKW friends and arranged about August 1942 his transfer into the z.b.v. 800 regiment and went with it to service in Poland.

(presumably he lost DSC/11/1942)

D. ROTE KAPELLE

1. After 4½ months on the Finnish-Russian front, CARETINA was called back into the Sipo. When he came to Berlin, Mueller, head of Amt IV, called him and admitted that CARETINA's plans for cooperation with Dschindra had been absolutely right. Because of the value of CARETINA's past recommendations and operations, it was planned to send him to Paris to take over the Sonderkommando Rote Kapelle. He was to set up the entire work entirely after his own judgement but he was at any cost to recruit and play back double agents, as the Germans did not have the strength merely to render Soviet existing networks inoperative, i.e., to put to work an entire German DF'ing force just to arrest Soviet agents. Mueller's argument to CARETINA was that experience had shown him that as soon as a Soviet net was destroyed, the Soviets set up immediately one or two new ones -- to operate so as simply to expose nets could not be permitted in view of the bare 2,000 officers and men the Germans could throw in to cover a population of 42,000,000. Two DF'ing companies (see chart), were assigned to the Kommando and CARETINA was permitted to draw strength from all Army units; JOEL in the "Wehrmachtsfuhrungstab" would, in a pinch, give any type of strength required. For a couple of months CARETINA made a study of cases in the German end of Rote Kapelle, i.e., Schulze-Boysen and Schellha groups; these cases had just come to an end with the arrest of the principal conspirators. Then in about March 1943, CARETINA took over his new duties in Paris.

2. His principal immediate tasks were the preparations for a big coup in Switzerland and further unearthing of agents, couriers and sources in France, Belgium and Holland. He pursued immediately a plan in preparation to kidnap from Switzerland all known members of Rado's net, the Rote Drei, but headquarters nixed the plan because of possible repercussions with the Swiss. CARETINA's first success was the breaking up of the internal net of the French Communist Party with seven transmitters and a Center in Paris. Previous German agent playbacks to Moscow had run over many different links. CARETINA had, from his own experience and efforts in past months in Prague, learned that technically it was not possible to run playbacks through many links. His decision was to select a few valuable links and through them pass information of only top quality, information that would stand every test. The few links established never lied to Moscow. Against Moscow's will military information was mixed with political and economic so that the relationship was about 50--50. Political information, at first only warily accepted by Moscow, proved to be a week or so ahead of information published in the outside world and the Soviets later accepted it greedily. Finally only three main links remained, the others being let go due to financial difficulties for which Moscow itself was guilty. Financing was always done in dollars through Switzerland and France, once through Bulgaria. Each time a sum of exactly \$10,000 was transferred.

3. Of the three networks maintained, those of Trepper and Kent were the most valuable. Up to the end the Soviets never had any suspicion, according to CARETINA, of Kent's being doubled. CARETINA felt Trepper had been absolutely honest until he was able to escape in September 1943. The loss of Trepper was not such a great blow to the Germans as it proved to them the security of other nets. Other playbacks were not harmed at all. By strictest separation of the individual transmitters, Kent's transmitters for example had no contact, even of a personnel nature, with Trepper's transmitters or others. After a little time had elapsed following Trepper's escape the Germans asked Moscow what they should do about Trepper who "apparently" had fled the Gestapo. The reply from Moscow was

to avoid any further contact with Trepper. Thus Trepper was finished in all circles - with the Russians as well as the Germans.

4. In order not to give the French CP, which under nationalist disguise had taken a strong leading position in the French resistance, the possibility of setting up a new contact with Moscow by uncontrolled channels, the Germans set up their own French CP inter-net. CARETINA arranged for pro-Communist youngsters to be recruited and trained illegally in Paris as radio operators for existing nets and for the German-rigged net. The men thus trained by the Germans staffed in all seven transmitters which CARETINA placed in interesting points in France. They received their work program from the Germans and the Center they thought they were reporting to was an Allied Center, actually of course German-controlled. Directed by CARETINA from Paris, this net worked excellently. CARETINA was in a position to observe and steer sabotage plans, the passing of intelligence and acts of terror - according to whether they were in agreement with Allied plans or not, they were agreed to or temporarily stopped by CARETINA. Raids on gasoline dumps, for example, were carried out by CARETINA's own Kommando, the risk being too great for the Germans to allow enemy nets to make the raids! The reputation of the "Allied Center" which worked so well and effectively became widespread among Resistance groups. Thus the Germans were informed of English and American pilots shot down and Germans picked them up and conducted them to res periods in Paris, etc before getting them out of the country. CARETINA, as an example, picked up an American Major M. J. Gatewood Jr., AO-25613, a graduate of the U. S. Military Academy, showed him the sights of Paris and got him safely across the Spanish border where *(turned him over to the American consul in or near Perpignan. Gatewood, of course, believed all the time CARETINA was an officer of the French resistance and he himself in French hands.*

(I told a memory!)

5. When the Allied invasion of Normandy began, CARETINA received in Paris the first enthusiastic radio messages: hello, we are free; the Allies have passed us, etc. When this happened CARETINA radioed to all his CP operators: "Comrades, your center has not been an Allied center at all but has been Moscow. As true sons of the Communist Party stay at your posts and continue to transmit information for we must know whether our capitalist Allies are fulfilling their duties as allies." The operators all remained at their positions as they were accustomed, says CARETINA, to having Moscow think for them and give them direct orders. Thus CARETINA had for a short time only however, a good network in the Allied rear.

6. As the Americans closed in on Paris, CARETINA's Sonderkommando withdrew into the Vosges mountains and finally the Karlsruhe area. Moscow, according to CARETINA, was so impressed with the quality of Kent's sources (and Kent was now the only playback left til the end) that when German troops withdrew from France, Kent was ordered by radio to withdraw also with the help of his good German contacts. At one point toward the end of the war Moscow gave Kent a meeting place in Muelhausen, Alsace, for transfer of funds but the Germans were not able to pick the money up.

7. When CARETINA got to Moscow he was first interviewed by the then Col. Gen. and chief of Smersh, Abakumov, and he had to explain to Abakumov what he and his R.K. Kommando had been doing during the war. Abakumov absolutely disbelieved that CARETINA and the Germans had had the capability to play Soviet agents back against Moscow for two and a half years. Other Soviet interrogators later told CARETINA that it was impossible to

conceive he had unearthed Soviet nets by DF'ing and that there must have been a German penetration of the NKGB at a high level. CARETINA blames his inability to convince the Soviets otherwise for his conviction to 25 years hard labor. By the way, he explained at this point his willingness to become a Soviet prisoner through his fear of what would happen to him if he fell into American hands.

E. PRESENT ROTE KAPELLE LEADS

1. CARETINA claims that there must be many active RK types in honorable positions in present day German political life. For example, certainly the entire Rote Drei source group is unknown. Without time to reconstruct anything of the whole complex, the details on personalities remembered by him at the moment are as follows:

- 807
- a. GRUENE, Adolf CARETINA claims to know he was General Director of the North-west German "Rundfunk" after the war and is now pensioned off.
 - b. KUCKHOFF, Greta
Gen Director of the East Zone Bak, Berlin; Chairwoman of the East German "Demokratische Frauenbund". Had been an exchange student at the University of Wisconsin and may have had good contacts in the U.S. who would be valuable to the Soviets.
 - c. HARNACK, Mildred Born FISH in the U.S.; student in Wisconsin. Since she died for Moscow, CARETINA feels it possible Moscow has spent money caring for her relatives in the U.S.
 - d. GRAUDEN, John Believed dead; writer; old Moscow agent; had been active in Spartacus League; in Moscow was reporter for United Press; in Berlin was reporter for N. Y. Times. In Ireland was kicked out for CP activity. Such a man, according to CARETINA, had many contacts, many still living.
 - e. HERRNSTADT, Rudolf Lives in DDR. Was formerly editor-in-chief, now said to be in charge of some cultural institute.
 - f. KUECHENWEISTER, Walter Dead, but his girl friend was Med. Dr. Elfried Paul who after 1945 became Minister of Health in Lower Saxony, E. Germany.
 - g. WEISSENBORN, Guenter Now in North German "Rundfunk" - travels and gives lectures on theater direction all over Germany.

2. CARETINA asks what about all other agents, resident and people just mixed up in it. For example, the following: OZOLS and SOLYA in Paris; Madame SPAAK and her husband Claude in Brussels; RAJCHMANN and Malvina GRUBER in Brussels; Frau BARCZA to whom CARETINA was godfather for her and Kent's son; Helen RADO who intended to marry a lawyer in Switzerland two years ago. - was that an honest intention or planned to make possible for her a domicile in Switzerland? She is now living in Paris with two children; RADO is a University professor of Geography in BUDAPEST. Trepper was reported to CARETINA in prison as being in Lubyanka in 1954 in a cell with a supposed American agent arrested by the Soviets in Poland. This latter is a Johann PAVELSKI or PAWELSKI, who CARETINA believes now lives near Kassel and who he presumes was recruited by the Soviets with Trepper doing part of the preparation process.


3. Lastly, says CARETINA, how about ROESSLER's source in WW II? If the Americans knew who they are, they would find they probably include people in NATO and in all the Western Armed Forces!

F. SCHLUSS

1. CARETINA knows [] as [] Any further attempt to contact him could be made by mentioning [] name as introduction.

[]

HITLER'S HEADQUARTERS



At outset, CARETINA was subordinated to JODL but on RSHA matters dealt directly with MUELLER and on SS matters with FEGELEIN. After Allied invasion he was subordinated to RUNDSTEDT in France; previously had no superior in France. Before war broke out DF'ing had been the job of the Ordnungspolizei; after war broke out OKW set up its Funkabwehr. Under CARETINA's direction, Funkabwehr worked in Northern France and Ordnungspolizei in Southern France; in Paris both were active.

SECRET

Attachment B to EGQA-81010

Heinz PANNWITZ
Kreuzacker 23
Ludwigsburg bei Stuttgart