

**SECRET**HEADQUARTERS  
OSS. SU. DET. 202, CBI  
APO 627

6 November 1944

SUBJECT: MO-AGAS Plan.

TO : Capt. Oliver J. Caldwell, Hq. OSS. CBI, APO 885  
via Major De Sibour and Col. Coughlin.

1. On 5 November 1944 Major de Sibour, Capt. Becker and Lt. Taylor of AGAS, and Major Faxon jointly discussed the above plan with the following results.
  2. Capt. Becker stated that the only plan which Major Wichtrich had mentioned to him was that of sending 2 or 3 OSS men into the Shanghai area under AGAS cover. This strongly resembles the plan to which reference is made in the last 2 sentences in par. 4 of my letter of 30 October 1944 on this subject.
  3. Both Capt. Becker and Lt. Taylor were very positive in stating that Major Wichtrich had never referred in any way to so comprehensive an operation as that contemplated in our present MO-AGAS plan or to the Memorandum for MO joint operation to which Major Wichtrich agreed in New Delhi.
  4. The latest revised "Plan of Operations" dated 20 October 1944; the Memorandum of the working agreement between OSS and AGAS re MO joint operations, and Lt. Col. Little's wire, dated Oct. 26, to Col. Coughlin for Capt. Caldwell were read by Capt. Becker and Lt. Taylor. They extracted the more important portions of these documents and Capt. Becker is wiring to Major Wichtrich in Washington for instructions.
  5. Both AGAS officers clearly indicated that, in view of the positive instructions contained in the AGAS directive, they would be unable to go further than arranging for 2 or 3 OSS men to enter the Shanghai area under AGAS cover until definite instructions are received from Major Wichtrich. This precludes clearing Pvt. Seely for Sian until Major Wichtrich's instructions are received. Meanwhile we have requested that Pvt. Seely's papers be forwarded to us from Chungking so that we can issue the necessary orders as soon as clearance is obtained from AGAS.
  6. A copy of this letter is being sent to Major Stevens for his information.
- cc. Major Harley C. Stevens.

*Harold C. Faxon.*HAROLD C. FAXON,  
Major, AUS.,  
Chief MO China Area.

1st Ind.

HQ OSS SU DET 202, CBI, APO 627, 6 November 1944  
TO: Capt. Oliver J. Caldwell.

1. Approved.

Declassified 20 MAR 1996

**SECRET***J. B. de Sibour*JACQUES B. DE SIBOUR,  
Major, AUS.,  
Commanding.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

Date

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~~SECRET~~HEADQUARTERS  
OSS. SU. DET. 202, CBI  
APO 627

7 November 1944

SUBJECT: MO-AGAS Plan - Private Seely.

TO : Major Harley C. Stevens, Fwd. Echelon, Hqs. USAF,  
CBI, APO-879.

1. Reference is made to your letter of 4 November 1944 on the subject of the assignment and indoctrination of Pvt. Seely.
2. Capt. Becker, of AGAS, is now in Kunming and the situation is as outlined in my letter of 6 November 1944 to Capt. Caldwell, a copy of which I hope you have received by this time.
3. Although nothing further can be done toward activating this plan until Capt. Becker receives instructions from Major Wichtrich, the following procedure will probably be followed, assuming that Major Wichtrich's instructions will be as I anticipate
  - a. All MO personnel destined for the MO-AGAS operation will, before going into the field, report to AGAS headquarters in Kunming for approval and final indoctrination in AGAS operational procedure. (Vide paragraphs 3 and 9 of pro-forma agreement)
  - b. Equipment and supplies will be furnished here.
  - c. Arrangements will be made in Kunming for supplying individual and general funds and for any joint financing between MO-033 and AGAS.
4. I believe that the foregoing answers, insofar as is possible at present, the points raised in your paragraphs 2 to 6 inclusive.
5. A copy of my letter of this date to Capt. Caldwell is attached for your information.
6. For Capt. Caldwell's information a copy of this letter is being sent to him.

cc. Capt. Caldwell.

Attachment: 1

HAROLD C. FAXON,  
Major, AUS.,  
Chief MO China Area.Declassified 20 MAR 1956  
date~~SECRET~~APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
date

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HEADQUARTERS  
 OSS. 3U. DET. 202. CBI  
 APO 627

7 November 1944

SUBJECT: MO-AGAS Plan.

TO : Capt. Oliver J. Caldwell, Hq. OSS, CBI, APO 685  
 via Major de Sibour and Col. Coughlin.

1. Attached is a copy of Major Stevens' letter of 4 November and a copy of my reply dated 7 November 1944.
2. Although, as stated in my letter of 6 November 1944, Capt. Becker does not feel in a position to proceed with the provisions of the MO-AGAS pro-forma agreement until he receives instructions from Major Wichtrich, he has approved in principle the statements in par. 3 a. of my letter to Major Stevens.
3. It seems to me that the most practical way of handling the matters covered in par. 3 b. and c. of my letter to Major Stevens, is as outlined. However, if any other arrangements have been made, please let me know as soon as possible. In any event, these suggestions would result in concentrating these parts of the operation in Kunming where both MO (Chins) and AGAS headquarters are located, and this would be a decided advantage from an administrative point of view.
4. Will you please let me know what, if any, steps have been taken in the way of standardizing equipment to be taken into the field by OSS. personnel? If you will advise the approximate number of personnel to be taken care of, we will requisition the necessary equipment and have it on hand in Kunming. This will simplify the problem of transporting personnel from India since the bulk of their equipment can be picked up here.
5. Your comments will be appreciated.
6. A copy of this letter is being sent to Major Stevens for his information.

cc. Major Stevens.

Attachments: 2

HAROLD S. FAXON.  
 Major, AUS.,  
 Chief MO China Area.

Declassified 20 MAR 1959  
 date \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
 Date \_\_\_\_\_

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(185)

OFFICE OF SPECIAL SERVICES  
ASIA AND INDIA AREA OFFICES  
APO SPO

8 November 1946

Subject: Operation of Special Funds Branch in C & I-3 District

To: Major General G. H. ...  
Special Funds Officer  
APO SPO

1. The accompanying instructions, which are to be put into effect immediately upon their receipt, are designed in part to centralize branch accounting, and in part to lighten the load at each of the Special Funds Offices concerned, especially at SPO, Detachment 101 and 12, SPO, Detachment 101. Copies are being forwarded to each of the 4 Special Funds Offices concerned, namely SPO, Detachment 101; SPO, Detachment 102; SPO, Detachment 103; and SPO, Detachment 104. (Note that books are set up separately for SPO, Detachment 101, C & I-3 and overall theater funds. A distinction must be made, therefore, in all books between receipt of budgeted funds and ordinary transfers of personnel allowances, etc., as between SPO, Det. 101, C & I-3 and any other Detachment Special Funds Office.)

2. Kindly acknowledge receipt of this letter and the enclosed instructions by indorsement on the attached copy. I shall appreciate having your questions, comments, and suggestions.

JACKIE F. ...  
Commander, USAF  
Special Funds Officer  
APO, C & I-3

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Illegible Original

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HEADQUARTERS  
Office of Strategic Services  
China and India Burma Theaters  
APO 895

8 November 1944

Lt. Col. W. R. Peers,  
Commanding Officer,  
Forw Hq OSS SU Det 101,  
APO 218.

Dear Ray:

As I have already cabled you, we expect to return to Washington in a couple of days; right now it is set for the ninth. I wouldn't be at all surprised if 109 changed his mind between now and the ninth and decided to come out here. It would be better if he would for I think the best solution could be arrived at by his being on the ground. In any case, we should have all the answers in the next two weeks.

As I have already told you, I think General Wedemeyer will be a real friend of OSS. Because of this, I think we will have operations in China that were undreamed of two months ago. As you already know, or at least suspect, things are not going too well in SACO. General Miller, in trying to help the situation, fouled it up somewhat, and there is quite a cloud to be cleared away up there. That is only one of the reasons it would be helpful if 109 came out. The conference in Washington is not going to straighten that out. However, I will do my best. I am satisfied that Dick is going to be the head man in China, and I think he should be. It is essential that OSS have a man in charge who the Theater Commander has confidence in. This, in my opinion, is more important than any other single point. I had a discussion with General Sultan a couple of days ago, and indicated the same to him. I said that when he established Colonel Wayne as the section through which OSS must channel all its business, it was really only an indication of his lack of confidence in me, and that a setting up of a new section was not the way to solve the problem. A much better solution would be to ask General Donovan to relieve me and to suggest the officer or officers that he would consider suitable for the position. Sultan agreed with me more or less.

I told him that I thought General Donovan would be mak-

Declassified 20 MAR 1966  
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ing some changes in the near future and that he should express his feelings, as I knew General Donovan was most anxious to please the theater commanders. I told him that my own recommendation would be that you be designated as the SSO for the India Burma Theater. Sultan didn't say yea or nay. He has, however, given me a letter marked "personal" to deliver to General Donovan. I don't know what the contents are, but I suspect and hope that it is a letter asking that you be assigned as the head man in his Theater.

It could, however, well be different. Colonel Hayne has prepared a brief on the OSS situation and has tried to make a strong case in favor of the head man for OSS in any theater being a Regular Army officer, who is thoroughly familiar with general staff procedure, preferably a graduate of a Command and General Staff School, one that is older, knows most of the officers he will be working with, and is more likely to inspire confidence in the Theater Commander. During the discussion I felt that Hayne was trying to describe himself. I indicated several examples of what I considered successful officers who were younger and were not graduates of the Command and General Staff School, and Hayne didn't like it. I told him that my feeling was that the Strategic Services Officer should first have the confidence of the Theater Commander, and second have some knowledge of the organization and capabilities of OSS. I added that I thought you filled these two qualifications better than anyone else out here, but he didn't agree. He felt you were ideal for the job you had but that you were too young to be the SSO. I don't think it is anything to be concerned about because I doubt that General Donovan would ever consider designating Hayne as his chief out here. I do feel that it is important that you get to know General Sultan as well as possible - as soon as possible. I feel that Hayne is more or less on the loose looking for a job, so don't be surprised of anything he does or says.

I am going to cover a number of points briefly in order that you may have a little better understanding of some of the things that are happening.

X-2 in India - Major McDonough, who is the Head of X-2 for SEAC, has been very friendly and would like to be on our team. He has to watch his position but I feel he is a right guy and an able one. Thurston was down here for a couple of days and he and McDonough got on nicely. I asked that Thurston channel all his stuff from China through McDonough for forwarding to Washington. This would leave McDonough in a position to know everything that was happening X-2-wise in the Far East. If I was called on to explain about X-2 in China, I would have someone here who could do it. Thurston indicated he did not feel he should have any respon-

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ability for X-2 operations at 101 as he is too far away to be either informed or assist in control. I agreed, and asked McDonough to think of X-2 activities in Assam, including 101, as part of his baby. I explained to McDonough that you would have to be completely advised both as to what was happening and what was planned or you would be embarrassed and not satisfied with the arrangement. McDonough promised to do this. I am sure you will find this a better arrangement. I think he will discuss the whole X-2 set-up with you, and this applies to Assam and Calcutta, and elsewhere if you wish. He has convinced me that he is really trying to do a job and not trying to build an empire. I asked Harry, when he went through, to talk with McDonough and tell him what the X-2 situation was at 101. As a result, McDonough has written you a letter which I enclose. If you will think of him as trying to help and not trying to grab, I am certain you will find he can help you. Thurston indicated he thought Helfrich was God-awful, and that as far as he was concerned, he should be sent home. He didn't say this with any idea of taking action on it as he realizes you would be the first to express such a feeling if you thought things had reached that stage. He was just making it clear that he had no confidence in Helfrich. I think McDonough feels a little bit the same but wants to help work it out if he can. McDonough is not at all fooled by Patterson. He is not happy with him either. He may be able to get up there this next month. I am sure if you can arrange to discuss the subject with him, you will find that McDonough will be able to help in the situation.

Security - A Mr. Harjes has reported here to head Security for what was the CBI Theater. I don't know where he will fit into the new scheme of things, but he is a good worker and he wants to do a job. I just don't have time to check everything he does. He may write letters that get under your skin. Don't let them. His intentions are also the best. He burned McDonough up yesterday by writing a letter to Washington about a discussion he had had which was supposedly man to man and sort of off the record. I hope you will show a little patience with the guy and credit him with sincerity of purpose. They have had a lot of briefing in Washington and it may take a little while for them to see things our way, but I am sure they will in the end and will be a real help. Just don't let him burn you up.

As you know, de Sibour has gone to Kunming to be CO of Detachment 202. I don't know how this is going to work out. It is simply a trial. I think de Sibour is able and might be able to do a job. However, he has at least one strike, if not two, on him for certain people in the 14th Air Force are very much against him.

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He has a Sgt. Davis up there in Special Funds who is a Certified Public Accountant and supposedly very good. Joe Loete is very anxious to have the Sergeant down here to work for him. I have been holding off until I was satisfied the Sergeant was not needed in Kunming. A decision on this may come up before I get back, or the new set-up is arranged. Mykland is doing very little Special Funds work now and I think it is being mostly handled by a Lt. Davis. I don't think the Sergeant should be taken away from the Lieutenant, unless the Lieutenant and de Sibour are satisfied that the work there will go on. If Loete brings this up to you in my absence, my suggestion would be that it was up to de Sibour to say whether or not the Sergeant could be spared.

I think I have already told you Berno is scheduled to leave here on the 8th. for Kandy where he is to become the Deputy Chief, OSS in SEAC. I will believe it when I see it. Harry is talking now of moving it from Wednesday on to Friday, and from Friday he will probably move it to a week from Friday. I think the feeling here is the sooner he leaves the better. Ed Taylor got back yesterday and today Berno wanted to know what I thought of his becoming the OSS representative on "P" Division and Taylor becoming the chief in Heppner's absence down at SEAC. Taylor apparently wants to get off of "P" Division and Berno would like very much to get on. I told them I didn't have any feeling in the matter; that it didn't make any difference to me which one of them was on "P" Division--and it doesn't. I know you are much more familiar with the workings of "P" Division than I am, and probably have a much greater appreciation of the importance of the kind of man we have there. If you do have any strong desires on this, I suggest you express them either by letter or cable to either the General or myself. I might be able to convey the thing a little stronger to the General if you had any objections.

As I already advised you by cable when I thought I might be leaving today, I am designating Hunter as Acting Deputy Strategic Services Officer in my absence. You, of course, are the Acting Strategic Services Officer for both Theaters. I don't have too much confidence in Dave. I would have much preferred to leave Wilky here, but since he was an eye witness to certain happenings in SACO which are now under investigation and on which the General is anxious to have a complete report, I felt it essential that he return at this time. Spencer has a fair idea of what goes on in China, and between Spencer and Hunter they should be able to figure out whatever answers may be necessary here.

Paratroopers - Harry Little indicated there was some mis-

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understanding about the pay and wearing of the badge of the paratroopers. I am satisfied that once a man completes the course in a recognized parachute training school, he is entitled to wear the badge just as a pilot who wins his wings is entitled to wear them foreverafter. His pay status may change but the privilege of wearing the badge never. Some of the men were taken off of jump pay as a result of a couple of cables received from Washington. I feel that a liberal interpretation of the ruling can be made. If there is any possibility of the man being used on an operational jump, then I think he should get the pay; but if, in your own mind, there is no possibility of his being used on operations, then I do think he should be taken off jump pay. No order on the thing is necessary. The commanding officer is required to certify whether or not a man is on a jump status. If he does not consider him on a jump status, he just doesn't certify to it.

Lt. Col. Arden Dow is now the OSS head man in SACO. Dow is a damn good boy. I wish he wasn't in SACO for there are a number of places he could be used. If anything comes up in my absence, I would give his recommendations considerable weight.

Harry explained to me that you now have an Adjutant located in Chabua who can write orders and expedite the movement of personnel. This boy must be a real expeditor. Major Kearny, who you know came through here a couple of weeks ago, is probably as good as anyone we have had come out with respect to working in the jungle. He has had quite a bit of practical experience in Panama and was anxious that he go up to 101 for work for you at least for the next two or three months. I explained this to Kearny and we issued orders here assigning him to 101. The next I hear he is in China. I still don't know how he got there. I get really pissed off when I even think about it. I am attaching a copy of the order on Kearny for your info. What goes on at Chabua is beyond me. Private Chang is another example of this same thing. He was assigned to 101 for an entirely different reason but he ends up in Kunning. I understand he has been sent back by this time. I have made no effort to try to recall Kearny because I rather think he is just what they are looking for in Kunning and probably have him involved in plans up there by this time. I don't know who is at fault but someone certainly is. We give the men orders here but they can't reach their destination.

Modified Liberators - MacCarthy, as you know, is in London screening personnel for this Theater. He is also doing all that he can trying to obtain some of these modified Liberators for us. I feel they are more or less set on assigning one squad-

ren to the India Burma Theater. These should be able to service both you and SEAC. I know you don't have any particular need for them now but you may have in the future. They are badly needed in China. I am writing to MacCarthy asking him to correspond with you direct on the personnel he lines up. He has been trying hard to get a bunch for China. He has written several "eyes alone" letters to me in which he has popped off about an individual or two, primarily Hoppner and his letters might prove embarrassing if certain people saw them. I am going to leave them all behind, however, in Macaulay's care, and if you wish to review them, they will all be available.

We had a bunch of Nesei arrive here a few days ago. I think they decided on the split as six for you, six for China and two to remain here. They are mostly Honolulu boys and I think you will find them pretty good.

Alderdice - I get the feeling that Joe is not helping the situation all he could. We have been screwing up by having people go to Calcutta and then maybe to 101, and then maybe back here. Much of this confusion is my fault. In some instances, I didn't even know the bird was out here until I heard from 101. These people come back and indicate the treatment they got from Alderdice is not so hot. If the situation has been fouled up, it is not necessarily their fault. Whether they are able or not has nothing to do with it. They come out here in good faith and Joe should treat them the same way instead of giving them the works on how SO never turned out a good man yet, etc., etc. It is nothing to do with his job and certainly doesn't add anything to the morale of the individuals concerned. I have had several people ask me what is happening at 101. That feeling didn't use to exist and I don't think it should now.

McGehee - Maybe I am just getting old - maybe I am turning sour. In the past three weeks I changed my mind a lot towards McGehee. I don't know what his game is. He sends a lot of stuff to Washington that I never see. I only know about it when I get cables back from Washington asking or referring to cables which I have never seen. It is really not important I guess but it burns the hell out of me, and makes me wonder just what his game is. If he is not under you when I leave here, it won't be because I didn't try. He has been transferred from SEAC to CBI. While he is now assigned to this Headquarters, this Headquarters may soon be your rear headquarters and you will be able to do with it as you like.

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I know you have done a swell job up there, Ray. You have built it up like no one ever dreamed of it being built. You have it well organized and you are paying off. I shall do everything I can to leave you in the strongest possible position. I may come back but I doubt it very much. I am convinced that OSS does have an important part in the war effort and I know that you are the best proof of this fact. I hope to see you one of these days - maybe on the China coast.

Best wishes.

John G. Coughlin,  
Colonel, Inf.

2 Incls:

- Incl #1 - ltr fr Maj. McDonough,  
dtd 4 Nov 44
- Incl #2 - copy of SO 296 Hq USAF CBI  
re Kearny
- Incl #3 - copy of SO 295 Hq USAF CBI  
re Chang

~~SECRET~~

8 November 1944

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Charles D. Cheston  
 From: Far East Theater Office  
 Via: OSSTO  
 Subject: Request for officers' slots - CBI

207  
 [Handwritten signature]

Request is made for allowance of one Lieutenant Colonel and one Captain slot to CBI to provide for the transfer of Lt. Col. Charles B. McGehee and Captain Chester A. Chartrand from SEAC to CBI.

While General Order #40 Revised, Sup. 1 of 4 September 1944, provides that in cases of this kind the transfer is effected with the allotment slots, the decision in this instance was that they would not be so transferred.

Cable #10897 from New Delhi from Colonels Coughlin and Hepner requested and approved the transfer. The Director's cable #16207 of 24 October in reply agreed to the transfer and said that the men should not be transferred with their slots. It is, therefore, necessary that appropriate slots be transferred to CBI to take care of this situation.

A letter from Major Small, Colonel Coughlin's Executive Officer, in fact states that the transfer of Colonel McGehee without the slot upsets their plan, since all the Lieutenant Colonel slots were allocated in connection with Colonel Coughlin's promotion program.

GEORGE C. DEIAS  
 Lt (JE) USNR  
 Far East Theater Officer

Declassified

Date

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Date

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HQ. OSS. SU. DETACHMENT 202 CHINA THEATER  
APO 627

Source: HQ-74  
Evaluation: C-3  
Sub-source: American Born Chinese  
business man  
Evaluation: P-0  
Date of info: July 44  
Dissemination: C.O. C&I-B APO 885  
C.O. Fwd Ech USAF  
(att G-2) APO 879  
R&A Br. OSS 14th AF  
APO 627  
CD Br. Det. 101  
APO 465

Report: Y-2025  
NYN/EM-216-44)  
Date: 8 Nov 44  
No. of pages: 1  
Attachment: 1  
(confirms )  
Report: (contradicts) #1  
(supplements)

**SUBJECT: SHANGHAI - ITINERARY OF TRAVELLER FROM KUNMING AND OFFICIAL PAPERS REQUIRED FOR TRAVEL AND RESIDENCE**

1. A travel route from Kunming to Shanghai, which has been successfully followed, is via KWILIANG, TUSSEN, KINGCHEN, KIANG, KWILIN, HINGYANG, KUKONG, KANCHOW, CHANGTING, YUNGAN, LISHUI, LUNGCHUANG, WENCHO, KANTAU and NINGPO.
2. No official papers are needed until NINGPO is reached. Here, the traveller, to get a boat ticket, (unless he can purchase one from a "scalper") must satisfy the ticket seller that he has been examined. The first examiner asks to see the traveller's immunization record showing inoculations for typhoid, para-typhoid and cholera. Inoculations and an immunization card can be obtained at the NINGPO HOSPITAL. (photo print attached) The second examiner asks to see the traveller's travel permit. One of these can be obtained from "Black Market sources" by the traveller's hotel for CN\$500. It is good for one month. (photo print attached) Three other examiners (Japs) search the traveller's person and baggage. At SHANGHAI, there is a customs examination.
3. Most of the travelling in and out of SHANGHAI is done by smugglers posing as business men. The Jap policy is to curb travel unless a good business reason is given.
4. In SHANGHAI, the traveller must get a residence pass. (photo print attached) While awaiting this, a temporary permit is issued. (photo print attached) These are obtained in the district of residence. Certain Block Numbers are assigned to Districts.
5. New arrivals in SHANGHAI are reported in through the "Lien Hwan Pao" system operating there, where families are grouped under a neighborhood mutual guarantee system.

Declassified on 11/19/2000  
Date

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Date

HEADQUARTERS  
Office of Strategic Services  
MO Branch  
China and India Burma Theaters  
APO 885

8 November 1944

SUBJECT: MO Coordination - China Area  
TO: Major Harold C. Faxon  
THRU: Channels  
FROM: Captain Oliver J. Caldwell

1. This is an attempt to answer informally your letter of 28 October on the above subject. Major Monroe has been fully informed of the MO-ACAS plans, and is now assisting the development of these plans while he is in Calcutta.
2. A recent letter from Lt. Col. Little informs us that the ACAS project is officially designated in Washington as the Tower Project. We will refer to it as such from now on. We are also informed that every effort is being made to preserve the cover of ACAS, and that Major Wichtrich insists that this procedure be followed as otherwise all ACAS work in China would be imperiled.
3. I note that you are planning an MO conference in Hunning as soon as possible after Lt. Col. Little's arrival in this theater. We will keep this suggestion for Col. Little, who is expected sometime this month.
4. Your comments regarding the accruing weakness of A.L.'s organization agree with other information at hand. However, I wonder if there is not a real danger that in the process of declining we may become increasingly dangerous to those who oppose him. I hope that I am not too much of an alarmist if I suggest that it would be well for USA to be on guard against him in spite of his present situation.
5. I am not able to comment on paragraphs 5 and 6 of your letter, in which you discuss the chain of command. However, it would be hard to disagree with the facts which you cite.

Approved for Release  
Date 11 / 11 / 1944  
11 AUG 1986

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Major Harold C. Faxon

6. Your comments regarding the situation in Indo-China are particularly interesting. Would it not be a good idea for you to prepare a detailed analysis along the lines of your comments. It would appear that the situation is sufficiently important to necessitate serious thought, and that the MO Branch of OSS should know what it is doing before it makes any further commitments in this area.

7. We hope that Captain Becker will soon be available so that our Tower Project teams may receive AGAS indoctrination. As soon as he is available I suggest that you ask him to send a man to Calcutta, if possible, to participate in our training program.

---

Oliver J. Caldwell  
Capt., AUS  
Acting Chief, MO



HEADQUARTERS  
OSS. SU. DET. 202, CBI  
APO 627

10 November 1944

SUBJECT: MO-AGAS Plan.

TO : Capt. Oliver Caldwell, Hq. OSS, CBI, APO 885

1. With reference to our wire of 10 November we give further details of our conversation with Capt. Becker.

2. This morning Capt. Becker brought over a wire which he had just received in reply to his message to Major Wichtrich, to which I referred in paragraphs 4 and 5 of my letter of 6 November. The gist of the message from Washington was:

a. That the War Department did not approve the proposed MO-AGAS agreement.

b. That Capt. Becker was to take no further action pending Major Wichtrich's return to this theater.

c. That Lt. Col. Little was being advised of the situation.

3. It was Capt. Becker's opinion that it would be about a month before Major Wichtrich would be back in China.

4. Under the circumstances, we cannot secure clearance for Pvt. Seely to proceed on his mission nor can anything further be done at this end toward activating the MO-AGAS plan.

5. The whole situation is far from clear to me and is very disappointing in view of the many possibilities inherent in the plan. While it may be possible that Major Wichtrich's approval (in Delhi) was based on the very minor operation mentioned in par. 2 of my letter of 6 November 1944, this seems highly improbable in view of the very broad terms of the pro-forma agreement which he helped to compile in Delhi. I refer particularly to paragraphs 2, 6, 7 and 10.

6. In our wire we suggested the advisability of obtaining information as to the exact situation direct from OSS Washington.

7. It may be that a working arrangement between MO-OSS and AGAS can, eventually, be reached, but at present the situation does not appear at all hopeful. As a matter of interest, I shall appreciate learning your decision as to your future course of action in recruiting personnel and continuing the training of personnel already recruited. In the event that you decide to defer further training and, possibly, to release certain individuals now being indoctrinated, will you please let us have full particulars of all such personnel before releasing them. Our reason for making this request is that, if you cannot place them

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date \_\_\_\_\_

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Date \_\_\_\_\_

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in your organization, we might be able to utilize their services elsewhere in this theater.

8. A copy of this letter is being sent to Major Stevens for his information.

c.c. Major Harley C. Stevens.

*Harold C. Faxton.*  
HAROLD C. FAXON,  
Major, AUS.,  
Chief MO China Area.

*OK*  
*sum*

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS  
CSS. SU. DEI. 802, CEI  
AFC 827

11 November 1944

SUBJECT: DT-15 production.

TO : Mrs. Betty MacDonald, CSS, CEI, AFC 888  
via Lt.Col. de Sibour and Col. Coughlin.

1. The 500 copies of the above production, to which reference is made in your production report, have arrived here.

2. I assume that it is intended to distribute the entire set as a single unit and that the lower right and left corners of the cover card are to be cut, as indicated on the sample copy, and the resulting tab inserted along the line marked "insert" on the face of the card showing Japanese troops leaning from a train. Fasting would, I believe, be less time consuming and would serve the same purpose.

3. One of our Chinese suggested that the scenes on the "year before last" and "last year" cards would act as a deterrent to the surrender of Japanese troops. This might be so, but it is my understanding that this particular series was produced with an entirely different end in view, namely, that of showing the Japanese what has happened and what will happen and not as an inducement to surrender.

4. Your comments will be greatly appreciated.

FRANK B. FRAZEE,  
Major, AAS.,  
Chief of China Area.

107  
1944

Declassified  
date

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DATE

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(193)

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HQ. OSS, SU. DETACHMENT 202 CHINA THEATER  
APO 627

Source: R&A Br. (HQ-6)  
Evaluation: unstated  
Sub-source: Chinese Gd Int.  
Photo coverage  
Evaluation: unstated  
Date of info: varies, see report  
Dissemination: C.O. C&I-B APO 885  
C.G. Fwd Ech USAF  
Att G-2, APO 879

Report: X-2034  
(YH/KM-222-44)  
Date: 11 Nov 44  
No. of pages: 1  
Attachments: 0  
(confirms )  
Report: (contradicts) #X  
(supplements)

SUBJECT: RAILROAD REPAIR FACILITIES IN SHANGHAI AREA

1. At the locomotive repair shop and Central China Power plant at CH'ISHUYEN, cars are repaired that are damaged by air attacks on the NANKING-SHANGHAI and HANGCHOW-SHANGHAI, Railway lines. Plants are capable of producing some locomotives. 4 Oct 44

2. 5 Oct 43 only small repair facilities were located at WUCHIN adjoining the railwa, yards. Photo coverage of Aug 44 showed car and locomotive shop, machine shop, five small shops, (possibly foundries) and a small power plant just west of WOOSUNG railway yard.

3. 300 Japs and 3000 Chinese are employed in the former NANKING-SHANGHAI railway shops. The main railway repair area of SHANGHAI is located N of the railroad yards. There is one shop 250'x130' with 2 tracks entrances, a locomotive shop, 208' x 60' with four track entrances and 3 turntables. Oct 44.

Approved for Release  
Date 11 AUG 1955

Declassified  
date \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
Date \_\_\_\_\_

NOV 11 1944

# 281

3 November, 1944

Colonel Lawrence W. Loran  
Office of Strategic Services  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

I am glad to get your letter of 22 October and to know that you are  
going all the way and in the ETO. I am glad that the reason that he thinks I  
am doing here is not a job out here but it certainly is a damned good one.

I am inclosing for your information copy of a report I have submitted to the  
Commanding Officer here which may help to give you a little insight on the current  
situation in these parts. Actually things are shaping up pretty well if we can  
get these ASPETS boys in line. Our new training school is functioning nicely,  
the new receiving station is nearing completion and we are expanding our trans-  
mission station along with installing facilities to cover the tremendous distances  
between the East and West in China. The code room is now all under one roof, the Signal  
Center has been moved and set. Operations and maintenance center set up in the  
new building - also under one roof.

1. The situation here is serious to be, but of the military situation, I am of  
the opinion that it is all an old story and I am not sure that I can  
do anything to help you with this. The only thing I can do is to  
keep you posted on the situation and to let you know when I get out of  
here. Freddie and Luck are both doing well at the moment and I  
am in good luck. Incidentally Freddie and Luck are both doing well at the moment  
and I am in good luck.
2. I am sure that you will be glad to hear that I am still in the  
line and that I am still in the line and that I am still in the line.

I am sure that you will be glad to hear that I am still in the  
line and that I am still in the line and that I am still in the line.  
he is sure that you will be glad to hear that I am still in the  
line and that I am still in the line and that I am still in the line.  
I secured a ASP-2 for Kettle Holes and I hope that you will be glad to  
hear that I am still in the line and that I am still in the line.  
I am in the battle of Oyster.

The military situation here is in a state of flux and I am sure that  
you will be glad to hear that I am still in the line and that I am  
still in the line and that I am still in the line. General Wedemeyer taking  
over in China and I am sure that John Coughlin is going home. So to  
life in China - I am sure that you will be glad to hear that I am still  
in the line and that I am still in the line and that I am still in the  
line and that I am still in the line and that I am still in the line.  
I have wanted to see you some time. I have wanted to see you some  
time and I am sure that you will be glad to hear that I am still in the  
line and that I am still in the line and that I am still in the line.  
I am sure that you will be glad to hear that I am still in the line  
and that I am still in the line and that I am still in the line.

Best wishes to you and Freddie.

Sincerely,  
*Lawrence W. Loran*  
Colonel, OSS  
1111 1111

Declassified  
date 20 MAR 1968

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Date

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*orig  
JH Weaver*Page 2 A Personnel

It is suggested that the last paragraph on page 2 and the top one on page 3 should be qualified to read as follows:

If trained Chinese radio operators can be obtained from any of the sources now available to OSS in China (either some unused ASSTR operators or any now being trained at the school in Kweiyang) that a sufficient number of these continue their training at the school in Kweiyang until they can successfully operate the SSTR-1 sets to become part of the "Oyster Project" and join the other units in the Philippines, or wherever they will get their final training and briefing. (Dialect and language considerations should be given some thought, as the Formosa dialect may be quite different from <sup>that</sup> of northwest and central China.)

If the "Oyster Project" is put into actual operation and the team sent in around March or April, it is believed that a few sets of the ground to plane voice units would be able to be made available by the Communications Branch in time to supplement the mission's use of the SSTR-1. It is not believed that any of these parties should go into Formosa without the SSTR-1s, regardless of whether or not they also take along a voice unit for ground to plane communication. Without the TR-1, if anything should happen to the ground to plane unit, the mission would be without means of communication and lose contact with the outside world. Also, if they were in Formosa for any great length of time, the dry batteries used for the ground to plane unit might become no longer effective and they would have to obtain others either through droppings or from some local source, which might be extremely difficult and hazardous to obtain.

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On the bottom of page 3 (C. Communications), it is suggested that perhaps this paragraph should read:

Appropriate signal plans, frequency uses with adequate alternatives for both the SSTR-1, as well as the use of the ground to plane voice unit, would be established for this project. If planes can be made available from either Philippine sources or sources in unoccupied China, installations of the ground to plane units should be made in the planes and this method of transmission of intelligence (particularly of an enemy tactical nature) should be employed as often as successful results would seem to indicate. For emergency communications, transmission of longer as well as more long range intelligence reports, the SSTR-1 radio sets should be employed. Each landing party should also be equipped with light visual signal devices and possibly MAT-DAV units and recognition signals for communicating during the process of landing or re-embarking. The Communications Branch will be responsible for supplying the necessary communications equipment for these operations.

#### Training of Operators

The Communications Branch is prepared to train in this country Chinese or Formosa native operators for the "Oyster Project", or if such operators are available to CAS in China, they can be trained by CAS Communications personnel at the Kwaiyang School, or some small unit school which could be set up in China for this purpose.

The length of time it would take to train such operators would depend wholly on three factors:

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(a) If the operators made available to OSS were already competently trained Chinese operators and spoke English and come to OSS with a code speed of 15 to 20 words a minute, a matter of about three weeks' intensive training should take care of it.

(b) If their code speeds are below 10 words a minute, it would probably take a minimum of 5 weeks.

(c) If the operators cannot speak English, are not technically minded, and come with a lower speed than 5 words a minute down to zero, it would take somewhere from 12 to 18 week to make them competent, or serve for such missions.

(d) Naturally, the individual brightness or mental sluggishness of each operator has considerable bearing on the length of time it takes to absorb a new subject. Also the individual operator's own interest in the subject has great bearing.

With adequate manpower made available to the Communications Branch, it would be possible to set up a small communications training unit in the Philippines for the training of these operators.

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HEADQUARTERS  
CSS SU Detachment 202  
APC 827

12 November 1944

Commander Joseph F. Leete,  
Special Funds Officer  
Headquarters CSS C&B  
APC 885

Dear Commander Leete,

I am sending you a report which I have prepared for Mr. Dimond. The report covers the period from January 1944 through June 1944 and is designed to answer all the questions that Mr. Dimond has raised during that period. In addition, I have broken down all expenditures by branch and object classification with explanatory notes wherever they were needed.

Will you forward one copy of this report to Mr. Dimond and keep the other for your files?

Sincerely,

*Gunner G. Leland*

GUNNER G. LEELAND  
Ensign, USNR  
~~Finance Officer, CSS, C&B~~

SPFO Det 202

Approved for Release  
Date 11 AUG 1964

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AG. CSB, 1, Det. 222, CHI,  
APO-887, c/o FM, WFO, WI.  
12 November, 1944.

Capt. Oliver J. Caldwell,  
Hq. CSB, CHI, APO-885.

RECORDED.

Dear Oliver:-

Many thanks for your letter of 6 November which I greatly appreciate. I have been intending to write to you for some time, but the days seem to slip away with good intentions as the principal result.

Needless to say, I am extremely disappointed that your excellent plan seems to have arrived at an impasse which, I hope, is only temporary. However, the tenor of the wire from Washington which B. showed to me is very positive indeed and leaves the local officers no option whatever. Nothing can, or will, be done until W. returns to this theatre sometime about one month hence.

I have tried to give you the complete picture in official correspondence but if there is anything which needs further clarification please let me know and I will try to go into greater detail. You are now confronted with the problem of what to do with the groups which are now in training and the others which, presumably, are being recruited. It is certainly a difficult situation but I am sure that it will be handled with your usual excellent judgment.

You will have received our wire regarding the Chinese who formed the subject of your letter of 9 September to W. I have also written officially to B., with a copy to you, explaining the situation. Y is a very intelligent individual but, by his own statement, did not have the qualifications which W. required, and his social and political affiliations are such as to make us hesitate to use him in our own organization. However, we left all our bridges intact, insofar as his Chinese connections are concerned, and he not only does not consider that he has in any way jeopardized these connections, but feels not the slightest resentment against any one of us on account of the way things have turned out.

I am very sorry indeed to learn that you are seriously ill and will give our best wishes for a speedy recovery. I am hoping to hear from you soon.

I am glad to hear that my wife and daughter are well and hope she is now on her way to New Delhi. If you happen to be there when she arrives, I shall greatly appreciate your telling her how much we all love her and how much we are getting to know her.

Do you know how to contact the Chinese who are working with Major Woodhall? I have been unable to get in touch with them at this time, so I am sure you will be able to help me. If you can forward me their names and addresses, I shall be very grateful.

It is very difficult to get the necessary supplies and equipment for the Chinese and I am sure you will get the necessary supplies. I have been told that you have a large stock of supplies and I am sure you will be able to help me. I have been told that you have a large stock of supplies and I am sure you will be able to help me. I have been told that you have a large stock of supplies and I am sure you will be able to help me.

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Date 11 AUG 1980

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There have been rumors that the China Theatre is to have new shoulder patches but, so far, nothing specific has come to light. Do you know whether this matter has been decided? If so, I would be very thankful if you could arrange to send me a dozen - again with all expenses for my account, of course.

I am still with my old friend the Commissioner of Eastern and certainly appreciate the opportunity of being in such pleasant surroundings. There is some uncertainty about the lease on the premises and there is just a chance that there will be a change at the beginning of the year. I hope that matters will be straightened out so that it will not be necessary to move all my goods and chattels elsewhere but it is impossible to predict what the final result will be.

I have heard from my wife that Major Beckett is married. I have written several letters to him but he is not a very good correspondent so have received no reply to date. The last information from him was to the effect that he was teaching MG in the CATS at Yale. It is just possible that he has applied to be placed on the inactive list and has gone back to teaching at St. Mark's but please say nothing to any one about this possibility as it is pure surmise on my part.

Exchange has now reached the high point of 200:45 to US\$. As far as I can see, there is nothing to prevent it from going still higher. Is the post-war Chinese currency to be left to seek its own level with respect to foreign exchange or do you think that there will be some attempt to stabilize it at some arbitrary rate? I make no pretense of being a financial expert, but even a layman can envisage the enormous problem this poses. Meanwhile, I am still in the springing of my own mind.

If there is anything at all which I can do for you in this part of the world, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Please give my warmest regards to my friends at Harvard with all the best to yourself,

Very sincerely yours,

*ACFarewell*

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24 November 1944

AIR POUCH  
WK-127

Ensign Gunnar Nykland  
Headquarters Squadron  
APO 627

Dear Gunnar:

This letter will cover the reconciliation of your financial report as of the end of September 1944, and covers the three months of July, August and September. In connection with the appended schedule the following comment is offered.

The method of handling the conversion of outstanding rupee advances and subsequently repaid in United States dollars is correctly handled except that you used an exchange rate of \$.32 per rupee instead of the customary rate of .3026268. By using the rate of \$.32 you arrived at a United States dollar conversion of \$519.37 and \$45.50 instead of \$506.95 and \$45.39. This item occurs in your August report. Therefore, the individuals will have repaid to you \$16.91 more than was originally advanced.

In correcting the transfer of \$10,000 from Commander Lee as shown in your August report there is an error in conversion of four annas or \$.08. The 33043-12-0 rupee is equal to \$9999.92 instead of \$10,000. It appears to us that you should have taken this as a transfer of 33044-0-0 rupees equaling \$10,000.

The \$1289.00 which you received from the Navy has been used by us to reduce the advances outstanding by Mary on the Overall Statement. In September you paid to Commodore Miles an amount of \$1522.27, however, according to your letter and statement of 6 August, the correct balance due him was \$1546.48. Will you please clear up this difference of \$24.21. This \$1522.27 has been added by us to the advances outstanding in the name of Mary leaving a total amount still due as shown on the inclosed recapitulation of \$55,065.60.

In August you show as a transfer to Detachment 202 an amount of \$5,000 in the name of Lieutenant T. Carter Olysteen which is the exact amount we advanced him in Washington. However, you also show a receipt of 14,000 CN's at 180 to 1 or \$77.80 in your March report. Were these 14,000 CN's part of the \$5,000 we advanced him or was it derived from other sources? -

*no. Olysteen returned 5000 in cash in August*

*Setting Demand  
know this is the official  
rate in India. to 3.3044*

*Added to Mary  
this night*

NOV 24 1944

(98)

Your September report shows receipt of 20,000 GH from the  
of force. Does this represent a return of GCS funds or did they originate  
from some source which would necessitate their being credited as a  
miscellaneous receipt? Please advise the exchange rate used on this  
transaction. *Collins' advance - misc. receipt to adv.*

You indicate receipt of advances in the amount of 1220-2-0  
rupees made to individuals by Commander Leste in Calcutta. Please advise  
us the names of the individuals who obtained such advances and the amount  
advanced to each in order that we can give the proper individuals credit.

You also indicate receipt of 1000 rupees advanced to Captain  
Gabriel and transferred from Commander Leste. Captain Gabriel in addition  
received in Cairo an advance in the amount of \$150.00 which was trans-  
ferred to Leste through Captain Crull at Detachment 404. Is this \$150.00  
included in the sum of 1,000 rupees turned in to you? *SEAC has kept 715*

I note from your letter of 3 October that a temporary audit  
has been made by Lt. and Corporal Davis and that the same has been  
approved. Please send us a record in detail of all correcting entries  
made by them so that we can adjust our books accordingly. We would also  
appreciate receiving any comment that the auditing officer may have made.

In accordance with our instructions your August report takes  
up the advance of \$1150.00 to Allen Burich, however, we have been informed  
by Detachment 404 that Burich turned over to Ed Leestas 100 rupees and  
that he will account for this amount to Detachment 404. It would appear  
to us that you should therefore credit the Burich advance and debit  
transfers to Washington in the amount of \$30.27 inasmuch as Washington  
has charged Detachment 404 in that amount.

We have shown as an exception in our reconciliation, an  
amount of \$250 reporting an advance made to Robert Wentworth in Washington.  
In addition to this he received a \$50.00 advance from Detachment 404.  
Detachment 404 subsequently transferred this amount to Commander Leste  
in Calcutta but this transfer does not show on Leste's records. If  
Wentworth is at your Detachment please have him account for the \$300  
however, if he never reached you please let us have your advice as to  
where this man may be located.

I am most gratified to observe the substantial improvements  
in your reports and want to congratulate you for getting them to us in  
a much shorter period although I do appreciate why this has not been  
possible before. The main difference between our accounts is the still  
outstanding advance in the name of "Mary" amounting to better than  
\$55,000 and I hope we will be able to clear this up in the near future  
in view of the fact that a letter of 2 October from Commander Leste says  
that Mile's accounts are now audited and the discrepancies are less than  
\$100. This letter was addressed to Colonel Coughlin.

I hope to find time in the near future to write you a personal  
letter and hope with the Davises on deck you will be able to do the same.

Very truly yours,

D. E. DIMOND

*sent -  
Credit Section  
& debit transfer  
Washington*

*Franklin  
has it - used  
no 11/11/50  
Tuck*

Balance to be accounted for per our ledger 9/30/44			\$431,344.98
<b>Balance per report 9/30/44</b>			
	<u>Currency</u>	<u>Rate</u>	<u>U. S. Dollars</u>
Cash on Hand 9/30	CN's 469,687.00		
Add Difference 7/1/44	71,620.00		
	555,607.00		
Less "Y" Forces - Sept.	20,000.00		
	515,607.00	259.80927-1	1,984.56
Cash on Hand 9/30	Rs 100,177-14-0	3.3044	30,316.51
Cash in Bank 9/30	Rs 70,425-12-6	"	21,312.13
Cash on Hand 9/30	US 14,651.42		
Less Difference 7/1/44	1,362.52		13,266.90
Foreign Currency Reserve 9/30	CN 312,000.00	259.80927-1	1,200.08
Advances Outstanding 9/30	CN 56,044,785.70		
Add " " Happy Valley	CN 117,500.00		
	56,162,285.70	"	216,167.36
" " "	Rs 4,953-0-0	3.3044	1,498.91
" " "	US		23,550.25
<b>Balances on Hand per Report 9/30/44</b>			<b>309,297.50</b>
<b>Add items not in report</b>			
Advances Outstanding Commodore Miles "Mary"		55,065.60	
Errors in conversion Rs to US	Aug. 16.31		
	Sept. .08		
		16.23	
Funds transferred by Comdr. Leete 9/30		69,474.64	
Adv. Robert Wentworth by D. M. Diamond		250.00	
			124,806.17
Less receipt of funds (U.S. June) Source Unknown			434,109.97
			2,700.00
			<b>431,344.98</b>

**SECRET**

HQ. OSS. SU. DETACHMENT 202 CHINA THEATER  
APO 627

14 November 1944

Commander J. F. Leete  
C&I-B Theaters  
APO 885

Dear Commander:

I am very sorry for having been neglecting, considerably, to send you as much information as I should and also I have been very negligent in answering your letters. You probably know, however, that I have been a busy individual during the past six weeks and in addition to being busy, have been laid up for about ten days with a first class attack of boils. The result of this being that I put off everything I possibly could.

Now to get around to the question of our Special Funds set up in Kunming. I have not heard from you since I wrote you suggesting you come up here and take over the Special Funds function. However, in the meantime your letter about Lt. Oates and the recall of Lt. Davis from AGFRTS arrived. Lt. Oates has arrived a few days ago. Personally I would be very much in favor, if you are not coming out here, in seeing Lt. Davis named Special Funds officer for China. He is capable, thorough and I feel would make a very good man as Special Funds officer. You are aware, however, of our relationship with AGFRTS. It is such that we can't take people out of it just any time we want to. This is a change which would have to be effected with the mutual consent of AGFRTS and probably could not be effected immediately. I am working on it and hope for a successful conclusion. Col. de Sibour has indicated that while he agreed to the plan he did not realize that Lt. Davis was attached to AGFRTS and that it would be a question of getting him back, replacing him, etc. Actually what I am planning on is to have Lt. Davis in as Special Funds officer for China and he will handle both OSS and AGFRTS accounts. Since we are not working on a deal to move the AGFRTS Hq. to Kunming, it is shouldn't be too hard to do. This cannot be accomplished immediately, however, but I do think it is desirable in that it would give us the most efficient use of personnel.

Now as to Bob Davis. You know that Bob has been my right arm in Finance since all the additional responsibility being put on me in the past few months. I certainly can't send him before the end of the month at best as I would want to close the books for the month and transfer my accounts and full responsibility to the new Finance officer.

Declassified 20 MAR 1986

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Date 24 MAR 1986

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This can best be done at the close of an accounting period. Col. De Sibour agrees completely on this point. It is my feeling that we should have an EM to replace Bob. As I see it the Special Funds job in the Kunming area, even with the new plan, should not require the services of more than one officer and one good EM. It certainly is not a job for two officers. This brings up the question of what should we do with Lt. Gats. I am thinking seriously of sending him to Chungking but there are several problems here:

#1. Everything is so unsettled in China at the present time, I am sure you understand this. The amount of Special Funds work in Chungking is really very small in bulk and would not take much of his time so that we would have to find additional work for him to do. This is my frank and candid analysis of the Special Funds picture in Chungking as I now see it. I think that eventually, if we expand we can use a maximum of 3 officers and a maximum of 4 EM but to what extent we will expand is a question which no one can foresee. You know me well enough to know that I have always felt we should not put someone in a spot in Special Funds unless there was enough to keep him busy full time or some other duties that he could assume which would be secondary to his Special Funds job. It is for this reason that I have always been rather conservative in personnel needs in Special Funds in this area. Actually the figures I have given you are pretty much what you and I and Col. Daughlin agreed on way back last May when he talked about bringing in 2 officers in addition to myself and 3 or 4 EM. I see no reason that this need has changed and at the present time some reason to doubt that we will need that many people. I would certainly welcome your comments and suggestions on this entire problem.

We received the \$11,127.75 yesterday. This is very good for it. I checked the wire copy and find that we had on the 28th of October, message #145 in for \$1,700.00 and on 29th, 200,000 rupees. The last message we sent in November was a repetition of this message in which, I think, I had ample time to prepare the wire.

I am sure you will find this situation very interesting. The total situation is very complex and the amount of work is going to be very heavy. We need it. The amount of work is all in the hands of the EMs and the officers. We need to get on out that will be very important. The amount of work is next to nothing. The amount of work is very heavy. The amount of work is very heavy. The amount of work is very heavy.

then. The amount of work is very heavy. The amount of work is very heavy. The amount of work is very heavy.

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~~SECRET~~

I hope that all is going well with you and that you are enjoying life in Delhi. It would be a pleasure for me to get back to the bright lights of Delhi and Calcutta for a few days as I could use a little change of scenery. The situation up here has certainly been a trying one.

Best regards,

*Gunnar G. Mykland*  
GUNNAR G. MYKLAND  
Ensign, USNR  
Executive Officer

~~SECRET~~

15 November 1944

Major Jack E. Horton  
Br. Hq. 31, Det. 101  
Calcutta

Dear Jack:

This is simply to acknowledge your 3 November letter. The subject of the leaves should be decided on between Lt. Colonel Porter and Lt. Colonel Falkner, and any recommendations of theirs will be acted upon promptly.

Your excellent report on the subject of ACFTS is being discussed here by Major Hillis with Colonel Smith, Colonel Coughlin, and Colonel Hoffman. Any decisions will be relayed to you by him.

Mattie left a few days ago and Chuck is going on leave for at least thirty days before he comes out. He should leave here some time in late December.

Regards.

Sincerely,

Lawrence W. Lowman  
Colonel, Sig C

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Declassified  
date 20 MAR 1981

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Date

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HEADQUARTERS  
OSS. SU. DET. 202, CBI  
APO 627

15 November 1944

SUBJECT: Propaganda Leaflet #DIPLO 283

TO : Mrs. Betty MacDonald, MO OSS APO-885  
via Lt.Col. de Sibour and Col. Coughlin.

1. We have been requested by Mr. Neil Brown, of OWI, to try to obtain a sample of the above leaflet which was allegedly dropped over Indo-China. The text is said to be based on a speech by de Gaulle.

2. We are unable to identify this document and hope that you may be able to secure a sample for us.

*Harold C. Faxon*  
HAROLD C. FAXON,  
Major, AUS.,  
Actg. Chief MO/China.

*(Handwritten initials)*

CLASSIFIED 21 MAR 1988  
date \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
Date \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

201

MEMORANDUM  
OSS. SO. DET. 302. 311  
AFC 027

18 November 1944

SUBJECT: Border Publications

TO : Mrs. Betty MacDonald, MC OSS AIC-385  
via Lt.Col. de Sitour and Col. Coughlin.

1. We refer to your letter of 8 October 1944.
2. Mr. Brown has been, and still is, making efforts to secure the list of newspapers mentioned in the first paragraph of your letter. It will be forwarded to you as soon as we can obtain it.
3. With reference to the second paragraph of your letter, Mr. Brown states that OWI can use 12 sets of the photograph enclosed with your letter. The screen should be 65 and the size of the mats should be 2 column (4" x 2 1/2"). The coarseness of the screen is necessitated by the quality of available newsprint.
4. Mr. Brown asks for your suggestions as to distribution. If for Free China the papers would be printed in Kanning. If for Occupied China, they would be printed near the border.

W. J. Brown  
AFC 027  
AFC 027  
AFC 027

FOR RELEASE  
DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
BY \_\_\_\_\_  
DATE \_\_\_\_\_

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET  
U.S. AIR FORCE  
1944

10 November 1944

Subject: Chinese Typewriter and Type

TO : Capt. Oliver F. Caldwell, Jr., USAF, APO-SF-48,  
via Lt. Col. Ge. Sibbort and Channels.

1. With reference to your wire of 12 November, we can obtain the Chinese newspaper if you will tell us whether you wish the rough type or the so-called "American" type as per samples attached. Also, please give us the price.

2. I have been unable to find any thin Chinese typewriter paper but if you will send a sample with the dimensions, I will do my best to obtain your requirements.

Attachments: 2

HAROLD S. [unclear]  
Major, A.S.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff

*Yes*

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
Date \_\_\_\_\_ 1988

Declassified  
Date \_\_\_\_\_

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第 一 頁

### 工商界的救星

## 當局宣佈信用與業縮

### 預料均有銀行商團

【本報訊】當局為救濟工商界，特宣佈信用與業縮，此舉實為工商界之救星。據悉，當局已決定縮減信用，並限制業縮，以減輕工商界之負擔。此舉將使工商界得以喘息，並有助於穩定市場。預料此舉將獲得銀行商團之支持，並對市場產生深遠影響。

### 經濟消息

【本報訊】本週市場消息，物價趨於穩定，工商界對當局之政策表示歡迎。據悉，當局之信用與業縮政策，已獲得市場之廣泛認可。預料未來市場將保持穩定，並有助於經濟之復甦。

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全省各埠均有代售

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**民權大會**  
 本會定於五月廿三日(星期日)上午十時在...  
 地點：...  
 主辦：...  
 協辦：...

**宣威六縣民權大會**  
 決議案  
 一、...  
 二、...  
 三、...  
 四、...  
 五、...  
 六、...

**由青島歸來**  
 本報記者 修六  
 青島之消息，最近頗多，據悉，青島之局勢，已趨於穩定，各界人士，亦多表示滿意。...

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# 新論衡

第五期

## 指改軍備兵待遇方案 伍廷元

方家指出不詳

伍廷元：最近軍政部擬定「改組軍備兵待遇方案」，其內容如下：(一)改組軍備兵之待遇，應與現職軍人同等。(二)改組軍備兵之待遇，應與現職軍人同等。(三)改組軍備兵之待遇，應與現職軍人同等。...

## 知識青年從軍 與富裕階級出發

知識青年從軍，與富裕階級出發。...

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新華日報 第五十二期 正圖 刊

中華民國三十一年一月五日

低地國




德軍在低地國之攻勢  
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德軍在低地國之攻勢



德軍在低地國之攻勢



在特勒



德軍在低地國之攻勢  
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德軍在低地國之攻勢



官軍美印在

德軍在低地國之攻勢

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HEADQUARTERS  
Office of Strategic Services  
MO Branch  
China and India Burma Theaters  
APO 885

16 November 1944

SUBJECT: DT-13 Production  
TO: Major Harold C. Faxon  
FROM: Mrs. Betty MacDonald

1. The DT-13 production has been designed for dissemination among Chinese in the occupied territories. The purpose is to show that the Japanese troops are inevitably being defeated on all fronts.
2. Captain Caldwell suggests that the 500 copies be sent to Lt. Roy Squires and that he attempt to mail them to Chinese in that area who are behind the Japanese lines.
3. The cards are in no way intended to suggest surrender of Japanese troops but are merely pictorial evidence of Japan's defeat.

---

Betty MacDonald

Approved for Release  
11 AUG 1985

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HEADQUARTERS  
CSS. 30. DET. 202, CRI  
AFO 627

16 November 1944

SUBJECT: Bogus "Senjin Kan"

TO : Mrs. Betty MacDonald, PO CSS AFO-605,  
via Lt.Col. de Sibour and Channels.

1. With reference to the "Field Service Codes" mentioned in Lt.Col. Little's memorandum of 26 September 1944, will you please send to us, as soon as possible, fifty (50) copies of the code. If you cannot spare this quantity, please send as many as you have available.

*Harold C. Faxon*  
HAROLD C. FAXON,  
Major, ACS.,  
Actg. Chief MO/China.

*(Handwritten initials)*

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
Date 21 MAR 1986

Declassified  
date 21 MAR 1986

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*(Handwritten number)*  
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