

By Oct., 127 agents trained and landed in occupied countries by parachute or from subs and boats. SOE had aircraft squadron for its own use. Finance drawn from Treasury on secret vote and Director of Finance presents his estimated expenditures in a lump sum for each coming month and obtains Treas. sanction.

Other memo from S. to WJD

"The oppressed people must be encouraged to resist and to assist in Axis defeat, and this can be done by inciting them, by assisting them and by training and organizing them..."

Memo to WJD, 1/19/42

Solborg recc. that "after mature concentration and consultation with the British, we have come to the conclusion that, in order to achieve most effective and rapid results, the activities of SI should be combined with SO from the very beginning... We should like to have you agree to centralize all these activities in our group..."

"We propose to give such men as will be selected to be sent out for field duty an abbreviated course of training which will be directed by Colonel Ellis and Major Brooker with Colonel Solborg's, Mr. Bruce's and Major Goodfellow's contribution in their respective fields." Recc. not accepted for SO-SI merging.

Solborg went to Lisbon in March 1942 to open SO office, and development of his organizational ideas in EC then delegated to Goodfellow. G took over officially from Solborg in 2/42. Solborg then served SO in Lisbon and London and NA, where he was in touch with Giraud. He was later appointed military attache at Lisbon.

Goodfellow was G2 officer in WWI. Then became Pres. and publisher of Daily Eagle. As reserve officer, he was called to active duty with G2 in June 1942. In August, he was appointed liaison from G2 to COI and remained until his transfer to COI in 1942. Goodfellow had worked for G2 with staff of ten men in days before COI came into existence in charge of tasks which later fell to SI Branch of OSS. Solborg, David W. King, Stafford Reid, Kenneth Pendar and Leland Rounds were already on duty under cover for G2. They later went to NA in pre-COI days, Solborg as a businessman and others as Food Control officers. Other member of this group was Lt. Col. Warren J. Clear. He was sent to Far East and Philippines in summer of 1941 to report on the advisability and practicability of setting up an intell system in that area. He escaped from PI by sub in 2/42, and made a forced landing in company of Pat Hurley, on return trip to Port Darwin. Plane was destroyed by Jap bombers and Clear was obliged to report on his mission from memory, since all his papers destroyed. Clear now in PR Division of Army. The work of all these men in this period had to be strictly under cover before Pearl Harbor.

4/1/42 - activation of COI Service Command to function as HQ of military personnel assigned to COI. This authorized by SEC.War on 2/23/42. At that time 51 officers included in this command. Under this command, headed by Goodfellow, was a Service Unit, and Training Unit under Lt.Col. Garland Williams. At that time SA/Bruce separate from SA/Goodfellow

Organization completely informal in these days. There were no strictly observed branch lines. Recruiting, processing and training all overlapped.

SO and SI then trained jointly. Commander William K. Vanderbilt then XO to Goodfellow had as adjutant Sgt. (later Maj.) Frank Ball and as asst. Engin William Horrigan. They processed military personnel without ref. to branch lines.

2 kinds of men then recruited by Goodfellow - those with quality of initiative to carry on individual missions. Those chosen because they had the physical and psychological stamina to act as members of guerilla forces

Goodfellow had small staff begin planning and recruiting for guerilla fighters as early as 4/42. This staff included Col. Ebright, Garland Williams, Maj. Serge Obolenski, Maj. Russell Livermore, Lt. Frank Ball, and Robert G. Stout. On 6/13/42, Sec. War ordered this activity stopped! Goodfellow prevented from proceeding because of his own dubious title. Until 8/19/42, G was officially chief of the contact and liaison section of G-2, head of SA/G, G2 liaison to COI, etc.

But in spring of 1942, Goodfellow did recruit key personnel. Eifler Mission: When first recruited Eifler was Capt. in charge of detention camp on Oahu. Joining Eifler were Coughlin, head of rival company in Eifler's regiment on Oahu; also Eifler's faithful Sg., Vincent Curl; Lt. Robt. Aitken, Capt. Archie Chun-ming of medical corps; and Capt. Frank Devlin, a young West Pointer. Coughlin brought in Peers and "Montana" Chan, a Korean from Montana; other original members of 101 were Phillip Houston, Harry Little, William Wilkinson, Floyd Frazee, David Tilquist, officers; and Sgts. Irby E. Moree, Charles F. Bruce, Allen Richter, John R. Murray, George T. Hemming, Jack C. Pamplin, Skywon Chang, Don Y. Eng, Fimce Haimson, Chan Hong.

TORCH: Through efforts of Solborg and Wallace Phillips, Carleton Coon, Harvard antrop. and explorer with knowledge of Arabic was brought into organization. Coon and others brought in to serve under Col. William A. Eddy, who was established at COI chief/Tangier in early 1942. Role of OSS was to pull all of these ops groups together into united front and to provide commo and coordinate intell and ops planning in NA for DDay. SO and SI performed as team. Original COI team for TORCH consisted of Eddy, then at Tangier under naval attache cover, who at thome with Arabs, having been brought up in Syria and Egypt; Donald Coster, former memb. of American Field Service; Gordon Browne, who had spent many years in Morocco as business man, sent to Tangiar by COI-SO but ostensibly as Vice Consul to American Legation; Joseph Raichle, commo expert, and Coon. Coon was sent first to train at the British SOE school in Canada before leaving for Lisbon and Tangiers in May 1942.

Other missions: under COI -

Nicol Smith to Vichy

Tolstly - T first proposed mission to Good. in 3/42 to discover shortest possible route to China through Tibet in case of Jap attack on India. T and Dolan both explorers and veterans of Asiatic expeditions.

Hoskings - brought into COI early in 1942. Leader of Expedition 90, org. by COI and OSS to make survey of the potentialities of the Near East in helping to win the war. Political and economic studies of Iran an important aspect. Authority for Exped. 90 came from CCS, 11/5/42: "To survey the situation in Syria, to establish a communication system, cells of defense, and information centers in Syria, and carry on psychological warfare propaganda." Also an oil expert was recruited to survey oil situation in relation to future hostilities. More immediate purpose was to organize SO and guerilla groups to harass enemy in case Rommel broke through British lines. This meant ~~xxxx~~ penetration of Arab groups and getting their cooperation. Hoskings to be accompanied by some 30 or 40 men recruited by Lt. Andre Pacatte, early recruit in SA/0. Other early offs. were Maj. George White, Lts. James Goodwin, Robert Schlangen, and Ben Welles. Preparations in summer of 42. Hoskins commissioned LtCol in July. Mission cleared by State Dept. and approved by Donovan. Then order came to halt mission; JCS decided that Hoskins should undertake a prelim survey before full mission sent. Hoskins and White left in November. They were scarcely out of town when entire missions called off. Major Pacatte remarked that Expedition's motto was "Here today, Here Tomorrow." Trucks, jeeps, guns, cases of typewriters and small plane requisitioned by Hoskins and Pacatte, all waiting to be shipped were raided by other missions, and the members of the party scattered to other duties in SO.

Training program:

Based on SOE schools in Scotland and Canada. In 1/42, began to secure title to 3 tracts of land for camps. By 4/1 in operation under Garland H. Williams, an infantry officer and former member of the Narcotics Bureau brought in by Goodfellow to handle both SI and SO training. Recruits were trained in small groups - 2 weeks in demo., weapons, close combat; 2 weeks in raids, attack, sabotage; 2 weeks in advanced work in security, organizing natives for sabotage; one week in parachute school; one week in landings from vessels and completing contact; 3 weeks in industrial sabotage; two weeks in "social circulation work." William attended SOE school at Oshawa, Ontario and patterned OSS SO training on their program. Two Brit. instructors, Lt. Col. R.M. Brooker and Major William E. Fairbairn came to this country as advisors. In spring and early summer of 1942, COI sending men to Canada - membs. of Eifler mission and Coon. Also Cmdr. N.G.A. Woolley was loaned to COI by Brit. Navy and helped Donovan and Good. to organize underwater training and craft landing.

## Equipment:

Good. took personal responsibility at beginning for some several million dollars of SO materiel. Between 3/1 and 11/5/42, he ordered 224 lbs. potassium chlorate; 875 lbs. lead shot; another 3360 lbs. of potassium chlorate; 14 micro switches; 25000 shaft assemblies; 5000 spring coshes; 4 million battery cups with primer; 25000 metal containers for packets of powder; 250000 ampoules of sulphuric acid for cigarettes; 3 and half million rubber sleeves for use in pencils and other devices?

Plastic production began.

Technical Development Sec. one of first estab., with its own priorities board headed by Lt. J.H. Rosenbaum. Money came from Treasury. TDS predecessor of ~~R&D~~ R&D Branch. Also two radio stations at Hollywood and Bellmore purchased and equipped in G's name. Col. L.W. Lowman, COI's first Commo chief brought in by G to handle commo for all Spec. Activities. Lowman helped develop first agent portable radio, done by radio experts Maj. Henry Shore and Lt. Comm. S.H. Simpson, both of RCA. Various sorts of special devices - inc. "Coon-Browne explosive turd" perfected by TORCH<sup>4</sup> team in NA

By 11/42, 48 OSS officers ready for SO ops

~~xxx~~

## Recruiting:

SO sought men with language qualifications, knowledge of special geog. areas, radio and mechanical aptitude. Names furnished by Army and Navy recruiting offices, by foreign groups and societies in America, by records of foreign origin enlistments, etc. - Many were first and second generation foreign born Americans. There was considerable jealousy in Gt. Britain because of this. SOE seemed to resent and fear these foreign language speaking recruits of mixed racial and social backgrounds. In the field there were attempts to block their use.

## Working with British:

LONDON AGREEMENT with SOE in summer of 42 made by WJD and G. Paved by WJD talks with Hambro in London between 16 and 22 June, 42. Delineated areas of responsibilities. and "spheres of influence" for American and British SO:

India, East Africa, the Balkans and Middle East were to be province of SOE London with American liaison and assistance. China, Manchuria, Korea, Australia, Atlantic Islands and Finland to be province of OSS.

Joint handling of Western Europe. - would continue to be under SOE until ~~SSSxxxxxxx~~ joint military command came into existence; meanwhile, SO would establish mission in London and prepare SO organization for attachment to Amer. Military command in training this organization. Recognized that Americans could function in areas closed to British - particularly Vichy.

Special ops. procedures in NA, also (inc. Span. Morocco) - predominantly American sphere of ops. American head of SO to be responsible for SOE activities in this area in anticipation of TORCH. Existing British SOE would maintain close relations with US SO chief and work under his direction.

But special arrangement for Gibraltar - outside area of American SO NA mission.

Neither SOE nor SO to work in Russia. West Africa was to have an American mission working through the existing British office there.

Agreement on pooling of resources.

Brit. Maj. F.A. Freeth and R.W.B. Billinghamurst were currently working on SO production in NY under OSS John S. Russell

Also agreement on joint funding.

9/43 - Huntington appointed C/OSS/5th Army, NA; took him out of direction of Psych. War Ops. Title passed briefly to Lt. Col. Edward Gamble, then Huntington's XO. But Gamble then ~~ordered to Algiers~~ as C/SO and in October, duties of Acting Deputy Director, PWO went to Joseph Scribner.

Also in September, Dave Halliwell left on overseas mission to Near and Far East for Donovan (see MILESØ. His work in Washington inherited by Scribner.

Scribner banker from Pittsburgh, partner in investment securities firm of Singer, Deans and Scribner, and director of National Assn. of Securities Dealers; Gov. of Pittsburgh Stock Exchange; Dir., Investment Bankers Assn. of America. In WWI served in Navy on mine sweepers. Came to DC in 42 and served as Spec. Asst. to Dir. of Mterials Div., WFB; Dir. of Minerals Bureau and Spec. Asst. to Dir. Genl. of Industry Operations. First Job in OSS - 4/43 - Materials and Supply Officer, SO. Conceived of his job in business terms.

OSS genl. Order 9 - created DDI, Magruder  
DD/PWO, Huntington

PWO officer order 1, 6/8/43 - Huntington set up staff offices to carry out overall function of PWO. But H. more concerned with establishment of OGC and activating more SO agents than in branch organization. He believed that in field branch lines were unimportant.

But these org. matters did interest Scribner, whose orderly mind was offended by lack of clear cut lines of authority and the confusion existing between various branches. Decided to make order out of chaos.

9/21/43 - Policy Committee composed of Magruder; Charles Cheston, spec. asst. to Dir.; Lowman, chief/commo; Elmo Roper, spec. asst. to Dir.; Scribner; presented to Donovan a study of OSS as an org. "Our first conclusion is that...the OSS is...a holding company." Comm. recommended that OSS would be most effective if restricted to intell, no ops (SO, etc.). But knew that WJD would not agree. "that means that we must find a way to operate, under the JCS, what amounts...to a holding company." Also recc. that Dep. Dirs. assume the functions of vice-presidents in corporation.

RECC'D THAT  
OPS. UNRELATED  
TO INTELL.

Comm. recc. on 10/2, creation of DD/Ops to be chr. of overall Ops Comm and DD/PWO - and OPS STAFF to approve all ops.

On 10/10/43, meeting held at WJD's home to clarify proposals. WJD stated at that time:

- 1) Deputy Directors were not to interfere with Branch Chiefs administrative functions
- 2) They responsible for coordination, but not performance by branches, and should report to Dir. only lack of performance.
- 3) WJD did not wish an additional echelon between branch chiefs and himself.
- 4) DDx would not have power to fire and hire.

Therefore attempt to cut ops branches off from direct access to WJD failed.

✓ Geo. Sharp replaced as SO/WE by his assistant F. Bayard Rives  
 ✓ when S. transferred to AMG assignment in France at request of  
 ✓ John McCloy; Rives an intl. lawyer first practiced in firm of  
 ✓ Winthrop and Stimson, fluent in French and Spanish

✓ Rives in constant contact with Vanderstricht in London about  
 ✓ qualifications of French SO men

London SO theoretically directing Algiers SO with Pflieger as liaison, but in practice Algiers independent, though responsible to Ike in London

✓ April 10, 44, Davis To Algiers as Chief of SPOC

Sept. 1, 1944 - 25 Jed teams in France, 18 from Eng, 7 from NA;  
 also 41 undercover SO in France

✓ Aug. 14, 1944 - Gamble went into France with 7th Army getting  
 ✓ info and picking up OSS teams

Aug. 30, 1944 - 1292 tons to France, 532 of drops by SO

Fall 1943 - Ike decided to use OSS/NA for ops in So. France. But DC had trouble getting slots for transport to NA for men to be sent to France. WE section had already skimmed off best candidates. Downey had trouble finding even 10 men he finally sent to NA for French ops.

Jan. 44 - Pflieger, ~~xxxx~~ former Acting SO chief, then Asst. XO to Glavin; appointed SO liaison from London to Algiers.

✓ SPOC, N.A. set up in an Operations Room (actually some Nissen  
 ✓ Huts and tents with teletypes to OSS and ISSU6) in 5/44 as the  
 ✓ exclusive agency in MEDTO to handle coord. of resistance in So.  
 ✓ France. SPOC was joint SO/SOE under SHAEF and G3 - directed by  
 ✓ Ansety and Davis  
 ✓ French participation in SPOC consisted of attachment of considerable no. of French officers and NCOs to establish liaison with  
 ✓ Maquis in So. France  
 ✓ 7 Jed teams sent from GB to NA in 5/44  
 ✓ SPOC problems in So. France: non-existent transportation system;  
 ✓ widespread demand for arms from many conflicting resistance groups  
 ✓ 8/1/44-8/15/44 alone, SPOC dropped 447 tons of supplies and 206? agents  
 ✓ Liquidated 9/9/44 - Only bright spot in SO-SOE relationship  
 ✓ Separate SO operation from SPOC planned in Algiers - ETOILE - planned  
 ✓ by Huntington and executed by Peter Dewey in summer 44

West Europe:

Major recruitment under direction of Major Geo. Sharp, AOA  
WE/SO. Sharp a lawyer with Sullivan Cromwell. Father had been  
US Ambass to France. Success of SO recruitment for WE in 43-44  
due to his expertise on France.

Following is Sharp's plan for pre DDay ops, written 10/29/43

*see FR-FILE*



Sharp Plan, cont.

"Intelligence Requirements:

Identifications, location of leaders of underground groups and resistance groups: location, nature, defense of military installations, communication, centers (see appendix no. 1), location of small air fields, beach defense regulations...."

Recruiting of agents for France and Low Countries involved delicate political issues. Besides the Gaullists there were many other resistance groups of varying political hues and many resistance centers were discovered after DDay. As Lincoln's War Diary for OSS/Eto remarks of DDay landings of the 1st Army: "They soon discovered that there was a good DeGaulist organization in the Manche of which there was no record in the Kardex files!\*" Other surprises were less pleasant. French agents who went to England but who were not identified with DeGaulle found that they couldn't work with OSS independently of the British. The same issue occurred in DC. On 5/12/43, Huntington cabled Canfield in London that individuals and groups of officers recruited in this country for France are apparently expected to be made part of British organizations and asking whether or not these officers can be assured that they will be "handled by Americans." These French recruits felt strongly enough on this matter to make a condition of it before signing up.

Another problem was the matter of appropriate military rank for many distinguished and mature men.

Some SO were taken from a pool of French speaking officers at Fort Benning

Once these agents arrived in England, arrangements from there were ruled by the principle stated in the London Agreement of 1942, providing for British supervision of underground activities in France until an American Command was set up for the ETO.

Meanwhile SO in England had charge of final training and screening of SO agents. Later in the field SO/SOE was integrated into existing networks.

There was a tendency on part of French speaking officers in US Army, particularly those who were recent arrivals, to carry over old political antagonisms into their new work. Frustrated for years perhaps, they wanted, not unnaturally, to settle old scores and to be assured that the particular resistance of their affiliation was the one SO/SOE would support. Thus internal quarrels were interposed in an already complicated situation and a miniature three way dispute, on the lines of the larger British-French-American differences, was only averted by screening out those Frenchmen who could not submerge their party feeling into the larger issues.

This took time. Propsects from French speaking centers like New Orleans and NY were canvassed on a no. of recruiting trips. SO files list a long who's who of France in America, and many of these were chosen, commissioned (since they were not allowed to operate as civilians), trained and shipped to GB. A further problem was that many of the agents who volunteered merited rank of field grades. Yet only 2nd Lt. slots were available - this was true of all those recruited for Jed teams.

The Jed teams were first proposed by the British. They were one American and one British officer, one French officer and one US or Brit enlisted man as WT op. Their job was to organize the resistance. The director in London was Lt. Col. Carlton-Smith, head of Milton Hall, SOE training center, and Lt. Col. Henry B. Coxe, Jr., SMO/London. DC's responsibility for them began with recruiting and ended with training and supply. This was done by the regular WE/SO staff through fall 43 and spring 44.

As early as 5/43 plans for Jed teams were contemplated ~~by~~ ~~SOE/for~~ in DC and London. By 8/43 tentative requirements for the plan were drawn up; and by 9/1/43, Gerald Miller of WE/SO wrote to Freeman Lincoln, DC/SO that "The SO recruiting objective is...44 officers for staff, 50 officers fluent in French for teams, and 50 enlisted men for WT operators. The staff of General Devers has approved the Jedburgh Plan. G-2 has been interested to the extent of requesting OPD to transport 30 men regardless of the transportation freeze. London feels that the entire success of OSS in the European Theater will be judged by General Devers on the success or failure of accomplishing the objectives of the Plan."

A memo from WJD to Branch chiefs dated 10/11/43 states that the Jed Plan was given highest priority for ETO. He therefore ordered that all branches turn over specified slots for officers to WE/SO until requirements for Jeds was filled.

The goal of 94 officers and 50 enlisted to be dispatched by 12/43 was achieved through the coordinated effort of the Dep.Dir./SSO Scribner (Goodfellow apparently Dir.SSO), by Col Connely of Personnel Procurement Branch, by Mr. <sup>ow</sup> ~~H~~land of the Sec. Off., by Major Alderdice, XO of the OGs, Lt. Colonel Gamble of PWO; and Lt. Colonel Franklin Canfield (sent to Washington by SO London for the express purpose of recruiting Jeds and officers to be attached by Army staffs; and by C. Sumner Williams, appointed by Scribner to coordinate this rush job.

The WT operators were trained by Larry Lowman, C/Commo, and Lt. Colonel R.T.Salzman, WE/SO planning officer assisted in interviewing and screening trainees. The OGs also helped in training.

The British helped by appointing Col. Skilbeck of the SOE school in Canada for temporary duty in DC to help train the crew once picked. A long and detailed correspondence between Canfield and Joseph Haskell SO/London, reflects the problems of the period - whether to take volunteers expert in everything ex. French or to choose men primarily for language ability; whether recruits could acquire enough French in 2 weeks to pass as Frenchment or whether it would take longer to look for linguists than it would to drill French into the recruits selected. This was a burning issue. By 11/2/43, Canfield could report to Haskell that 59 officers chosen as team leaders were in training and ready for shipment. One in GB, they would received more training in SO/Soe schools under direction of Maj. Hohn Tyson, SO.

Lt. C.P. Frank of SO helped process Jeds and served as their adjutant. This was a feverish period with Sharp and F. Bayard of WE/SO Rives bearing most responsibility; Canfield attached to their

office for 2 months to expedite the program and keep in touch with London; Sgt. Warren Delano in WESO office to assist Sumner Williams who was coordinating the program there. ~~xxxxxxxx~~

All Jeds came in temporary duty without equipment while waiting security and qualification checks. All were parachutists; all had French background; all from Fort Benning and Camp McCall. They were cleared through H.H. Bennett, Personnel Officer of SSO. They got overseas through Lt. Col Harold W. Fuller, SO later deputy comm. Jed training, England.

In an order of 12/20/43, Jed ops was summarized as:

OCT.-  
NOV. 43?

**SECRET**

through the efforts of Lt. Colonel (then Major) Harold W. Fuller, SO, who later became deputy commandant of Jedburgh training in England.

The role these men were to play in the support of operations for the invasion of Northwest Europe was defined in an official order dated 20 December, and summarizing the final plans (see exhibit <sup>III</sup> attached).

"It has been decided that 70 Jedburgh teams...will provide the strategic reserve with which SOE/SO can create and control offensive action behind the enemy lines on and after D-Day where existing communications, leadership, organization or supplies are inadequate, or to carry out such additional specific tasks as are demanded by the military situation.

"Jedburgh teams will normally consist of three men, of whom at least one will be a native of the country in which the team is to operate. Teams will consist of a leader, a second-in-command, both of whom will normally be officers, and one wireless operator.

"The principle function of Jedburgh teams is that of liaison with Resistance Groups. Leaders and seconds-in command of teams should have a sound working knowledge of the language of the country so that they can give instruction and orders where necessary. It is not the intention that Jedburgh teams will necessarily usurp the authority of local leaders, but it is felt that the arrival of Allied soldiers, in uniform, behind the enemy lines, will have a marked effect on patriotic morale and that these teams..... will act as a focus for local resistance.

"As a general rule, Jedburgh teams will be sent only to those areas where there are known to be actual or potential resistance elements. Their function will vary according to the nature of the group to which they are sent and may include any or all of the following:

- 1). Organization of a group for guerilla activity.
- ii). Equipping a group.

The orders also deals in detail with zones of ops., equipment, specific tasks and targets for Jeds, and for coordination and direction by SOE/SO and commo with SOE/SO HQ, England.

All Jed program activities, however, were only a part of overall recruiting of regular SO agents for France. On 9/1/43, Sharp wrote a memo to Wm. Mudge of SO personnel, stating the immediate need for 50 more agents, 25 WT operators to go with them and 10 officer observers of "superior intelligence." In addition, 50 officers to serve as leaders of Jedburgh teams.

For these officers, Sharp wrote; "They must be prepared to be parachuted in uniform behind the enemy lines, be experienced in handling men and if possible have served in an active theater; must have aptitude for use of small arms weapons; have a good knowledge of French."

Staff offs. were also needed, both for London and field HQ. Also training officers and 16 officers to conduct service functions for SO. All of these were in addition to officers needed by the OGS. Sharp's memo concludes: "Time is of the essence."

Sharp's office in DC also handled relations with the French Military Mission, concerning status of French officers in training in US whom OSS was attempting to recruit. The terms on which these officers were released by the French command were:

That they remain members of the French Armed Forces on detached temporary service for a specific mission with OSS; that liaison with the French military authorities should be permitted at all times, "within the proper limits of security and protection;" the French High Command was to be notified, always within the limits of proper security, of departure of the mission for which these officers were being trained.

By 11/43, Sharp was reporting to Lincoln, acting c/SO on dispatch of 81 SO trained men to London. By 2/44, Wm. Davis, who succeeded Lincoln as Chief SO reported to WJD that of these

81 after further training, 46% had been accepted after passing last hurdles, a rate of acceptance far higher than British had been able to reach. Yet this figure still shows much wasted effort and time. Finally by summer of 44, Washington was able to drop its responsibility for French recruiting when a tripartite staff was set up, responsible through SOE/SO command to Koening of FFI acting under SHAEF, to carry on ~~network~~ of agent activity sparked to life by British and US efforts.

BY 9/10/44 there were 80 Jeds in France, but aside from them only 46 other SO agents remained in France. Control of Special Force Detachments in France passed to Koenig and plans were under way for using as many as were qualified for SO/Germany.

- ✓ By 4/2/45, 227 SO men had returned to DC from ETO of whom
- ✓ 118 had been transferred to FE. This processing under Harrison
- ✓ T. Barrows, Ops. officer ETO

GEO. SHARP  
AO/WG/50  
MEMO. 10/29/43

"SPECIAL OPERATIONS

PLAN FOR OPERATIONS IN FRANCE

REFERENCES: P.G. 55/1. 1943 and Implementation Study for Psychological Warfare in Southern France.

OBJECTIVE: Stimulate resistance: Organize and equip resistance groups: disruption of lines of communication and supply: coordinate activities with military operations in direct support thereof.

SITUATION: a. The majority of the French people are in passive resistance to the German occupational authorities and to the German controlled French Government.

b. A strong organization for resistance and sabotage has been built up in all of France by the British.

c. Numerous French resistance Groups have been building organizations in all of France: their effective strength is not definitely known and varies widely from community to community depending on the type of leadership.

d. British SOE has preferred to concentrate their efforts in Northern France, and it is, therefore, necessary for SO to bring about a unified organization in Southern France, to supply and equip it, and to coordinate resistance group activities in Northern and Southern France through joint SO-SOE action.

MISSIONS: a. To carry out operations upon special targets of military significance as designated by Military Commanders.

b. To equip, unify resistance groups, and coordinate their activities with the plans of the Military Commander.

c. To sabotage sources of key materials, plants and other targets of military significance.

d. To destroy or disrupt lines of communication and supply in accordance with plans of the Military commander.

(1) For specific targets see Appendix No. 1 to this plan.

PLAN: a. To introduce into France, prior to D-Day, a minimum of 12 agent operatives, equipped for recruitment, liaison, organization, and equipment, of teams for specific missions of sabotage. A minimum of one wireless operator with equipment to accompany each agent operative.

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b. To int: Approved for Release: 2023/01/11 C02730858D-Day a minimum of 10 officer observers to serve as contact with underground leaders, to report upon matters of organization, equipment, discipline, and coordinate with the plans of the Military Commander: 1 wireless operator with equipment to accompany each officer observer.

c. To form, train and introduce into France 35 teams composed of:  
1 Officer, Leader  
1 Officer or E/M, second in command (to be obtained from French command)  
1 Wireless operator

just prior to, or on D-Day, for the purpose of liaison with other groups, to act as guides where necessary, and coordinate efforts of resistance groups on and after D-Day. To coordinate and guide efforts of operational groups in "coups-de-main".

d. To introduce into France at times dictated by the Military situation, Operational Groups totalling 29 officers, 171 enlisted men, for the purpose of carrying out "coup-de-main", destruction of installations of military value and other limited objectives, in accordance with the plans of the Military Commander.

e. To form staff groups (35 officers) and enlisted personnel, which will be attached to Army, Corps, or Division Staffs in the field for the purpose of carrying out the plans of the Military Commander by means of a., b., c., d. above.

**PERSONNEL, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS:**

Officers                      E. M.

Personnel Plan:	a. 10	10	(Exclusive of personnel
	b. 10	10	required for staff,
	c. 35	35	communications, liaison,
	d. 29	171	SO Base of Operations.)
	e. 35	88	

**Equipment:** A minimum of 100 radio sets: Individual equipment, weapons, etc., to be supplied at SO Base of Operations of 119 officers, 314 men between 1 November 1943, to 1 December 1943. Thereafter, from Bases to Operational Areas as dictated by the Military situation.

**Supplies:** Not subject to estimate beyond an estimated initial supply of 651 lbs. per man. Same as above. To be furnished by Army depots at SO Base of Operations.

**TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS:**

Air or water transportation should be made immediately available for the transportation to SO Bases of Operations of 119 officers, 314 men between 1 November and 1 December 1943. Thereafter, from Bases to Operational Areas as dictated by the Military situation.

## Western Europe:

Related at all points to SOE, since England base for ops. in WE - Was necessary for SO to have permission and goodwill of SOE in order to operate.

- ✓ London Agreement - 6/42 So-SOE pact, but it was still only possible for SO to send limited missions to explore possible ops until Directive from the JCS in 12/42 giving OSS authorization to carry on ops. in any area where the theater commander wanted its services.
- ✓ In early 43, small group of SO officers in London. At that time a modification of the London Agreement was arranged and set forth in an Operational Agreement signed by Charles Hambro and Col. Huntington (ATTACHMENT)

Through this arrangement, SO obtained a toehold on the SOE ops already underway - at that time SO/London had only 10 men, while SOE already numbered 6000 on its rolls. The only way SO could begin was to attach their officers to the WE section of SOE on a temporary basis to learn the ropes. In 43 these officers included, Lt. Col. Paul Vanderstricht, who had been head of the WE desk in SO/DC, Capt. William Grell, Capt. Paul Mellon, Lt. Col. Franklin O. Canfield, Maj. Henry Coxe, Lt. Col. John A. Bross, and Maj. Robert R. Doddridge.

DC always maintained the view that SO should always maintain its own identity, no matter how closely it collaborated with SOE. Therefore, in addition to those attached to SOE, SO maintained its own skeleton staff in London - Bross, Lt. Col. George E. Brewer, Lt. Col. G.W. Embury, Col. Joseph F. Haskell and Col. Charles S. Vanderblue. This mission acquired real first prestige when on 6/4/43, it became a military detachment headed by Lt. Col. David K.E. Bruce under General Devers' orders. Later on 11/11/43, in order to keep SO control in line with SOE, then under COSSAC, SO was itself put under COSSAC.

The only thing SO could do in 43 was to supply badly needed personnel and materiel to SOE and to try to get in on the planning of future operations on a joint basis. SO was first established as an operational unit in 8/43 when the first officers dropped into France. The number of agents continued to increase in 43 and 44 in cooperation with the Maquis so that there was a resistance network supplied and ready by D-Day, to carry out specific tasks of demolition and harassment while allied armies were landing and securing the beachheads.

SO/London also controlled a large number of individual French native agents dropped into the country and supplied by SO. They received their orders from Grell, an American of Belgian birth who recruited, briefed and maintained contact with hundreds of native French agents. Much of this activity was carried on without the knowledge of the French resistance, SO and SOE considering their security dubious and not wishing to run any greater risk to their agents than necessary.

Similar ops. with native agents were carried on in Norway and Denmark.

There were thus three separate group of agents sent into the continent by SO/SOE:

Their own operatives known as <sup>F</sup> section, sent to set up communication "closed" circuits unknown to the FFI;

French agents known as RF section, dropped, supplied and run by SO/SOE;

Jedburgh teams of mixed US-French-British who organized resistance groups in France, equipped them and supervised their activities, working always under the instructions of the local FFI, who in turn were instructed from London.

Starting with a few teams in 6/44, the Jeds increased to a 45 American officers and 100 enlisted men by late summer.

✓SO/L got another boost in 10/43 when, after Col. Joe Haskell's ✓transfer to the OSS detachment, he was able to get the services ✓of the 492nd bomber group attached to the 8th Air Force, to ✓carry out SO missions. Jos. Scribner of Washington shared in ✓this achievement, which made it possible for SO to carry out ✓independent sorties and fulfill the work laid out at its packing ✓station set up at Holme.

✓In Washinton, the year 43 was one of feverish recruiting acti- ✓vity. In England, Col. Haskell was the key SO figure at this ✓time. He was a regular army officer who had inside connections ✓with staff officers in London through his former position as ✓Asst Chief of Staff, G-5. It was through Haskell's effort in ✓that post that the OSS det. was set up, giving its respectable ✓status and the right to requisition supplies and use regular ✓military channels. Haskell also secure increasing nos. of planes ✓from the 492nd BC once he had secured its use for OSS. 64 planes ✓eventually became available to SO.

In 1/44, SO and SOE joined organically to operate as a unit. Brig. Mockler-Ferryman and Haskell had equal status in this merger which controlled ops. heading toward DDay - included Jed teams, individual agents of SO and SOE, the Operational Groups, the 492nd BC (inc. supply drops). The admin staff was modelled on Eisenhower's Staff, with complete integration of planning and ops. and sharing of planes available to either side. HQ was original HQ of SOE Baker St. This arrangement lasted until France fell entirely into Allied hands, then SO pulled out of Special Force HQ for ops. in Germany, while remaining under SFHQ for ops. in the Scandinavian countries and Denmark.

As London HQ became more and more active af 44, relations with DC became more independent and by DDay, London relied on DC only for men and supplies. Plans were completely under Ike and his staff, as Gen. Marshall had forseen they would have to be when he made his suggestions for the drafting of OSS' charter Directive from the JCS in 12/42. Liaison with SOE/DC was maintained through Col. Bouverie, general head of BSC/DC

The attachment of SO officers to the allied armies as Special Force Dets. was worked out in London. As noted in Lincoln Freeman Was Diary: "The general conception of the function of an SF Detachment was that it would serve as a liaison between the field forces and SFHQ in London for the planning and execution of strategic missions by resistance groups behind the enemy lines."

On 6/1/44, SO staffs attached to US field forces and similar SOE staffs with British armies were designated as Special Force Detachments and assigned SF numbers; with the OSS designations as follows:

1st US Army Group	SF Det 12 -
— First US Army	SF Det 10
— 3rd US Army	SF Det 11
9th US Army (vacuum)	SF Det 13
Un-named Army	SF Det 14

1st  
SI - KIRKICATRICK  
K2 - DUNAWO - WAIN WRIGHT  
DUNAWO - KLOTZ

By 6/30/44, 100 SO officers were in these dets, operating as liaison between resistances and the Army, picking up info. from the resistance as the Army progressed in France, carrying out necessary sabotage ops and directing ushc ops on the part of French groups whom they had supplied with materiel. Interference with enemy commo and transport lines was the object of most of these ops. One important contribution was the role played by Det 10 in solving the mystery of V1 and V2 bombs. Contacts established by this Det in the Cherbourg peninsula provided the key info on the launching sites and working of these missiles.

By early Sept., 80 Jed teams opeting in France. One American Jed found the plans of all German defenses of Lorient and St. Nazaire and worked his way through German lines with them to 3rd Army HQ.

Also 100 SO agents operated behind lines before DDay. This followed the British example of infiltrating French speaking agents as fast as possible.

- ✓ The SO packing station at Holme, handled supplies from EC.
- ✓ At its peak 365 enlisted men were on duty at Holme where
- ✓ packing of containers and packages increased from 15,000 in
- ✓ the first 6 mos. of operation to 48,949 three months later.
- ✓ These containers carried 300 pounds of materiel each and were
- ✓ delivered in 2717 sorties by air to the continent.

- ✓ In 9/44 a planning and operations comm. was set up in London
- ✓ to act as a link between WE and MED So. Shortly after this,
- ✓ these two theaters were combined to form European SO. Maj.
- ✓ C.S. Eubank was head of ESO desk until his transfer out of
- ✓ SO in 3/45 when Capt. Harrison T. Barrow was appointed to
- ✓ this office. DC'S responsibilities by this point consisted
- ✓ mainly of reprocessing returning agents and record keeping,
- ✓ under reports officer R.T. Brake

SO Branch report for 1/45 follows:

"II" THEATER ACTIVITIES

A. E/SO

1. WE/SO

(a) Progress

1. The SO Branch in ETO has been undergoing a considerable re-organization. Every effort is being made to develop special operations into Germany and Central Europe.

2. A study of Czechoslovakian Resistance was prepared for USSTAF with a view to obtaining permission for 492nd Bombardment Group (H) to fly supply operations to clandestine groups in Moravia and Bohemia.

3. Attempts to arm Danish Resistance are progressing favorably; and the briefing and training of SO agents to be used inside Germany are being successfully effected.

4. Meetings have been held with members of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Staff Officers from SPHQ and SI Branch OSS, to discuss SO participation in a projected airborne operation. It is contemplated that SO participation will take the form of effecting "hit and run" tasks; and securing operational intelligence for the Airborne Corps concerned.

5. Tasks assigned to SO by the Planning Section are:

(a) To contact dissident Germans and overrun foreign worker elements which can be placed at the disposal of Army units concerned in an airborne operation for the purpose of obtaining operational intelligence and assistance in the form of guides and labor.

(b) To maintain contact by W/T with OSS radio station, London, and SI representatives concerned in the operation. One SO officer and two EM from the Central European section will be engaged in the operation and it is the intention of this section to follow very carefully the development of this airborne operation.

6. Members of the Western European Section have been engaged in the final liquidation of EMFFI, which was closed down as of 1 December 1944. However, OSS interests in France are still being carefully followed.

7. Captain Edwin A. Willard was appointed Chief, Planning Staff, vice Lt. Colonel Canfield effective 2 November 1944.

8. FIELD BASE "T" has been set up at Toulouse, France.

(b) Achievements, Awards and Commendations

1. Achievements

GERMANY  
1/45

- (a) Contact has been maintained with the agent infiltrated into the Ruhr during the early part of September. Two other agents are preparing to join him in the near future.
- (b) Two W/T sets have been delivered to safe addresses in Berlin. Briefing and documentation for two agents is under way and the sets are expected to be operating in the near future.
- (c) Two agents are being trained and briefed to enter Southern Germany and Austria. Their missions will be to establish contact with resistance groups, and arrange to supply them with materiel and equipment.
- (d) Sabotage in Jutland has been undertaken on a large scale during November. German troop movements have been delayed substantially. The AALEBORG Aerodrome VEST was successfully attacked by saboteurs on 2 November. Two hangars, about 30 aircraft, and a special aero mechanical workshop with all tools, etc. were destroyed. An officers canteen was also blown up, and many Germans were killed and injured. On 6 November patriots took one of the largest railway ferries and delivered it to Sweden."

This report also summarizes air operation in ESO for the year

1944 as follows:

"III SUPPLIES

A. E/SO

1. WE/SO

(a) Supplies dropped.

The 492nd Bombardment Group (H) ceased Carpetbagger operations as of 18 September 1944; therefore there were no American air operations for OSS since that date. The following are the figures for the calendar year 1944.

1. Aircraft missing on missions to:

Belgium	4	France	13	Norway	1
Denmark	1	Poland	6	Practice	2

2. Bodies dropped on missions to

Belgium	38	France	377
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3. Containers and packages dropped on missions to:

Belgium	1,136	containers	125	packages
Denmark	104	"	—	"
France	23,324	"	10,017	"
Norway	456	"	145	"
Poland	1,084	"	—	"

Belgium 95-1/2 France 3,055-1/4 Norway 53-1/2  
Denmark 5-1/4 Poland 119-1/2

5. Bodies picked up and delivered on pickup missions

Belgium 5 Picked up 5 delivered  
France 176 " " 61 "

6. Number of sorties (successful and non-successful) to

Belgium 35 France 2,595 Norway 61  
Denmark 25 Poland 108

Base packing station progress

1. Containers packed during the year 50,075

2. Containers delivered during the calendar year to:

492nd Bombardment Group (H) 14,125  
RAF 23,691  
Research and Experimental (British) 34  
8th USAAF (Day Light) 5,298  
EDATC (Norway) 471

(b) Supplies - general

1. Plans are being made to supply Italian Partisans in Northwest Italy from a base to be set up in the Haute-Savoie region of France. It is estimated that this base will need enough supplies to completely outfit 4000 men.

2. It is expected that the following disposition will be made of the enlisted men at the packing station at Hdne:

- 140 to be shipped to the Far East approximately 1 January 1945.
- 72 to be returned to the Army in ETO.
- 50 to remain for possible use in operations.

Of the 140 earmarked for the Far East, 20 enlisted men and one officer will be sent from London to Caserta to open up a packing station in Pisa-Florence Area of Northern Italy and will then proceed to the Far East.

2. MED/SO

(a) Mass drops were made from Brindisi on 10 and 17 November, 1944. Although 250 tons of supplies were dropped, only controlled areas received approximately 80 tons.

(b) Total supplies flown into Italy during the month of November was reported as 250 tons. This figure does not, however, include the mass drops to Partisans.

(c) Discussions have been held with the MAAF. Mass air drops were Approved for Release: 2023/01/11 C02730858. Planes have been flown from Brindisi to North East Italy. Arrangements for shorter haul flights were also discussed and suggestions as to bases in the Siena area were favorably received. No definite word has been given, however.

(d) The 2000 pounds of initial supplies for the Agency base have been dispatched by air 24 November. They were received in good order.

(e) The 20 enlisted men and one officer who were earmarked for FE/TO by London will be sent to Caserta about 1 January 1945 to open up a packing station in the Pisa-Florence area of Northern Italy."

This same report mentions certain difficulties in the theater

worth noting:

#### "IV. DIFFICULTIES

##### A. E/SO

##### 1. WE/SO

(a) At present, the personnel question is constituting the greatest difficulty in the SO Branch. The fact that there is a dearth of German speaking officers to be used in proposed operations into Germany has hindered present progress. The need of personnel to serve in a liaison capacity between SO and SOE has also been felt.

(b) The question of obtaining suitable aircraft to undertake operations to the northern section of Norway presents a grave problem at the moment.

(c) The German increased system of control and check-up has hindered the work of SO agents in Denmark to a marked extent."

✓ The notes in the rest of this report concern operations now in progress

✓ and therefore do not belong in this history, but it may be mentioned here

that Colonel William C. Jackson, Operations Officer, OSS Detachment London was appointed in December 1944 to act as coordinator of OSS/SO activities

in Germany. SO operations in Germany are conducted in cooperation

those of SOE but close cooperation has been maintained; this in line



with Gen. Donovan's intention of keeping OSS independent whenever possible.

By April 45, pattern of continental ops becoming clear. OSS activities in Norway, Denmark, CSR, air drops to Warsaw, safe routes in and out of Germany, were all part of the picture which will have to be put together in a postwar account of ops.

Outstanding ops:

- ✓ 2/45 report mentions exploits of Nick Jalick and Arthur Jibilian
- ✓ during the preceding five months in evacuating or helping to
- ✓ evacuate 343 American airmen from Mihailovic territory.
  
- ✓ In Italy, the 5th Army Det., all SO, established regular sup-
- ✓ ply routes to the Partisans operating in the area of the Brenner
- ✓ pass and was committed to deliver 550 tons a month to this im-
- ✓ portant element

After transition from COI to OSS in 6/42, organization came under JCS and WJD submitted 2 reports to Chiefs.

- 1) Report on functioning of COI for past year; known as "Rogers Bible" because written by James Grafton Rogers
- 2) Submitted 8/28/42, basic estimate of OSS future potential to Joint Psych. Warf. Comm. of JCS

8/11/42 - WJD set up Strategic Services Command under Colonel Goodfellow, awaiting final directive on SO from JCS. Approval for this interim command obtained with aid of Gens. Nelson, McNatney, and W.B. Smith. A week later this approval withdrawn. Old line War Dept. officers feared provision for what they called "Donovan's Dragoons." OSS not allowed to support guerilla units.

8/19/42 - New order; stated subversion and sabotage to be conducted by OSS and endorsed OSS principle of guerillas, but it obliged OSS to hold up plans before actually putting guerillas into operation.

Not even SOE allowed to use anything resembling unified military guerilla unit. ("Strategic Services troops")

But OSS during this period clearly authorized to send out individual SO agents, regardless of debate over SO guerilla units. With Goodfellow involved with unit planning, WJD transferred Lt. Col. Ellery C. Huntington, Jr., then head of Sec.Off. to be chief of SO (name changed from SA/G on 8/31/42)

Huntington a lawyer and officer in NY investment companies. Capt. in WW I and active in 17th regiment of NY State Guard. Came to OSS in 2/42 and started setting up security system for Donovan. Headed Sec.OFF until transferred to C/SO. Budget plans for SO, 8/42: Administrative staff of SO then about 200 army and navy officers of whom 18 in Washington and the rest in training and schools. 11 attending British SOe schools. Scattering of agents abroad. 4 school areas in operation, and commo school being established jointly with SI

In summer and fall of 42, WJD and Good. continued to attempt to get clearance for guerilla units from JCS

9/4/42 - Huntington formally appointed C/SO  
Ops personnel then divided into SI under Bruce; SO under Huntington; and remainder under Good.

9/7/42, Huntington set up list of key SO positions:  
Acting XO - Lt. James F. Lawrence  
Fiscal Officer - Lt. Col. W. Lane Rehm  
Chief Ops. Officer - Lt. Cmdr. Warwick Potter  
Project Liaison Officer - Capt. Franklin Canfield  
Chief Recruiting Officer - Ensign Wm. Horrigan  
Chief Training Officer - Capt. Geo. ~~xxxxxx~~ H. Brewer, Jr.  
Advisory Dir. of Training - Lt. Col. R.M. Brooker  
Asst. Ops. Officer - Horrigan  
Asst. Training Officer - John A. Bross, Lt.

Potter, Brewer, Lawrence and Bross had all been members of Huntington's regiment in the NY State guard. They were all eager for action.

A bitter rivalry existed between this new group and the men who stayed in Col. Goodfellow's command.

Huntington left on the first of his overseas trips for London in 9/4/43, leaving SO in the hands of his deputy, Lawrence. Rivalries with Goodfellow's office continued.

Huntington's first report to WJD on trip to England, 11/2/42 mentions existing missions: Eifler, Tostoy-Dolan, Hoskins, TORCH

Suggested expansion of current Mission in China under Commander Miles to include all other missions in the Far East and coordinate their activities.

Projects suggested for future:

Philippines

New mission to replace one man (Smith?) at Vichy

\*Greater cooperation with the Free French resistance movement while at the same time operating with other French resistance groups, so as to lose no possible toehold in Western Europe - this suggestion strengthened by memo from Lt. Col. Arthur Roseborough dated 10/23/42, outlining, after talks with the Free French, their need for materiel to supply existing French manpower and British bases.

New missions to low countries, Scandinavia, Spain, Portugal, West Africa, Cairo

Huntington pointed out that there were areas where the British could not function as acceptably to native populations as Americans could and he proposed making men available for such areas

While the Strategic Service Command remained uncertain ~~max~~ after withdrawal of its authority in August, two units, Maritime Unit and Operational Groups split off before JCS issued final directive, (JCS 155/4/D) of 12/23/42 defining exactly what OSS operations could include.

Directive said:

SO not to operate in Western Hemisphere.

All ops in organized theaters were to be subject to direct control of theater commanders

Assigned continued responsibility of psychological warfare, sabotage, guerilla warfare, and resistance liaison

But not guerilla units - "Unless otherwise specifically authorized, personnel to be provided for guerilla warfare will be limited to organizers, fomenters and operational nuclei of guerilla units." - But no full units as in British Commandos.

This ended Strat. Serv. Comm. and Goodfellow became special Assistant on Donovan's staff for all OSS, while Huntington began to develop SO "organizers, fomenters, and oper.nuclei"

This order became known as "The Golden Directive"

Huntington order 11/28/42 - new SO appointments.

Operations Officer - Warwick Potter

Area Operations Officer - John Bross

Admin. and Security Officer - J. Freeman Lincoln (who had been  
head of Couriers under William A. Kimbel.

Executive Officer - R. Davis Halliwell (soon C/SO)

11/13/43 - Strategic Services Operations/Dept. Dir. created.  
Replaced PWO, and Scribner named new DD/SSO.  
Branch chiefs objected tot his new arrangement: SO, MO, MU, (OG)

Scribner as XO chose Lt. Col. Edward Bigelow  
B had been asst. to Charles Cheston and Spec. Asst. to Dir.  
on personnel; actually personell off. of all OSS until estab.  
of Personnel Procurement Board in 6/43  
B a Boston Banker.

HUNTINGTON  
BIGELOW  
HOFFMANN  
DAVIS  
SCRIBNER

Chief of Staff for Scribner, Lt. Col. William P. Davis; also  
banker. Served with 108th Field Artillery in the National Guard  
and later graduated as highest man in his class at command  
and General Staff School at Leavenworth.

New Chief of SO, J. Freeman Lincoln, already long service as  
member of SO staff.

Area officers, SO: Western Europe - George C. Sharp  
North Africa - W.W. Downey  
~~Middle East - Morris Berg~~  
Far East - Carl O. Hoffmann

~~...~~ (delivered)  
Commander Green - Personnel Officer, SSO

Now 1750 members of OSS fell under SSO.

Problems: Winter-Spring 1944  
Eifler Mission asking for additional personnel.  
Jed program given trop priority at request of Gen. Devers called  
for 50 officer leaders and 50 WT men.  
Staff officers needed to serve with US field armies as liaison  
between AEF and French resistance orgs.  
SO agents trained in sabotage were being requested and over  
300 men for SO packing station at Holme, England.

Two srots of men operating in OSS  
Ops branches attracted younger, less experienced activists.  
More seasoned business men concerned with introducing business-  
like methods into organization.; they were partial to intell.  
functions, but operations required new and possibly dangerous  
departures, not suceptible to complete organization.

Donovan's sympathy with the men of action saved them. Like  
the operations men he too was a soldier and an adventurer in  
ideas. What the studies and proposals of the protagonists  
of the holding company idea had forgotten was the human equa-  
tion; men of action not concerned with methods and channels  
and impatient with restraints intended to harass them.

3/44 - Scribner left on world tour of OSS installations. Affected  
his thinking on theater realities.

In Scribner's place, Bigelow appointed

Sc̄ribner returned from trip in June; resigned from OSS in July.

It said that the Functions of SO Branch based on a JCS Directive of 10/27/43, were

1. To conduct sabotage operations in enemy and enemy-occupied countries.

2. Support and supply of Resistance Groups in enemy and enemy-occupied countries.

Xerox → (Copy of Lincoln memo.)

The OGC were as close to Donovan ever got to his dream of raiders and rangers modelled on the British Commandos.

With Lincoln's departure for ETO, Col. Davis was borrowed back from SSO where he was Planning Officer to become Chief of SO, with C.S. Williams as Deputy, with William's ME-SO Desk taken over by Russell P. Place, then Deputy/SO.

Soon after Davis took over, <sup>C.S.</sup> ~~James~~ Sharp was transferred to AMG for assignment in France at the request of John McCloy, then Asst. Sec. War, and replaced by his assistant F. Bayard Rives as Area Ops Off./WE. Rives was an international lawyer who had first practiced in the firm of Winthrop and Stimson, and later had his own firm in NY. He was fluent in French and Spanish, and already well versed in the needs of ETO Ops.

Rives carried on detailed correspondence in this period with Major Paul Vanderstricht of SO/London regarding qualifications for SO/ETO. With DDay approaching SO/SOE was straining to get as many agents onto the continent as possible to keep the French resistance primed for action, and to chart out commo for advancing American army.

On 3/22/44 Davis announced the consolidation of ME and NA Ops offices into a new MENA. This was changed to MEDTO in 5/44. By then, OSS already had officers with 5th and 8th armies in Italy. Algiers was the HQ of MENA and then MEDTO, in line with

OSS policy of keeping in step with Eisenhower's command. SO/London was still theoretically directing Algiers SO ops with Lt. Col. Pflieger as liaison between London and Algiers. But in practice, Algiers was independent, and both offices were under Eisenhower HQ in London.

On 4/10/44, Davis was relieved to go to Algiers as C/Special Projects Operating Center ~~xx~~ responsible for the NA end of Haskell's Command.

He was replaced as C/SO by Carl Hoffmann, a civilian lawyer who had gone into the Coast Guard in 1942, serving on sub patrol duty out of Staten Island. On receiving an honorable discharge, Hoffmann was asked by Donovan to come to OSS. He began in 2/43 as Assistant C/Fe/SO under Francis Devlin. When Devlin went overseas, Hoffmann became Chief

The most expansive recruiting phase in SO was over by then. What remained was the reassigning of agents returning to the US from Europe to the FE. Hoffmann thus sent two men out in the summer of 1944 to follow the SO activities in ETO and find out what they were and how much longer they would be needed in Europe. These scouts were Owen McGivern, who went to NA and Italy, and Chas. Eubank who went to England and France. As a result when several hundred agents returned from France, in the fall of 44, SO was able to receive them, and within a week reassign them for training and to SO.

By the summer of 1944, Hoffmann also sent Carleton Coon and Gordon Browne back to NA to write the history of TORCH

By 9/1/44, Hoffmann reported the presence of 25 Jed teams in France, 18 from England and 7 from NA. There were also 41 undercover agents in France.

In Belgium, clandestine sabotage was progressing and air

supply missions conducted under Berndt Balchen? (Pages skipped?)

IN ME, Paul West had visited the heads of the opposing resistance factions in the interest of more effective ops. against the Germans.

HQ moved from Algiers to Caserta and bases were established in Bari, Brindisi, Sienna, and Rome.

29 officers and 62 enlisted men were attached to 14th AF in China under AGFRTS.

On 8/15/44, Col. Ed Gamble had gone into France with 7th Army getting info and picking up OSS teams while maintaining liaison with Allied Command.

By 8/30/44, 720 airmen had been evacuated to Bari alone and over 1500 had been taken out of the Balkan ~~area~~, largely through SO. And at same time, air drops in France had reached the figure of 1292 tons of which  $532\frac{1}{2}$  were dropped by SO.

Hoffmann gives much credit to his deputy, W.E. Duggan, USMC, who assumed admin duties, leaving Hoffmann free to carry on committee and policy work for Donovan, particularly in development of Thai project and transferring SO men from Europe to FE. Also SO/Washington staff was reduced from 40 to 31 members between 4/44 and 9/44, indicating further streamlining.



The saboteur is a person who divides itself naturally into the work done by saboteurs, organizers in enemy and enemy-occupied countries as contrasted with that performed by special groups who are trained and introduced into enemy or enemy-occupied territory for a single, or coup de main project.

The agent organizer is an individual of highly specialized qualifications, in that he must be able to live under cover for extended periods under the eyes of the enemy. It follows, therefore, that he must be completely facile in the language and even in the dialect of the region in which he is to do his work. He must be provided with a cover story that will explain to the satisfaction of enemy counter-intelligence his reasons for being in that particular region. In almost all cases, he will operate in civilian clothes. His task on entering the target area is to make himself as inconspicuous as possible, to establish his cover and to live without taking action for a somewhat extended period of time. His activities begin when he feels that he has established a legitimate position in the community. He then sets up his machinery for building up an organization, initiated in the beginning to passive resistance. When his task is successful, passive resistance will lead by natural steps to open violence and eventually to proper time - to armed rebellion. The agent organizer must be an individual of high courage, intelligence and emotional stability. In almost all cases, his equipment will include a radio set with which he will communicate to his headquarters in a friendly or neutral country. By radio, at the proper time, he will request supplies, either for sabotage operations or to arm organized Resistance Groups.

### III. Coup de Main Operations

Coup de Main operations as performed by SO are attacks upon strategic targets in enemy and enemy-occupied countries, such attacks always being made with the full approval of the Theater Commander concerned. Personnel for coup de main operation must almost always be able to speak the language of the country in which the target is located since the objective is to strike swiftly and then to escape, personnel do not have to have the very special qualifications required of an agent organizer. Coup de main operations are initiated by the use of submarine or parachute as the individual circumstances require.

It should be noted that SO operations differ sharply from those carried on by the Operational Groups in that SO operations are always directed against strategic targets usually remote from enemy lines and frequently hundreds of miles within enemy territory. SO agents are not necessarily trained, as are SO personnel, in purely combat techniques. SO agents never to perform a tactical but always a strategic operation. OG's under the OSS set-up perform tactical

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ever military jobs may be assigned them by the Theater Commander. SO personnel by the same token attempt to destroy targets which have been designated by high authorities as those of strategic importance.

#### IV. Support and Supply of Resistance

In offering encouragement in the form of weapons, food, clothing and medical supplies to organized Resistance Groups in enemy and enemy-occupied countries; in supplying Liaison Officers and communications to such groups; in transmitting to the Resistance Groups, at the proper time, the combat orders of the Allied Theater Commander, the SO Branch is again performing a function that is purely strategic.

It should be stressed, and stressed again, that SO personnel is not recruited or trained for combat or similar duty in or near the front lines of an advance army. In both time and space elements, SO should, and does, operate far in advance of the battle zone."

It is interesting to compare this statement with those in which General Donovan set down in 1940 and 1941 his case for guerilla warfare. Lincoln's statement is a description of the work SO agents were doing. The distinction between the Operational Groups, who were as near as Donovan ever got to his dream of raiders and rangers modelled on the British Commandos, and the SO agents and organizers, indicates that the General had won his case in essential respects by the winter of 1943. The value of SO agents was proved by the increased demands for them from all theaters. The usefulness of the

Operational Group Command, and its accomplishments, are recorded

## Chapter VI - SO/DC's Main Task

One constant SO goal - recruiting for missions overseas. From beginning when Goodfellow and Solborg began by recruiting friends to later point when whole groups transferred to SO from army camps. First encourage by "Golden Directive" from JCS in 12/42. Recruiting has absorbed most of energies of SO branch in Q Building.

Earliest recruiting in COI carried on informally, without reference to branch lines. By spring 43, more definite geographical and branch needs. Personnel officers worked with area desk heads in SO to find different foreign language speaking volunteers for ops. then in planning stage under Huntington and Halliwell.

### No. Africa:

NA ops ruled by JCS Directive 170 of 12/23/42 providing for SO ops in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, France and "other such places as are required by the NA Theater Commander." Provisions made for SO HQ, commo groups and cell centers in Canaries, Cape Verde, Azores, Madeira Islands, Spanish, Morocco, Rio de Oro and Tangier. Specific objectives:

- establishment of the NA Mission and HQ
- cover for mission in SOS of theater
- training school for both SI and SO agents

Directive also approved living quarters, 12 trucks and 8 army cars and army equipment for SO.

In fall 43, Eisenhower decided to use NA/OSS for ops. in So. France. In Washington, this task of recruitment given to Lt. Comm. W.W. Downey, USNR, AO~~Q~~/NA/SO.

Downey had trouble getting "slots" for transport to NA for men to be sent into France. West Europe section had already skimmed off best candidates. Downey had trouble finding even the 10 men he finally sent to NA for French ops.

More important to NA ops was procurement and training of Italian speaking volunteers for Ital. ops. In 5/43, Eddy, following up an earlier cable to War Dept from Eisenhower, sent SO/DC a request for 75 Italians to be in North Africa by 8/1/43. This request was first specific one from Ike and came as part of implementation of JCS 170. Lt. Commander Downey set out in May with recruiting mission to army camps. Mission included several branch reps., including Col. Toulmin, Majors Quay and Cheevers, Capt. Peter Ortiz, and Lt. Chas. Stuart of Sec. Off. Visited camps in No. Carolina and Georgia looking for Italians for both OG and SO. Had to be fluent in Italian and willing to ~~be~~ undertake dangerous sabotage (not always in uniform) and, as Downey put it, to take a "shot at their relatives." Also had to be capable of training in intell work as well as sabotage.

Out of 4000 possible applicants, Downey picked 50 for SO. Next 25 found at Camp Forest, Tenn. Army not always willing to transfer these men to OSS, but finally they were cleared and some of the men on their way to NAHQ by 8/1. By Sept all 75 on way to NA. Downey then joined them in NA.

Recruiting for NA continued under Downey's asst Robert W. Richards and later John L. Dupree, who replaced Richards.

1/44 - return of Lt. Col. Robert P. Pflieger, former Acting SO Chief, Algiers and then Asst. XO to Glavin. Pflieger's new appt. as liaison for SO ops/S France between London and Algiers HQ helped to clear up confusion of overlapping recruitment. SO drops of 500 packs a month from NA to S France an important part of these ops.

See  
S. W. 6/1  
850011

Most FE recruiting in 43 done by Hoffmann as Asst AO/FESO to Devlin in spring 43 and later as AO/FE, Hoffmann recruited first 100 men to follow original 101 Det. party to Burma. He also directed recruiting of SO men for AGFRTS after he became C/SO in spring of 44. Col Hoffmann's method of recruiting was to line up all candidates scouted by his staff and ask them 3 questions:

Had they had a high school education?

Did they come from a small town or from the country?

Did they like to fish, to hunt, to be out of doors?

If a candidate's face lit up and he showed any real interest when asked this last question he was "in." Hoffman believed that such a man would be able to take care of himself in the rugged conditions under which FE ops were carried out. On the contrary, men who were not at home out of doors he considered a bad risk, regardless of their intelligence qualifications.

Exeprience in the field in Burma and China seems to have proved this method useful.

Under Charles E. Fisher who succeeded Hoffmann as FEAO in 10/43, the job of channeling men and supplies to 101 had to be sustained. Stilwell's instructions of 7/42 to "disrupt Japanese communications, shipping, and to bring about Japanese reprisals on native population, which will result in discouraing native aid to Japanese" was amply carried out ~~in~~ <sup>by</sup> 101. By 11/43, SO had in field or enroute to 101, 24 officers and 32 enlisted men. Natives made up majority of personnel at 101.

The Free Thai mission came into the picture about this time. These were Thais trained in the fall of 42 under Goodfellow's direction. Nicol Smith sent as US lision officer of the group, led by Kunjara. Goodfellow got Thai funds unlocked and got the JCS to agree to activation of the mission as the Free Thai Army. Following dispatch of origianl group to China in 3/43? 16 more Thais were in training in the fall, inc. 2 doctors who were badly needed. The Washington arrangements <sup>and the whole project</sup> were carried on under the watchful eyes of the Chinese rep. of the Central Government in Washington.

Other projects under discussion were those for Indo-China, for the Philipp nes and other Pacific Ocean areas. But the only one to surrive was the Meynier Mission. This consisted of Captain de Corvette Meynier, a French naval officer close to Giraud in NA; his wife, exfiltrated from France by the British as a favor to OSS; and a party of officers and Annamites, who were sent to Chungking in 7/43 and established under Miles. After many complications, the mission was actually infiltrated into Indochina.

In 1944-45, SO has concentrated on FE treruiting. As of 1/1/45, 169 offs., 159 enlisted men and 7 civilians have embarked

to CBI since 5/42 and by 3/28/45, 235 officers and 246 enlisted men and gone to CBI and 53 to SEAC. This indicates the rapid increase of FE retraining.

Percy S. Wood, Chief So/Cairo

By 1/9/44, 25 So men infiltrated to Greece by parachute, plane or sea

Between 8/43 and 4/44, 16 SO men infiltrated to Yugo.

While Farish went in to Tito, Captain George Selvig and Lt. Melvin Benson went to outlying Partisan HQs.

OSS arranged for delivery of 1400 tons to Tito before deliveries taken over by British.

Farish, in early summer of 1944, led Columbia mission (himself, Lt. Eli Popovich and Arthur Jibilian) through 6 to 8 hundred miles in Yugo, visiting missions, establishing pin-points for drops, gathering intell, evacuating wounded airmen by stretcher and ox cart.

Farish also reported on the issues of civil conflict in Yugo and the essence of such conflicts in all countries caught today in the dual pressures of their own divisive interests and the interests of outside countries using them for other ends. - Yugo, China, Greece, Poland.

"Major Farish has caught the tragic and epic character of these dual struggles. He writes with limpid sincerity and disinterested understanding, pleading for honest and forthright leadership on the part of the only country these countries trust in foreign affairs - the United States. This report is more than intelligence. It is history."

First purely operational mission out of Cairo in 10/43 when Col. Paul West, chief ops. officer, Cairo, landed at "Featherbed", secret airport in Greece, to evacuate twelve American fliers who had been brought down in Greece.

First SO men dropped into Greece in late fall and early winter of 43 - Capt. Gerald K. Wines, Lts. Kermit W. Anderson, Robert E. Moyers and N.J.P. Tryforce, and Private Sprios Kaleyias. Later followed by Capt. James Kellis, leader of the Chicago Mission.

Chicago went int at request of State Dept. to block flow of chrome from Turkey to Germany by blowing bridges in Evros District of Greece. R&A furnished much info. on area. Mission accompanied by 500 ELAS guerillas blew RR lines on nights of 29 and 30 May (yr.?) Then arms and munitions were turned over to ELAS guerillas and with these, Germans were driven from Evros in August.

AFRU rescue from Chetnik territory - 8/9-10/44 in 16 sorties more than 225 American airmen evacuated by Americans. By 8/31 over 350 airmen taken out.

Rumania: AFRU unit headed by Colonel Kraigher, and accompanied by 11 OSS men (5 SO) flew to Bucharest to arrange for the evacuation of a large number of men grounded there.



Halyard mission: Muselin report=

- 8/3- radio contact established with Bari
- 8/9- 241 Americans evacuated in less than 2 hours.
- 8/26,27 - 58 more airmen and 2 British evacuated.

SO report by Hoffman:

"Since the fall of 1943, OSS air rescue work carried on cooperatively with Allied Air Forces has contributed to the evacuation of more than 3000 airmen from Roumania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia (both Partisan and Chetnik areas)..."

8/43 - Carleton Coon, Chief, So/Bari

Chief ops. officer, Huot

Coon sustained a serious head injury in North Africa and was sent home by Col. Toulmin. At same time, Huot was replaced by Lt. Col. Paul West.

West personally involed in ops., incl. rescue of fliers from Greece and visit to Gen. ~~Sxx~~ Sarafis, chief of ELAS.

Although Americans in Greece were under British operating control, West was leader of all US troops for a time and led ELAS guerillas as well in their resistance.

Maj. Gerald K. Wines played important part in effecting a truce between opposing ELAS and EDES sometime before 2/44. Worked with Woodhouse, who officially gives Wines much credit for his help in the delicate negotiations attempting to bring these factions into sufficient agreement. On one op. called Noah's Ark - blowing up transporations routes and bridges ahead of retreating Americans - ELAS and EDES cooperated in working with OSS officers.

OSS built four landing strips within Greece to facilitate guerilla warfare. One at EDES HQ in Parmathia.

Under Capt. Robert E. Moyers (actually a dentist in real life),  
OSS established an Allied Military Mission Hospital behind the  
lines in Greece (with aid of noncoms Robert C. DeWeese and  
Paul Phillips). They distributed urgently needed medical sup-  
plies through Greek physicians and gave actual medical service  
to Greeks in range of hospital

Basic problem in ME, working with British.

Gen. Devers, deputy under Gen. Wilson, was responsible to British command for all OSS activities from Cairo, Algiers, Bari.

For ops. purposes, SO was divided into two sections.

Algiers under Col. Edward J.F. Glavin

Cairo under Lt. Col Paul West.

2/44 - Joint Staff Planners stated that combined British-US ops. in ME and North Africa limited to SO; should not include MO and SI which would be independent under Theater Commander and responsible to Washington. - JCS 714

Dealings of SO with British intricate and uneasy -

"Many British officers held OSS in suspicious regard and, while they were interested in the material contributions to their operations, they were not unnaturally jealous of the toehold such

contributions might give the organization and its government in Middle East affairs. A good many individual reports of the 1943-1944 period in the theater bristle therefore, with angry criticism of British methods of keeping OSS down, and with documentary evidence of actual interference with legitimate So Work..."

CHICAGO MISSION - SENT AT REQUEST OF STATE DEPT. (TO GROSS?)  
TO BLOCK FLOW OF CHAINS ORS FM. TURKEY TO GERMANY  
BY DEMOLITIONS.

OSS was totally unprepared for Salerno and its effort there had to be improvised on the spot. Pacatte and Cagiati were only allowed to join Downes at the last minute and had only six days to recruit 25 agents from Italians at replacements pools in NA.

Also, once bases were established in Italy, there ceased to be an organic connection with Algiers. Caserta became the center of OSS activity.

OSS was only partially successful in Italy. Whereas in NA a network of agents and commo was set up far in advance of the invasion, in Italy the agency had no such toehold before DDay and came into the operation very late.

Also SI was extremely uncooperative under Vincent Scamparino, whose policy precluded any exchange of info. or help with other OSS arrivals in Italy.

Also the British were difficult, as Huntington told Donovan in a letter of 11/17/43. The Col. denied British charges that OSS men were becoming embroiled in Italian politics.

Lack of preparation was chief hindrance to more coordinated effort in 1943. Later in winter of 44, there were echoes of wasted manpower at the base in Caserta under Col. Glavin's command. The desire for a big show which prompted Glavin to build up personnel there to some 1000 in number seems not to have been justified by results.

In Spring 44, consolidation of the NA and ME Theaters with HQ nominally at Algiers, but actually still separate between Toulmin at Cairo and Glavin at Algiers, meant that as far as SO/DC was concerned the ME end of the Med. Theater loomed more important than the Italian offshoot of NA. This was partly due to the fact that the 5th and 7th Army Dets. were OSS rather than separate SO and SI groups and SO/DC tended to lose track of its personnel as they became involved in overall OSS ops without reference to DC or even to Algiers. A sense of confusion pervades this whole period of Italian ops and only the supply services to Italian Partisans in the North ~~and~~ stand out as separate SO accomplishments.

The organization of SPOC - Special Project Operations Center - set up in an "Operations Room" (actually some Nissen Huts and tents with teletypes to OSS and ISSU6) in 5/44 as the exclusive agency in the Med Theater to handle coordination of resistance in So France. SPOC was a joint SO/SOE op under control of SHAEF and G-3.

SO and SOE made available to SPOC all SO and OG personnel trained for duty in So France. The staff was under joint command of SOE Lt. Col. John Anstey and SO Lt. Col. William P. Davis. It was organized into a French section, Jeds-OG, Air Ops., and Intell sections.

French participation in SPOC consisted of the attachment of a considerable number of French officers and NCO's used to establish liaison with the Maquis in So France. It was for the ops controlled by SPOC that seven American-led Jed teams were dispatched from Gt. Britain to NA in 5/44.

The situation problems in So France with which SPOC had to cope are ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ the non-existent transportation system; the widespread demand for arms from many conflicting resistance groups, and the precarious supply situation.

Between 8/1 and 8/15/44 alone, SPOC dropped 447 tons of supplies and 206 agents.

SBQC was liquidated on 9/9/44 when allied strategy no longer demanded this specific effort. It was one of the few bright episodes in the history of SO/SOE relationships.

An SO operation distinct from SBQC but laid on from Algiers was ETOILE, conceived by Col. Huntington and executed in summer 44 by Peter Dewey - further described in Chap. 9 on Saigon ops. }  
}

JA. 0 The Eagle Mission sent to establish liaison between the Partisan movement in the Belluno, Udine, Gorizia area and OSS in Italy, and to train instructors among Partisans in use of arms and demolition material dropped to them was reported by Col. Davis as successful on 10/27/44. A number of ops. followed the establishment of this liaison channel.

Finally, SO Med Theater carried on Air Rescue Work, as Col Hoffmann reported in 1/45: "The escape and exfiltration section of the 12th Air Force advised that since they have been using OSS facilities to a maximum, the rescue of downed pilots has risen from 10 to 17%. Records now show that the recover, 5 out of every 9 men downed in Italy, can be directly traced to OSS our our direct Partisan connections. Fifth and 8th Army Detachments have made very substantial contributions by their exfiltrations, not in large batches, but two and three at a time."

As of 1/45, OSS continues to operate in Italy. Regular supply channels are established with the IV Corps front and quantities of clothing and arms are passing to the Partisans. As the battle line moves north plans are ready for further penetrations and aid to the forces battling on this grim and sometimes neglected front.

FRANCE - TORCH - 6/43

SPAIN

ITALY - 5/43 - 6/44 - HUSKY TO ROME

FRANCE - 6/43 - 9/44 - LIBERTY

ITALY - 6/44 - LIBERTY (6/45)

INC. SURPRISE

SO Branch: Joseph Scribner

Otto Solborg  
Millard Goodfellow

Chief - David Halliwell  
Joseph Lincoln - 2/44  
William Davis III 2/44-4/44  
Carl Hoffmann 4/44-

DC - W.E. Duggan  
Wm. Davis 1/44-2/44  
C.S. Williams 2/44-  
Jos. Scribner  
Jos. Lincoln

C/FE - Francis Devlin  
Carl Hoffmann - 10/43  
Charles Fisher

DC/FE - Carl Hoffmann 2/43

C/ME - C.E. Williams  
Russell P. Place

C/W.Eur - F. Bayard Rives 3/44-  
George Sharp 43-3/44

C/No. Africa - W.W. Downey

Charles Fisher (banking partner of Scribner) - succeeded Hoffman  
as FE/SO chief in 10/43

Hoffman was Asst. Chief SO/FE to Maj. Devlin in spring of 43,  
and later Chief SO/FE until 10/43.

Hoffman became Chief

Consolidation of NA and ME Theater, first into ME-NA in 3/44 and then MEDTO with HQ at Cairo and later Caserta, meant similar desk changes in DC. This happened in 9/44.

ME Ops:

Carleton Coon returned in May 43? to DC and put to work on ME desk, SO to help in recruiting. Desk in charge of Lt. Andre Smolianinoff, USN and asst. Granville Holden. ~~Connax~~ assigned to find hundreds of SO men for Yugo, Albania, and Greece.

Recruiting expedited in NY by Francis Kalnay, recruiting Yugoslav Merchant Marine seamen stranded there by the immobilization of ships. Mostly Dalmatians, well-acquainted with coastal waters of Yugo. But snag when Halliwell and Scribner suspected these Yugos of "Communitistic tendencies" and questioned Kalnay's own motives.

Recruiting Albanians also difficult. All Albanians in US know each other, also minority Greek Orthodox, who are disliked by majority elements in Albania. Attempt to recruit Gheg Albanians who represent best fighting element in country. But very few of these in US, and competition for their services in OSS keen. One of best was man who had been 20 years as chief clerk at American Legation, Tirana, and who had extensive tribal connections in No. Albania. SI attempted to recruit him unsuccessfully. Coon succeeded. Another prize recruit was editor of Boston Albanian language newspaper "Liria," organ of Free Albania. "This man had to be spirited (willingly) away from his responsibilities and from rival recruiting agents of SI. He became intell and polit. expert for Capt. Hans Tofte.

Ploesti Plan: (told by Coon)

"One of the hectic projects considered by SO at this time was the destruction of the Ploesti oil fields. Major Raymond Young,



an old time oil man who had helped set up the oil installations at Floesti, was living in France under the German occupation in 1941 when he escaped to Algiers and thence to the United States. He had been taken into OSS as a member of SO and had developed a remarkable scheme. This was to recruit a number of oil experts like himself who knew the machinery and installations from A to Z, also to recruit an OG to go with these men with as many as possible speaking Roumanian, then to take these men to Cairo and to perform the following operation. The American personnel would dress themselves up in the costumes of Roumanian firemen and Roumanian oil well workers, complete with monkey wrenches, oil cans, etc. A flight would set out from Cairo and a few bombers would dropt the charges, including incendiaries, on the installations. Other ships would drop the OSS personnel under cover of darkness some few miles away. Once these men had removed their parachutes, they would proceed to the oil wells and join the frenzied throng milling about the burning area. They would rush in carrying fire axes and wearing bright red helmets and say 'make way, make way for the Fire Department.' Others with their oil cans in one hand and monkey wrenches in the other would dash into save certain installations, and would smash them. In a few minutes the few vitalpieces of machinery which could be replaced and without which the oil fields could not operate, would be damaged beyond repair and our team would have scattered to the hillside discarding its gawdy raiments as it ran. A reception committee of pro-allied Roumanian politicians would pick them up a short distance from the scene of the operation and take them into the country to hide them.

This scheme seemed to me a most dramatic, and well conceived operation, in fact, a work of genius. I helped Major Young write it up for presentation, and all we needed was to recruit the proper personnel. I was sent over to Ickes' offices once more to interview top flight oil men to see if any could be found who would be fool-hardy enough to take on such a mission. I found two men, both of whom were high salaried petroleum officers, both of whom were willing to go. This took me sometime and a great deal of coaxing over cocktails in various bars and other establishments.

I did my best to urge OSS to take these men, but those in charge delayed so long that the two men in question became disgusted and withdrew. By the time things had come to this pass, the Air Force bombed Floesti anyhow, lost a lot of American personnel, and succeeded in reducing the flow of oil to the Axis from these field only by 25% and only for six weeks..."

Meanwhile, SO men were being requested for the Balkans in increasing numbers by Cairo. Morris Berg of SO/ME managed the transfer of as many Greek and Yugo-speaking personnel to SO as possible. Berg was succeeded by C. Sumner Williams in Dec. 43.

Major problem for SO/ME dealing with British. All SOE wanted was OSS equipment with, above all, no Americans with language qualifications on missions. Relations between Guenther, Huntington, Brewer (of SO/London) with Lord Glenconner were strained.

It took Donovan's personal intervention in London in summer 43 to clear way for US Balkan missions.

In late 44, OSS closed down branch offices in Cairo and continued only such necessary SO activities as supply of four tons of medical equipment to Capt. Moyer's hospital in Greece. This supply service and packing station at Cecina in winter 44 to supply Italian Partisans were only 2 ops involving MEDSo Washington. By 2/1/45, 221 men~~X~~ returned <sup>TO</sup> ~~from~~ DC from Theater of whom 91 went on to FE.