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HEADQUARTERS
2677 REGIMENT, GCS (PROV.)
APO 512, U. S. ARMY

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Lt. Col. Belton
Lt. Col. [unclear]
[unclear]

23 November 1944

Subject: Report on Mission to Yugoslavia, Ranger Unit

To : The Commanding Officer
2677 Regiment, GCS (Prov.)
APO 512, U. S. Army

1. The undersigned was sent into Yugoslavia as head of an Intelligence unit to contact the Yugoslav Nationalist Forces. The party reached Serbia on 26 August and arrived back in Bari, Italy, on 1 November 1944.

2. The attached report deals primarily with the principal problem assigned to the unit - the status and significance of the Nationalist movement in Yugoslavia.

3. The undersigned has relations with G-2, AFHQ, and with FICA, MILERS. He would appreciate it if copies of this report will be furnished promptly to these two organizations. He believes, also, that copies would be appreciated by the U. S. Political Adviser to General Wilson, and by the British Minister Resident.

Respectfully submitted,

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3020
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

ROBERT W. [unclear] Lt. Col., M.I.

Attachment

Job 81-815R
Box 532

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date 30 Jul 74 E.O. 11652

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
2677TH REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROVISIONAL)
APO 512. U. S. ARMY

23 November 1944

SUBJECT: Yugoslavia - An Examination of Yugoslav Nationalism

A. Introductory

1. Sources and Degree of Reliability

The following observations represent the principal conclusions reached by the undersigned as a result of his mission to Yugoslavia during the period 26 August - 1 November, 1944. Prior to this war the undersigned taught the history of the Balkans at the University of Michigan and has spent twenty-five years in the Near East and the Balkans. In the U. S. Army since November, 1942, he has been engaged in the study of military and political developments in the Balkans with particular emphasis on Yugoslavia. Though untrained in Serbo-Croatian he speaks French, German, and Turkish, all of which were found most useful inside Yugoslavia. Three of the four other members of his mission speak Serbo-Croatian.

The members of the mission travelled almost constantly during their stay in Yugoslavia. The undersigned personally as well as most of his staff covered Western Serbia and East Bosnia, that is, the area from the Morava to the Bosna. One member of the mission spent several weeks in East Serbia and another reached the suburbs of Belgrade and stayed there for several days. Officially the mission maintained relations with General Mihailovich and the Yugoslav Nationalist organization, but in practice each member of the mission sought the broadest and most frequent contacts with the general population.

Particular significance attaches to this basic aim of the mission. British and American officers with the Yugoslav Partisan formations have consistently found their contacts with the general population either limited or forbidden except through specified Partisan channels. With few exceptions officers previously attached to Nationalist formations, either through ignorance of language or personal choice, have limited their relations largely to the principal officers serving under General Mihailovich. It has been the unvarying experience of the undersigned and his staff that no restraint whatsoever has been placed on their efforts to establish direct contacts. With only rare exceptions the mission lived apart from Nationalist

officials. Though travelling in the general company of the Nationalists, local stops were made when and where the American officers desired, and only by chance and rarely were Nationalist officers present at conversations with the population.

Owing to the above freedom of contact and to the great response of the general population to the interest shown by the American officers in their local conditions and problems, the mission was able to converse with dozens of people in each local community and with literally hundreds during the whole period. These comprised, besides Nationalist soldiers and Partisan prisoners, rich and poor peasants, shop keepers, professional men, intellectuals and students, including Bosnian Moslems and some Croats and Slovenes as well as Serbs from all parts of Yugoslavia who had moved into free Nationalist territory during the war years. In view of the number and variety of the sources, plus the fact that the members of the mission already possessed a good background in Yugoslav affairs, it is the judgement of the undersigned that the conclusions reached in this study as to past events and the current thought of the people in the areas covered are factual and fairly presented.

In addition to these personal contacts the mission received the daily radio reports from Nationalist commanders in all parts of Yugoslavia and had numerous conversations with Nationalist military and civilian leaders not only from the areas visited but from numerous districts in East Serbia, West Bosnia, Slavonia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro whose delegates were present at Nationalist Headquarters. Material from these sources, though not accepted as necessarily authentic, was of considerable value.

2. Summary of Examination

a. Yugoslav Nationalism is the movement supported by those Yugoslavs - Serbs, Croats, Moslems, Slovenes - who on the one hand have opposed the Axis occupation and on the other, the attempt of the Yugoslav Communist Party to gain control through its present domination of the Partisan movement.

b. The Yugoslav Nationalist Movement is the sum total of a large number of local movements each of which developed in 1941 and 1942 as a spontaneous local uprising against Axis occupation and atrocities. The Movement was created by the Yugoslav masses, and it is only the numerous local Nationalist leaders, chosen by the people, who exercise real power in the movement. General Mihailovich is nominal head of the Yugoslav Nationalist Movement. In no sense did he create it or its program nor is he essential to its survival. He leads the movement only in so far as the local district leaders and the people are willing to follow. But he is admired and trusted by the peasants and students - the two principal elements in the movement -

as is no other single Nationalist leader.

c. The Yugoslav Nationalist movement was created as a "home guard", a series of local defense units, against Axis and quisling occupation and atrocities; it has continued resistance to the Axis to the extent of its capacity; but the unremitting efforts of the Yugoslav Communist Party to destroy Nationalism since 1941 has increasingly forced the movement to devote its principal strength to self defense against the Communists and the Partisan Army which the Communists control. Though solely military and defensive in its inception, Yugoslav Nationalism through force of circumstances has become in addition a political movement. This political phase has increasingly imbued the whole movement with a more positive, dynamic, even revolutionary tone.

d. The Yugoslav Nationalist movement is devoted to the liberation of the country from domination by Germans or any other foreign power, by Yugoslav Communists, and by the old Parties and leaders who controlled the country during most of the past twenty-five years. It seeks genuinely free elections, preferably under control of the three Allies, which will enable all the National and Political groups, including the communists, to express and implement their wishes as to the future government and society of Yugoslavia in proportion to their numerical strength. The movement includes conservatives who perhaps pay only lip service to this program. But its strongest supporters and its all-important local leaders are peasants, intellectuals, and students who are determined to achieve a legal revolution and a more realistic democracy.

e. The great majority of both Nationalists and Partisans, about 85 per cent of the total population, share common hopes for the future political and economic life of the country. They are divided by fear of reaction on the part of the Partisan masses and fear of Communism on the part of the Nationalist masses. To purge Nationalism of reaction presents no great problem, but the Communists control the Partisan movement.

f. Hatred on the part of the Nationalist masses as well as leadership against the Communist leadership of the Partisans has become implacable. It derives not only from the still basically conservative and individualistic character of the majority of Yugoslavs. It has been created in large measure by the record of this communist leadership in its attempts to destroy the Nationalist movement. Much of this record has been personally checked by the undersigned, and includes Communist collaboration with Axis and Quisling groups; attacks upon Nationalist forces while the latter were engaged against the Germans; Partisan failure to attack German forces; falsification

of Partisan communiques; and atrocities against Nationalist civilians, including women and priests, on a recently increasing scale.

g. Nationalists made up of Serbs, Moslems, Croats, and Slovenes heavily outnumber Partisans throughout Yugoslavia, but the latter, due to better organization and especially Allied military support, represent a stronger military force.

h. A long and bloody civil war is inevitable between Partisans and Nationalists unless the Allies intervene and set up effective machinery for genuinely free elections and free expression of democratic rule by the majority of the population.

3. Definition of Terms

It has become the common practice to employ the term Cetnik in reference to the followers of General Mihailovich and to equate the General's name with the whole of the movement with which he is associated. Both of these practices are incorrect and misleading.

Inside Yugoslavia it is universally recognized that traditionally a Cetnik has been simply a Serb engaged in irregular warfare, though a very few Moslems and Slovenes have adopted the term. Some irregulars who give their allegiance to Mihailovich, especially in Western Yugoslavia, call themselves Cetniks, but the General and most of his lieutenants have never accepted the word in application to their troops. Indeed the term has been definitely unpopular among patriotic Serbs and its widespread use outside the country in reference to Mihailovich was due in the first instance to romantically inclined American and British writers and more recently to Partisan sympathizers who have deliberately attempted to smear the General with the ill repute attached to some Cetniks. For, in fact, though traditionally possessed of patriotic associations, during this war the term has been officially sponsored in large measure by quislings, and even prior to the war the official Cetnik Association had too frequently served as the tool of reactionaries. Pechanatz, at the outbreak of this war the head of the Cetnik Association, became an open quisling in 1941, and his followers either joined Mihailovich or entered the Fascist organization of Ljotic. The latter was a known Fascist prior to the war and the Ljotic Cetniks in Serbia have proved the most ferocious of all the enemies of the Mihailovich men.

The most characteristic use of the term, however, has developed in Dalmatia and parts of Herzegovina and Montenegro where first the Italians and later the Germans raised armed bands from among the homeless and desperate local Serbs who then adopted the name of Cetnik. Ample substantiation of this development is

to be found in Italian (and doubtless German) documents and in Croat and Serb newspapers. The fact that in these same areas some patriotic Serbs have continued to use the traditional term has led to both honest confusion and malevolent misuse of this confusion.

Misunderstanding outside Yugoslavia of the relation of General Mihailovich to the resistance movement has developed through faulty liaison on the part of the British and through deliberate fostering of a myth by certain Serb emigres. The fact is, as the General himself consistently points out, that Mihailovich was only one among many patriotic Serbs who after April, 1941, set themselves the task of rousing the people against the occupants. Since that date he has in no sense been either the inspiration or the controlling genius of the Serb resistance movement in Yugoslavia as a whole. His role will be discussed further below. Here it is sufficient to insist that the use of the General's name to denote a widespread political movement leads only to misunderstanding of the significance of the movement.

All who are concerned with Yugoslav affairs require a term which can properly be used to denote those who, whether Serb, Croat, Slovene or Moslem, are connected with neither the occupants on the one hand nor the Partisans on the other. To fill this requirement the undersigned has always used the term Yugoslav Nationalist or simply Nationalist, and the present study conforms to this practice. Only in a few instances, notably in Montenegro, has the word been adopted by collaborationists, and more than any other term it expresses that which distinguishes a large part of the Yugoslav population from quislings and Partisans. This will be discussed in detail below, but the reader should understand that in the judgement of the undersigned General Mihailovich and those who work with him or along parallel lines constitute the Yugoslav Nationalist Movement.

The term Ustashi also requires special consideration. The undersigned has long suspected that there were "good" as well as "bad" Ustashi, and personal observation in Bosnia has borne this out. In that part, at least, of the puppet state of Croatia many Croat villagers and some Moslems have avoided active military service for the Axis by accepting membership in village home defense units whose members are called Ustashi and in part at least wear the Ustashi uniform. The Serb population unanimously testifies that these home defense units have indulged in none of the atrocities with which the word Ustashi is generally associated. Though originally organized by the puppet government they have ceased to recognize its representatives in the towns and constitute in fact the local governing body in the Croat village communities of Bosnia. Their recent role in the Nationalist Movement will be discussed below.

Any consideration of Bosnian affairs requires appreciation of still another element in the military and political situation - the "Green Cadre". This is a loose Moslem organization composed principally of deserters from the German SS Division originally formed from Bosnian Moslems under the auspices of the Grand Mufti. Today these deserters are organized in village home defense units whose members not only employ full German equipment but from necessity continue to wear their German uniforms, though they are bitterly hostile to both Germans and the quisling forces by whom they are frequently attacked. Their future significance will be discussed later.

B. Examination of the Yugoslav Nationalist Movement.

1. Genesis of the Serb Nationalist Movement

The Serb Nationalist Movement was generated during 1941 as a result of three principal stimuli, and these stimuli have in large measure continued to determine its development since 1941. In chronological sequence they are (a) National self defense against the Axis invaders, (b) self defense of individual life and property against the atrocities and exaction of the Germans and the Ustashis, (c) self defense against the threat, first to the social structure later to life and property, which developed out of the organization of the Partisan movement by the Yugoslav Communist Party. The essentially defensive - and hence to a degree the passive, even negative - character of the Serb Nationalist Movement is fundamental and the source of much of its past weakness as well as its basic strength. However these same stimuli have contributed to the development within the Serb Nationalist movement of a dynamic, even revolutionary, spirit which is extremely significant for the future.

a. Reaction to Invasion

In April, 1941, immediately upon the collapse of formal Yugoslav resistance, numbers of Serb officers and men collected in the forests in obedience to the traditional Serb patriotic impulse. This instinctive movement was wholly military in character but, contrary to popular legend, gives no indication of having been previously planned or of possessing centralized control. General Mihailovich has told the undersigned that, after the capitulation when he disobeyed orders and broke through the German lines with his unit, he was anticipating further organized resistance by the Yugoslav Army as such rather than recourse to irregular warfare in the forests. By his own repeated statements it is clear also that the resistance movement which he organized from his hideout in Ravna Gora was initially purely local and was only one of

several similar centers independently developed in various regions of Serbia by Army officers. This initial phase of the Serb Nationalist Movement was largely limited to Old Serbia, though a few centers developed in Montenegro and Herzegovina. All the evidence strongly supports the conclusion that each local leader at this period was blindly following patriotic instinct for National defense and the movement possessed neither a broad strategy nor even the slightest political program. Nor, as yet, was it a popular movement.

b. German Atrocities

By May and June of 1941 the Germans in Serbia had begun to reveal the savage ruthlessness that was to characterize their occupation throughout the war. The mission devoted a great deal of time to careful investigation of German atrocities by an indirect approach which would tend to minimize the opportunity for exaggeration on the part of the contacts. In addition, of course, a great many prepared statements on atrocities were received. It is clear that atrocities began not as reprisals but as a technique of discouraging the thought of resistance. As resistance developed, the reprisals made the initial terrorism appear as moderation. In each community, in almost every home visited by the mission, the story was the same - one or more of the male members of the family murdered in 1941 or 1942 by German troops. The undersigned on the evidence is completely convinced that the Serb claims concerning their treatment at the hands of the Germans are essentially accurate, and that only in Poland was there more wholesale and barbarous treatment of the civilian population. It is worth noting that the high German official with whom the undersigned held conversations in Serbia admitted that German conduct had been worse in Serbia than in any other part of the Balkans including Greece.

c. Ustashi Atrocities

German savagery was of the same quality in Bosnia but there the massacres of Serbs by Ustashi were still more brutish and on a larger scale than those carried out by Germans directly. In Bosnia the mission collected evidence of current as well as past savageries on the part of Ustashi. The record is only too clear that whereas the Germans were primarily concerned with simply killing males, the Ustashi made a general practice of killing by torture women and children as well as men. During 1917-19 in the Caucasus and Turkey the undersigned became very much accustomed to massacre and torture, but the carefully checked stories from Bosnia revealed a sadism, an insanity, much beyond the worst of the last war's atrocities. It is to be presumed that the Ustashi record has been equally bad in Herzegovina, Croatia, and Dalmatia.

d. Reaction to Atrocities

The Serb Nationalist movement gained popular support as a result of these excesses rather than of the Axis occupation as such. For, to the undersigned, it appears clear that in Yugoslavia as in France the mass of the population had suffered domestic mis-Government too long to enable it to effectively rally around traditional symbols. It was only the instinct of self-preservation that led the mass of the Serb peasants and intellectuals to join with the small groups of officers and men already in the forests of Old Serbia, or, as in Bosnia, to organize their own defense forces. During this second phase, the emphasis was again on self defense, this time of the individual and local community. It was during this period - the second half of 1941 - that the various Serb "Corps" were organized which remain today the basis for Serb Nationalist military activity. They were, and still are, essentially militia for home defense, raised entirely through local initiative, officered largely by local men locally chosen, and in the long run responsible only to local ideas as to strategy and tactics.

e. The role of Mihailovich, 1941-42.

It is difficult to assess exactly the significance of General Mihailovich during this phase. It was clear to the mission that today in Old Serbia the feeling of the peasants for the General approaches adoration, while the intellectual leaders and students proclaim him the only one of the ranking leaders in whom they have complete confidence. At the same time he appears to be genuinely accepted as at least nominal head of the Yugoslav as well as Serb Nationalist movement by all leaders with whom the mission had contacts. On the other hand the undersigned found no evidence, and certainly the General made no claims, that the growth of the Nationalist movement during 1941 was in any significant respect due to any action or influence of the General. It is the present judgement of the undersigned that the degree of eminence among Nationalist leaders which Mihailovich has attained is due in the first instance to the support and publicity which he received from the King and the British Government through Liaison officers and the British Broadcasting Corporation during 1942. In short, the Serb Nationalist movement was created, and developed certain basic characteristics, through spontaneous popular reaction towards self defense expressed primarily in terms of local community interests and loyalties. It had, and still has, its roots in the people. It was not created by leaders; it has created its own local leaders.

The undersigned wishes in no way to detract from the qualities of General Mihailovich, for whom he has sincere

respect and admiration. Today he fills a position of great significance in the Nationalist movement and his role in the future may be still more important. Though in a sense the creation of BBC, he has won the respect and confidence of the great majority of the Yugoslavs who have come to know him. But his influence over the people is not that of a creator but of an interpreter of their own basic instincts.

2. Serb Nationalists and the Partisan Movement.

The third stimulus to the development of the Nationalist movement - reaction of the people to the Communist created Partisan movement - has become so significant that it must be examined in detail. Throughout his mission the undersigned has taken the position that particular importance attached to the task of ascertaining the reaction of the masses to the Partisan movement and to Yugoslav Communism. This reaction has proved to be complicated and superficially contradictory. Briefly stated there is almost complete disdain and hatred for Communists, with whom are bracketed all Partisan leaders; the Partisan political program receives mingled sympathy and distrust; the Partisan social and economic program as it exists on paper meets with entire sympathy; the rank and file of Yugoslav Partisans are recognised as brothers, misled but generally forgiven.

a. The Role of Local "Reds".

Great significance must be attached to the fact that to most of the population of Old Serbia and East Bosnia, at least, the Partisans are known primarily as invaders and occupants by military force who hitherto have never remained for long in a given community. Each community, on the other hand, has long known its own local Communists or Communist sympathisers and the local attitude towards these "Reds" has been that characteristic of Americans from the Midwest. The "Red" is always represented as the local intellectual who became a social misfit or the local ne'erdo well, too lazy to work or a thief. Invariably contacts stated that whenever Partisan forces arrived in a given community these local "Reds" showed up clothed with authority and eager to use it at the expense of his former fellows.

b. The Role of the Communist Party, April-May, 1941

Among intellectuals and officers contacted a principal charge brought against Yugoslav Communists was to the effect that they were traitors in a double sense - they had served both Russia and Germany. Specifically there were

two charges: (a) attempts to induce soldiers and civilians not to resist the Germans on the grounds that it was not a "people's war" (until Germany attacked Russia in June, 1941), (b) cooperation with the Gestapo and denunciation of Nationalist resistance leaders.

Details on the first charge have been given to the undersigned by at least six individuals covering incidents in Belgrade, the Banat, Ljubljana, Mostar, and Berane. The informants appeared to be respectable and reliable characters and each claimed to have been an eye witness. In the Belgrade incident the informant was a girl, a student at the University who took part in street demonstrations in favor of Yugoslavia's entrance into the war. She alleged that Belgrade communists organized a counter demonstration denouncing the war during which she was severely beaten by Communists; leaving scars which are still visible. The other informants included a Socialist engineer from Ljubljana, a chemist from Berane, and a Moslem doctor from Mostar. General accusations of a similar sort were made by numerous contacts, and it is clear that the charge is sincerely believed by Serb Nationalists. In view of the facts that Communists in America and Britain pursued the same line and that the Yugoslav Communists have produced no evidence that Tito, then Secretary-general of the Party, took any part in resistance to the Germans until after the attack on Russia, considerable credence must be given to this charge.

The charge that Yugoslav Communists have assisted the German Gestapo in tracking down under cover agents of General Mihailovich in Belgrade is widely made in Nationalist circles. Leaders of the Nationalist underground movement in Belgrade told one member of the mission that they could furnish the names of Communists now serving the Gestapo in this respect. Several individuals who had been held in the German concentration camp for Nationalists at Belgrade related to the undersigned numerous stories supporting the charge. Finally, the German representative with whom the undersigned held conversations, as a part of his denunciation of the Gestapo and the SS officers, stated that these German elements in Yugoslavia and throughout southeastern Europe maintained relations of this sort with the local Communists whom the Germans were supposed to be eradicating. In view of past known instances of collaboration between Nazis and Communists this statement justifies further investigation. On the basis of ^{the} evidence available the undersigned does not consider the charge substantiated, but for the purposes of this study it remains significant that the Nationalists sincerely believe the Yugoslav Communists to be double traitors who have sent patriotic Yugoslavs to death at the hands of Germans.

c. The Break Between Nationalists and Partisans,
Summer of 1941

Everywhere the mission found evidence of the uneasy collaboration between Nationalists and Partisans during the summer of 1941. In each community visited the story was essentially the same. After the German attack on Russia, strangers from the cities would arrive at local Nationalist headquarters in the forests and ask to join in the struggle against the Germans. The local Communists and sympathizers would soon gravitate around these strangers, communist propaganda was started, stories were circulated against the local leaders, and finally would come a demand for share in the leadership or, in some instances, the assassination of local leaders. These infiltration tactics were distinct from the direct formation of independent Communist led bands in certain districts. In Bosnia this infiltration of Communists came later than in Serbia and in this early period there were no local Partisan bands. In Bosnia, too, the break came after, and in a measure as a result of, the break in Serbia between Mihailovich and Tito. Up to this point, in the judgement of the undersigned, the evidence is ample and unmistakable that the Nationalists were first in the field, actively fighting the Germans, Bulgars, and Ustashi; that the communists first became active only after Russia came into the war; that initially the principal Partisan endeavor was to infiltrate and take over the already existing resistance groups, that failing this they organized their own "Popular Front" or Partisan movement; and that from the very beginning of the collaboration, the local Communists displayed a desire to disrupt and destroy the Nationalist organization and local leadership.

The question as to who first gave the famous "stab in the back", Mihailovich or Tito, has been disputed. The undersigned had heard the story from authoritative Partisan sources prior to his visit. Inside the country he was given all details, with dates and places, by the Nationalist leaders and by several participants of no rank. The date on which the Nationalists allege they were attacked by Partisans is earlier than the date given by Partisans for the alleged initial attack on them by Nationalists.

The undersigned here would like to call attention to a pamphlet published by G-2, AFHQ., The Cetniks, A Survey of Cetnik Activity in Yugoslavia, Sept., 1944. This document has been edited in a spirit of hostility towards the Nationalist movement, and fails to cite any of the several Allied Liaison officers who supported the Nationalists. Yet one of its principal witnesses against the "Cetniks", a German named Mueller, states (p.10) that the Partisans were the first to break the

agreement and gives the details and dates of the attacks on Nationalists by Partisans prior to the first attack on the latter by the Nationalists. His evidence, that is, completely supports the story given the undersigned by the Nationalists and contradicts that of the Partisans.

d. Falsification of Information by Partisan Headquarters

It should be borne in mind that one of the most common complaints of the Nationalists against the Partisans, and the basis for much of their complete distrust of Partisan leaders and their promises for the future is the alleged dishonesty revealed in Partisan documents and in their radio emissions through BBC and "Voice of America". The undersigned had become interested in this matter prior to his trip as a result of the daily situation map and sheet maintained in his office at Cairo during the period April-July, 1944, based exclusively on the official Partisan communiques. This study revealed so many serious contradictions in Partisan claims as to require rejection of the communiques as serious military documents. Further studies by the undersigned reported to Washington during the summer of 1944 revealed gross exaggeration in the totals claimed for the Partisan Army. There was the further evidence of Capt. Mansfield, American Liaison officer with the Nationalists in 1943. Capt. Mansfield in company with a British Liaison officer witnessed the capture of a town by Nationalist troops and then heard the BBC announce capture of the same place by the Partisans.

When the undersigned was about to leave for Serbia he examined a situation map prepared by the British from Partisan sources. This showed much of Western Serbia where the mission was expected to land as Partisan "liberated territory". After landing the undersigned diligently sought for evidence of Partisan liberated areas between the Morava and the Drina but found that there were none and had been none.

During the last days of August the Partisan radio emission was heard stating that the liberation had been accomplished of the area in north central Serbia around the towns of Lazaravac, Belanovica, and Ljig. The undersigned at once ordered one of the mission to the area. He left on 2 September and visited each center named in the Partisan emission. In each he found the Nationalists in complete control and busy destroying and driving out the German garrisons. Of Partisans there was no trace though he examined both the German dead and prisoners.

During the period 26-29 September the undersigned was in the district of Semberija in East Bosnia. While there he heard the English broadcast of a Partisan announcement that this district had risen for the Partisans. The undersigned spent

several days travelling through the area engaging in conversations with local Serb and Moslem Nationalist leaders and in inspection of Serb Nationalist schools and hospitals. There was absolutely no trace of a local Partisan rising. On the contrary all adult males seen along the roads wore Nationalist insignia, and the Serb Nationalists controlled not only the military situation but the civil administration outside the principal towns held by Axis garrisons. The only Partisan activity in the area was the sporadic infiltration of "troikas" (groups of three to five men) from Srem and their passage through the area towards South Bosnia. In one hospital the undersigned talked with three civilians who had been attacked and wounded by such transient marauders.

Around the middle of October the Partisan radio emission announced the liberation of Gracanica in East Bosnia and the destruction of the railway between that town and Doboï (on the West bank of the Bosna River). The undersigned was in the area at the time and lived for some ten days within about ten miles of Gracanica. He took daily walks along the railway in question. Actually the Partisans raided the town but held it for only two days, while the railway had been thoroughly destroyed by the Nationalists of Ozren many months previously.

During September the Partisan Headquarters made the official claim that Keserovich, one of the Mihailovich commanders in Serbia, had broken with the General and denounced him as a collaborationist. The undersigned received orders to check this claim and despatched Lt. Kramer to the headquarters of Keserovich. Lt. Kramer found the officer in question vigorously defending himself from the Partisans while attacking the Germans. As late as 24 October Keserovich was still in the field under the command of Mihailovich and still actively engaged against Germans and Partisans.

In September, again, a Partisan communique announced that members of the staff of Mihailovich had been captured during the latter's retreat in Serbia, along with important archives. Every member of the staff was personally known to the mission and all were still accounted for as late as 24 October. During the retreat in question the archives of the General's headquarters were carried on pack horses, and in the line of march were always immediately in front of the mission party. No attack was ever made on them.

Throughout the stay in Yugoslavia the mission received numerous detailed accounts by apparently reliable sources of similar false statements on Partisan radio emission regarding Partisan strength and achievements. In view of the evidence for which the undersigned can personally vouch, in his judgement there

can be no doubt but that the Partisan leaders follow a deliberate policy of falsification of news and documents to suit their needs. This cynical attitude has convinced the Nationalists not only that no confidence can be placed in the promises of Partisan leaders but that the Allies have shown themselves naive in accepting Partisan claims. It has contributed materially to the complete break between Nationalists and Partisans and to the elevation of the latter to the status of most dangerous enemy.

e. Status of Allied Liaison Officers with the Partisans

In many communities visited which had at one time or another experienced occupation by Partisan troops, conversations with the Mission staff turned to the presence of Allied Liaison officers with the Partisans. No question was raised as to the reason liaison was maintained. But invariably in communities which had been visited by such liaison officers the question was raised as to why there were so few, or no, contacts on the part of these officers and the local population. Invariably the story was told of efforts to meet and talk with such officers which were frustrated by the Partisans around them. The free manner in which the present mission mingled with the local population emphasized in their minds the apparent fear on the part of the Partisan leaders of the results of free contacts. In some communities there was a conviction that the officers in British uniform were actually only Partisans trying to pass as British, and that this explained the barrier. There is ample evidence, of course, from both British and American officers that the Partisan commanders in most instances do discourage or forbid personal investigation by liaison officers of the local situation and sentiments. To the undersigned, indeed, it is truly astonishing that this practice on the part of the Partisans - and the contrasting freedom consistently enjoyed by liaison officers attached to the Nationalists - is not given the significance which it deserves. For only those who fear and mistrust public sentiment seek to throttle its free expression. But the point the undersigned wishes to make here is that the Nationalists do recognize the significance of this Partisan practice, and it serves to complete their mistrust of Partisan leaders and their unwillingness to come to terms with them. Repeatedly Nationalists of all classes have insisted to the undersigned - "If we accept a government by Tito we are lost. The Partisans lie, and the British believe them. The British send officers, but they see and hear nothing. We will be persecuted and killed, and the outside world will know nothing of it". This conviction on the part of Nationalists is sincere and deep, and it again explains the elevation of the Partisans to the status of most dangerous enemy.

f. Nationalist Charges of Partisan Atrocities

During the stay in Yugoslavia the mission was offered a great deal of information concerning alleged atrocities

committed by Partisans on Nationalist civilian populations. This fell into three classes - prepared official compilations of former incidents, information concerning individual incidents brought out in conversations with the population, radio reports of current incidents received at Nationalist Headquarters from district and field commanders. Because of extensive past experience with atrocity charges, and the natural tendency to exaggerate, the undersigned hesitated to devote much time to this phase of intelligence. In the case of one current incident he reported the names and requested that liaison officers with the Partisans be ordered to investigate. He also requested that he be advised whether or not he should continue to accumulate data of this sort. As these requests were ignored he has not brought out from the country extensive material on this subject.

Despite this, the undersigned wishes to emphasize the seriousness of these charges. They involve execution, beatings, "disappearance" of individuals under Partisan custody, burning and looting of property. In the case of charges of individual incidents brought up in conversation, the mission staff made every effort to check the story and seek evidence of other witnesses. In the case of some of the charges brought in official Nationalist documents it was possible in some instances to secure independent witnesses. No member of the mission personally saw any act of atrocity, though numbers of alleged victims of attacks were interviewed and examined. In the light of considerable past experience in the investigation of atrocity stories the undersigned is convinced that there is no common standard in this matter among Partisans. It was freely admitted that on some occasions of Partisan occupation the attitude has been correct - beyond the natural seizure of cattle and other food supplies. On the other hand the mass of evidence and the extent of corroboration require the undersigned to believe that in many instances civilian Nationalists, including women and priests, have been murdered, while many others have been carried away. The majority of charges involve two classes of Partisan troops, the ex-Ustashi who have been accepted so freely in Partisan ranks, both Croats and Moslems, and the foreign troops which have been so conspicuous in the recent Serbian campaign - Bulgars, Rumanians, and Hungarians. There appears, further, to have been a marked increase in such terroristic practices during the past two months, involving in particular Serbia and the Dalmatian Coast.

Whether mistaken or not, there is a sincere and deep conviction on the part of the Nationalist leadership and rank and file that the deliberate intention of the Partisan leadership is to exterminate at least the local Nationalist leaders in each community in the hope that the masses may be persuaded to accept the Partisan movement. Paralleling this is the conviction that the Partisan-Ustashi combination in Western Yugoslavia is now engaged in the extermination of the whole Nationalist Serb population. These convictions must be considered in connection with the Nationalist realization that the Allied Liaison officers with the Partisans are not permitted to observe conditions

for themselves. The two together engender desperation and a desperate hatred for the Partisan leadership which has provoked this situation. Whether mistaken or not, that it is a sincere conviction on the part of a large portion of the population of Serbia is proved by what the mission witnessed during the retreat in Serbia - old men, women, and children streaming over the hills in flight before the advance of the "liberating" Partisans; and the population which stayed behind lining the roads with tears running down their cheeks as they passed out water and bread to the retreating Nationalists.

g. Partisans and the Nationalist Isolation

Nationalist hatred and distrust of Partisan leadership spring also from the conviction these leaders have from the beginning pursued a deliberate policy of isolating Nationalists and especially Serbs from their traditional friends, Britain and America. They are convinced that the Communist leadership of the Partisans intends to bring all the Balkans under Russian domination. They see that Allied officers with the Partisans are screened from the people. They hear on the radio that the desperately needed food, clothing, medicine, and measures for rehabilitation are not to be administered directly by British and American officers but through the Partisans. Today the Partisans are known to have an abundance of medical supplies, whereas the Nationalist hospitals lack both drugs and instruments, and operations and amputations are performed without anesthetics. They realize that in this blockade food and medicine from Britain and America are to be used as a weapon to strike down Nationalism.

Still more horrifying to the Nationalist consciousness is the undoubted fact that they have been sealed off not only from official contacts but from the voice of public opinion in Britain and America. They know that the British and Americans will no longer permit Nationalist representatives to leave the interior and present their case nor may British or American officers or newspaper men visit Nationalist held territory. As they phrase it, they have been "sealed off as thoroughly as Jews in a German gas chamber - and for the same end".

At present, resentment at this catastrophe is not directed against Britain and America nor even Russia. The Nationalists as yet cannot bring themselves to believe that with the long Serb record of democracy and readiness to fight for freedom, a great segment of the Serbs can be deliberately destined by America and Britain for destruction. Rather, to the Nationalist mind today, it is Yugoslav Communist trickery which has brought them - and the conscience of Britain and America - to this pass.

b. Alleged Partisan Failure to Fight the Axis

In all communities visited the mission found a wide spread belief among Nationalists that Partisan troops rarely if ever seriously attacked German troops or installations. It was freely admitted that the Partisan rank and file had joined with the intention of actively fighting the Axis, and some individuals admitted under pressure that in the early years of the struggle even some Communist leaders may have been animated by similar emotions. But the general conviction was that the Communist leadership of the Partisan movement had taken advantage of the willingness of the masses to fight and of the readiness of the Allies to supply arms for this purpose, simply in order to create an armed force that could eventually be used to enforce their mastery of Yugoslavia and the Balkans. It was insisted that from 1941 on the principal military objective of the Partisans has been to attack and destroy Nationalist resistance among Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

To support these charges a great mass of evidence was offered the members of the mission, much of which, of course, could not be checked in the time available. In many instances, however, corroborating testimony was secured from individuals whose character and honesty could not be lightly impugned. In addition, of course, members of the mission personally observed sufficient instances of Partisan avoidance of German troops and installations in Serbia during August and September to require the conclusion which the undersigned unhesitatingly accepts - that during this period at least the Partisan Army made no serious effort to fight Germans or hinder their retreat, but concentrated on attacking Nationalist troops who in some instances were occupied in attacking Germans.

When the mission reached Serbia, Nationalist mobilization was already under way and a series of attacks had been initiated on German and Bulgar garrisons and lines of communication. General Mihalovich explained to the undersigned that he intended first to clean out German garrisons in Northwestern Serbia, between the Brina and the Sava, and in Northeastern Serbia along the Danube. In these operations his primary objective was the seizure of certain known German depots of munitions which the Serbs badly needed. The second operation was to cut the German lines of communication between Belgrade and Sofia, Belgrade and Aradjevo, and Belgrade and Uzice, to be followed by the clearing of the line Uzice-Aradjevo. He planned, that is, to put his Serbian forces right across the main German line of retreat from the south to Belgrade. The

troops at his command in this area numbered about 40,000 by the first of September, but were deficient in automatic weapons, mortars, and ammunition. He estimated that a maximum of six German divisions would come up the Morava from the south, but that owing to communications no more than two could be deployed against him simultaneously. He anticipated that in the immediate future no more than two and one-half divisions could be concentrated against him in the Belgrade area. He had hoped that Allied air support would be made available as well as supplies of ammunition. He possessed reserves of from 50,000 - 60,000 trained soldiers who had no arms. Negotiations with certain high Bulgar officers gave him reason to believe that the latter would turn over important depots of arms and ammunition in return for safe passage of Bulgar personnel to the frontier. To this Mihailovich was prepared to accede on the basis of Bulgar parole to take no later part in the war, and it was his intention to handle German prisoners in the same way in case no means were provided by the Allies for disposing of prisoners. He himself was in no position to feed or secure large numbers of prisoners.

In part the above plan was disturbed by the impetuosity of the Nationalist field commanders. Disregarding the planned schedule, Nationalist formations began to attack both German and Bulgar garrisons and communications all over North Serbia during the last week in August and the first week in September. Though there is ample proof that these operations resulted in significant losses and disrupted the German and Bulgar lines of communications, their piecemeal character delayed the concentration of Nationalist troops at key points and led to the breakdown of negotiations with the Bulgars who found the Partisans more ready to facilitate their retreat.

Disaster came, however, on the heels of victory when the Partisans unleashed a sudden offensive northwards over the Zap Morava, accompanied by the use of American fighter planes in strafing operations which resulted in much more harm to the Nationalists than to the Germans. At this period the mission was staying just north of the Zap Morava and roughly midway between Kraljevo and Uzice, and the members of the mission had ample opportunity to observe the character of the Partisan offensive. The German garrisons at Kraljevo, Cacak, and Uzice were carefully avoided by the Partisans. German traffic between these points had already been severed by the Nationalists, and the three towns had been partially invested. The first phase of the Partisan offensive was limited exclusively to driving the Nationalist north away from these towns and communication lines. The undersigned vouches for the fact that German traffic was then renewed between Uzice and Kraljevo and the German garrisons were attacked or forced to retreat only in October.

The second phase of the Partisan offensive comprised a supreme effort to push the Nationalist troops north into German arms. To accomplish this concentration in the north the Partisans evacuated most of the territory along the Zap Morava - interesting evidence of their numerical weakness. Mihailovich in turn sent most of his field forces south through the Partisan lines where they again began to harry German communications in the Ibar Valley as well as along the Zap Morava. With less than 400 men around him Mihailovich, by his clever use of knowledge of the country, evaded capture by greatly superior Partisan forces which pursued him as far as the Drina River. In this third phase, again, the mission was able to observe in the Valjevo and Sabac areas the careful abstention of the Partisans from any attack on German held towns.

Early in September one member of the mission had been sent to the Krusevac area in East Serbia. Here throughout September and part of October he witnessed the Partisan concentration of forces against the Nationalists while at the same time a steady stream of German traffic from Greece followed the Ibar valley route to Kraljevo. Though the Partisans held positions in strength along much of this route throughout most of September and October, nothing significant was attempted to disrupt this line. In fact its use was discontinued only because of the approach of Russian troops late in October.

In the light of all the evidence which the undersigned has been able to gather regarding the fighting in Serbia during September and October, it is his considered judgement that up until the final drive on Belgrade, for which he has no details, the Partisan forces killed, captured, or disrupted fewer German forces than did the Nationalists, despite the Partisan disruption of the General's plans. Yet throughout this period the Partisans regularly received supplies of ammunition from the British by American planes while Nationalist troops went into battle with as few as ten cartridges and accompanied by unarmed men who hoped to acquire a weapon during the engagement.

Further direct evidence of Partisan unwillingness to attack the Germans was observed by the mission in Bosnia, while stopping in the district of Ozren near the Bosna River. On the West bank of the river, where the Nationalists were poorly organized, Partisan forces were constantly attacking and harassing the Nationalists. Meanwhile a principal German escape route, the railway and highway from Sarajevo to Doboy, ran along the river, and the steady stream of German personnel and materiel was never interrupted by the Partisans. On the Ozren side the potentially equally important escape route from Visegrad through Tuzla to Doboj, had for months been completely blocked by the

Nationalists despite repeated German efforts to open it.

Another source of direct evidence were Partisan prisoners of the Nationalists with whom the undersigned talked - Croats, Slovenes, Italians, and a Russian. They were asked by the undersigned to give an account of their marches and engagements during the current year. Though each had been repeatedly engaged against Nationalists in Dalmatia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, or Serbia, not one had seen any action against Germans or Ustashi. They also testified that they had never seen any British or American officers in the vicinity of any engagement, though some of them knew that there were liaison officers at rear headquarters.

These examples of evidence supporting the numerous detailed charges brought by Nationalists of Partisan failure to attack Germans must be associated with the known instances of Partisan falsification of communiques. To this should be added the testimony of British and American liaison officers attached to Partisan units, given in official reports as well as orally, to the effect that they have not been permitted to observe Partisan activity and they suspect the Partisans of failing to seriously attack Germans while hoarding the arms and munitions received from the Allies in order to use them in a civil war. The sum total of the evidence requires the objective observer to give serious consideration to the Nationalist charge that the principal concern of the Partisan leadership has been, not to destroy Germans, but Nationalists and Nationalism in Yugoslavia and the Balkans.

i. Partisan Collaboration with Ustashis

The mission received a great deal of information charging that the Ustashi and Partisans were collaborating in attacks on Nationalists in Dalmatia and that in Bosnia Ustashis in large numbers were joining the Partisan ranks. It was charged in particular that known Ustashi criminals, who had been active in the terrible killings of 1941, had taken this means of escaping punishment. Since coming out from the country the undersigned has been told by a competent source that this last charge has been recognized as true by the British and that unsuccessful representations have been made to Partisan Headquarters on the subject. The Nationalists, both Serbs and Moslems, have collected a mass of detailed reports on Ustashi crimes, with names, places, and dates. They also have the names of the better known criminals who have joined the Partisan Army or civil administration or who have been accepted by the Partisans as collaborators against the Nationalists.

The undersigned was not in a position to obtain direct proof of these charges, but their specific character and the varied character of the sources give the impression of

veracity. It is certainly true that the charges are believed by Serb Nationalists and encourages them to believe that the Partisan leadership, in addition to its Communist character, has inherited the program of Pavelich and the Ustashis which sought the destruction of the Serb population in Western Yugoslavia. The latest reports from Dalmatia received by the undersigned prior to leaving the country, covering the second and third weeks in October, do strongly suggest that a bloc of one half million Nationalist Serbs in that general area are being harried by both Partisans and Ustashi, that many civilians are being murdered, and that large numbers of civilians are fleeing into the higher mountain districts despite the winter and lack of food. Since this area lies so close to the British and Americans in Italy, at Nationalist Headquarters it was felt that Dalmatia would serve as a test case. If in this area the British and Americans do nothing to stop the civil war and bring security and relief to the civilian population, then Nationalists generally throughout Yugoslavia must be prepared to fight the civil war to the bitter end.

J. Defensive Character of Nationalist Combat with the Partisans.

In any attempt to estimate the influence of the Partisan movement on the development of Serb Nationalism, it must be borne in mind that in the struggle with the Partisans, as with the Axis, the strategy and the psychology of the Nationalists has been basically defensive - the defense of many different local communities, never a coordinated offensive to destroy the enemy. Ever since the 1941 effort of the Yugoslav Communists to destroy the budding Nationalist Movement by infiltration, followed by the Partisan "stab in the back" in the fall of 1941, each year of the war has seen either one or two major Partisan offensives from Western Yugoslavia directed against Old Serbia and Bosnia, the principal strongholds of Nationalism. Since 1942 these offensives have been sustained by British and American munitions, food, hospitalization, clothing, and air support. Though Allied authorities gave supplies and support in the belief that they were being employed to defeat Germany, it has been only too evident to the Nationalist troops that this aid has been turned against them.

To each member of the mission this American participation in the internal strife of a supposedly friendly country became a most painful subject. During the Partisan offensive in Serbia the members of the mission were obliged to watch American planes strafing area held not by Germans but by Nationalists. They heard American pilots who had been shot down state that in their briefing they have been told that everything was "enemy" North of the Partisan lines in the Zap Morava valley -

though in fact it was entirely and exclusively Nationalist held. After a day spent in watching Nationalist troops go into battle with rifles and scant ammunition to face American and British mortars and automatic weapons, the mission each night had to listen, alongside these Nationalists while American transport planes circled overhead while preparing to drop further weapons and munitions into the Partisan lines for the morrow's battle.

The psychological effect on the Nationalists of this continuous defensive struggle against bitter enemies who are aided by those whom the Nationalists count their closest friends, has been very significant. Only to a moderate extent has it lessened the determination to continue the Nationalist struggle, but it has sown a spirit of frustration, of self-pity, and even of hopelessness regarding all the future which is leaving its impress on the Nationalist Movement.

k. The Nationalists and the Partisan Political and Social Programs

In the preceding sections the undersigned has attempted to draw a picture of the Nationalist hostility towards the Partisan movement. In later sections the political and social programs of Serb Nationalists will be discussed in detail. But at this point the undersigned wishes to draw further attention to his observations concerning Nationalist - Partisan relationships.

All Nationalists, of course, draw a distinction between professed and real Partisan intentions. To them it is inconceivable that Communist Party members of long standing, of proved discipline and loyalty, as are Tito and his closest associates, can sincerely work for the success of a movement with the professed political and social aims hitherto sponsored by the Partisans. These professed aims fell far short of socialism, to say nothing of Communism, and constitute individualism as well as Capitalism. The Nationalists correctly insist that the world has yet to see a Communist of Tito's rank sincerely support such a program. They correctly point out the known fact that the Yugoslav Communist Party, of which Tito was chief, down to June, 1941, held to Communist dogma much more radical than that of Russia, and that repeatedly since that date Tito has been obliged to reprove his Communist followers for failure to cover up that program, but has never renounced it.

The above are facts. The Nationalists add to these generalities a long list of specific incidents which allegedly prove that the Communists in the Partisan movement continue to preach communism and to assert that communism is to be installed in the Balkans. During September handbills were circulating in parts of Partisan occupied Serbia which denounced capitalistic and plutocratic Britain and America, attacked Churchill and Roosevelt specifically, and proclaimed the coming of communism to Yugoslavia. Such bills have been seen by American officers, but

The undersigned believes that they may well have been distributed by German agents to create trouble between Russia and the Anglo-Saxons.

Another source of these charges is constituted by Serbs who have left Partisan ranks and joined the Nationalists. The undersigned has met some of these, and was much impressed by the apparent honesty as well as intelligence of one in particular, a Montenegrin, a reserve officer who had been an officer in the Partisan Army and is now an officer in the Nationalist army. He was and still is extremely sympathetic towards the professed Partisan aims and doesn't conceal his respect for certain of the Partisan leaders and his dislike of certain conservatives among the Nationalists. Yet he gave members of the mission detailed and specific accounts of statements and practices of Communist Partisans which showed a determination to enforce Communism in Yugoslavia.

To the undersigned the most significant source of information along this line came from the incidental conversation of peasants with whom the mission stayed and who had previously been hosts to Partisan officers during passage of Partisan forces through their districts. Several such occasions presented themselves, and the undersigned stakes his judgement that there was no opportunity for the concoction of false stories. The incidents related by these peasants were based on either conversations among Partisan officers - in one instance a quarrel - or statements made by them to the peasants. The whole tenor of the remarks pointed to the sincere belief on the part of these Partisans that the aim of their movement was to install communism in Yugoslavia.

In any case Nationalists believe that the professed political and social aims of the Partisan movement will not be carried out by its present, largely Communist, leadership. On the other hand they freely admit that numbers of the non-Communist Partisans are sincerely working for these aims. Numbers of younger Nationalists have told the undersigned of the struggle that went on in their minds during 1941 as to whether they should join the Partisans or Nationalists. Most of these younger men related that none of their comrades had turned Partisan. The question that divided them was whether a greater threat to their common hopes for a better Yugoslavia came from the left wing of the Partisans or the right wing of the Nationalists. Repeatedly Nationalist leaders have told the undersigned that the only factor which separated Partisans and Nationalists was Communism. No leader among the Nationalists would question the professed Partisan social aims.

The political program of the Partisans had a mixed reaction; was definitely greeted with considerable misgivings. This was due primarily to the very prevalent belief among Serb Nationalists

that the Partisan leaders, whether Communists, or ex-Ustashi, or Croat politicians, were aiming to weaken Berboom. In the judgment of the undersigned this belief is being skillfully spread by right wing elements from Old Serbia, and by men including some intellectuals whose lives are wrapped up in the position of Belgrade as the center of Yugoslav life. Among Montenegrin and Bosnian Serb Nationalists the undersigned found a healthy readiness to place a regional loyalty alongside their sentiments as Serbs. Further, throughout his stay, the undersigned was very much impressed by the prevalent and sincere Nationalist devotion to the concept of a united federated Yugoslavia.

The question naturally arises whether Serb Nationalist political and social thinking has been significantly influenced by the impact of the Partisan movement, especially in view of the facts that in its inception the movement was almost entirely devoted to armed self defense and has remained essentially defensive in character. At this period, so close to the events, a final answer cannot be given. But, on the evidence available, the judgment of the undersigned is that a positive, dynamic, and revolutionary character has developed within the Serb Nationalist Movement primarily as a result of convictions held by the mass of its supporters prior to 1941. That is, the common elements in the Nationalist and Partisan movements - a deep desire for political and social reform - in neither movement spring from the upper leadership but from the people, especially the peasants and students. In the Partisan movement the high leadership was itself dynamic, politically minded, and positive, and was quick, therefore, to grasp and make use of the popular sentiment. In the Nationalist movement, however, the high leadership was conventional, overly mature, prevailingly military, and defensive in its strategy to the point of passivity. General Mihailovich and many of his top collaborators had long recognized the necessity for profound changes in the Yugoslav political and social structure, but it has required pressure from beneath to make the demand for these changes the vital element in the movement which they have become.

The significant stimulus to the Nationalist Movement which derives from Partisan sources lies in the pressures created by the Partisan political strategy which in self defense have forced the Serb Nationalist leaders to stress the political as well as the military character of their movement. Through this move the dynamic qualities of popular sentiment on political and social questions have been rallied to the service of the Nationalist military program. The Nationalist masses, and their local leaders, are today more willing to entrust their local fighting forces to the command of Mihailovich, the political leader and crusader, than they were previously to Mihailovich, the General and Minister of War. It is not too much to say that now in this second half of 1944 the Nationalists have begun to fight not only against hated enemies, but for a positive program of their own. In the judgment of the undersigned it is largely to the Partisans that - perhaps too late - the Nationalists owe their new maturity as a poli-

tional movement and Mihailovich personally, the discovery of his true role as a leader.

3. Serb Nationalists and Charges of Collaboration

Charges are frequently brought against the Serb Nationalists that they have collaborated with the Axis, or that, at least, they have failed to support the other Allies in attacking the Axis. These charges should be considered separately.

a. Alleged Collaboration

In the introductory section of this paper it was explained that the term Cetnik is used to denote a variety of classes of Serbs, and that Partisan propaganda has made use of foreign misunderstanding of the term in order to convict General Mihailovich of collaboration. The Partisan leadership, with its patent hatred for Mihailovich and its record in respect to the falsification of information, should not be taken too seriously in its role of accuser. However, one must face the fact that certain Serbs have collaborated with the Axis forces in varying degrees. The question at issue is, can General Mihailovich, or, more properly, the Serb Nationalist Movement, be held responsible?

Prior to his stay inside Yugoslavia the undersigned was inclined to believe that a degree of collaboration was in effect between the Germans and certain Serb Nationalist leaders and that General Mihailovich tacitly accepted this situation. During the stay in the country no evidence whatsoever was obtained which supported the suspicion that the General in any way conspired with the Germans to maintain or prolong their occupation of the country. On the contrary, there was ample evidence that the General, the field commanders, and the Nationalist political leaders were filled with a burning hatred for the Germans much beyond that held by British and Americans. There was further, an intense distress that Serbs were playing so minor a role in the defeat of Germany.

On the other hand it was clear that in Serbia, the immediate and most formidable enemy of the Nationalists had become not the Germans but the Partisans. After 1942 the Germans had limited themselves to a defensive role in Yugoslavia - they attacked only when seriously pressed - and these tactics were applied to both Nationalists and Partisans. Nationalist pressure on German forces had dwindled in proportion as Partisan attacks on the Nationalists increased. The relative passivity of General Mihailovich in Serbia during 1943 and the first half of 1944 in part sprang from his unwillingness to expose the people there to German reprisals. But the evidence is unmistakable that during this same period the tempo and weight of Partisan attacks on

Serbian Nationalists had increased to the point where they engaged all of the troops whom the General could adequately supply with ammunition. These Partisan offensives were successfully stood off. The Partisan attack of September, however, which caught the Nationalists deployed against the Germans, proved the inability of the Nationalists to fight simultaneously both Partisans and Germans. In East Bosnia, where the Partisan attacks on the Nationalists have been intermittent and on a smaller scale, the Mission found ample evidence that the German and his henchman, the Ustashi, had remained the principal Nationalist enemy against whom operations have been carried on throughout the war years.

In the light of the evidence the undersigned is inclined to believe that a semblance of collaboration has made its appearance wherever the Partisan attacks on the Nationalists have been most intense and have constituted a potential danger to the Germans as well as a menace to the Nationalists. Without having any evidence to prove it, he is inclined to believe that under such circumstances some but not all, Nationalist officers would accept aid from the Germans and would seek to attack Partisan forces already engaged against Germans. This is collaboration of sorts, and the undersigned doubts that officers practicing it would be disciplined by the Nationalist Headquarters if their record was otherwise clear. In fairness, however, this must be viewed against the background - the all out Nationalist resistance to the Germans in 1941, the continued struggle in East Bosnia, the sincerity of Nationalist hatred for the Germans and love for democracy and freedom, the bitterness of the Partisan attacks on the Nationalists, and the instances of Partisan attacks timed to catch the Nationalists engaged against the Germans. All the evidence, including much collected earlier by British and American liaison officers, cries out against the hypocrisy and dishonesty of the Partisan effort to destroy the Nationalist movement by labelling it collaborationist or quisling. By this attack they have only succeeded in depriving the Allies at this moment of the services of well seasoned troops, eager to attack the Germans if only relieved of the pressure of Partisan attacks.

b. The passivity of General Mihailovich since 1941.

As has already been stated, in the face of the terrible German reprisals for the Nationalist attacks in 1941, General Mihailovich informed the Allies that no useful purpose could be served by further major acts of resistance until the Allies were ready to invade the Balkans. When that day arrived he would throw all the manpower of the country into active service. This attitude was completely in line with the policy laid down by the British and American Governments for all patriots in occupied countries. Disagreement arose between the British authorities and General Mihailovich over the matter

of sabotage and other minor acts of resistance. The undersigned has heard the story from the Nationalist point of view, but does not believe that it would be useful to discuss this matter in this report. He wishes to point out here simply that passive resistance and sabotage have both been carried on by the Nationalists in Serbia and especially in Belgrade throughout the period of German occupation, and that in East Bosnia active resistance has been the rule rather than the exception. Throughout this period the Nationalists have continued to bear German reprisals through execution and imprisonment in concentration camps. When all of the evidence is evaluated, it is the considered judgement of the undersigned that only the Poles in all occupied Europe will be able to equal the record of Serb Nationalists in respect to losses suffered at German hands. They still stand ready to renew their attacks on the Germans whenever the Partisans agree to cease civil war.

4. Yugoslav Nationalism in Bosnia

Bosnia is well known as the home of mixed populations of Orthodox Serbs, Roman Catholic Croats, and Moslems. In 1941 Croat and Moslem elements under Ustashi leadership carried out major massacres of Serbs. In 1942 in a few instances, Serb Nationalists conducted counter massacres of Moslems. Outside the country much has been written about the deep hatred and chaos that has developed as a result.

During four weeks the undersigned covered most of East Bosnia and was in touch with Serbs, Croats, and Moslems from the west and south. The evidence thus collected in his judgement constitutes the greatest contribution made by the mission. For the evidence clearly demonstrates that the peoples of Yugoslavia have within themselves the capacity to compose their differences and to join in the reconstruction of their country. The composition of the differences between Serb, Croat, and Moslem has been a part of the program of General Mihailovich for at least the past two years. But the credit for what has been accomplished in East Bosnia must go to the people themselves and to the local leaders, particularly to Father Sava, Orthodox priest and Serb Nationalist leader.

East Bosnia, of course, is part of the Puppet State of Croatia, but the latter has been completely unable to establish a local administration. The Germans control the principal towns with forces which include both SS troops and Ustashi. Outside these towns, with the exception of small areas controlled by Partisans, the administration is in the hands of Nationalists. Outside the towns the Axis forces move only in convoys, and trade between towns and countryside is largely at a standstill. Axis forces are constantly subject to attack, and only a limited number of roads are used by their convoys. The royal Yugoslav emblem is openly worn throughout the countryside.

The Serb Nationalists, as the best organized, have been the prime movers in this development. But increasingly Moslems and Croats have been consolidating their own strength and ridding their communities of pro-Axis elements. Complete harmony exists among Serb, Moslem, and Croat Nationalist leaders. A joint staff has been set up to coordinate all military operations whether involving Axis forces or Partisans, and joint operations are undertaken on an increasingly large scale. On the civilian side each of the three National groups handles its own affairs, and disputes involving two or more of the groups are handled by joint committees. The sincerity of the friendship and cooperation developed on all levels is unmistakable. The significance of this development lies in the fact that it emphasizes both its Bosnian and its Yugoslav character. In the interests of each of the local communities it has been proved by sad experience that they must first unite as Bosnians and then work as a unit of Yugoslavia. This of course, is the antithesis of Great Serbism or of Great Croatism, both of which deny the existence of Bosnian entity, and supports the Partisan contention that Bosnia, along with Herzegovina, should constitute one of the federal units of the future Yugoslavia. Not only is this correct but, in the judgement of the undersigned, the Bosnian Serbs and Croats are in a position to influence powerfully the promotion of a closer understanding between the main bodies of Serbs and Croats.

For the purposes of the present report the particular importance of the Bosnian situation lies in the fact that Bosnia rather than Old Serbia has become the principal stronghold of Nationalism. All three elements in the population appear to be overwhelmingly opposed to the Partisan movement because of the Communist influence and republican tendencies which characterize this movement. Nationalism in Bosnia is positive and dynamic, the population, warlike and well armed. Nationalist refugees from both Serbia and Dalmatia have already begun to stream into Bosnia. In the approaching civil war the principal formal engagements will be fought on its borders and it will remain the center from which Serbs, Croats, and Moslems irregular bands will strike out into the surrounding areas to keep the struggle alive.

5. The Program of Yugoslav Nationalism.

The undersigned has discussed Nationalism with all Yugoslav elements, Slovenes, Croats, Moslems, and Serbs from all the centers of Serbdom. Yugoslav Nationalism in one sense is heterogeneous. Each of the National and religious elements composing it have their own fears and ambitions. In terms of ideologies it embraces all political parties from Right to Left except for the Communists. It has not been created by a small group seeking to impose their blueprints on a whole country. Rather, it was first a series of local movements, which, under pressure, have coordinated-or are coordinating - their programs and interests to achieve certain common aims.

The common aims of Yugoslav Nationalism may be summarized as follows:

a. The freeing of the soil of Yugoslavia from all foreign domination.

b. The complete defeat of the present attempt of the Yugoslav Communist Party to win National control through its control of the Partisan movement.

c. The purging from all political parties of all individuals who have played any significant role in the various Yugoslav Governments of the past fifteen years, and the punishment of certain leaders either for collaboration with the Axis or for anti-democratic actions prior to the war.

d. The creation of a completely new political constitution for Yugoslavia that will re-define the rights of both national groups and the individual citizen; this to be accomplished through a series of elections, perhaps under control of the Great Powers.

e. A new orientation of the economic life of the country with all emphasis on the employment of Yugoslav wealth to create better living conditions for the people as a whole rather than for favored classes; to be accomplished with a minimum of permanent government regulation, a maximum adoption of the principles of Cooperatives.

f. Reform of the educational system to place the greatest emphasis on the base rather than the apex.

g. A policy looking towards the creation of a Balkan Federation.

h. A policy of friendliness towards all the Great Powers, specifically including Russia, but refusal to recognize any part of the Balkans as the sphere of influence of any one power.

i. Reorganization of the Army, with forced retirement of all officers of General grade.

The largest group within the Nationalist movement are the peasants. They reject any Communist associations for Yugoslavia, but they show almost equal hatred for all of the old political leaders and parties, including the Agrarian Party. Their basic feeling is one of determination to free themselves from strict government control of their economic life - whether from right or left. They believe in cooperatives managed by the farmers themselves. They believe that they must be represented in the government by actual "dirt farmers", not by politicians who used to be farmers. The vast majority of these peasants are mildly royalist, in certain areas royalism is intense, but as a whole the question of the monarchy is less important than that of reform.

The most dynamic group in the Nationalist movement are the students, who have furnished so many of the best Nationalist fighters. For the most part their program is that of the peasants, in fact they believe in a peasant government, but they are more revolutionary, less individualistic, than are the mass of the peasants. Their hatred for the "old order" reaches the point of a demand for the trial and execution of many of the old political and capitalistic leaders. Yet their hatred for Communism is intense. The students are probably more royalist than are the peasants today.

The third element of significance in the Nationalist movement comprises older intellectual and professional men, ex-politicians, and former government employees. Some of these are undoubtedly idealist and reformist, but many of them, in the judgement of the undersigned, are riding the Nationalist wagon primarily because they have no other alternative. Some of this element is called "the Belgrade group", and is viewed with considerable distrust by peasants and students, as well as by many local leaders who dislike the past influence of the capital in national affairs.

The role of General Mihailovich places him in a special category. In Serbia he is adored by both peasants and students; Bosnian and Slovene leaders appear to have great respect for him; but his influence appears to be very slight among Croat Nationalists in Croatia proper. His admirers among the students blame him for being unwilling to place more young men in positions of responsibility, and numbers of Serbs from outside Old Serbia feel that the influence of the Belgrade group has tied him too closely to Serbia. But General Mihailovich accepts the revolutionary character of the Nationalist movement, and apparently sincerely supports all the programs of the peasants. Only second to his devotion to the peasants is his keen interest in the subject of Balkan federation. It is probably true that he is essentially a compromiser - the one significant link uniting the conservative Nationalists with the students and peasants, and he may increasingly serve to unite the various national elements of Yugoslavia and the Balkans.

To any one who seriously studies both the Nationalist and the Partisan movements it becomes clear that the announced programs of both agree, or diverge only slightly, on most points. The rank and file in both movements certainly share the same hopes for the future, but have separated over the point of their fears - the one group fearing most the power of reaction, the others, the power of communism. In the judgement of the undersigned at least 85 per cent of the peoples of Yugoslavia share common fundamental aspirations as to the future political, economic, and social life of their country. The differences which do divide this great majority are not vital, but latent. Potentially they remain a menace to future unity, but only if small groups of willful men are permitted to stir up, to over-

The above optimistic appraisal of popular sentiment must not be misunderstood. If the approximately 15 percent of the Yugoslav population which comprises both the Communists and the overly Conservative element in Nationalism could be removed from all positions of power in the two movements, within a very few months the great majority would unite under new leadership drawn from both Partisan and Nationalist ranks. The Communist Party members and the ultra-Conservatives could, of course, be given their share in this leadership in proportion to their numerical strength. But the above is theory. The actuality is bloody civil war and increasing anarchy. The ultra-conservatives have little influence in the Nationalist movement, particularly in respect to control of active resistance. But on the Partisan side the National Army of Liberation is completely dominated by officers who are devoted Communists.

C. Conclusions and Recommendations.

1. Strength and Weakness of the Nationalist and Partisans

a. Popular and Proportional Strength.

It has long been the conviction of the undersigned, only strengthened by recent experience, that in evaluating the sentiments of any large groups of people one must distinguish between active and passive proponents or opponents of any given sentiment. That is in considering Yugoslavia he would distinguish between active and passive supporters of Nationalism and of the Partisan movement.

At the most, only 5 percent of the total population can be labelled as pro-Axis, and these must be classed as almost entirely passive - they serve the Axis only because of force of circumstances. For practical purposes, aside from a few individuals, they can be ignored as a distinct group, and considered as either Nationalist or Partisan. Thus, numbers of active Ustashi leaders are joining the Partisans and Nedich followers are certain to be assimilated by Nationalists.

Not more than 10 - 12 percent of the Yugoslav population are Communist Party members or aspirants for membership. Of these a majority are Serbs from all centers of Serbdom but particularly from Western Yugoslavia, followed, in numerical order, by Slovenes, Croats, and Moslems. This includes, of course, women and youth. A large majority of this total have been attracted to Communism only since the outbreak of war and the consequence, upheaval of Yugoslav society.

Not more than 3 - 5 percent of the Yugoslav population are ultra-Conservatives, almost entirely male and in the upper age brackets. It is not unfair to class them all as either plutocrats (men whose political thinking is determined by their economic interests) or politico-religious leaders (political thinking determined by clerical interests). They are well distributed among Serbs, Slovenes, Croats and Moslems.

Of the remaining large majority of the population, and including both active and passive, it is the considered judgment of the undersigned, based on all available evidence, that Nationalists heavily outnumber Partisans, probably not less than the ratio of 3 to 1. That is, throughout Yugoslavia there are at least three individuals whose principal fear is Communist domination for every individual whose great fear is directed at reaction.

The strongest factors supporting Nationalism among Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and Moslems are:

(1) The conservative and individualistic character of the peasants, a large majority of whom own their own land.

(2) The influence of the three religious faiths and the fact that a heavy majority of the clergy insist that Communism is anathema to God, and actively support Nationalism.

(3) The tradition of National patriotism combined with the conviction that Communism is alien and works to subject the country to alien influence.

(4) Intense hatred for the Partisan leadership engendered by the record of that leadership during the past four years, in particular, atrocities.

The strongest factors supporting the Partisan movement are:

(1) Dislocation produced by the war, in particular the atrocities by Germans in Slovenia, by Ustashi in Croatia, West Bosnia and Dalmatia, which drove large numbers of desperate men into the forests and mountains, ready to welcome any leader who could promise food and arms.

(2) Conditions of poverty in Montenegro, Dalmatia and Western Bosnia even prior to the war.

(3) Disgust with the regimes which have governed Yugoslavia throughout most of the period between 1920 and 1940, and the consequent spread of pro-Communist sentiment among intellectuals, idealists, and some peasants in nearly every Community.

(4) Excellent discipline and organization of the Yugoslav Communist Party; its training in Partisan tactics prior to the war on the battlefields of Spain, in France, and above all, in certain schools in Moscow. Particularly skillful has been the training in propaganda.

(5) The economic and military support contributed by Britain and America.

If one turns to consideration of active supporters of the two movements, the ratio becomes more favorable to the Partisans. Among the latter nearly all are perforce active because of both Communist discipline and the highly organized character of the movement. Among Nationalists, as has already been explained, loyalty and discipline are based primarily on small local groups; the organization is loose, and the high leadership cannot impose its will. Nationalists who are active are exclusively volunteers, whether as fighters or political workers.

It is the considered judgement of the undersigned, indeed, that the Partisan movement today has come to comprise in large measure simply a military machine placed at the disposition of its leaders, whereas the Nationalist movement has become primarily political.

In terms of numerical strength among the Yugoslav population, there are probably at least two active Nationalists to every one active Partisan, but in terms of practical military and political strength, their present organization and the Allied resources available to the Partisans give them effective superiority.

b. Current military strength of Nationalists and Partisans on the basis of careful studies based largely on material from Partisan and British sources gathered since April, 1944, the undersigned estimated that as of last July the Partisan military effectives numbered no more than 100,000 for all of Yugoslavia. All evidence gathered during the stay in the country corroborated this conclusion and further demonstrated the numerical weakness of the Partisans through their inability to effectively hold territory which they had over-run. For each new advance they were obliged to evacuate territory formerly held.

Since August of this year, the Partisan Army has received significant accretions from Bulgarian, Rumanian, and Ustashi sources, and they have been joined by about one half of the Domobran, the army of the Puppet state of Croatia. One must assume, though the undersigned lacks evidence, that recruits have been secured from among the population of Old Serbia, in particular, Belgrad. On the other hand, there was good evidence as of mid-October, that the average Partisan division - of the large number concentrated in or near Old Serbia - totalled closer to 2000 than to 3000 men. The average strength, of the division, that is, was less in October than that estimated by the undersigned for July. There is certainly no basis for estimating current Partisan army strength at more than 100,000 effectives. These are concentrated principally in Old Serbia and Dalmatia and Western Croatia. They effectively control only small parts of Slovenia, Bosnia, Hercegovina and the Sandjak.

As of the first week in September, Serb Nationalist troops in the field numbered close to 100,000, but were widely scattered throughout Old Serbia, East and West Bosnia, Dalmatia,

Hercegovina, and Montenegro. As of the third week in October, this field strength had been reduced to between 60 - 70,000, mostly in Bosnia, Hercegovina and Dalmatia. Some 10,000 additional Nationalist troops have gone underground in partisan-occupied Old Serbia.

All Serb Nationalist units are effectively handicapped by lack of ammunition and of mortar and artillery. About half of their units have serious shortages of automatic weapons. The soldiers and the non-commissioned officers are of good quality, adequately trained, and, of course, exclusively volunteers. In the judgement of the undersigned there is a serious deficiency in field grade and, especially, staff officers. In this connection it must be borne in mind that most Yugoslav officers are prisoners in Germany, as well as over 100,000 enlisted men, mostly Serbs. A very serious additional handicap is the point already made, that Nationalist troops are still essentially a homeguard militia, effectively at the disposal of the commanding general only in so far as local sentiment concurs with his objectives.

In addition to Serb Nationalist military strength, one must consider the potential contribution of Nationalist Moslems, Croats, and Slovenes. In East Bosnia the Moslem homeguard, the Green Cadre, as of 20 October, numbered not less than 20,000. These men, before desertion from Axis formations, had been trained by German officers, and are well armed and supplied. As further inevitable disintegration overtakes the Moslem SS units, recruits and supplies will continue to flow into the Green Cadre. Within the next few months it is expected that Green Cadre strength in Bosnia will total about 50,000. These Moslems have a fine military tradition, and the enlisted men and junior officers appear both well-trained and possessed of high elan. Owing to the ease with which they have been able to rob German depots - guarded by other Moslems planning to desert subsequently - they are well-equipped with all weapons save field artillery, and possess a considerable reserve of ammunition. As hitherto primarily a village home defense force, the Green Cadre has functioned only through small units. With the aid of Serb Nationalists during October considerable progress was made in the organization of battalions and brigades, and the Moslem leaders at that time were planning integration of all Moslem forces in Bosnia into a group of "Corps" in the model of the Serb Nationalists. General Djinalovich assisted these leaders in procuring the services of certain Yugoslav Regular Army officers of Moslem extraction. It is hoped, later, to secure the services of Turkish officers. The Moslem Nationalist forces, in short, are weak in the present organization of larger units, but for defensive purposes and irregular warfare their contribution to the Civil War will be very significant - especially in view of the strong antipathy felt by most Moslems towards Communism. In addition to Bosnia, as of 20 October in the Sandjak a force of about 1000 local Moslems was cooperating

with the Serb Nationalists.

As has already been noted in Bosnia the Croats have organized Nationalist home defense forces by taking over certain elements in the Ustashi organization. About half of the Domobran has either deserted to swell these village units or has formed Nationalist bands under command of Peasant Party leaders in the forests of Western Bosnia and Slovenia. Here, too, General Mihailovich and the Serb Nationalists have been of considerable assistance. But, in the judgment of the undersigned, the Croat Nationalist military movement, at least in Bosnia and Slavonia is still weak. Up to 21 October, their numbers cannot have exceeded 10,000. All the men have had some military training, and they possess an adequate number of officers, but organization and equipment are still very deficient.

All who are familiar with Croats will agree that Croat Nationalist resistance to the efforts of the Partisans to establish domination over Croatia will be intense, perhaps fatal to the Partisan cause. But whether they will make a significant military contribution to the Civil War will depend in large measure on the energy which may, or may not, be displayed by Macek and the other Peasant Party leaders. If Macek retires from active leadership there is some reason to fear an internal dispute among Nationalist Croat leaders over the succession. However, if the Partisans continue their recent practice of persecuting and killing Croat Nationalists - as established by British sources - this internal dispute will probably be postponed.

Prior to his visit to Serbia, the undersigned had managed to establish rather satisfactory sources of information on the Slovene Nationalist movement. About 10,000 Slovene Nationalists fled to Serbia and Bosnia during the first two years of the war, and most of these have actively joined in the Serb Nationalist movement. General Mihailovich has maintained close relations with the leaders in Slovenia, and has been formally recognized as in command of all Slovene Nationalist troops. Slovene Nationalists claim two military bodies. The homeguard organized by General Rupnik and recognized and armed by the Germans last summer possessed a total of about 12,000 men, well-armed save for artillery, and fairly well-trained and officered. It is claimed, and the undersigned believes, correctly, that with the exception of a small number of senior officers, including of course Rupnik, this force is thoroughly anti-German. It definitely is Nationalist and strongly anti-Communist. Upon the retirement of the Germans this force is certain to put itself at the disposition of the Nationalist cause in any Civil War with the Partisans. The illegal Slovene Nationalist force in Slovenia numbered last summer approximately 6,000 men actually under arms. They were neither well-armed nor well-trained, but increasingly they were being joined by Slovene deserters from the German army. The military strength of Slovene Nationalism is, thus, not insignificant, but presently largely potential. But Slovene Nationalism is as intense and dynamic as Slovene Communism, and, numerically, enjoys a ratio

of at least 4 to 1. It must be borne in mind that much of the Partisan strength in Slovenia has come from the Italian minority.

c. Estimate of Future Strength or Weakness of Nationalists and Partisans.

The present strength of the Partisan movement, political and military is the result of war, more specifically, the result of British and American military and propaganda support. The present strength of the Nationalist movement derives solely from popular sentiment and conviction. Given normal peacetime conditions, it is the considered judgement of the undersigned that the Partisan movement as now constituted would disappear. It would become a political influence in proportion to its popular support. The Partisan Army today is largely conscript. The best of its troops are drawn from the displaced elements of the population. If peace should bring the opportunity for these elements to return to the rebuilding of their homes and their normal life, a large majority would renounce their military service. If Allied military and economic assistance and propaganda support should be withheld from the Partisan Army as such, the present movement would collapse in a few months. Marshal Tito, that is, can retain his present position and power only through continuation of both Allied support and at least the semblance of conditions of war.

Nationalist military strength is incapable of standing in formal war against the Allied supported Partisan Army. Notwithstanding, whenever the expected full dress Civil War breaks out, the Nationalists - Serbs, Moslems, Croats, and Slovenes - are likely to make, initially, a resistance based on formal warfare. Assuming continued Allied assistance to Marshal Tito, they will meet defeat owing to shortages in armament and to the ability of the Partisans to make rapid concentrations.

This defeat will inaugurate a period of irregular warfare for which the Nationalists are already laying plans. Their extended strategy is that already so successfully applied by both Mihailovich and Tito against the Germans - infiltration through and behind the enemy lines. They calculate that to successfully crush organized irregular resistance, Tito will need a numerical superiority of 4 to 1, that is, a field force of at least 400,000. With a Partisan force of no more than 200,000, they believe the Partisans will be unable to effectively occupy a major part of Yugoslavia, and the irregular warfare can be continued for at least two years. They believe further that if Tito attempts to raise an army large enough to crush the Nationalist movement in from six months to a year, he will overstrain the resources of the country and bring about his own destruction.

The Nationalist leaders anticipate bloody repression of the type which has already been inaugurated by the Partisans against the Serbs. But they count on the very broad base of the Nationalist movement, and in the large number of trusted local leaders, to render such repression ineffective. On the other hand, they anticipate that the Communist leadership of the Partisan movement will be unable to find any large number of Yugoslavs willing for long to act as executioners of their own people. What they perhaps most fear is that the Yugoslav Partisan movement will be integrated with the Partisan movements of neighboring countries; that Yugoslav Partisans will be conscripted to repress Nationalism in those neighboring countries, while Yugoslavia is being terrorized by a conscript army of Hungarians, Rumanians, Bulgarians, and Albanians under Tito's command.

The undersigned cannot too strongly emphasize that these Nationalist preparations are being made in deadly seriousness. Though they still hope that the Allies will desist from seeking to impose Partisan domination by force, and will instead impose genuinely free elections, as realists the Nationalist leaders - Serbs, Moslems, Croats, and Slovenes - recognize that their peoples have survived previous blood baths. If these leaders did not so plan, their place would be taken by other leaders.

It is the firm conviction of the undersigned that a Communist led and dominated Partisan movement can in the long run neither win over Yugoslav Nationalism nor effectively crush it. Due to its present effective military strength, it will win temporarily a measure of success, but it lacks the possibility of winning a broad basis of popular support under its present leadership. If, on the other hand, the Allies would insure genuinely free elections, and if a government should be set up representative of all the elements in the population, both the Partisan movement and the Communist Party have sufficient vitality to make a significant and beneficial contribution to the future of the country.

2. Russians, British and Americans in Yugoslavia

a. Russia in Yugoslavia

Prior to the entrance of Russian armies into Yugoslavia, the undersigned found no evidence of any Russian activity among either Partisans or Nationalists except for radio broadcasts. Once the Russian armies crossed the border, reports began to come in from Nationalist field commanders indicating that no fixed policy had been laid down by the Russian High Command. Contacts between Russians and Nationalists were established by General Mikhailovich's command wherever possible. In numbers of instances, the Partisans were able to prevent such contacts, or to stultify them. In some instances, the Nationalist officers and men and civilian leaders were imprisoned by the Russians, in others, by Partisans operating with the Russians.

but in certain instances Russian commanders established friendly relations with the local Nationalists, assured them that Russian occupation was purely military and temporary. In a few instances, liaison officers were exchanged and the Russians accepted Nationalist offers to cooperate in attacking the Germans. In some towns, Russian discipline was reported as excellent; in others, excesses of a regrettable nature were reported.

Among Nationalists the undersigned found no hostility towards Russia except insofar as it was feared that she would support the Yugoslav Communists. There is considerable evidence to suggest that the Nationalist leadership would welcome any move towards cooperation that might be made by Russians on the basis of recognition of Russia as a protector and abstention by Russia from interference in local affairs.

b. Britain in Yugoslavia

Despite the support given by Britain to the Partisans, the undersigned was astonished at the strength of pro-British feeling among Nationalists. Bitterness was developing, and may become general, but for the most part there was still a belief that Britain and the Serb Nationalists would eventually resume their traditional friendly tradition.

c. America - Yugoslavia

After making allowances for the natural tendency of a friendly people to demonstrate in the presence of visiting officers, the undersigned was left with the impression that American decision to assume no responsibility for Balkan developments is not accepted by thinking Nationalists. Baldly their position is that American power in the world is such that though she may seek to avoid responsibility in this quarter, she will, nevertheless, be saddled with it. If the sentiment of the people should turn against Britain, America will in large measure be viewed in the same light. In optimistic moments, Nationalists speak often of increased American participation in Yugoslav economic life. Otherwise, all they expect of America is a share in the alleged joint Allied responsibility to insure free elections after the German retreat. They would welcome American occupation along with that of Britain and Russia, but do not consider this essential.

In general, all Nationalists are convinced that the best and only effective way of preventing civil war is for the Allies to occupy all of Yugoslavia, to oversee the elections, and recognize a responsible Yugoslav Government only after such elections.

3. Recommendations

a. The undersigned recommends that the Allies jointly inform both Nationalist and Partisan leaders that civil war and all acts of organized violence must cease immediately; that failure to comply will insure withdrawal of Allied support.

b. The undersigned recommends that Allied missions be established in all provincial centers of Yugoslavia, attached to no local group, but charged with the duty of establishing temporary zones of local administration, recognizing temporarily in each area the local group now exercising the powers of administration.

c. The undersigned recommends that a provisional National Government be set up on the following basis: One third of the members to be nominated by Partisan authorities, one-third, by Nationalist authorities, and one-third by the Allies from among Yugoslav personalities. The duties of this provisional government would be, (1) to accept the dissolution of the present Partisan and Nationalist armies and incorporate them in a Yugoslav Army which would be placed under Allied command for use against Germans; (2) set up the machinery for elections for a National Convention which would determine the future political organization of Yugoslavia. Failure of any group to carry out this program would insure withdrawal of Allied support from that group.

Obviously the policy above recommended is feasible only if supported by the three Allies. Whether or not such joint action is possible is unknown to the undersigned. If possible, however, the undersigned is convinced that after preliminary outbursts of protest, a large majority of both Partisans and Nationalists would accept the policy. The undersigned is convinced further that the enforcement of this policy would require only tactful firmness, not the employment of large bodies of Allied troops to maintain order.

Failure of the Allies to enforce their joint will on all groups in Yugoslavia will inevitable lead to bloody and prolonged civil war which may spread and eventually require a much more grave involvement of the Allies than that envisaged in the above recommendations.

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