

DCI interagency Balkan Task Force



5 February 1993



FOR THE A/DCI




This package was assembled for Mr. Woolsey's Principals Only meeting today on the former Yugoslavia.



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The NSC paper initially came in [redacted] for the DCI. Subsequently, a second copy arrived for me, which I am sharing.



Daniel wagnev

*Hold as backup
for
2/8
Deputy*

cc: DDI
D/EURA

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(b)(6)



DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force



FOR THE DCI



Talking Points on Decision Memo
for the President



Summary of actions taken in response
to taskings at last NSC/PC

Minutes of last NSC/PC meeting

Maps of Muslim-desired changes to
Vance-Owen Map

Talking Points on Muslim changes to
map



DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force



FOR THE DCI



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map



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Talking Points: Principals Committee
5 February 1993

The Policy Options Paper is an accurate reflection of the Principals' deliberations and a good effort toward declaring broad US goals and policy.

- That said, there are certain sobering realities that limit our prospects for success and which must be clearly understood at the outset.

(Page 1, 2d para, 1st sentence: "Our options...")
Our options also are limited in a fundamental way by the ethnic makeup and history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The dissolution of Yugoslavia resulted in large part from the death of Tito (whose iron rule and shrewd political balancing had kept the lid on for decades) and the end of the Soviet military threat (a glue that held the otherwise antagonistic "Yugoslav" communities together). We cannot put the Bosnian Humpty Dumpty back together again. We can improve things, but not necessarily solve them permanently.

(Page 2, 4th para, 1st sentence: "In effect,...")
Our dilemma, of course, is that visible pressure on Belgrade will encourage the Bosnian Government to cling to its hope for eventual international military intervention.

- (Last sentence: "Without at least...")
Yes, any imposed plan would have "little hope of holding," but even a consensual agreement will not permanently prevent the Bosnian Serbs from one day renewing efforts to achieve union with Serbia.

(Page 3, 3d para, last sentence: "By early next week...")
(If asked) Northern Bosnia is neediest in terms of medical supplies, [redacted] Also, it would be easier to reach from Croatian territory than equally needy (in terms of food and medicine) eastern Bosnia.

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(Page 3, last para, 1st sentence: "With regard to...")
(If asked) The UN mandate in Croatia technically expires on 21 February, but the Croatians seem to focus on the March anniversary of UNPROFOR's arrival in country. Either way, time is extremely short.

(Page 4, 1st para, last sentence: "Putting a force...")
[redacted] the British would be willing to increase their contingent in Bosnia to a brigade to help enforce the Vance-Owen plan provided the US put in ground troops. Overall, a European contribution matching that of the US would seem a feasible goal.

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ACTIONS PROPOSED TO INDUCE THE PARTIES TO REACH AGREEMENT

(Page 1, 1st para)

The Russians also want to limit no-fly enforcement to targetting fixed-wing aircraft only.

(Page 1, 3d para)

The DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force has a data base on detention camps and war crimes. Although the available reporting is often stale, fragmentary, and sometimes contradictory, we are working with State and others to identify perpetrators. How this material will hold up in legal proceedings, however, is uncertain.

Page 2, last para)

I would add that a dialogue between the Croatian Government and the Croatian Serbs is indispensable to defusing that situation. Perhaps this should be a high priority of the UN/EC negotiations and our US point man.

DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

(Page 1, para 3)

We believe the Russians are close to their limit on pressing Serbia. Some real hand-holding, as proposed here, seems essential to keeping them on the reservation.

(Page 1, para 6)

Perhaps add a tic here to make my point about encouraging Croatian Government-Croatian Serb negotiations, which we believe are needed urgently.

DRAFT PRESS BACKGROUNDER

(Page 2, last para)

Here too, we should acknowledge the difficult realities in Bosnia and Croatia (centuries of communal warfare) as severely limiting what may be possible over the long term and highlighting the risks in trying.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward the Former Yugoslavia

Purpose

To set your policy course toward the former Yugoslavia and adopt both a diplomatic and public relations strategy for implementing it.

Background

Over the past week, the Principal's Committee has considered a range of options and the steps that would be necessary to implement them. Our criteria in judging them have included what we ideally would like to accomplish on the ground (improving the humanitarian situation; stopping further Serbian aggression; rolling back Serbian conquests to date; strengthening prospects for a negotiated settlement) as well as broader foreign policy objectives such as deterring others who are judging the international response to ethnic warfare in this new environment; maintaining our position in the Muslim world; NATO's effectiveness; preventing a break with Russia; and the risk of wider conflict in the Balkans if the fighting spreads to Kosovo and elsewhere. We also have considered the costs in money and American lives; the prospects for American public support; and the roles and attitudes of our European allies.

Our options were limited when you assumed office by the terrible situation on the ground. They have been further narrowed by the Vance/Owen "take it or leave it" gambit, including a call for military sanctions against any party that refuses to sign their plan as it stands, and by Russia's favorable view and the European Community's assertion of "unequivocal support" for the plan (their private comments to us about its flaws notwithstanding). Thus if we do not engage on the basis of Vance/Owen we will be expected to impose our own solution, including by force of arms if necessary, or else be seen as blocking the only chance for peace.

We considered options ranging from (1) saying that the Vance/Owen plan can't work, re-writing their map and trying to get allies to go along with measures we would propose to change the situation on the ground, to (2) backing off and telling the Europeans that

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff~~SECRET~~

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since they have endorsed Vance/Owen, it is up to them to carry it out. All Committee members agreed that ~~none~~ ^{neither extreme} was feasible.

At its February 3 meeting the Principal's Committee therefore agreed that we should engage more actively in the negotiations now underway in New York from the basis of Vance/Owen. It is important to understand that this would imply American willingness to help implement an agreement if one can be reached by the parties. A hard decision would have to be faced about whether and how to do so. DOD is assessing what would be required for missions that could range from monitoring to enforcing the provisions of an agreement.

The option we propose neither would embrace the Vance/Owen plan as it stands nor redraft (and try to impose) our own solution. Nor would we take the lead in negotiations; that should remain with representatives of the UN Secretary General and European Community. We, however, would attach a senior, skilled American negotiator to the talks who would help explore ideas with all parties and facilitate compromises among them.

We would take the steps sketched below, to the extent possible with our allies, to increase economic and political pressure on Serbia to compromise. At the same time, we would tell the Bosnians what we are prepared to do but that we cannot impose their terms on Belgrade; they must make the best deal they can at the negotiating table.

In effect, through a combination of increased pressures on the Serbs and disabusing the Bosnian Muslims of the expectation that the U.S. will impose their desired result on the Serbs (while assuring them that we will not force Vance/Owen down their throats), we would hope to bring the parties into a renewed negotiation wherein they would agree to a resolution which the international community would help enforce. Without at least their grudging consent at the outset, it is our view that any plan imposed upon them has little hope of holding.

We would push for enforcement of the No-Fly Zone over Bosnia. This would keep your campaign pledge and could lend greater credibility to future warnings, although most Washington agencies doubt it would have much military effect. The British, Russians, and others will continue finding reasons to delay this measure and we may not succeed in overcoming their resistance.

Otherwise our immediate pressures on Serbia would be political and economic. We would:

- Mount a far more vigorous effort to enforce economic sanctions. While we probably cannot deprive Belgrade or the Bosnian Serbs of the physical means to continue the present level of fighting, tightening sanctions enforcement can increase Belgrade's pain and over time hobble the Bosnian Serbs.

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- Step up publicity and preparations for war crimes trials
- Increase U.S. government-funded broadcasts into Serbia to break Belgrade's "information blockade".
- Talk to key West European governments and Russia about prospects for increasing Serbia's diplomatic and physical isolation, e.g. by cutting its financial and telecommunications links.

We would tell the West Europeans and the Russians that we are joining them in giving the Vance/Owen process a chance to work and that we will contribute American energies and political capital to their efforts, both by our role in the negotiations and by additional actions to press the Serbs and other parties, and that we hold the possibility of more forceful action, including military action, in reserve. That tacit threat may itself provide some leverage on Serbia. The possibility of an American role in actually enforcing a settlement -- not just observing whether or not the Serbs comply -- would meet one of Sarajevo's prime objections to the Vance/Owen plan as it stands.

We considered adding to our pressures on Serbia military action to identify and open all detention camps, and lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia. We rejected the first because in practical terms it could mean military intervention to take control of Bosnia, and the second because both the relief agencies and their UN protectors would cease operation as soon as we were seen to have taken sides in the conflict.

At the same time, we would take what steps we can to improve the humanitarian situation in Bosnia. We would increase our own donations and put continued pressure on UN forces in Bosnia to use force if necessary to get the supplies through. By early next week, we will have a separate paper on what U.S. action would be required either to try to meet Bosnia's need for medicines and vitamins on a continuing basis, or for a one-time supply of food and fuel as well as medical supplies to Northern Bosnia (the neediest area).

With regard to Kosovo, we would reaffirm former President Bush's Christmas Day warning that in the event of conflict caused by Serbian action the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper, as well as his message to Albania and to the Kosovar leadership urging that they avoid any step that might stimulate or provide a pretext for violence. And we would propose increasing the UN military presence in Macedonia.

With regard to Croatia, we would push for a renewal of the UN mandate before it expires next March, but this time with tougher action to compel Serb compliance with the agreement it signed in January 1992. We would urge Germany to use its considerable influence with Zagreb to curtail the latter's unilateral action to take back Serbian-held parts of Croatia.

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Costs. This would cost some money. Providing more material and civilian personnel to help Serbia's neighbors enforce sanctions could cost some \$3 million; persuading them to tighten enforcement could require compensating their sanctions-related economic losses of about \$3 billion a year. (The EC should help.) Costs of any military action we might choose to undertake obviously would depend on the action. Putting a force of 10,000 men on the ground either for humanitarian purposes or to help enforce a settlement could cost in excess of \$1 billion for six months; a longer effort could triple the cost because of rotation requirements.

The biggest costs, in money, political capital, and the risk of American lives, could come if we succeed in helping to forge an agreement which would need to be enforced against violations by any of the parties. While not saying now what the American role in enforcing a settlement would be, we would have implied willingness to participate in some fashion. While we could propose that the prime American contribution be air power -- for instance, to retaliate against a party guilty of a pattern of violations -- the West Europeans could insist on an American ground component at least in the initial phase of separating the parties and getting heavy weapons under control. Some multilateral peacekeeping force will be necessary in Bosnia, whenever and however the fighting winds down. One key question is whether it will have the mandate and muscle to ensure compliance with agreements reached on paper. If you approve this strategy you should be aware that we will be under considerable pressure to help do that job.

More detailed information about the steps we propose is at Tab A. We have also drafted a diplomatic plan to begin implementation of this policy. It is attached for your review at Tab B. A draft Press Backgrounder is attached at Tab C.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Policy outlined above.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Action
Tab B Diplomatic Strategy for Implementing the Strategy
Tab C Draft Press Guidance for Background Use

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ACTIONS PROPOSED TO INDUCE THE PARTIES
TO REACH AGREEMENT

- Push for Enforcement of the No-Fly Zone over Bosnia. NATO allies and Russia all have agreed in principle but insist on very restrictive rules of engagement (e.g., a 30 day waiting period after a UN Security Council resolution is passed, and a phased approach which at least initially would restrict action to attacking only planes violating the prohibition in Bosnian air space, not their air bases in Bosnia or hot pursuit of violating planes themselves over, for instance, Serbia). And all argue for delay even in starting the 30-day clock so long as negotiations continue. (S)
- Mount a far more vigorous effort to enforce sanctions. Leon Fuerth has assumed chairmanship of our interagency sanctions enforcement effort. His group is considering ideas such as using administrative review to slow down all transactions by Yugoslav firms and citizens; upgrading the customs services of Serbia's neighbors and providing additional Sanctions Assistance Monitors to help them; restricting Serbia's overseas financial transactions; and pressing West Europeans publicly as well as privately to crack down on their citizens and firms engaged in sanctions violations. (S)
- Step up publicity and preparations for war crimes trials. While naming names now could make the accused less likely to compromise in the negotiations, we could begin by trying to identify grass roots criminals. (S)
- Increase USG funded broadcasts into Serbia. The Serbian public has very little access to any view other than that of their government, which portrays Serbia as the victim of a conspiracy of its traditional enemies -- Islam, Germany, and the Vatican. We would try to counter that view by increasing VOA broadcasts into Serbia and by reprogramming some Radio Free Europe assets still devoted to former Communist states on Central Europe. Part of our message would be that our quarrel is not with the Serbian people, whom we consider the victims of their own government and for whom better relations with the U.S. and the West are possible. (S)
- Talk to key European governments about increasing Serbia's diplomatic and physical isolation. The European Community is exploring ways to do this. Ideas include severing its financial and telecommunications

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links with the outside world. We appreciate the potential downside of increasing the Serbian peoples' isolation from outside contacts and therefore perspectives, and also would need to find a way to delink the communications links of, for instance, Bulgaria and Romania from those of Serbia. (S)

- Take steps to improve the humanitarian situation in Bosnia. We are trying to get a better fix on whether lack of supplies is part of the problem, or only Serbian (and other) impediments to their delivery. The best way to improve the humanitarian situation would be to end the siege of Sarajevo and other Bosnian-held towns. But that, like freeing the camps, could mean large scale intervention of ground forces. (S)

- Reaffirm the threat to take military action if Belgrade provokes fighting in Kosovo. We need to know what we mean by this, and are working on contingency plans for you. (S)

- Push for a stronger mandate for UN forces in Croatia. Fighting has resumed there because Serbs have not complied with the Vance Plan they signed in January 1992 to turn the UN Protected Areas over to UN control. Serbian gunmen still control the areas, Croatian refugees are not being allowed to return home, and some degree of ethnic cleansing continues. Croatian patience is wearing thin, but unilateral action to regain territory risks broadening the war and destroying any hopes for peace. Chances are slim that present contributors to the UN force in Croatia will take forcible action to reclaim the territory in question unless the U.S. is on the ground sharing risks with them; but all Principals agree we should try to persuade them. (S)

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DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

1) To demonstrate our commitment to the process, we will send a senior diplomat to New York to serve as our primary liaison with the various parties. (S)

2) President Clinton will send messages to key counterparts explaining our approach. Messages will also be sent from Secretary Christopher to his counterparts in key countries (Security Council members, other EC member states, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, inter alia) outlining our position. President Clinton and Secretary Christopher will use their meetings with visiting officials to explain our position. (S)

3) We will devote particular attention to ensuring that Russian support for the effort continues. Secretary Christopher can meet with Ambassador Lukin here and remain in telephone contact with Minister Kozyrev between now and their meeting later this month. U.S. representatives in New York will also make a special effort to keep in close touch with Ambassador Vorontsov. We may wish to send a special envoy to Moscow to discuss the issue with senior Russians, including Yeltsin and to show the Russian people that we give high priority to the relationship. (S)

4) In our contacts with Izetbegovic and other Bosnian officials, we will make clear that:

-- We actively will engage in the negotiations, oppose imposition of a settlement on them, and increase pressures on Serbia to compromise;

-- But we cannot force a settlement on Belgrade; they must make the best deal they can at the negotiating table. (S)

5) With the Serbs, both in Belgrade and Bosnia, we will:

-- Affirm our intention to tighten the sanctions noose in a variety of ways;

-- Make clear that if they do not engage constructively in the negotiations, American military action remains a possibility;

-- Reiterate the Christmas Day warning regarding Kosovo. (S)

6) With the Croatians, we will:

-- Warn that unilateral offensives to retake Serb-held territory in Croatia will forfeit them sympathy at the negotiating table;

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-- Insist on the Vance/Owen "constitutional principles" to which all three parties have agreed, and in particular make clear that any effort to annex the Croatian majority provinces in Bosnia will have an immediate and serious negative impact on Croatia's relations with the United States and the rest of the world. (S)

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
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 EURA-5003/93
 4 February 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on "Yugoslavia,"
 3 February 1993

1. This second NSC/PC reviewing US policy toward the former Yugoslavia established the basic approach of US policy, selected specific actions to propose to the President, discussed military options (but set them aside for now), and directed specific intelligence and policy "next steps." The NSC/IWG was instructed to prepare an options paper for the President to be considered by another NSC/PC, likely tomorrow. (The NSC/IWG approved that draft this morning, and the NSC promised us a clean copy this afternoon to be cleared by Principals.)

2. **US Policy Takes Shape.** Tony Lake began by outlining four broad policy approaches:

- A. Own the Problem. Dump the Vance-Owen (V-O) proposal and stake out an assertive US approach.
- B. Lead the Effort. Modify the V-O map into something we can support morally and practically, and impose it.
- C. Support the Effort. Stay out of the map debate, impose nothing, but press all parties toward whatever settlement they can collectively accept.
- D. Disown the Problem. Back off this "European problem" except to provide aid and support sanctions.

3. Ambassador Albright and Secretary Christopher described with some frustration our isolation among the Allies, Vance, and Owen in New York. They said the others disparage the Muslims we are accused of goading on, and that the Allies insist they will pull out if we try to lift the arms embargo. Lake then moved, and all agreed, to discard "A" and "D." Consensus evolved to a "B-/C+" solution.

- Secretary Christopher favored "B," likening it to the US-brokered Mid-East Peace Process, although he urged that military force not be used until the V-O proposal is tried and seen to have failed.

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SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on "Yugoslavia,"
3 February 1993

- Secretary Aspin urged "C," not imposing anything, remaining "agnostic" on V-O, insisting that "only a consensual 'C'" could endure, and suggesting Bosnia might surpass the Cyprus record as a peacekeeping mission without end. General Powell explained the requirements and costs of a high-end military option and judged that the Europeans have no more troops to contribute. He underscored that "imposing" a plan could mean anything from peacekeeping to full combat.
- Lake dismissed the V-O map as unacceptable. He defined the group's consensus as "C+," although it was not clear precisely what this means.
- The Principals then reviewed approximately 30 specific policy actions and selected those to be proposed to the President. They shelved the high-end military options for now and deemphasized the military aspects of the remaining options, but retained most suggestions designed to promote the delivery of relief assistance and tighten sanctions and other pressures on Belgrade).

4. On modalities, the US intends to work with the P-4; Lake's suggestion of forming a contact group (ala Namibia) was abandoned in favor of Ambassador Wisner's advice to work in parallel with the Allies and Russians rather than in concert. Lake suggested we work with the Bosnian Muslims to redraw the V-O map, sell it to the Europeans, and then impose it. Recognizing that Vance is tired and won't commit beyond February, State will nominate a US point man to work with and pressure whomever the UN names to succeed Vance. We should also send someone (Matlock?) to brief Yel'tsin, and we need to get the Germans to restrain Croatian President Tudjman.

5. **Military Options.** General Powell advised that airpower "solutions" won't work, and his preference (if a military option is called for) is to go in fast and heavy, intimidate the opposition, and hopefully scale back rapidly. His estimate of the force needed to enforce a V-O-type solution would be a "division package" of 20,000 troops for openers, triple that if rotations are needed over a long haul, UN Chapter Seven ROEs, and

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on "Yugoslavia,"
3 February 1993

\$1 billion marginal costs over the first six months. General Powell also warned that Congressman Murtha has begun calling to ask the price tag.

6. **CIA Contributions.** Mr. Woolsey supported the discussion by outlining differences between the V-O map and what the Muslims want, by walking participants through the humanitarian aid shortfalls, and by highlighting likely reactions to the proposed policy options (our matrix was not as useful as hoped, however, because, in simplifying, we glossed over some important exceptions, and because the NSC had changed the order of the policy options addressed in the matrix). All in all, however, the meeting was well served with intelligence.

7. **Next Steps.** I have passed along several taskings from Mr. Woolsey [redacted] General Powell (b)(1)
(medical shortfalls in Sarajevo), and Ambassador Wisner (fuel (b)(3)
deliveries and a suggestion to smuggle in medicine). We also are printing a map for tomorrow's PC meeting that will highlight the changes the Muslims want to the V-O map, with accompanying talking points on the implications. Finally, [redacted] is (b)(3)
attending a meeting of Leon Fuerth's new sanctions group this (b)(6)
afternoon.

Daniel W. Wagner
Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

cc: DDI, D/EURA, D/RTT, [redacted]

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5 February 1993

NOTE FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Taskings from Last Principals Committee Meeting

General Powell's question: Yesterday, a Task Force analyst provided a one-pager on medical needs in Sarajevo to RADM Cramer for General Powell (attached). We believe our estimate is correct that 72 percent of Sarajevo's medical needs were unmet during the period 26 November to 13 January.

Ambassador Wisner's question: There are no data available on fuel needs in Bosnia; unlike food needs (# of people X minimal daily requirement), we cannot estimate the need for fuels like firewood, coal, etc. We will continue to work this problem, however.

Leon Fuerth's initiative: Task Force analysts attended Mr. Fuerth's meeting yesterday on tightening sanctions; we will support this interagency working group along with State, OSD, JCS, and Treasury. We also discussed with Mr. Fuerth his information on smuggling into Bosnia. We were already in contact with the same individual and will relay Mr. Fuerth's suggestion [redacted]

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Daniel W. Wagner
Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

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4 February 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: RADM Michael W. Cramer
 Director J-2
 Joint Staff Intelligence

FROM: Daniel Wagner
 Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

SUBJECT: Response to Gen. Powell's Question on Medical
 Needs in Sarajevo

Our estimate that 72 percent of Sarajevo's medical needs were unmet during the period 26 November to 13 January was made on the basis of Bosnia and Herzegovina Government data on medical needs and UNHCR data on deliveries. In a late November paper, the Bosnian Ministry of Health estimated that 7 percent of Bosnia's medical needs had been satisfied with deliveries of 41.5 metric tons (MT) of medical material during the week of 16 to 23 November 1992. From that, we extrapolated the amount needed for one week to about 600 MT. The Bosnian Government further stated in its report that Sarajevo accounted for about one-quarter of the total medical need for all of Bosnia. On that basis, we estimated Sarajevo's weekly medical need to be 150 MT, or 1,050 MT for the seven weeks from 26 November to 13 January. UNHCR reports stated that UNHCR had delivered 290 MT of medicines and medical and hygiene materials--106 MT via the airlift and 184 via land convoys--to Sarajevo during the same period. (UNHCR is the only relief agency that is regularly delivering humanitarian aid to Sarajevo, therefore this figure represents virtually all deliveries.) Dividing deliveries by the need gives us 28 percent of the need met, or 72 percent unmet. [REDACTED]

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Daniel Wagner

cc: James Woolsey, DCI


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Bosnian Government's Proposed Changes to the UN Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina



~~SECRET~~DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
5 February 1993**Bosnian Government's Proposed Changes to the Vance-Owen Map****Percentages of Pre-war Population in Bosnia and Herzegovina:**

-- Bosnian Serbs	31 Percent
-- Bosnian Croats	17 percent
-- Bosnian Muslims	44 percent

Current Territorial Control:

-- Bosnian Serbs	about 70 percent.
-- Bosnian Croats	about 20 percent.
-- Bosnian Government	about 10 percent.

Territory under Vance-Owen Map:

-- Bosnian Serbs	42 percent
-- Bosnian Croats	27 percent
-- Bosnian Government	27 percent

Territory after Muslim changes to Vance-Owen:

-- Bosnian Serbs	34 percent
-- Bosnian Croats	26 percent
-- Bosnian Government	37 percent

POINTS

- The Bosnian Serbs have already rejected the Vance-Owen plan to reduce their current 70 percent territorial control to only 42 percent. They would protest a further reduction to only 34 percent (leaving the Muslims with the largest portion) unless compensated (we wonder how?).
- The Serbs would also resist strongly the change in the northeast (province 4) that further erodes their northern corridor. The Croats would protest as well, although they would not be wedded to this still-contested area of eastern province 3.
- The Serbs would argue to retain the disputed portion of province 6 in the southeast, but could sacrifice part of that finger of territory because they retain access to southern Herzegovina (province 6) through Montenegro.
- The Serbs would be less insistent about retaining the southernmost part of province 6 (although they want to retain the Serb-majority city of Trebinje) and some of the Muslim-desired area in western province 2.

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-- The latest Bosnian Government map omits earlier insistence that Sarajevo become a Muslim province and that the small Serb island of province 6 (totally within province 5) be eliminated.

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the Muslims may also drop demands for eastern slices of provinces 2 and 4.

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Deputies Meeting Intelligence Update

8 February 1993

Fighting

-- Croatia

(Military update map accompanies)

o Croat- Serb skirmishes continue east of Zadar. Intercept today reports a Croatian Serb helicopter fired on UNPROFOR near Zadar.

o The Krajina Serbs have some 12 Gazelle helicopters-- capable of carrying rockets and anti-tank missiles--and probably a handful of HiP multipurpose helicopters.

o They operate primarily from two airfields near Knin. Bosnian Serbs have provided some maintenance and logistic support for Krajina Serb helicopters at Zaluzani airfield in Bosnia.

o UN accusing Croatian Serbs of firing at German C160 relief flight on Saturday near Karlovac. UN observers say they saw Serb fire. Serbs admit it, claiming flight not registered.

o UN relief flights to Sarajevo on again; 14 flights expected today.

humanitarian situation hand out

-- Bosnia

(Serbs and Muslims trying to increase "map" negotiating position)

o Muslims resumed attacks around Bratunac.

o Bosnian Serbs continue shelling around Brcko and Sarajevo.

o Croatian Army shelling Bosnian Serb forces around Trebinje and Bileca.

o Croats and Muslims resumed fighting in central Bosnia following a week-long cease-fire.

o Tulsa Muslim leaders threatening "chemical warfare."

Vance-Owen

o "Map" chatter going nowhere, Muslims want to reduce Serb gains almost to status quo ante. Refer to maps of *Muslim demands.*

o Muslim expectations include Western--and US--military force to get them a better deal.

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