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DISPATCH NO. SCMA 03711

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TO : Chief, EE
(ATTN: Chief, SR)
FROM : Chief of Base, Munich

DATE: 25 September 1952

SUBJECT: GENERAL— RadSOX/ Operational

SPECIFIC— ABQUOE/ Operational Discussion with R. Ostrowski

REF: DIR 19374; SMUNI 0069

1. Radislaw Ostrowski, president of the Belorussian Central Rada, was contacted by [] during 9-11 September with a view to conducting exploratory conversations concerning matters of operational interest.

2. Ostrowski's proposal was initially quite modest. It is outlined in detail in Attachment A. Briefly, the proposal envisages the formation of an Intelligence Group consisting of a BCR representative and a representative of the AIS. Under this arrangement there would be a staff which would instruct the agents and handle the communications and administrative responsibilities. The joint-intelligence group would be responsible for training the agents and the running of any subsequent operations with the groups.

A. The above-mentioned group would form, in Ostrowski's words, the "American Sector" of his operations. The BCR has, admittedly, a "British Sector", in collaboration with which two men were sent into Poland in April 1952. It was difficult to get much information from Ostrowski on the extent of the collaboration with the British. However, the following did emerge:

(1) Zarechny is the principal representative of Ostrowski in regard to operational work with the British and would not be in on the American Sector operation.

(2) Ostrowski himself has had no direct contact with the British.

(3) Ostrowski was interested in working with the Americans because the British were too narrow in their attitude, i.e. interested purely in the procurement of military intelligence.

(4) The British did not seem to be too interested in operations into the USSR or, if interested, were unable to do anything about it.

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B. Since Ostrowski was convinced that the AIS was actually in an operational relationship with Cambista 1, he posed as a condition sine qua non that the joint intelligence group be named by both Cambista 1 and Ostrowski's personnel. Otherwise, if there were two Belorussian groups, each cooperating with the AIS on the same problem, he foresaw all kinds of tragic possibilities. Ostrowski felt that not only should there be a single effort so far as operations against the common enemy were concerned, but that also there should be no paralleling or duplicating of functions within the joint group itself. He claimed that it would make no difference to him who was selected for any particular job. It was felt that the group should be considered a military organization with the principle of unity of command and responsibility maintained. (This unity to be achieved through U.S. control.)

3. Ostrowski gave [] a document containing a general survey of the present situation in the Belorussian underground. A translation of this document is appended as Attachment B.

4. Following are the field's recommendations on the future actions to be taken in view of the Ostrowski development:

A. When Ostrowski returns to Munich we will obtain biographical and background information on the members of his proposed staff and agent personnel. We will then look over the staff and agent personnel on a preliminary assessment basis. After we are certain we have a potential team, we will discuss the rules of the game with Ostrowski or his representative. Ostrowski will be told that for control and security reasons the training program will have to conform to AIS standards in terms of schedules, discipline, subject matter and location. The points in his proposal relating to communications will be clarified, viz. that this sphere shall be under exclusive American control.

B. If the Ostrowski candidates are assessed favorably and we are confident that we have a basis for an operation, we inform Cambista 1 of our decision to set up a joint school for Belorussian operations. This is contingent, of course, on whether Cambista 1 has produced any candidates as a contribution to a joint effort. Cambista 1 will be told that the AIS does not consider it operationally feasible to have separate groups in the BSSR, particularly since the common basis upon which the AIS is cooperating with emigre groups is the defeat of Bolshevism. Therefore, the AIS will not be a party to the creation of a situation whereby one team trained by it would be denounced by another team because of political differences in the emigration.

If Cambista 1 refuses to cooperate on the above basis, we will inform its representative that the AIS can no longer consider

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operational collaboration with the organization. This will be based upon a clear demonstration to the group that our interests in the operational field are no longer compatible -- that Cambista 1 is apparently more interested in internecine fighting than in the accomplishment of the number one objective upon which our collaboration was formerly based.

Actually, we cannot see how Cambista 1 can fail to accept the proposal. Practically speaking, this group relies almost exclusively on American support. A demonstration by Cambista 1 of intransigence in the operational field would clearly have an effect on the other fields of collaboration, e.g. the development of the Cadre school and the support of its publications.

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Approved:

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ATTACHMENT "A"

PLAN FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF AN
AMERICAN-BYRONIAN INTELLIGENCE GROUP

CONTENTS:


1. Organisation chart of the American-BYRONIAN Intelligence Group.
2. Foreword.
3. Advantages inherent in such an organization.
4. Ideological bases.
5. Official cover for the group's activities.
6. Organisational structure:
 - a. Operations
 - b. Liaison
 - c. Technical section
 - d. Headquarters
7. Cadres.
8. Maintenance of secrecy regarding group's activities.
9. Methods of active intelligence work.
10. Training.
11. Financing.
12. Table of organisation.
13. Conclusion.

Attachment A

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Organizational Chart

Showing Interaction of Americans and Byelorussians in the Intelligence Group



September 2, 1952

Drawn up by the Secret Operations Section of the Supreme Headquarters of the Byelorussian Liberation Movement.

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FOREWORD

The American-Byelorussian Intelligence Groups will fulfill two important functions:

- a) It will assume the operational direction of the Byelorussian revolutionary-liberation underground movement, whose forces are in Byelorussia; and
- b) It will function as a secret intelligence service in collaboration with the corresponding agency in the United States, concerned with the struggle against aggressive bolshevism.

There is no need to dwell on the necessity for founding such an organization at the present moment, when it is clear that war between the democratic world and the communist system is inevitable. In order to achieve victory it is essential to know exactly what the enemy's forces are and to have advantageous political positions prepared in the enemy's country in advance.

The United States of America has already proved its steadfast determination to fight for the inviolability of the foundations of freedom and democracy. We, as true anti-bolsheviks, are also bound to bring our forces to the aid of the Byelorussian Liberation movement, fighting for liberty and democracy for all peoples.

1. The Advantages of Forming Such a National Intelligence Group.

The advantages of forming a Byelorussian intelligence group to work in Byelorussian territory (as compared to a group composed of various nationalities) are as follows:

- a. The national idea of an independent Byelorussia;
- b. A negative attitude toward Great Russian imperialism;
- c. General implacability in the face of bolshevism; and
- d. Knowledge of local conditions and of the Byelorussian language.

If the first two ideas are properly developed among the personnel of the intelligence group, they will contribute to the success of the work of the underground movement, whose members will be working not for material compensation but for the idea of national independence and liberty.

An agent or a member of an underground organization who works for material reward will easily sell out to anyone who will pay him. A general antipathy to bolshevism and communist ideology is strengthened by the two factors mentioned above, providing a reliable base for the political and moral state of the group member.

Thus, a nationalist orientation in the politico-educational work among the organization's members yields the following results:

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- a. A spirit of sacrifice for the sake of the national struggle, which is valuable in the execution of operational assignments; and
- b. Some degree of national isolation of the group personnel is helpful in maintaining of secrecy regarding the group's work in western Germany.

These political and moral factors will be instilled by means of training in the nationalist spirit.

2. Ideological Bases.

The ideological platform will be founded on the following elements:

- a. The struggle for a truly independent Byelorussia.
- b. The struggle against bolshevism and communism.
- c. The Byelorussian people itself is to decide its future, the organization of the independent Byelorussian Republic, and the form of government.
- d. Soviet Great Russian imperialism means imprisonment of peoples.
- e. Friendship with the Great Russian peoples and with the peoples of the republics of the USSR.
- f. Friendship and collaboration with the peoples of the free West.

These basic precepts should be accompanied by a heavily veiled American orientation.

3. Official Cover for the Group's Activities.

Officially all of the activities of the American-Byelorussian Intelligence Group will be under the cover of the publication of the newspaper "Mezaleshnaya Belarus", the organ of the Byelorussian Liberation Movement, which is officially supposed to be financed by the sale of the publication, but is actually supported by an interested American office.

4. Organizational Structure of the American-Byelorussian Intelligence

The entire Intelligence Group will consist of two parts, the official section and the secret section.

The publishing office of Mezaleshnaya Belarus belongs to the official part. Under the secret part are the Operations Section, Liaison, and the Technical Section, which form the core of the Intelligence Group.

A. Operations Section.

This section is composed of three independently operated groups, 1, 2, and 3.

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Group 1 is intended for action in Poland. It is composed of: A wireless operator and his assistant, equipped with one wireless set; one worker for postal communication, assigned to the transmission and formulation of secret letters. Tasks of group 1: Reception of wireless messages from Byelorussia from groups 2 and 3 and also reception of letters from groups 2 and 3; the composition of secret letters for groups 2 and 3, as well as for Secret Service Headquarters, the letters to be sent to addresses in Germany and France that have been specified by the Secret Operations Section of Supreme Headquarters of the Byelorussian Liberation Movement. Personnel of Group 1: One wireless operator, trained here; his assistant; and a worker for secret correspondence. These are available in Poland, already legalized, and they are in contact with the Secret Operations Section of Supreme Headquarters of the Byelorussian Liberation Movement.

Groups 2 and 3, intended for work in Byelorussian territory. Neither group will be larger than two persons, one wireless operator and one assistant, equipped with wireless sets and the means for secret correspondence- invisible ink and recovery agent. Tasks of Groups 2 and 3: Organization of underground groups and collection of intelligence information. The information is transmitted by the American wireless station; orders for group 1 are transmitted by secret letter as well as by radio.

B. Liaison

The Liaison Section is in the Tables of Organization of the Secret Operations Section of Supreme Headquarters of the Byelorussian Liberation Movement. Its function:

Courier liaison between group 1 and group headquarters. A transmission net has already been established on the German-Polish border, composed of members of the border guard. However, the transmission point between Eastern and Western Germany is not very satisfactory, and it should be reestablished through contact with the German service.

This section also aids in communication between group 1 and headquarters of the secret service group, which will work in collaboration with the Secret Operations Section of Supreme Headquarters of the Byelorussian Liberation Movement. The procedure for written communication and for courier contact should be determined individually.

C. Technical Section.

This section is composed of two people and is included in the Tables of Organization of the Headquarters of the American-Byelorussian Intelligence Group. Its function is the ciphering and deciphering of communications.

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D. Group Headquarters.

This is composed of one officer from the Byelorussian secret service, who is on the Tables of Organization of the Secret Operations Section of Supreme Headquarters of the Byelorussian Liberation Movement, and one American officer from the secret service. These two form the core of group headquarters, directing the American-Byelorussian Intelligence Group.

5. Cadres.

The cadres of the operations sector are selected by a Byelorussian officer of the secret service (the director of the American-Byelorussian Intelligence Group). Cadres will be selected either in the USA or in France. They will be selected from among the members of the Byelorussian Liberation Movement and persons active in the Byelorussian community in those countries.

6. Maintenance of Secrecy Regarding Group's Activities

The publishing of the newspaper Nezaleshnaya Belarus will provide sufficient cover for the activities of the Intelligence Group. The maintenance of secrecy will be carried out through the usual precautionary measures.

7. Methods of Active Intelligence Work.

The basic working method will consist of dispatching agents into Byelorussian territory. Agents will be sent only into those areas that are most suitable for underground work. These areas will be indicated by us, along with certain strong points known to us.

Contact between groups in Byelorussia will be by radio and secret correspondence, sent by group 1 from Poland. Contact between group 1 and headquarters will be by letter, or in case of special need, by courier. We have already checked on this method, and it would be superfluous to discuss it further. The dispatching of groups into Byelorussia must be worked out in accordance with the opportunities at the disposal of the American secret service.

8. Training

Training will be carried out in each individual case according to a specially worked out plan applying to the specific task. Training will be conducted by instructors from the American secret service, and in part by instructors from the Secret Operations Section of Supreme Headquarters of the Byelorussian Liberation Movement. The training program should be roughly as follows:

- a. Tactics of underground work
- b. Military science
- c. Secret communication
- d. Operational work
- e. Intelligence (military, economic, and political)
- f. Defense methods
- g. Organisation of underground work

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- h. Camouflage and conspiratorial life
- i. Counterintelligence
- j. Political training
- k. Military topography
- l. Preparation of documents in the field
- m. Radio communication and wireless apparatus
- n. Ciphers

Of the following subjects, our instructors would be able to handle the following: Tactics of underground work, secret communication, operational work, intelligence, organization of underground work, camouflage and conspiratorial life, counterintelligence, political training, military topography, and preparation of documents in the field. If it were absolutely necessary, our instructors could also handle ciphers.

It would obviously be best if the American secret service conducted the complete training course!

9. Financing

The basic financial expenditures will occur during the organizational period. When agreement in principle has been reached on a given project by both parties, we will draw up a detailed estimate.

10. Tables of Organization

American officer	1
Byelorussian officer	1
Liaison	2
Technical section	2
Operations (groups 2 and 3),.	4
Operations (group 1)	3 (two of them are already in Poland)
Total	13

If the financial support is sufficient during the organizational period and if means of transportation are provided, the organization of the American-Byelorussian Intelligence Groups should not take more than three months.

11. Conclusion

The Byelorussians will contribute all of the forces at their disposal to the struggle against the common enemy, bolshevism, but there must be a guarantee that the Americans are equally sincere in this regard.

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We make this reservation because the past history of the American secret service, so far as it is concerned with Byelorussian matters, does not provide any such guarantee (as is evident from the copies of informational and agent material).

Believing in the rightness of the undertaking that we have initiated, we would like to see in the American service a sincere and steadfast ally, as well as an ideological partner; it is for this reason that we approach this important question with one reservation.

THE SECRET OPERATIONS SECTION

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS

BYELORUSSIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT