VIA:		DI. TCH NO	EGFA - //8 3/
,	CL SSIFICATION		
TO : Chief, EE		DATE:7_A1	igust 1956
FROM : Chief of Base, Frankfurt		INFO; COS	
SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/ SPECIFIC— Identity One REFERENCES: A. EGFA-11064; B. EGFA-11552		DECLASSIFIED AN CENTRAL INTELL SOURCES METHODS EN MAZIWAR CRIMES EN AZIWAR 2005	GENCE AGENCY XEMPTION 3826
l. Identity One's protouch with an ODACID office be able to assist him in a Union by the German element and on 6 presented an opportunity which KUBARK without damage on the contact with Identity One, was meanwhile to be briefed assist him in making contact with in a position of a later appropriate with the contact with a position of a later appropriate with the contact with in a position previously arranged to meet assist him in making contact with its province with the contact with the conta	eviously-reported requestial in Bonn (Reference pplying for employment t of FJIESSON was discursed by the following for employment. It hich could be used to be a cover an exter in Bonn on 9 July who was still in the Ed in Frankfurt by two deal with Identity thim, a notional account with "the right man" This account with "the right man" The right man was not provided in the picked him up at the picked him up at the picked him was not and his wife and woult with wife and woult with the right man was not and his wife and woult with the right man was not and his wife and woult with the right man was not and his wife and woult with the right man was not and his wife and woult with the right man was not and his wife and woult with the right man was not and his wife and woult with the right man was not and his wife and woult with the right man was not and his wife and woult with the right man was not and his wife and woult with the right man was not and his wife and woult with the right man was not and his wife and woult with the right man was not an account with the right man was not an account with the right man was not an account with the right man was not a count with the right man was no	est to to B., paragraph 9) as a specialist of assed with was agreed that to bring Identity One and that was a managed that to be a managed to	the Soviet he situation into contact ould brief taining the Bonn hed efforts to rked out with to fulfill , out at the n the ved. ged two tity 3, a from the the time had
though ambulatory, suffering 4. Tas previous story:	ng from an advanced cas		
problem and mad been n	sulted his Principal Of referred to the Executi ly been informed of the ichhad made to	ve Director of[The em during
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that there was in fact a FJIESSON representative in told Bonn who served as a sort of liaison officer from FJIESSON to various German government offices, and that this officer happened at the moment to be an American colonel, though his predecessor had been a Turk and his successor might be of any FJLESSON nationality. This FJIESSON officer, though he happens to be an American, in the position of an international civil servant, has no official connection with offices in Bonn and it would be most improper for any officer to approach him with a request of the sort had in mind. The Executive Director went on to say that this officer would not possibly be able to act for Identity One in a matter of the had in mind, even if Identity One should be able to approach him directly; and that even if he wished to do so, any recommendation he might make to the German Interior Ministry would be regarded as a grossly inappropriate action which could not advance Identity One's cause.

The Executive Director in effect forbade to pursue the matter further through any official channel. He then, however, remarked that another possibility existed, and made a telephone call which was followed by the appearance of a man, obviously an American of some importance, to whom | was rather conspicuously not introduced. The Executive Director explained the matter to this person, who said at once that he recalled Identity One's case, though the name itself was less familiar, and that he was aware that Identity One had recently returned to Germany. He added that some of "his people" would like to talk with Identity One and asked whether he thought to meet them. Treplied that he did not know, that he thought so, and inquired who he should tell Identity One wanted to see him. The unidentified man merely said that Identity One would understand who was interested in him without being told -- clearly implying that he himself was a higher PBPRIME intelligence official. If Identity One was in fact interested was to inform the Executive Director, and Identity One in a meeting, would hear later, presumably through of the specific arrangements for an interview.

5. It should be noted that the information given Identity One about the FJIESSON representative in Bonn, his position vis-a-vis the 7 installation, and his ability to help Identity One is factual. The west of the story is notional, though 🧶 undertook to have it backstopped by the Executive Director (who is aware of F is true identity) in the event of any check of independent follow-up. also pointed out that a vacancy in the German element of FJIESSON roughly similar to that which Identity One describes did in fact exist a few months ago, though it may now have been filled. also expressed the firm conviction that no German with Identity One's cackground could have any shadow of a chance at being selected for it. For the rest it may be said that the story was a convincing bit of fiction which probably reflected very accurately the

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reception would have received had he actually tried to proceed in naive good faith along the lines Identity One had indicated to him. Although it does not flatter personally in Identity One's eyes, it certainly strengthens

- mind that Identity One swallowed 6. There is no doubt in T his story whole. His first reaction was one of resignation, and he remarked simply that he had not really expected this approach to work out but had hoped that the relation of the FJIESSON officer to the Germans might conceivably have permitted an initiative in his behalf. As he thought it over, he began to generate real emotion and to complain bitterly about the discouragement and rebuffs he has received during the past several weeks of his curvey of the future possibilities open to him. It became clear to [last disappointment, though half-expected, had come as the last straw of a long series and that his morale was at a very low ebb. Speaking a little wildly Identity One went on to say that all he wanted was the possibility of a "buergerliche Existenz" (middle-class living) for himself and his family, that he had worn himself out traveling and spent more than he could afford in the past weeks trying to locate a decent job possibility without finding anything at all. Industry, he says, has no place for him, who has little relevant experience to offer and the Gestapo albatross as a permanent liability. Returning to the police, he finds, is not so easy, since much of the time since his transfer from the KRIPO is not to be credited, and he must find a vacant slot under a sympathetic chief to be able to return even three or four grades below his last rank. He sees before him the specter of slipping back into the proletariat, after having once had bright prospects, and he cannot face this possibility. He went on to say that he was fed up completely, that he could no longer bear the humiliation of it, that he did not even want to see and talk to people any more, not even the CAVATA or UPSWING people "whichever they are" whom he is supposed to meet in Munich on 26 July. As for meeting PBPRIME intelligence people, if they were prepared to offer him the chance of making a decent living it would be different, but it was obvious that they had no inclination or intention of helping him but merely wished to exploit his knowledge and then discard him.
- 7. Partly responsible for the above outburst was a pamphlet which Identity One picked up at the post office while talking to _______ This consisted of an excerpt, translated into German, of the recent book "Soviet Espionage" by David Dallin. (The entire book has been translated and is shortly to be published in Germany.) He had ordered the pamphlet because he had heard that it contained a reference to him by name, and scanning it swiftly to find the passage, read a footnote which mentioned his weakness for carrying on political discussions with prisoners. The passage seemed to imply that he had been concerned with the prosecution of one Identity 4, who he in fact never saw and who was tried while he was serving as an Unteroffizier on the Finnish front. He concluded in his aroused frame of mind that, "Herr Dallin hat Mist geschrieben." ("Mr. Dallin has written manure.")

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- 9. The question of possibly writing magazine articles for publication came up during the discussion of Identity One's precarious financial position and suggested that might take advantage of his presence in Bonn to talk himself, in preliminary fashion, with the Life correspondent in Germany. Identity One was in no mood to do so and dismissed the suggestion. It is probable that he will not consider this possibility until he learns exactly where he stands with respect to CAVATA/UPSWING.
- cannot believe that Identity One's emotional display during this interview could possibly have been other than genuine, and the meeting as a whole strengthened his growing belief that Identity One cannot be a Soviet agent of any kind. The many aspects of his story which require clarification might in themselves be considered negative evidence in support of this conclusion, since an honest Soviet legend would probably have fewer such loose ends.
- still believes that Identity One is more interesting from the point of view of potential future operational value than as a candidate for interrogation, though the two are not incompatible. It is probably wiser to make no effort in this direction until the upshot of his negotiations with CAVATA/UPSWING becomes known. If he is unable for any reason to come to terms with his own service, he will at once become extremely vulnerable to the proper sort of proposal from a foreign service and will simultaneously feel himself largely absolved of lingering loyalties to his former associates, though not of course to his concept of Germany as a nation with a special mission in the defense of the West against Soviet Communist imperialism. Though it seems likely that he will receive an offer from his own people, it might be advisable to consider now what action KUBARK might wish to take if he does not. Delay in acting thereafter, especially in view of what he considers the half-hearted PBPRIME interest shown on 9 July, might result in his turning to the British, who passed the word several years ago that they were interested in talking to him about resuming operations.

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ATTACHMENT
Identity List - S/C

DISTRIBUTION:

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S/C . .. to EGFA-11839

Identity List

Identity 1 - Heinz Pannwitz, Chief, Sonderkommando "Rote Kapelle"

Identity 2 - Bonn telephone number 21197

Identity 3 - 303 Hausdorferstrasse

Identity 4 - Harnack