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EGM-2758

Frankfurt (Info: Fran - Attn: Mmi)

1. On the basis of available information, Headquarters feels that ASTROWSKI is, at best, an opportunist; at the very worst, it is possible that he might be - probably unwittingly - an instigator of the RIS. Because of this it is improbable that clearance to cooperate with him would be granted. Therefore, it is recommended that any relations with ASTROWSKI be conducted with utmost caution. This, however, does not preclude exploratory talks in an attempt to discover as nearly as possible, the strength of the BCR.
2. Headquarters discussions also reflect unfavorably on the principle of KUBARK attempting to ^{coax} ~~force~~ two rival political factions to cooperate. Therefore, should future exploration of the ASTROWSKI group reveal that the above mentioned doubts are unfounded and should it also be discovered that ^{actually inspiring} ~~inspiring~~ this group has an ~~informing~~ agent-candidate reservoir, it is then suggested that the BCR be treated as a completely separate operation functioning with separate support, training facilities, etc.
3. Attached is analysis of the reports submitted by ASTROWSKI.

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Astrowski Movement
(left) WZB R.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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1. Although it is realized that the following questions have been considered by the field, they are expressed here as indicating this Case Officer's ~~own~~ reflections. The following is, therefore, submitted for your ~~general~~ perusal and for suggestions and/or comments you may wish to ~~make~~ ^{make}.

2. Possible Reasons for BIS ~~Failure~~ ^{NOT SUPPORTING ASTROWSKI}

In para 2 of reference ~~dispatch~~ ^{dispatch} ASTROWSKI claims that "the British were interested only in the procurement of military intelligence", but at the same time ~~states~~ ^{states} that "the British did not seem interested in operations into the ~~USSR~~ ^{USSR} if interested, were unable to do anything about it". Inasmuch as ASTROWSKI's ~~so-called~~ ^{so-called} assets (and BIS must also have been so informed) present extensive ~~intelligence~~ ^{intelligence} gathering potentialities, it does not appear plausible that the BIS ~~should~~ ^{should} have neglected to exploit the BCR unless:

- Partial*
- a. After investigating ASTROWSKI, had decided that ~~these~~ ^{his} claims were largely ~~or~~ ^{or} completely unfounded,
 - b. Had decided that ASTROWSKI has been misinformed or deliberately misled to believe that such contacts exist,
 - c. Had uncovered that the assets are RIS monitored or are RIS fabrications or provocations,
 - d. Had discovered that although ASTROWSKI's assets may be existent, his organization, the BCR, is unable to undertake such missions into the ~~USSR~~ ^{USSR} or that his organization is insecure for such penetration missions, or
 - e. ~~It is~~ (and this is rather unlikely) it ~~(BIS)~~ ^(BIS) is actually unable or unwilling to meet ASTROWSKI's demands. Regardless of what ASTROWSKI's ~~demands~~ ^{demands} to the BIS may have been, political ^{or} financial, it appears more ~~probable~~ ^{probable} that the BIS would have attempted, ~~most~~ ^{most} ~~anxiously~~ ^{anxiously}, to exploit ~~its~~ ^{its} ~~own~~ ^{own} potentialities.

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3. According to the minutes which were submitted to Headquarters covering the conference held between [] [] [] and SIS, it appears that SIS is willing to allow KUBARK to procure agent candidates who are members of ASTROWSKI's group located in the United Kingdom. It appears to the undersigned that SIS might possibly request, once any operations are launched, all operational intelligence information obtained or requested to be coordinators of any such penetration undertakings. The above, then, would result, that SIS gains full benefit of KUBARK successes without having to expend their funds or resources. This, by the same token, affords SIS an opportunity to evaluate the BGR as to its cleanliness of RIS implications ~~and a~~ ^{which would afford them} basis for determining their future operational interests with this emigre group.

speculations

4. The report written by ASTROWSKI in August (Ref B, Attachment C, Page 2) mentions the improbability that RADKEVICH "has helped many Byelorussian partisans to get jobs in the militia or the secret police". The above statement, however, is refuted by Lt. Col. ZARECHNYI in his report to ASTROWSKI (Ref C, Attachment B, Page 2, report titled Report on the Byelorussian Underground Movement) if we assume that Gen. R. is one and the same RADKEVICH mentioned by ASTROWSKI. In this latter report it is claimed that a Gen. R. and his uncle OK..... directly aided Byelorussian partisans in acquiring "legal existence and responsible positions". Noting that the latter ZARECHNYI report claims many more assets than is found in Ref B (submitted to [] [] in September 1952) the undersigned forwards the following as possible: ~~See~~

understand

~~See~~ a. ASTROWSKI, fearing KUBARK was not particularly impressed by his August visit, decided to throw discretion to the wind, and, therefore, claimed

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~~potentialities.~~ *Para b.* ASTROWSKI, believing KUBARK to be in desperate need for agent candidates, decided to present potentialities which he believed KUBARK could not overlook. *Para c.* ASTROWSKI, finding himself in desperate need for funds or political prestige, decided upon this course of action as a last resort to ameliorate his position. ?

4. RIS vis-a-vis ASTROWSKI's Alleged Assets

It is noticed that ASTROWSKI's claims concerning his contacts (regardless of whether these are in Poland or Byelorussia) offer the following as doubtful:

a. That an important personality such ~~was~~ as Gen. R. would have remained uncovered in his role as a defector, or that Gen. R. would have survived the many investigations conducted by Security Forces prior to his obtaining a ministerial appointment. (If this Gen. R. is RADKEVICH

aka (RADKEWIECZ), then it becomes almost impossible to assign any credence to ASTROWSKI's claims. ^{highly improbable} It is ~~impossible~~ to conceive that RADKEVICH, NKVD-trained, appointed by Moscow as Chief of the Polish ~~IR~~, a position he has held since 1944, alleged to be in direct contact with BERIA, and reportedly being more highly trusted than Marshall ROKOSOVSKI, could be sympathetic to any partisan forces.)

b. If Gen. R. is someone else than RADKEVICH, it is nevertheless unlikely that he is allowed to conduct or support partisans unless the RIS is monitoring Gen. R. in his clandestine role on the assumption that considerably more can be gained by monitoring tactics than by completely annihilating ^{the} this resistance movement. It is also possible that the RIS is sponsoring Gen. R. in his clandestine activity which then results, in effect, that the resistance movement is an unwitting organ of the RIS.

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- c. That Soviet Security organs, possibly unaware of Gen. R's. role in partisan affairs, are probably ~~xxxx~~ cognizant, by this time, of his appointing individuals of known unreliability to responsible positions, and *are* ~~is probably following his activities with keen interest!~~
5. Analysis of ASTROWSKI's Alleged Assets

In screening the reports submitted to AIS by ASTROWSKI, the undersigned observes the following:

a. ASTROWSKI's description of the communication system, by which he obtained knowledge of partisan activities, appears to be rather poorly administered. That premise being true, then little doubt remains that the RIS is completely aware of the partisans' identities, the groups' locations, their activities, and their plans.

b. In that ASTROWSKI is claiming an unusually large amount of assets behind the Iron Curtain; this tends to indicate fabrication and/or provocation.

c. In listing his assets, ASTROWSKI contradicts basic assumptions as regards internal Soviet policies. By stating that numerous former Byelorussian partisans are presently employed within State Security Services, ASTROWSKI is attempting to have AIS believe that no RIS or UB security checks and clearances are conducted on the applicants.

As the security ~~xx~~ forces are largely communist party members, ASTROWSKI, by inference, is further claiming that ~~they~~ ^{these aforementioned partisans} have succeeded in joining the CP. In addition, ASTROWSKI claims that the second, though less powerful, underground group is composed mainly of people deported from Byelorussia between 1944 and 1946, but ~~no~~ ^{he forwards} explanation is forwarded as to how these deported people returned to the BSSR. It appears that ASTROWSKI infers

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that little control is exercised over deportees, but all information known to the undersigned indicates ^{that} strong measures are exerted in ^{repressing} ~~restraining~~ ^{people} from returning to their former place of ^{residence} ~~residence~~.

file:
In conclusion, ASTROWSKI's claims indicate that these assets are known to his secret operations section, but he admits that there has been no contact, other than written, since the spring of 1948. In the last analysis, therefore, there is no definite proof that these assets still exist, or, if existent, remain free from RIS control.

d. ASTROWSKI's eagerness to combine the BCR "in all operational phases" with the GAMBISTA 1 organization presents the following as possible: Being denied by the BIS the definite prestige of possessing a functioning clandestine network, ASTROWSKI, attempting to organize his own political unit, has approached the AIS for purely political expediency. It would be more likely, should ASTROWSKI possess such contacts in the BSSR, to insist that AIS cease operational contacts with GAMBISTA 1, thereby denying GAMBISTA 1 the benefits of such penetrations. Furthermore, by agreeing to cooperate with GAMBISTA 1 in clandestine operations, ASTROWSKI would be denying himself the inherent propaganda value in having his organization being the sole emigre group successfully operating for the liberation of the Byelorussian people.

e. Yet another aspect worth considering is that according to GAMBISTA 10, ASTROWSKI did not reorganize the BCR until 1948; this, then, tends to indicate that any information known concerning resistance within the BSSR would be known to the Headquarters personnel in the ENR. ASTROWSKI reports, however, that no information was received by him, except by mail, since the spring of 1948. This, therefore, indicates that "Captain ~~Vasili~~ Vasili S" returned prior to the spring of 1948, and simultaneously, prior to ASTROWSKI's

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forming the BCR. It, therefore, becomes doubtful that the information brought back by Captain Vasily S. would not have become known among the BCR leadership, nor does it seem likely that the BCR would not have been knowledgeable of Captain Vasily S's mission. Had the BCR been aware of this/ Captain, his name would certainly have figured more prominently than it has to date. It is difficult to reconcile that the BCR and Captain Vasily S's information arose concurrently ~~and~~ without the BCR ever strongly considering ASTROMSKI as being anything but an opportunist. // 7

6. CAMBISTA 1's Possible Reaction to Merger Proposal

The undersigned also questions that CAMBISTA 1 cannot act in any other manner than by cooperating with KUBARK. To date, all correspondence indicates that CAMBISTA 1 is strongly opposed to the BCR and that it has considerable doubts as to ASTROMSKI's genuineness. It is quite possible that CAMBISTA 1 would prefer severing any operational contact with KUBARK rather than endangering themselves, or their agents, to what CAMBISTA 1 believes "may be a Soviet controlled organization". CAMBISTA 1, furthermore, appears to have definite and powerful motivation in its aims and ambitions. Therefore, it does not seem likely that CAMBISTA 1 would compromise to willingly collaborate with the BCR whom they consider an opportunist organization. There also seems to be some doubts that the financial backing that is supplied by KUBARK is so great that CAMBISTA 1 could not possibly refuse KUBARK merger proposals. The possibility always remains that CAMBISTA 1 would attempt to find support for its activities elsewhere. In any case, whether it agreed to collaborate with the BCR or not, KUBARK-CAMBISTA relations would certainly become more strained. Should KUBARK insist and realize success in establishing this proposed

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collaboration, any leakage of such KUBARK pressure among the emigration-at-large might result in serious complications with other emigre groups.

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