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 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
 DATE 2008

VIA: AIR  
 (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SECURITY INFORMATION

D. ATCH. NO. EGMA-00434

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 CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, SR  
 Chief, EE  
 FROM : Chief of Base, Munich  
 SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/AECOB

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SPECIFIC— Final Recapitulation of the AECOB Dispatch.

Deadline:	Check one
Hq Action Req. by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
DATE: 18 September 1952	
CLASSIFICATION	
Hq Comments Req. by cable	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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Office	
Date	1852

I General

This report is to serve as a summary of pertinent facts during training, during briefing and during dispatch. A great deal of the information upon which this summary is based has been reported in monthly progress reports and other dispatches. Detailed accounts of the mechanics of such items as meeting arrangements, S/W and W/T control and compromise indicators etc. not reported as yet, will be furnished under separate cover.

II Dispatch

1. On 26 August 1952 CAMUSO 1, 2, and 3 were dispatched to Latvia by air. They were dropped SE of Liepaja, directly at the center point between MACIT and TREKNI. The operational plane a C-47, left the Wiesbaden air base at 1644 hrs on 26 August 1952 and returned on 27 August 1952 at 0414 hrs. The total time in the air amounted to 10 hours 26 minutes. Each agent carried an average of 120 lbs of equipment.

2. Operational Plan and Mission.

a. Operational Plan. Immediately upon being dropped the agents are to proceed due NE until they reach the VENTA river in the vicinity of NIGRANDE, which is approximately 25 kilometers from the DZ. It is expected that they will reach this point on their 5th night in Latvia. Upon arriving at the Venta they will await the beginning of a new night on the western banks so as to enable them to cross the river, make the original W/T contact (to be made by CAMUSO 3 on CAMUSO 1's W/T set), and separate, with C-1 and C-2 going northward while C-3 proceeds eastward.

C-1 and C-2 will proceed to the MEKI area where most of their gear will be buried. They will then take the 100,000 ROSES for Broadway partisans and bury them at a suitable burial place. Upon their return to their equipment, C-1 will make W/T contact and report the location to the partisan money cache. The plan then calls for a move to the TUKUMS area where C-2 will separate from C-1 at the earliest opportunity and proceed to Riga, after having arranged a dead letter drop with C-1.

C-3 will proceed from the Venta river to within 25 Km of Renge where he will cache his equipment. He will then board a train for Riga at the RENGE or AUCE station. In RIGA he will take a train for Gubbene or Valka whichever departs first; time permitting he will eat and procure a food

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supply for his trip. From his destination, be that VALKA or GULBENE, he will proceed to look up numerous prospective contacts whom he has previously known and who are scattered all over the NE corner of Latvia.

It is estimated that C-1 should reach his operational area (Tukums vicinity) within 15 days; C-2 should reach his area (Riga) a day or two later; C-3 should reach his area within 15 days.

b. Changes in Operational Plan. Because the delay of dispatch which was due to bad weather, the agents discussed several possible changes in their operational plan. Their reason for the need for such changes is the fact that the oncoming rainy season and frost period would impede their movement and preclude their living in the open.

The major change consists of their burying their equipment approx. 15 km. from the DZ and proceeding to their operational areas which they would reach a great deal sooner. After establishing themselves and procuring the necessary aid they would then return to retrieve their gear. Should, however, frost intervene, this return for their equipment would not be possible until the following spring because frost and subsequent snow would not only preclude living black in the woods until they have moved their gear close enough for utilization, but also make it impossible for them to dig their equipment out of the frozen ground.

Another alternative would be for all three agents to travel to the KULDIGA area where C-3 would bury his gear along with the others. They felt that during their marches C-3's immeasurable strength would be of great aid.

A third possibility is that C-3 travel with the others until they reach a point parallel to JELGAVA where C-3 can bury his equipment and then entrain at JELGAVA for RIGA.

In any case they decided to judge the situation on the ground and proceed accordingly. By no means had they fully decided to abandon their original plan but because of the various factors which they may encounter on the ground and which may force them to proceed with one of the above alternatives no matter what their orders from this side are, [ ] agreed with these alternatives, as he felt that they were well thought out, fully feasible, and operationally sound.

c. Mission.

(1) General. The agents were informed that they are to consider themselves as spearheads, establishing support points and operating possibilities for others who would follow. They were extremely happy because of this, as they suspected and feared that they would be used as "intelligence agents", a term they abhor. Because of these suspicions and fears, it was continually reiterated, that they are "operational personnel" who are undertaking a mission for the liberation of their homeland and to aid the U.S. government in its fight against communism.

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Legalization was another overall mission. The agents were instructed in all possibilities, including substitution by exfiltration, seeking employment with needy employers willing to procure and furnish documents, etc.

A priority system of what to report by W/T and S/W was established as follows:

- (a) Concrete and definite indications of outbreak of hostilities and or preparations thereof.
- (b) Operational intelligence (documentation, controls, movement possibilities etc.), with particular emphasis being placed on names of contacts, agent movement, and anything pertinent to the person of the individual agent.
- (c) Atomic installations, production of atomic weapons, TU-4 bomber production, location, as well as existing TU 4 bases or their construction. Jet propelled aircraft location, production, and research. Submarine pens, paying particular attention to Schnorkel types. However, no specific targets were given, merely general briefing.
- (d) OB data
- (e) Political and economic information
- (f) Other.

In accordance with instructions from headquarters the agents were informed that overland exfiltration possibilities exist in Poland, providing, the agent is in W/T contact with [ ] [ ] In such case the agent will be directed as the situation warrants. They were also instructed to attempt to exfiltrate to Finland and Sweden; upon arrival at the place outside of the Iron Curtain, they are to make their way to a U.S. Consulate or Embassy and state that they are seeking "Paul Dexter." If they are apprehended by foreign authorities outside of the curtain, they are to demand to talk to a representative of the Consulate with whom they would again use "Paul Dexter" as a recognition signal. This same system applies to any other person they may exfiltrate whom they must instruct accordingly. Regarding exfiltration prospects, the agents were informed that there is great interest in resistance element leaders, defectors from Soviet officialdom in Latvia, and high caliber scientists and research experts engaged in the technical development of highly classified weapons.

Reception, support and onward movement of newly dispatched, including (to the Latvians) foreign agents was stressed as one of the major objectives.

(2) CAMUSO-1 -- Because of the somewhat excessive use of alcohol on the part of C-1, as well as his self-imposed duty and desire to contact the active resistance elements in Kurzeme, it was decided that C-1 be forbidden to contact the Kurzeme partisans and that he be completely subjugated to the more level headed C-2. His mission consequently became that of a W/T operator and general support base for C-2. C-1 was approached with this mission and unconditionally accepted it. His mission was then broadened somewhat to include the creation a support net in the Tukums area which he is to

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set up for use in case C-2 is rendered inactive. However, he was instructed repeatedly, and repeatedly agreed in what seemed to be good faith, to keep his own support net on a limited, emergency scale, and to concentrate his major efforts on complete support and subordination to C-2. It is commendable of C-1 that he swallowed his pride of being a leader and soldier, and subjugated himself to C-2, because he himself felt that C-2, would be operating in an area which is a logical "Hq" and which would provide C-2 with contacts reaching all of Latvia. He is also charged with the task of caching the 100,000 ROSES for the Broadway partisans and to report the location by W/T.

(3) CAMUSO-2 -- Having ceremoniously accepted leadership of the team C-1/C-2, and having promised to keep C-1 in line, C-2 was given the mission of establishing support points in Riga and report operational intelligence with particular emphasis on documentation and controls.

(4) CAMUSO-3 -- C-3 is to establish himself in the NE corner of Latvia where he has had numerous acquaintances who he feels would aid him in his mission. Great emphasis was placed on C-3's establishing support points for onward movement of agents of other than Latvian nationality.

In addition he will attempt to establish contact with the Catholic resistance in Latgale. It is rumored that the headquarters of this resistance is in Rezekne which is on the southern fringe of C-3's op area. C-3 hopes that one of his contacts in Vilani will lead him to this resistance movement.

An alternative plan was set up for C-2 to contact C-3 who would handle C-2's W/T messages in case C-1 is unable to do so for some reason or other. Conversely C-3 can also contact C-2 if the former would need some aid. A means for C-3 to contact C-1 and visa versa has also been established.

### III Security

#### 1. CAMUSO-1.

a. During training.-- His security was the poorest because he was quite irresponsible when drinking. He always carried his cover well but on 3 occasions, in Kempton, Starnberg, and Munich, he ran up sizeable bar bills which were later paid by CAMBARO 2. He used his AID card with alias as a means of identification on these occasions, he also tended to talk quite freely when drinking but no direct security breaches were ever observed. However, in the two months prior to dispatch and especially the last month in the staging area his security was excellent. This could be, in part, attributed to the result of several talks with [ ] in which it was pointed out that irresponsible action could be very serious to his own personal security, the security of the mission, and his native country as a whole.

b. Estimate of Subjects security on mission; The case officers were a little worried about the subject's security during training. However, his excellent attitude prior to dispatch, when the operation had assumed more reality in his mind, indicates that when the chips are down

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his security will be much better than in training. The subject inclined to think that in training security was not so important and that really stringent security measures applied only to the mission itself.

## 2. CAMUSO-2

a. During Training-- His security was at all times excellent. Since he has no relatives outside Latvia and no permanent connections from his stay in Sweden, he never communicated with outside people. He never drank heavily; had no propensity for casual relations with women; always acted with discretion and sobriety; and was always strongly aware of the necessity for security precautions. From the viewpoint of security, he was, in training, an ideal agent.

b. Estimate of subjects security on mission: Everything indicates that CAMUSO 2 will be as good securitywise on the mission as he has been in training.

## 3. CAMUSO-3

a. During training-- His security was generally good. He tended to become less communicative when drinking, and loose talking was never observed when drinking. In March 1952 CAMUSO-3 was arrested by the German Police in Augsburg. A full report on this incident is contained in MGAA-487 and 551. CAMUSO-3 was permitted periodic visits to his wife in Augsburg during training. [ ] and CAMBARO-2 are reasonably certain that he has kept the nature of his work from his wife.

b. Estimate of subject's security on mission-- CAMUSO-3's security should be good on the mission. He is taciturn especially with new acquaintances, and is not one to make hasty decisions.

## 4. Staff personnel known to CAMUSOS.

a. [ ] known as [ ] met the CAMUSOS twice in the Munich area in the Fall of 1951, once conducting them to a physical exam at the 98th Gen Hosp. and again for a Commo aptitude test at the Excelsior Hotel.

b. [ ] known as [ ] After [ ] arrival the agents referred to him as [ ] used his real first name the entire time but the agents thought that it was an alias since they knew that on principle everyone operated with an alias. [ ] was in charge of the CAMUSO safe house from the beginning of training Nov. 1951 until the dispatch.

c. [ ] known as [ ] an alias. [ ] lived at the safe house from Nov. 1951 until June 1952.

d. [ ] Commo instructor, known only as [ ] was in charge of Commo training for the entire training period.

e. [ ] replaced [ ] in June 1951, known as [ ] an alias. [ ] remained with the CAMUSOS until dispatch.

f. [ ] Airborne section CSOB/K, known as [ ] was well known to the CAMUSOS through training, at practice jump, packing and dispatch. [ ] also known to the agents but only

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through nick-names.

g. [ ] [ ], photography instructor, known as [ ]  
Saw the agents many times, especially CAMUSO 2.

h. [ ] [ ] headquarters AECOB Case Officer, known as  
[ ] he was often referred to as [ ] Also known as [ ]  
[ ] and [ ] accordingly, as [ ] registered at German hotels  
using the latter alias since this was the only documented one in his  
possession during his first trip to CSOB.

i. [ ] [ ] chief of Commo training CSOB, name not  
known to Agents. [ ] saw the agents several times but always for a  
short time. The agents have also seen 5 or 6 other Commo personnel during  
training and at the final Commo briefing but did not know any names.

j. [ ] [ ], carriage operator, known as "the engineer." [ ]  
carriaged CAMUSOS 1 and 2 twice and C-3 once.

k. [ ] [ ] and [ ] known as [ ] and  
[ ] [ ] and [ ] saw the agents 3 times for document briefing.

l. The CAMUSOS saw other people once or twice such as medical  
technicians, S/W instructor, [ ] and [ ] at the  
plane on the day of the dispatch, the plane crew, etc, but these meetings  
were always short and no names given.

5. Contract Employees known to the CAMUSOS.--

a. CAMBARO 2, indigenous instructor, known as Anderson. He is  
very well known to the CAMUSOS and OAMUSO 1 knows his true name from a  
boyhood friendship.

b. CAMBARO 1, known only to CAMUSO 2 as Herr Janson. The fact that  
a "Herr Janson" exists is also known to C-1 and C-3 though they have never  
seen him.

c. CALZA, indigenous Commo instructor, known as Alex.

d. CAMUSOS 9 and 10, housekeeping couple, known by their true names.

6. Installations known to the CAMUSOS:

a. Kaufbeuren-- The agents visited the Airborne and Commo hangars  
several times and are thoroughly acquainted with both buildings and their  
contents. They also knew that there was some kind of office on the Sub-post  
where the "chiefs" were but did not know the location of the building. They  
also knew that the Commo Hangar contained a W/T station for practice contacts.

b. Munich-- The CAMUSOS knew that an installation existed in Munich  
but knew nothing about it or its location.

c. Grafenwohr--The agents must have suspected that an installation

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existed at Grafenwohr because their field trips there were obviously internally supported.

d. Wiesbaden Air base-- The agents were dispatched from there and also took off from there for a practice jump.

e. Frankfurt-- It must be assumed that the CAMUSOS knew there was an office in Frankfurt since the case officers drew money there during the pre-dispatch month. However, they know nothing of its scope, activity, or location.

f. Washington-- The CAMUSOS know that Washington is the headquarters for the operation, since [ ] was introduced to them as the chief from Washington Hqtrs. They also have known that [ ] returned there.

IV Personnel

1. Assessment.

a. CAMUSO 1--Having never amounted to anything prior to the war, CAMUSO 1 clings to his only claim to greatness, his Ritterkreuz, as a drowning man clings to anything afloat. However, deep down inside of him he realized that this decoration was really awarded to him more as a matter of course rather than for bravery. In order to compensate for this as well as to fight against an inferiority complex, he has gotten to the point where he brags about his war time exploits which in part are true and in part obviously fabrications. During the past years, he has come to regard these fabrications as true happenings. This need for recognition coupled with a true desire to be needed by someone, particularly a female, has made C-1 a fairly unstable person. He frequently attempts to find an outlet in drinking, although his craving for liquor should not be likened to that of an alcoholic. When in female company CAMUSO 1 is extremely happy and will seldom if ever become inebriated. Otherwise, C-1 is dependable, honest, and seems to be a fairly simple individual with great enthusiasm for sports. He cannot be termed straight forward and will often confuse an issue if he is at fault. It has seldom been found that he will readily admit guilt, but will rather attempt to convince the accuser that he had no other recourse because of many extenuating circumstances. Though C-1 would like to picture himself as a good leader he does not possess the necessary ingredients for leadership.

b. CAMUSO 2 -- The most stable personality of the three is C-2. He will listen to reason, come up with logical suggestions for which he has above average capabilities, and will always know how to act properly in most all situations. He is a very responsible individual. Having a love for the finer things in life, he will shun excessive drinking or low women, but rather attend the opera if it were a toss-up as to which he should choose.

The only instability regarding C-2 that has been noted is what he considers his tragic past. Though he has never achieved greatness in life for which he, incidentally, has never clamored, he has been quite happy to live a moderate existence in his native country. The subsequent Russian and German occupations, his fleeing to Sweden, and now his arrival in Germany for preparation for return to his home, give him a feeling of being continually

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uprooted. Because of these events, his life has been disrupted to such an extent that he feels that there is hardly any practical use to undertake anything new in a professional line. This feeling occasionally tends to depress him, though he gets over it quite readily and has never been found to be living in the past. C-2's artistic talents can be easily considered as those of a professional. The wit accompanying his cartoons may surely be taken as an indication of the keen mind he has.

c. CAMUSO 3 -- can be considered as the rough and ready individual; he could more or less be termed a "farmer" with more than average intelligence. Having lived most of his life on the Latvian/Russian border, he has many of the distinguishing traits so indicative of the average Russian; he is exceedingly moody, stubborn, rough and very sentimental.

Because he is slow in taking to new acquaintances, places, and situations, this gives him the possibility of becoming objective and in his own way arriving at a logical course of action. Some of his experiences of his childhood and early youth, when he was mistreated by his father and other family members, have caused him to be very suspicious of people, extremely distrustful, and critical. This practically borders on hatred for strangers with whom he is very cold and will take an unusually long period of time to make friends. He particularly dislikes Germans, Soviet type Russians, and Jews in that order. He has a deep hatred for Communism and Communists, while he loves children and will make friends with them at a moment's notice. CAMUSO 3's worst feature is probably his stubbornness; he has been observed to go for a 3 day stretch without saying a single word just because he disagreed with some trivial statement or act. If he has once decided that he would not do a thing, no amount of reasoning will sway him; in such a situation a direct order will most always be obeyed, though there have been instances where this was not the case. CAMUSO 3 has practically superhuman strength and enjoys swimming, drinking, and female companionship in this order.

2. Morale. The morale of the agents was unusually high when the time for the spring dispatch arrived. They had been extremely enthusiastic and optimistic which appeared to have resulted in some overconfidence leading to foolhardiness. An indication of this was C-1's and C-3's statements that they would not attempt to sneak off if surrounded, but would rather kill the Russians surrounding them, no matter what the odds. If surrounded by a regiment they felt confident they (the 3 of them) could break through by sheer force of arms. As expected, the cancellation brought a slump in morale with it. The slump was furthered by [ ] arrival on the scene and his redirection of the operation which then was taken from what the agents considered Latvian leadership. However, the morale began to climb within a month and though it never reached the original peak that existed before the planned Spring dispatch, it was reasonably high one week prior to departure from the safe house. During the accelerated pace of the final briefing period the morale was very good with occasional depressive moods by C-3. [ ] viewed the morale situation during the briefing period as a very healthy one, where the agents were not overly enthusiastic and optimistic; this enabled them to

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be very thorough, objective, and detailed in the preparation of the sensitive portion of their work.

The drawn out holding phase presented many morale problems. The first few days showed the agents in a gay, happy, and receptive mood. The middle phase was unusually depressive with the agents continually devising some new plan of action which at times bordered on the impossible. It must be noted that throughout the holding stage C-1 showed the least amount of tension and in a number of cases even surpassed C-2 and C-3 with good logical reasoning. The final phase of the holding period brought a moderate amount psychological tension with it. The agents seemed very worried about the oncoming winter, but nevertheless felt it their duty toward their country to proceed with the plan. Furthermore, they began to worry as to what would happen if this operation was postponed once again and they had to face another prolonged period of repeated training. This feeling of lack of full and complete confidence that they somehow or other can beat the winter to fulfill their mission, and furnish a crushing blow to communism, led [ ] to consider recommending that the operation be cancelled. However, when the agents were finally informed that they might proceed, a strong spark of the needed confidence seemed to creep into their make-up. This then cause [ ] to decide that the agents should be dispatched. While getting ready on the plane, morale was high, they showed no tension, and behaved very businesslike; they seemed confident, and happy. This mood was broken by C-3 who suddenly discovered that the roses in small demoniations which he was to put in his pants pockets, were nowhere to be found. To everyones satisfaction, C-1 and C-2 then gave him some of theirs which practically equalled the amount C-3 had originally. Nevertheless, this episode made the agents worry whether all of their equipment was packed and present. No frantic searches were made and this very temporary feeling slowly subsided.

3. Resistance to Interrogation and Control. Regarding resistance to interrogation and control the following assessment can be made (a) CAMUSO-1 he has such a natural gift for gab that he can get off a subject involuntarily and with such ease that before it is realized he has led one down a side all. Furthermore, his speech becomes so monotoneous that one would much rather terminate an interview than be bored by his irrelevant jabbering. A smoo talker could talk him into most anything, if he can stand the boredom of replies. Generally, it could be said that if properly approached and handled he would offer little resistance, to control though this may be different when he is actually face to face with a Russian. If he is aroused, he would just as soon die or reveal anything. (b) CAMUSO 2-- If questioned at length he would possibly give himself away by sheer nervousness. Yet, his manner, is sufficiently flexible to permit him to pass a normal check with ease. C-2 is clever enough to retain at least one danger signal and await the most opportune moment to insert it. Even if he were completely broken and forced to reveal all compromise and control indicators, it is felt he possesses enough intelligence and ingenuity to insert some indication of control at the proper moment. C-2 is not able to stand a great deal of physical punishment. (c) CAMUSO-3-- Showed an amazing ease when questioned on his legend; he seemed to possess sufficient shrewdness to "build around" the legend furnished him. His flexibility was somewhat surprizing when compared with his stubbornness and

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just average intelligence. Armed with a good legend plus his excellent command of Russian, should permit him to pass a check which is more than routine. He could endure great physical torture and not reveal all of his compromise and control indicators, however he could stand only a limited amount of mental torture. It is felt he would even under severe conditions retain two or more compromise and control indicators. (He has a total of six.)

4. Physical Description:

a. CAMUSO 1 is frail-looking and partially bald. He is very short in stature and would be taken to be approximately 40 years old, which is older than he is. He has a scar across the forepart of his nose. His complexion is light.

b. CAMUSO 2--has an elongated head, long, brown hair, a fair complexion, and a protruding chin. He is of average height and build and would pass as being 32 years old, though his true age is 41. No scars or distinguishable marks are visible on him.

c. CAMUSO 3 is a stocky individual of average height. He is of ruddy complexion, has black hair, no scars or identifying marks, and would pass as a person of 34. His bearing is indicative of the immeasurable strength he possesses.

V Briefing

1. Briefing material: The CAMUSOS were briefed on the following material:

a. Material and instructions brought by [ ] from Wash.

b. Debriefings of repatriates furnished by [ ]

c. Translations of excerpts from the Latvian press and Russian press.

d. Standard CSOB briefing material (this included briefs on Moscow and Leningrad which the agents needed to tie with their legends.)

e. Mail drops were furnished by Washington for U.S. and Venezuela. [ ] furnished each agent with a mail drop in Germany. [ ] furnished one mail drop which is currently in use.

f. S/W control and compromise indicators were devised by [ ] W/T indicators were originally devised and taught under [ ] supervision by [ ] respectively. Since it was not desired that CAMBAROS 1 and 2 be knowledgeable of the sensitive part of the operation, some of the W/T indicators were revised while some remained intact. (These indicators will be furnished under separate cover.)

g. Danger signals for meetings as well as other clandestine meeting arrangements were worked out by the agents and [ ]

h. Briefing on W/T procedure was conducted by [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Where necessary [ ] acted as translator and interpreter. A Commo assessment

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and evaluation report prepared by [ ] the Commo instructor during the entire course will be furnished under separate cover.

i. The agents were briefed on their operational plan [ ] as discussed with [ ] [ ] [ ] and [ ] and reported in MUNI 9317. Briefing on the operational plan for CAMUSOS 1 and 2 subsequent to their split with C-3 and until their arrival in the Tukums area was conducted primarily by [ ] and [ ]

j. The agents were briefed on reporting by [ ]

2. Estimate of Absorbtion of Briefing Material.

Generally it can be said that the agents absorbed all material furnished to all case officers satisfaction. Particularly good was their retention of their legends and W/T control and compromise indicators. Reporting, which had been stressed little during most of their training was emphasized in the latter part only. Hence their ability to report and the quality of their reports will no doubt be just average. Having received their S/W control and compromise indicators only during the final briefing period, their retention of them could only be termed as fair, despite the fact that a great deal of review was afforded them during the prolonged holding phase. Particularly weak in reporting is C-2, who completely neglected his reporting practice because he had been dropped as a W/T operator in March 1952. In place of reporting by W/T he then practiced document forgery and photography until he became exceptionally well versed in these subjects. Memorizing the VOA authentication signals presented no problem to CAMUSOS 1 and 2, though C-3 did stumble a bit when these were later reviewed.

All mail drops, except the one furnished by [ ] and given to CAMUSO 2, were photograph on microfilm, hence needed no memorization. All other material, particularly that on exfiltration, prospective collaborators furnished by the repatriates, general area info, and the operational plan was absorbed and retained extremely satisfactorily and should present no problems. According to Commo the agents checked out satisfactorily on all phases.

VI Debriefing of the Air Craft Crew.

The crew was debriefed by air section personnel immediately after arrival. The only CSOB representative permitted to attend the debriefing was [ ] who had inspected the static lines while the crew was debarking. [ ] and [ ] awaited the debriefing results in an adjoining room. Pertinent information was received by them in 2 phases; at first [ ] furnished a flash report that basically the operation had gone off well; later a more thorough report was given.

According to the jump master-as related by [ ] the morale of the agents was good; they had been eager to jump and had shown no unusual emotional tension. They did not cry, shout, or sing during the trip; they also did not eat, though they did drink some coffee.

The agents jumped in numerical order, i.e., C-1 C-2, and C-3. Just prior to C-3 leaving the plane, the jump master noted that his static line was around his neck. C-3 was consequently held back by the jump master who quickly flipped the line over C-3's head. The jump master claims C-3 was so eager to jump that he had to use a great deal of force to hold him back for the short

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time it needed to place the static line in its proper position. This delay caused C-3 to jump approx 4 seconds later than C-2 who had preceded him. According to all concerned the delay should have caused C-3 to be dropped between  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile to 1 mile from C-2. Dispatching the agents in the dark of the moon, would no doubt present the CAMUSOS great difficulty in assembling.

Because of the darkness no parachutes were seen to open, however, the crew felt confident that the agents experienced no difficulty during their descent. No activity on the ground was noted by the crew either prior or after dispatch.

Having reported all salient points, [ ] reexamined the static lines and found no tell-tale traces that anything was amiss.

#### VII The Drop-Zone

As poor weather conditions caused the dispatch to be delayed further and further [ ] discussed with [ ] the possibility of having the agents dropped closer to the VENTA river which would have saved them approximately 20-25 Km of walking. It is regrettable that this never materialized although [ ] had been informed by [ ] that the air section had promised to drop the agents as close to the Venta river as possible.

Because the agents had begun to worry over the loss of valuable time prior to frost, [ ] informed them that they would save up to 25 Km of walking since they will be dropped as close to the Venta as possible. On the plane, just prior to take-off time, [ ] noticed that the drop zone had been charted on the east banks of the BARTIA, as originally requested of the air section by [ ]

When [ ] informed the agents of the fact that the drop zone is approx 25 Km from the Venta their morale dropped noticeably. To C-1's question as to whether an attempt will be made to drop the agents closer, [ ] replied in the affirmative. This reply was based on the possibility that the agents would be dropped in the extreme NE corner of the drop zone area, placing them approximately 7Km closer to the Venta.

Inasmuch as [ ] had to leave the plane at this point, no further reaction may be reported.

#### VIII Conclusion

The entire operation was well conceived and quite sound. The complicating factor was C-2's inability to report by W/T which necessitated tying him into one of the other agents for transmission of his reports.

Based on the fact that the agents were well trained, well briefed, of

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good spirits, and were dropped without serious complications, it could be said that the operation has, so far, been very successful, when it is considered how comparatively well the agents stood the prolonged holding stage and how successful the unprecedented dispatch in the dark of the moon has been.

Approved:

[ ]

Distribution:

- 3 SR (one-copy hand carried by [ ])
- 1 EE
- 3 COM [ ]
- 2 MOB [ ]

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