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**Combined Monthly Intelligence Review**

**GREECE**

**HENLEY**



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
HQ Land Forces GREECE  
COMBINED MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW No. 8.

CONTENTS

<u>Part I</u>	<u>GENERAL</u>
<u>Part II</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE</u>
	(a) ALBANIA
	(b) JUGOSLAVIA
	(c) BULGARIA
<u>Part III</u>	<u>MILITARY SECURITY and COUNTER - INTELLIGENCE</u>
	(a) General
	(b) Port Security
	(c) German Intelligence Services
	(d) Collaborators
	(e) War Criminals
	(f) Alleged Espionage Net in XANTHI Area
	(g) KKE Espionage
	(h) OZNA Activities
	(i) Displaced Persons
<u>Part IV</u>	<u>CIVIL SECURITY</u>
	(a) General
	(b) Armed Bands
	(c) Macedonian Autonomist Activities
<u>Part V</u>	<u>POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE</u>
	(a) The Government
	(b) The Elections
	(c) Constitutional Question
	(d) Internal Politics
	(e) Economic
	(f) Foreign Relations
<u>Part VI</u>	<u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>
	Locations of FS Sections

APPENDICES

- "A" Persons held on charges of espionage with the enemy and released by the Greek Authorities after trial.
- "B" TSALDARIS Government 18th April 1946.
- "C" Post Mortem on the Greek Elections.



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PART I

GENERAL

Although an expose' of the policy of GREECE's Populist government awaits the meeting of the Assembly on 13 May the first month of that party's government has given a clear indication of the main lines it proposes to follow. It was to be expected that the Plebiscite would be a primary consideration. Another preoccupation has been National Claims. The PARIS Conference and supposed imminence of the Peace Conference have focussed attention on them right from the start. It may be noted that it is on this point that KKE's appeal to the Greek population is weakest though the Party is trying to offset its anti-national attitude to claims in the NORTH by emphasising GREECE's claim to CYPRUS, and by launching an altogether new claim - against TURKEY, for Eastern THRACE. It is significant that the latter claim appeared so hard upon ZACHARIADES' return from the Communist Congress in PRAGUE.

The new government has been less active in the economic sphere and so far no action has been taken to find other methods of maintaining a stable currency than the present one of selling gold sovereigns to all comers. This method, unsatisfactory though it is, has however, achieved its object so far and in consequence commodity prices have shown little fluctuation throughout the month.

Labour has been showing signs of disquiet ever since the election result was announced since it is sure that the new government will favour the employers in its settlement of many outstanding labour questions, at the expense of the working classes. The government forestalled a 24 hour general strike on May Day by declaring the occasion a public holiday.

The state of law and order which had remained at a comparatively satisfactory level for some weeks showed a sharp deterioration after Easter. Right-wing terrorism has increased in the PELOPONNESE in parts of which the Gendarmerie seems incapable of taking any firm measures and Left-wing banditry has increased in Central and Western MACEDONIA, where attacks on the Gendarmerie are becoming frequent occurrences. It begins to look as if the Macedonian communists are deliberately attempting to stir up the Slav-Macedonian minority and it is suspected that on this point at least a measure of agreement has been reached between KKM and KKE. Although it falls outside the period covered by this summary it should be noted that the TSALDARIS government is alive to the situation and has already taken some stern, if undemocratic, measures in an attempt to control disorder and banditry.

KKE's all-out campaign against the presence of British troops in GREECE continues. No opportunity is missed to spread abroad any slanders, unpleasantnesses or downright lies which could possibly help to sully the good name the British soldier has made for himself in this country. So far this campaign has stopped short of physical violence but it is known that both this and sabotage are now envisaged by the Party as possibly becoming ultimately necessary.

PART II

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

(a) ALBANIA

On 27 March, HMG delivered a note to the Albanian government. This note was the consequence of a number of discourtesies and restrictions which the British Military Mission had received at the hands of the Albanian government. Though the HODJA regime was officially recognised on 10 November, the British Minister designate has not yet entered the country. The note stated that unless satisfactory guarantees were given to HMG that the specific complaints mentioned would be remedied and all normal diplomatic privileges granted to the new British Minister on his arrival, HMG would not instruct him to proceed to ALBANIA. The Albanian government replied to HMG's note on 28 April but the reply was not considered to be satisfactory. It was announced on 4 April that a British Minister would not be sent to TIRANA nor could an Albanian representative be received in LONDON. It was, however, pointed out that should the Albanian government choose to change its attitude HMG was perfectly willing to reconsider the question. On 5 April the British Military Mission was withdrawn from ALBANIA.

With the departure of British representatives from ALBANIA, little fresh reliable intelligence has been received. Of the information that has become available, a large proportion is from interrogation of refugees and cannot be regarded as reliable unless confirmation is also received. A demobilised Albanian officer who entered GREECE on 4 April stated that there were strong rumours in KORRCE that the army was to be reduced to three divisions. He was also of the opinion that 5 and 6 Divisions were disbanded on their return from JUGOSLAVIA. This disbandment was tentatively mentioned by Greek military sources in March but it can not yet be accepted. British sources in ALBANIA reported that troops wearing the distinctive uniform of 5 and 6 Divisions were seen in other divisional units in March, a fact which may support the disbandment theory or it may merely indicate that personnel are being cross posted to make up homogeneous units. A source confirms that moves and reshuffles were continuing throughout March and early April on some scale. According to this source these moves should have been completed by 15 April.

Troops from 11 Brigade of 2 Division were seen passing SOUTH through TIRANA at the end of March. Troops which were questioned stated that they were on their way to the ARGYROKASTRO and KORRCE areas where they were to be dispersed into other units. Whether the Headquarters of 2 Division has now moved from its previous location at SCUTARI is not known nor is it known whether the Division is in the process of disbandment, a development which the move of 11 Brigade might indicate. The refugee mentioned above stated that a new commander of 2 Division, Lt-Col BEQIR BALOUKOS, had arrived in KORRCE on 24 March. There is, however, no indication that 2 Division Headquarters has appeared in the KORRCE area.

In general the information received from ALBANIA is too vague and conflicting to make even a tentative appreciation as to how far the recent moves and reorganisation have affected the Albanian army. There has been no further clarification of the reasons for the recent call up mentioned in OMIRG No 7 but it is thought that it is in part and possibly in whole connected with the reorganisation of the army which has taken place.

(b) JUGOSLAVIA

Reports from deserters interrogated during the month have gone far to clear up the many outstanding points with regard to the order of battle of 5 Army/18 Army now thought to consist of 2 Proletarian, 41, 48, 52 divisions, the remnants of 2 Armoured division and probably but not definitely 22 Assault division.

Deserters from 8 KNOJ Division who had previously been in 42 Division stated that 42 Division was disbanded at KRALJEVO in mid February. Confirmation of this disbandment has been obtained and it is accepted. The deserter stated that the bulk of the disbanded personnel were transferred to 8 KNOJ Division but that some 100-150 men from each brigade were transferred to North Western JUGOSLAVIA. The composition of the division on disbandment was: 3 Macedonian Bde, 7 Albanian Bde, 16 Macedonian Bde and 1 Arty Bde.

It has now been reported that 49 Division has been disbanded. The deserter who was the source of the information stated that at the time of disbandment this division had under command 6, 9, and 11 Brigades. Headquarters 49 Division was then located at KICEVO. The deserter stated that some of the personnel were sent to 41 Division and some demobilised. No details of the exact time of disbandment or the disposal of equipment have yet been received. It was stated in CMIRG No 7 that disbandment was probably the fate of 49 Division but definite information was lacking. Its disbandment is now accepted.

The same deserter who was himself transferred from 49 to 41 division stated that Headquarters 41 Division was now located at KOUMANOVO with 8 Brigade at STIP, 12 Brigade 10 miles EAST of KOUMANOVO, and 17 Brigade at VRANJE. The division is stated to have under command an independent artillery battalion equipped with 4x105 mm guns and 4x45 mm anti-tank guns. The average brigade strength was given as 700-800 men. Other information from a source whose reliability is uncertain states that 50 Division has moved NORTH to the BELGRADE area. This move is not unlikely but accurate comment is hard to make since no reports on 50 Division have been received for some considerable time. The last location of the division was believed to have been GOSTIVAR.

Since 22 Assault Division moved from MONASTIR to the PRISTINA area information concerning it has been vague and conflicting. Reports that it has moved both NORTH and SOUTH have been received while a source of unknown reliability states that this division is no longer located in the PRISTINA area and that some elements have gone to ALBANIA. This report may tie up with information which states that clashes with Nationalist bands have taken place in the PESHKOPIJE area (QG87) and that Yugoslav troops have also been involved.

Treating recent trends in Yugoslav MACEDONIA as a whole it would appear that the unconfirmed report received in February that the garrison would be reduced to two full strength divisions contained a measure of truth although it is felt that three divisions is a more probable final number (not including 8 KNOJ Division.)

The move of 4 Macedonian KNOJ Brigade from MONASTIR to VELES has been confirmed by a deserter from 8 KNOJ Division.

On 30 March the Yugoslav government promulgated a new law on military service. The main points include:

- (i) All males between the ages of 20 and 55 are liable to compulsory military service. Age groups 20-40 are liable for service with operational units and 41-55 in reserve units. In the case of war or an emergency there may also be a call up of age groups 17-20.
- (ii) The period of compulsory service will be two years. In tank and airforce formations where a higher degree of technical training is necessary, the period may extend to three years, and in the Navy to four years.

(c) BULGARIA

There has been little new information concerning the Bulgarian armed forces during the month under review.

On 18 March the Russian delegation submitted a wordy exposé on the past and present situation of the Bulgarian armed forces. The strength quoted for the army was 97845 which, it was pointed out, was 832 under strength, indicating that the eventual strength as considered reasonable by the Russians and Bulgarians will be 98,677. This figure, however, has never been laid down by any joint decision of the A.C.C. It is felt that the figure of 97,845 is probably too high for the strength in February and March and may be the strength when the 1925 call up which began on 1 April, is completed. The Russian statement declared that 9 and 10 Divisions have been disbanded; it is thought that there is no real reason to doubt this. Consequently the order of battle for BULGARIA, as accepted at present, comprises 1 "SOFIA" Infantry Division, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 Infantry Divisions, 2 Cavalry Division, and 1 Armoured Corps.

Russian troops in BULGARIA

No fresh information of significance on order of battle has been received.

British officers of the A.C.C. have stated that in their opinion the Russian troops in BULGARIA are far better grade troops than those in the other Balkan countries. It appears also that old equipment is steadily being replaced by new from RUSSIA. This information would indicate therefore that the Russians regard the troops in BULGARIA as the spearhead of any move they may deem necessary in the Balkans.

Tailpiece

During a recent interrogation of a Yugoslav, an interesting sidelight was obtained on the methods of better class deserters. During questioning he constantly referred to a closely written sheaf of papers. On being asked what they were, he explained

that he had contemplated desertion for some time and asserted, somewhat indignantly, that any deserter worth his salt invariably collected as much information as he could, to hand over to the British. This he had been told would ensure good treatment!

It is hoped that this impression will spread to all other intending deserters.



PART III

MILITARY SECURITY AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

(a) General

- (i) Relations between Greek civilians and the British forces continue to be mainly good, in spite of the fact that many of the troops are young soldiers who have not been long in the country. Left-wing anti-British propaganda is maintained at high pressure and recently featured a particularly distasteful campaign in SALONIKA alleging mass seduction of Greek girls. Even so this propaganda has failed to produce incidents directed against British troops or seriously to impair individual relationships. At the same time it is known that the collection of intelligence about British forces has been specifically ordered by KKE: the importance of security must therefore be continually emphasised to the troops lest their habitual bonhomie should lead to leakages of information.
- (ii) The improvement in the security of military establishments has been generally maintained with the tightening-up of guards and constant checking of precautions. But it is still regrettably clear that theft of WD material continues to provide a livelihood for many Greeks.

(b) Port Security

FS checks on the security of the ports of PIRAEUS, PATRAS, and SALONIKA have resulted in generally favourable reports; the importance of adequate measures is being realised by most of the Greek authorities and arrangements for guards and check-posts are largely satisfactory. The integrity of individual Greek guards, however, cannot so easily be controlled and is the main cause of insecurity.

(c) German Intelligence Services

There are no new cases to report under this Heading.

(i) DIMTSIS Athanassios

Was arrested on the 14th April by the Greek General Staff for his connections with Hector STEINHAUER a former member of Ast ATHENS. DIMTSIS admitted that his house was used by STEINHAUER as a meeting place for the latter's agents but pleads ignorance as to the real function of STEINHAUER and his group. It is interesting to note that DIMTSIS' wife is a cousin of Egon CONTOUMAS, the well known German collaborator.

(ii) SEITZ Arthur

Reference CMIRG No 7 for March Part III (b) (i). In conjunction with the Greek General Staff a number of individuals known to have had connections with the above-named have been given friendly interrogation,

Information on SEITZ is being collected from all quarters, and it is hoped that eventually the result of this investigation will give a clear picture as to whether SEITZ' purpose in coming to GREECE was to establish a subversive organisation working for German interests or whether he merely chose to return to GREECE rather than have to endure the present-day hardships of life in GERMANY.

(d) Collaborators

ELINI MAC and her daughter LILY

From investigations carried out by the Aliens Bureau it was established that LILY MAC was an agent of the Gestapo and was employed by them in supplying information on British Military personnel hiding in ATHENS from the enemy. In 1942 LILY was arrested by the Italian Military authorities and sentenced to two years imprisonment; she was eventually reprieved by the intervention of the Gestapo who satisfied the Italian authorities that she was an agent in their employ. The Collaboration Court of ATHENS has completed the interrogation of mother and daughter and it is intended to bring them both to trial in the very near future. They will be tried on a charge of collaboration with the enemy.

(e) War Criminals

(i) Trial of KALTSEFF and RAVALI

RAVALI's trial has reached its closing stages. The tribunal having examined all the witnesses asked the accused to make his final statement in his own defence. This consisted of a long speech, which took up four or five of the Court's sessions, containing names and addresses of Italian Fascists who, according to the accused, behaved criminally against the Greek population.

RAVALI threw the blame for the crimes he was accused of having committed on the Italian Higher Commander GELOSO and on the Divisional Commander of that area General BENELI. Colonel VENIERI, garrison commander of KASTORIA (QN44) and GIONA, commander of the Carabinieri of the same area, were accused by RAVALI of being the responsible parties for the selection and execution of Greek civilians in the district of KASTORIA. RAVALI further states that the Italians and Bulgarians in KASTORIA had made a pact of mutual assistance against their common enemy the Greeks, and that the KOMITATO had been formed by the Italians on orders from DELZIOUITSE, members of which came under the command of VENIERI.

KALTSEFF is now in process of making his final defence speech.

(ii) German Generals

Reference CMIRG No 7 Part III (b) (III).

Generals MULLER and BRAEUER arrived by air from ITALY

on 31 March 46 accompanied by an American guard. They are both at present in KALITHIA Prison, ATHENS.

They are to be tried as war criminals in connection with the atrocities committed by SCHUBERT and his JAGDKOMMANDOES on CRETE. It has not yet been decided whether the trial will take place in ATHENS or CANEA.

(f) Alleged Espionage Net in XANTHI Area.

On 15th March, 1946, investigations were started by Greek Security XANTHI (RL58) concerning an alleged spy ring operating in the area. The case was taken up by F.S. N.C.O. XANTHI, who reports that so far no evidence has been produced to prove its existence. The main personalities involved in the case are Ioannis KARAPOUITIS who was arrested for being in possession of a stiletto, and KATINA STAVRIDOU, a prostitute registered as a POMAK with Greek nationality who alleges that KARAPOUITIS was in possession of a wireless set and was instructed from STALINGRAD, by wireless, to obtain information about British and Greek troops, and STEPHANOVITCH a Russian who allegedly possesses a Greek and Russian identity card both in the same name.

KATINA STAVRIDOU's story as given to the Greek Security is not very convincing; her statement to the effect that she heard on the wireless, which was at the time being operated by KARPOUITIS, the word, "STALINGRAD" repeated three times, in reply to which KARPOUITIS is alleged to have repeated three times the word "XANTHI" is, to say the least of it, romantic in tone and reminiscent of the "YORK" case as reported in CMIRG No. 7 Part III(b)(v).

STAVRIDOU has now been moved from XANTHI to a brothel in KOMOTINI (RL89). The madame of her former brothel states that STAVRIDOU was continually causing quarrels with her pro-Russian and anti-King of GREECE talk. The police in KOMOTINI have been warned to keep an eye on her.

(g) KKE Espionage

It is reliably reported that the Political Bureau of KKE is not satisfied with the achievements of its Intelligence branches. A new directive has been issued ordering that all British military movements be watched closely: every Party Member should try to obtain information on British activities and forward it as quickly as possible to the respective Party headquarters. It was urged that Communists should try to obtain employment with British services as clerks, translators, and interpreters, and also to infiltrate the British Embassy and Consulates. It was suggested that American services might also receive attention at a later stage.

During April eight men were tried in KAVALLA (RL16) by Greek Court-Martial on two charges based on the Espionage Act of 1936: the first, of collecting information of a secret military nature; the second,

of transmitting this information to a foreign power. All the accused were found guilty on the first charge, but the second could not be proved. They were sentenced to periods of from three to ten years' imprisonment.

In this connection an interesting report has been received describing one means by which military information is in fact transmitted across the frontier. This is through a weekly newspaper called "MACHITIS" (The Fighter) issued by the Northern GREECE branch of SAEA (see CMIRG No 6, Part II(a)). A column headed "I FONI TON STRATON MAS" (The Voice of our Barracks) contains information on locations, strengths and personalities in Greek Army units, from which an Order of Battle might easily be built up. It is reported that copies of this paper are regularly sent into JUGOSLAVIA.

(h) OZNA Activities

Reference CMIRG No 5, Part III(b)(iii).

Enquiries have shown that the Yugoslav Refugee Camp formerly in PIRAEUS has been moved to the Island of SIROS (WF38) where it is under the new camp is under the Guard of the Gendarmerie. The Aliens Bureau confirm the suspicions about STOYANOVIC, whose associates are given as DURACOVIC Janko (who is now in SIROS) and KRULJ and DIMITROFF, both of the Yugoslav Embassy. While in the PIRAEUS Camp STOYANOVIC and his associates were known to be undermining morale. STOYANOVIC himself was sent to SIROS on 5 April 46. It is understood that there are now 548 refugees in the SIROS Camp.

(i) Displaced Persons

- (i) The report of two British Security officers in an inspection of frontier security includes the following comments on displaced persons and frontier security in general:

"Concerning Displaced Persons who are received across the NORTH Greek frontier the present ruling of the Greek Gendarmerie (Aliens Bureau) is that if they are domiciled in MACEDONIA or THRACE, they are sent direct to their homes after being interrogated in the frontier area. It is suggested that the Aliens Bureau should take greater care in selecting persons of this category who possess interesting information and that, on being selected, they should be immediately forwarded to SALONIKA for detailed (a) examination. It is pointed out that British Intelligence, due to a shortage of trained personnel, has to rely largely on the Aliens Bureau for this preliminary selection.

The deference which Greek frontier posts in general display towards anyone wearing British military insignia, although an agreeable mark of good relations between Greek and British forces, can have dangerous security repercussions. Anyone wearing such insignia can move freely in all frontier areas and inspect, question, and observe where ever he will. Out of all the frontier posts and Greek military offices visited during this

inspection and mentioned in this report, all were content to impart any information to the inspecting officers, who were unknown to them, on their face value without asking for credentials".

- (ii) A report to the effect that eighty Jews, who tried to cross into GREECE in March 1946 were driven off by National Guard and violence used against them in the presence of a British officer was investigated and found to be without substance. The officers in charge of the National Guard detachments which dealt with the party, stated that it consisted of 27 men and 7 women. They were refused permission to cross the frontier and became excited. No violence was used against them, no firearms were discharged, and no British officer was present at any part of the proceedings.
- (iii) Movement of refugees practically came to a stand-still during the first fortnight in April. Only one person of importance arrived at the Displaced Persons Camp at FLORINA: on 28 March, Lt-Col TASIC Konstantine, Head of the Private Security Service to H.M. King Peter of YUGOSLAVIA arrived. He was unable to give any information, and was forwarded to the Refugee Camp in SALONIKA. He was later sent by the Aliens Bureau SALONIKA to Aliens Bureau ATHENS. Here he was interrogated by the R.A.F. on the reported presence of British Aircrew prisoners still in YUGOSLAVIA. TASIC was unable either to confirm or deny this report.

PART IV

CIVIL SECURITY

(a) General

After the comparative calm of the Election period and the general preoccupation with Easter festivities, a sharp decline in civil security was apparent during the last week of April. This decline may be generally attributed to two main causes; first, that the approach of summer encourages fugitives from justice to take to the hills and engage in local banditry; second, that the election results have crystallised the political issues into a more clear-cut distinction between communist and anti-communist feeling. The accession of the Populist Government has occasioned the replacement of many local officials by men of more extreme right-wing sympathy and has given all Royalists increased confidence. Consequently there has been a large increase in murders and other incidents arising out of political quarrels. Individual cases have not been limited to any one part of the country, but more serious clashes involving groups of communists and nationalists have been reported from the habitually unsettled area of KILKIS (Q088), and country districts near NIGRITA (Q036) and north-west of VOLOS (Q170). On the night 29/30 April a serious clash also occurred in the ATHENS suburb of PERISTERI in which five civilians were killed and three seriously wounded.

An inevitable corollary of both the election results and the general increase in terrorism is that the Gendarmerie is now more openly taking sides with the Right: especially in the troubled areas of Southern PELOPONNESE and Western MACEDONIA this force can no longer be regarded as impartial. The return from JUGOSLAVIA of a number - at present officially about 100 - of ex-BLAS refugees is also a potential cause of trouble. At present the majority of them are held in custody by the Greek authorities in FLORINA (Q066), but unless their future movements are controlled their return may well give rise to local vendettas as well as providing reinforcements for the bands operating in the hills of MACEDONIA. The likelihood of agents being included among them is not being overlooked by the Security authorities.

(b) Armed Bands

The recent increase in banditry has been noted and two underlying reasons suggested in the preceding section. On a detailed analysis of reports it is possible to trace the areas most affected with some accuracy, and also to show the political affinities of each band.

Right-wing bands were active during April in the province of MESSINIA in the PELOPONNESE where MANGANAS is still at large, assisted by his associate TSAKERIS and claiming a somewhat vague affiliation with "K", the right-wing terrorist organisation. These bandits occupy themselves with the beating-up and murder of communists and appear to exercise some control over the movement of the civilian population by the scrutiny of travellers on the main road from MEGALOPOLIS (VH99) to KALAMATA (VH85). Another similar band is reported on the Eastern slopes of Mount TAIGETOS in the villages about YITHION (VJ21). There is little doubt that these bandits enjoy not

only the support of many local inhabitants but also a measure of collusion from the Gendarmerie. Similar conditions obtain in the hills of central EUBOEA where Right-wing bandits are active and suppression of them is not undertaken by the authorities. In THESSALY a Right-wing band under one PETIKA has recently been reported near PARSALA (QY39): as this was the hunting-ground last year of the notorious SOURLAS, PETIKA is probably renewing the tradition as the active season returns.

Left-wing banditry on an extensive scale is based on the chain of mountains running North-North-west from OSSA (QT55) through OLYMPUS and VERMION to KALIMENCHALAN (QN98) on the Yugoslav frontier. A clash occurred on 27 April between bandits and a Gendarmerie patrol near AGHIA (QT64) involving about six bandits and four Gendarmes killed; on 25 April a Gendarmerie and National Guard post at YIANNOKOHORI (QO1352) was attacked and one Gendarme killed; these are in addition to the serious clash at LITOKHORION (QT48) on 31 March already reported in CMIRG number 7. But in the VERMION area, for some time the most bandit-ridden part of GREECE, a fresh wave of murders of Nationalists has recently broken out in the villages round VEROIA (QO23) and NAOUSA (QO14). The situation is tense, especially in NAOUSA, and it is feared that Nationalists may evacuate their villages and seek safety in the towns. Left-wing bands have also clashed with Gendarmerie patrols in the hills SOUTH of FLORINA (QM66) and WEST of GREVENA (QS59). The extent of co-ordination of these Left-wing bands, mentioned in previous numbers of this Review as likely to constitute a threat to the security of MACEDONIA, is not clear, but recent declarations by ZACHARIADIS suggest that an increase of overt encouragement and support from KKE is likely in the near future.

Another incident occurred on the island of KEFALLINIA subsequent to the one reported in CMIRG No 7. On this occasion, however, it was a small Left-wing band which clashed with a Gendarmerie patrol near LIXOURION (VB5191) on 27 April: one bandit was killed.

### (c) Macedonian Autonomist Activities

Examination of documents captured near PLATANI (QO16) in the clash on 22 March in which Kapetanios LEFTERIS was killed (see CMIRG No 7 Part IV(a)(ii)) has thrown further interesting light on KKM. These documents include letters to LEFTERIS from local KKM officials and a long directive to Party members from the Secretary of the KKM Committee for the province of PELLA. The Party is usually referred to by its Slav name of NOF (Peoples' Liberation Front) and its organisation conforms to the usual lines of communist subversive movements, including a Youth Movement - NOYS - and an "Anti-Fascist Women's Front" - AFZ. A major preoccupation of both the directive and the letters is obviously to clear up a misunderstanding regarding the relations of KKM with KKE and EAM. It is admitted that KKE has been slow to recognise the Macedonian movement, but reference is made to ZACHARIADIS' approval of KKM as expressed in a speech in SALONIKA in December 45, and the directive constantly reiterates the solidarity of both Macedonians and "honest Greeks" in the struggle against "crypto-fascism". At the same time union with the Yugoslav Macedonian Peoples' Republic is claimed as the goal of Macedonians at present in Greek Macedonia, though no attempt is made to clarify the position that Greek Communist residents within this area might be intended to

occupy: any other Greeks than Communists would presumably have been "liquidated" before the union could take place. It is clear that KKM feels the need of the local support of KKE in the struggle against the established Greek authorities, but it is not prepared to commit itself on remoter objectives. That this was the case had been suspected for some time and the documents in question provide specific proof. The attitude of KKE is similar in that ZACHARIADES reaffirmed in SALONIKA on 13 April the support of KKE for the Slavo-Macedonians in their present struggle/talking more vaguely about GREECE's part in a Communist Balkan bloc. Both KKE and KKM are therefore in a dilemma over their mutual relations which is likely to be resolved only by the higher authority of MOSCOW.

/while

(d) Subversive Organisations - Left-wing

KKE

Reliable reports indicate that the KKE is more than ever preoccupied with its own internal security problems and its preparations to face what it now considers to be an inevitable attempt on the part of the new government to eradicate the movement once and for all. In the event of a plebiscite being held, all KKE and satellite organisations have instructions to go underground. Persecution will not however be met "negatively" and both OAs and MLAs are expected to mount vigorous counter offensives. Secret plans for a new mountain guerrilla movement are in existence and in certain circumstances KKE hopes to find a 'democratic' military leader for the new ELAS.

A purge of the party is in progress and should be complete by 31 May, so that new identity cards may be issued after the June general meeting.

It has become clear during the month that all KKE organisations and satellites must be considered, from the counter-intelligence point of view, as espionage organisations. Directives of the Political Bureau which stress the necessity for expelling the British Forces even ultimately by force of arms, also include direct instructions to all party members to send in reports on strengths, locations, and equipment of British Units.

(e) Subversive Organisations - Right-wing

ETHNIKON KOMMA XITON ("X" Org) and R.A.N.

The future of EKK appears to be precarious. Both VALVIS and KORFOPOULOS are reported by well placed sources to have resigned, and the latter has now been appointed Nomarch of VOLOS. A report on EKK's activities in EUBOIA by the ADC to Col GRIVAS, is in part available to us and reveals the fact that the organisation, is not strong in the island where EDDES, Gen ZERVAS' organisation appears to wield greater influence. Figures for EKK membership are given as 600 odd but may be exaggerated. On the whole however members are reported to be better armed in this district than in the Party's stronghold, the PELOPONNESE.

There are indications that the ascendancy over all Right-wing subversive organisations is slowly being gained by RAN, a politico-military irredentist group of which little has been heard lately. Details are not yet available but a reliable source suggests that RAN is well considered by the present Government.



PART V

POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE

(a) The Government

The skeleton cabinet which was formed on 5 April with M. POULITSAS as caretaker premier was short lived. In any event, M. POULITSAS' position was purely an ad hoc arrangement until an official head of the Populist party had been elected. On 15 April M. TSALDARIS was elected head of the Populists by a large majority. Consequently, M. POULITSAS resigned on 17 April and M. TSALDARIS was asked to form a government. On 17 April the three leaders of the EPE, VENIZELOS, PAPANDEOU and KANELLOPOULOS also resigned. The official reason given for these resignations was a fundamental divergence of opinion over the Populist handling of the constitutional questions. The rumour that the EPE leaders were dissatisfied with the allotment of ministries offered to them was hotly denied by M. PAPANDEOU. However it is felt that another reason for their resignations was a desire to show HMG that even if the Populists were prepared to show impetuosity in regard to the settlement of the constitutional problem, the EPE wished to conform implicitly to the views of HMG. M. TSALDARIS has stated that he hopes that the EPE will eventually rejoin his government but there are no signs at the moment of this coming to pass. In any case the National Political Union, its election function fulfilled, is virtually in dissolution.

On 18 April M. TSALDARIS announced his new government. It consists almost exclusively of Populists. A list of the members of the new government as announced to date with short biographical notes is given at Appendix "B"

The new chamber was to have been convened on 29 April; the opening has, however, been postponed and will probably take place on 13 May.

(b) The Elections

The Allied Mission for observing the Greek Elections announced its findings to the Press on 11 April. The official unanimous statement has not yet been published in its final form; the main points which the Mission emphasised will be found at Appendix "C".

The final allotment of seats in the new chamber as announced by the Ministry of Interior is as follows - Populists bloc 206 (this includes National Liberals, Reformists and the National /Liberals Renaissance party), EPE - 68, /ZERVAS'EKE - 20, TOURKOVASILIS - 9, - 48 Independants - 3.

(c) Constitutional Question

It was reported in CMIRC No 7 that the Regent submitted his resignation to the King on 5 April. On 8 April the Regent received a reply from the King who stated that he would accept the resignation of the Regent in principle but requested him to continue in office until the government had been completely formed and was in proper working order. The Regent was not pleased with this reply as he felt he was merely being used by the King and the Royalists as a stop gap until the Populist leader was elected. For two days it appeared that the Regent would not continue in office under those circumstances. On 10 April, however, he received a personal message from Mr BEVIN requesting

him to continue to lend his services temporarily to the country. On 11 April the cabinet unanimously decided to request the Regent to continue in office during the "transitional period". The American charge d'affaires also approached the Regent in the same sense. The Regent eventually decided to accept these proposals and informed the King and Mr BEVIN accordingly. The length of the "transitional period" was not specified and has, naturally, aroused considerable public discussion. However, it is generally expected that the Regent will continue in office at least until the date of the plebiscite is announced and possibly until it is actually held.

The reaction of a large proportion of the Populist party towards the continuation of the Regency which was only brought about by British pressure and the influence of the EPE leaders in the government, was vigorous. A telegram signed by 148 Populist deputies was sent to the King. Their telegram congratulated the King on his re entry onto the Greek political stage and expressed their satisfaction at the King's decision to abide in all things by the Constitution. They continued that they were surprised, therefore, that the abnormalities and customs which had arisen during the period of constitutional disorder should be allowed to continue after the people had given their verdict. This was, of course, a veiled protest against the continuation of the present Regency which should, constitutionally, be superseded by a council of ministers. In general, the continuation of the Regency was not well received by the majority of the Populist party: M. TSALDARIS and other senior personalities who realise that they would be ill advised to act precipitately in direct opposition to British views, have had considerable party criticism to contend with. As one royalist paper put it - the Regent's resignation was accepted by GEORGE II but turned down by ERNEST I. It would appear at the moment, however, that sancer counsel is prevailing. The King, himself, has advised the extremist elements in the Populist party to moderate their views and refrain from attacking the Regent. The Regent, too, appears to be settling down with the Populists, despite the considerable mud-slinging to which he has been subjected.

In regard to the reaction of other political parties to the continuation of Archbishop DAMASKINOS in office, the Republican press is satisfied with his action and has criticised the Royalists with some severity. The Left have expressed the opinion that he should be superseded by a Regency Council of three containing a representative of the Right, Centre and Left.

#### (d) Internal Politics

On 15 April, the Populist Party met to elect, formally, a leader. Out of 151 votes cast, M. TSALDARIS received 114, M. MAVROMICHALIS 19 and H. THEOTOKIS 2. 16 ballot sheets were blank. It has been reported that M. TSALDARIS' over-whelming majority was due to the desire of the Populist leaders to present to the general public a facade of complete unity within the party. To achieve this end, it is stated, both M. THEOTOKIS and M. STEFANOPOULOS, did not put themselves up for election. M. MAVROMICHALIS only decided to do so at the eleventh hour. On matters of party principle the Populists have been mainly engaged in bickering over the constitutional issues and in fact some elements threatened, at one moment, to come out in open revolt against M. TSALDARIS' policy. The personality groups within the Populist party, which have threatened party unity before, still show signs of doing so again. M. MAVROMICHALIS, in whose hands, are all the armed forces excluding the Police and Gendarmerie, is showing his desire to ensure that senior

appointments are held by officers whose politics are in sympathy with his own. In this connection he has already clashed with British policy by appointing a new Chief and Deputy Chief of Air Staff who while more politically reliable from M. MAVROMIHALIS' point of view have had considerably less experience of modern Air-force conditions than their predecessors. With regard to the Army, a reliable report states that while M. MAVROMIHALIS is contemplating some changes, he does not want to cross swords with the British Military Mission if he can help it. He has been criticised by several Populists for this so called subservience to the Mission. This attitude is obviously detrimental to the country's interest if indulged in too freely but it must be pointed out that in GREECE where politics play, by tradition, an important part in an officers' career, a republican officer, however experienced or efficient, may find some difficulty in working under a royalist master.

/Military

Considerable press comment has been given to rumours of the impending dissolution of EPE. ALbeit M. PAPANDEOU has firmly denied any such allegations, it is still on the cards that M. VENIZELOS, now that he has shown that he can successfully operate in defiance of M. SOFOULIS may offer to rejoin the Liberal party on his own terms. In such a case, it is thought probable that M. SOFOULIS would retain the leadership of the party though his influence would be considerably weaker. Should the EPE as a whole join M. SOFOULIS as the opposition in the new parliament, the Populists might, at times, get into some difficulties since it is not improbable that more moderate elements of the Populists, whose standard of party discipline is not high, might side with the EPE on certain issues. Party activities, in general, however, have not been much in evidence during the month and the Centre have confined themselves to castigating the Populists for the proposed handling of internal affairs and emphasising the Centre's desire to work in close co-operation with HMG's policy.

The Left-wing has now formulated some sort of positive policy towards the Populists election victory. Despite the report of the Allied Election Mission, the Left continue their efforts to get the election annulled. Considerable publicity is being given to the increase in terrorism, alleged by Right-wing, since the elections, and incidents obviously inspired by the Left are represented as justifiable self defence on the part of the "democrats". In fact recent public statements by KKE have encouraged such activities by "democratic citizens". M. ZACHARIADES who returned from PRAGUE on 9 April has made a full report on decisions taken there, to the Central committee of KKE. He stated that representatives of nearly all European Communist parties were present and the general policy which was adopted could be summarised as a consistent and unrelenting opposition to Anglo-Saxon imperialism. He emphasised that to achieve the best results the Communists must combine with all forces of Democracy even if this necessitated moderating Communist policy on some points. He stated that every effort must be made to bring into existence a vigorous Pan Democratic Front in GREECE. Steps were taken at this meeting to ensure an intensification of KKE's propaganda directed towards the unification of all Socialist groups. M. ZACHARIADES stressed the importance of party security measures, the building of an armed striking force and the continuation of the campaign to get the "British occupational Forces" out of GREECE even if more stringent methods than mere propaganda were ultimately necessary to achieve this end.

So far no new lines of KKE policy have made themselves manifest. Further attempts have been made to win over the

KAFANDARISTS to the Pan Democratic Front but without success. The main stumbling bloc appears to be the fundamental differences of opinion with regard to foreign relations.

(e) Economic Intelligence

Throughout the month there has been little change in the overall situation. The price of the gold pound has been maintained at the 135,000 drachma level, thanks to continued sales by the Bank of GREECE. The number of purchases, taken on an average basis, has however, shown a tendency to decrease. Despite recommendations, the government has as yet shown no signs of producing a plan whereby the drawing of gold from the Bank of GREECE could be discontinued. The government has not shown much inclination to grapple with the problem of raising funds internally for reconstruction. The government has stated that a measure of control by the Treasury will be exercised to prevent unauthorised expenditure by various ministries. The British Economic Mission has submitted to M. STEFANOPOULOS, Minister for Co-ordination of Economic Affairs, a comprehensive statement of policy together with a number of recommendations for the restoration of the country's financial and industrial position and the application of sound measures for reconstruction.

The labour world has not produced any strikes of consequence during the month. It is anticipated, however, that KKE will use its influence in the Trades Unions (excluding, of course, MAKRIS' reformist labour group) to hamstring the governments' economic measures, some of which are bound to be unpopular. Already considerable opposition has been aroused in the Left-wing camp over the proposal to amend Law 424. This law was passed in 1941 and denies to the employer the right to dismiss workers, compelling them to retain and pay workmen for whom there is no employment. This leads to uneconomic over loading of industry and stifles enterprise. KKE alleges that the repeal of this law would automatically lead to wholesale dismissals of Left-wing sympathisers and trade unionists by the "crypto fascist plutocrats". The Central Committee of KKE decided that any attempt by the government to interfere with or attempt to curb the Trades Unions would be met by stoppages of work, and if necessary general strikes. M. ZACHARIADES in a statement after his return from PRAGUE emphasised that all KKE fractions in industries must be permanently alive to the dangers of interference by the present government. He stressed that all attempts to split the present composition of GSEE (Greek Confederation of Labour, controlled by ERGAS) must be firmly suppressed. He also stated that complete collaboration must be maintained with labour organisations of other countries so that measures against world capitalism could be co-ordinated.

/which  
is

(f) Foreign Relations

National claims and payment of reparations have again been in the news. N. TSALDARIS has confirmed GREECE's claims to Southern ALBANIA, DODECANESE and to strategic frontier rectification along the Greek-Bulgar border. A memorandum has been submitted to this effect to the PARIS conference which is being attended by the Greek Ambassador to FRANCE M. RAPHAEL, M. DRAGOUMIS Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs and the Director General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs M. MELAS. EAM and the Left Liberals published a resolution on 24 April stating that the presence of British troops in GREECE prejudiced GREECE's national claims which were enumerated as: South or'n ALBANIA, DODECANESE, Greek-Bulgar frontier adjustment, CYPRUS and Turkish THRACE. M. ZACHARIADES has stated

that KKE does not support Greek penetration Northwards apart from frontier adjustment with BULGARIA, but has stressed that GREECE should have CYPRUS and Turkish THRACE. KKE's attitude towards National claims has drawn considerable criticism from all sections of the press excluding the extreme Left.

A report from SOFIA to the effect that BULGARIA has submitted a memorandum to the PARIS conference claiming an outlet to the AEGEAN and Greek THRACE was greeted with indignation from all parties except KKE.

KKE's attitude towards TURKEY has undergone a fundamental change since ZACHARIADES' return from PRAGUE. Its present policy is obviously designed to bring KKE in line with the other Balkan communist parties which are aiding and abetting RUSSIA's propaganda war against TURKEY. M. ZACHARIADES has himself said that TURKEY is the last reactionary stronghold (excluding GREECE) left in the Balkans and must therefore be driven out. GREECE and TURKEY, he stated, are the only obstacles to a united Balkans.

M. TSALDARIS has affirmed that he will make every effort to extract full reparations from all countries that invaded GREECE.

The Soviet Ambassador, Admiral RODIANOV, called on the Prime Minister on 24 April. It is understood that he complained about anti-Soviet attacks in the Greek press. M. TSALDARIS replied that there was complete freedom of the press but he would consider making friendly representations to the various editors.

PART VI

MISCELLANEOUS

Location of FS Sections

5 FSS	HQ	PSYCHICO	(ATHENS)
	Det	LARISA	(QT33)
		VOLOS	(QT70)
		LAMIA	(QY35)
		LEVADHIA	(VD69)
		KHALKIS	(VE29)
		PHALERON	(VE34)
24 FSS	HQ	ATHENS	
	Dets	ATHENS	
94 FSS	HQ	CORINTH	(VD64)
	Det	PATRAS	(VD68)
		TRIPOLIS	(VD10)
		PIRAEUS PORT	
268 FSS	HQ	KAVALLA	(RL16)
	Det	DRAMA	(QP99)
		XANTHI	(RL58)
		ALEXANDROUPOLIS	(RM35)
290 FSS	HQ	SALONIKA	
	Det	KILKIS	(Q088)
		VEROIA	(Q023)
		NAOUSSA	(Q014)
		FLORINA	(QN63)

Persons held on charges of espionage with  
the enemy and released by the Greek  
Authorities after trial.  
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LEVANTIS VYRON      A close associate of the Greek Perikles  
NIKOLAIDES, member of the German Gestapo and  
recruiter of agents for the G.I.S.

Comment      Release justified on grounds that  
charges of collaboration with the  
enemy could not be fully proved.

It is intended to bring to trial by Courts Martial in May,  
the under-mentioned agents who were arrested by the British and  
Greek Military Authorities for their connection with the German  
Intelligence Service.

On 6 May 1946.

AIVADOGLOU	Ioannis.
PANDIRIS	Evangelos and his son Dimitrios.
KOSIADIS	Kostas.
DIMAS	Dimitrios.
TSIROPOULOS	Anastasios.
KONIS	Dimitrios.

On 16 or 18 May 1946.

HADZINIKOLAOU	A.
TSAKALINIS	E.
BRAIMOGLOU	M.
PAPALIAKOS	D.
APOSTOLIDES	A.
KARAVITIS	I.
KOUMARIANOS	G.

TSALDARIS GOVERNMENT, 18th April, 1946.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Appointment</u>	<u>Biographical Notes</u>
1. Konstantinos TSALDARIS	Prime Minister Minister of Foreign Affairs	One of the four members of the Populist Governing Committee. Claims leadership of the Party, since death (1936) of his cousin E. TSALDARIS who was leader and Prime Minister. Born 1885 in ALEXANDRIA, son of a cotton magnate. Prefect of PATRAS 1915-16 and CORFU 1916-17, Governor of CRETE 1920-22. Originally belonged to Metaxist Party and was imprisoned for six months after the 1923 putsch. Elected Populist deputy 1926. Held Ministerial posts 1933 and 1935. Kept out of politics under Metaxas. Escaped to CAIRO June 1944. One of the few Populists who has never swerved from Royalism.
2. John THEOTOKIS	Minister of Interior	One of the four members of the Populist Governing Committee. Born 1880. His father was Prime Minister and his brother was one of six Royalist ministers executed in 1922. Held posts at Court in ATHENS and in exile, during 1913-20. Several times Populist deputy for CORFU since 1920, founding his own National Populist Party there in 1935. Minister of Agriculture in 1928 and 1933-35, also of Foreign Affairs (and Vice-Premier) in 1935. Closely connected with the restoration of that year. Sentenced to exile for criticising Metaxas Regime, but allowed after Royal intervention to stay in CORFU. Is something of an agricultural specialist.
3. Petros HAVROMIKHALIS	Minister of War Minister of Marine Minister of Air	One of the four members of Populist Party Governing Committee. Born 1887. Populist Deputy at intervals since 1910. Held various portfolios in Royalist Governments 1920-21, then



<u>Name</u>	<u>Appointment</u>	<u>Biographical Notes</u>
		disappeared from politics till in 1935 he was Minister of Foreign Affairs and later of Communications. After restoration of November 1935 disagreed with policy of reconciliation with Liberals. During Metaxas regime was mostly in FRANCE and not allowed in GREECE until 1940. September 1941 went to ISTANBUL as representative of a Greco-German committee to obtain foodstuffs. Remained in TURKEY till January 1944 when he visited CAIRO. Refused to participate in Lebanon Conference, went back to TURKEY, returning to ATHENS in May 1945. Competes with TSALDARIS for leadership of Populist Party. A shrewd and successful business man.
4. Stefanos STEFANOPOULOS	Minister of Co-ordination	One of the four members of Populist Governing committee. Born 1901. Often Populist Deputy for ELIS (PYRGOS). Under-Secretary for National Economy 1932-33 and Minister of same in 1934. Turned Republican in 1942. Personal friend of PAPANDEOU and his Minister of Transport, October 1944 (also Public Works, December 1944). Specialised in economic questions.
5. General Stylianos GONATAS	Minister of Public Works	Born 1876. Distinguished professional soldier 1913-22. Originally Royalist, in 1922 joined PLASTIRAS revolt against King CONSTANTINE. Prime Minister 1922-24. Deputy for ATHENS 1924. Prominent in Venizelist Party. Senator 1929. Minister of Communications 1929. Governor of MACEDONIA 1929-32. President of Senate 1932-35. Condemned to five years' imprisonment for complicity in 1935 Venizelist revolt, but amnestied. Exiled by Metaxas. Represented PLASTIRAS in ATHENS during occupation. Imprisoned by Germans May-September 1944.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Appointment</u>	<u>Biographical Notes</u>
6. Nicolaos AVRAAM	Minister of Mercantile Marine	1935-45 one of triumvirate governing Liberal Party, with S. VENIZELOS and SOPHOULIS. March 1945 quarrelled with latter over constitutional issue and founded National Liberal Party, closely allied to Populists, who allotted him 70 candidatures in their electoral coalition. Reputed an able administrator.
7. Apostoulos ALEXANDRIS	Minister of National Economy	Born about 1887 in AETOLIA. Studied law at ATHENS University, and settled in PIRAEUS, where he became a successful advocate. Entered politics in 1928 as Venizelist deputy for PIRAEUS. Was Under-Secretary for Communications in 1928. Minister of Justice in 1930. Under occupation worked with Liberal Group of LAMBRAKIS, but later showed more moderate tendencies. Was Minister of Justice in first post-liberation Government as a Liberal. Finally broke with SOPHOULIS on constitutional issue and sided with GONATAS as Monarchist. Elected Populist deputy for PIRAEUS in March 1946 election.
		Born 1879. Deputy since 1907. Early Venizelist. Minister of Education 1912. Entered Diplomatic Service: Minister (1916-20) in ROME, BERNE, BERLIN. Associated with PLASTIRAS 1922. Minister for Foreign Affairs 1922-23, Minister in PARIS 1924-25. Re-entered politics. Minister of Agriculture 1930-32. Imprisoned by Germans May-September 1944. Emerged after occupation as founder and leader of small Reform Party, closely allied to Populists.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Appointment</u>	<u>Biographical Notes</u>
8. Dimitrios KHELMIS	Minister of Finance	Born 1888. Studied law and entered business. Under-Secretary for Finance in two TSALDARIS Cabinets, 1933 and 1935. Escaped to Middle EAST July 1944. September 1944 Minister without Portfolio in PAPANDEOU's Government, but dropped from it after liberation. Member of National Bank board since March 1945. Has the reputation of being one of the leading Populists most conciliatory to Republicans.
9. P. PAPANANASIS	Minister of Agriculture	Deputy for ERICHONIA in 1939. Minister of Justice in first TSALDARIS Government November 1932. Minister of Finance under KONDYLIS 1935. Was against the King's acceptance of the Regency. Elected Populist deputy for AETOLIA-ACHARNANIA in March 1946 elections.
10. Panos HAJIPANOS	Minister of Justice	An Egyptian Greek; an old member of Populist Party. A TSALDARIS Royalist. Was Vice-President of Greek Red Cross during and after the occupation. Minister of Education, and Royalist representative in the first post-liberation Government. Elected Populist deputy for EUBOEA in March 1946 elections.
11. Antonios PAPADIMOS	Minister of Religion and Education	Deputy for RHODOPI 1936. Populist representative on Conference on Electoral Rolls July 1945. Chairman of Populist Committee on Internal Affairs. Elected Populist Deputy for RHODOPI in March 1946 elections.
12. Spyridion THEOTOKIS	Minister of Public Order	Son of John THEOTOKIS, born 1905. Deputy for CORFU 1935. Secretary of Chamber 1936. Attended the Lebanon Conference, nominally representative his father's Party. Minister of Supply

<u>Name</u>	<u>Appointment</u>	<u>Biographical Notes</u>
		in Papandreou Government from which he resigned in September 1944. Violently anti-communist. Elected Populist deputy for CORFU in March 1946 election.
13. Andreas STRATOS	Minister of Labour	Born 1906. One of the ablest of the young generation of Royalist politicians. His father was a former Prime Minister and one of the six Royalist Ministers executed in 1922. Deputy, 1930. Inclined to Republicanism during the occupation.
14. Dimitrios PAPANIMITRIOU	Minister of Transport	Comes from PYRGOS. Returned as Populist deputy for ELIS. In March 1946 elections
15. D. STEFANOPOULOS	Minister of Supply	From PATRAS. Returned as Populist deputy for ACHALIA in March 1946.
16. Philip DRAGOUMIS	Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs	Born 1887. Son of Stefanos DRAGOUMIS who was P.M. in 1911. Governor-General of MACEDONIA 1933-34. Was violently against the return of the King in 1935, but later was in favour of reconciliation. He was an Independent, but recently declared that he had joined the Populist Party. Elected Populist deputy for FLORINA in March 1946 elections.
17. Michael AILIANOS	Under-Secretary of Co-ordination	Populist deputy for ATHENS 1930. Active in EDES resistance group in ATHENS during occupation. An economic specialist and author.
18. Athanasios ANTONOPOULOS	Under-Secretary of Finance	Populist who up to the end of 1944 showed Republican sympathies. Government Commissioner for Western GREECE under PAPANDREOU November 1944 (till February 1945). Deputy for PATRAS area.
19. Lambros EFTAKIAS	Under-Secretary of Agriculture	Born about 1908 at DADION. In 1936 was Populist deputy for PHTHIOTIS-PHOKIS, and elected Populist deputy for same division again in March 1946 elections

20. Nicolaos  
BALTATZIS-  
MAVROKORDATOS Under-Secretary  
of Press and  
Information in  
Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs. Royalist of the TSALDRIS  
Group. Returned as  
Populist deputy for LARISSA  
in March 1946 elections.
21. Georgios  
PARAVANTIS Under- Secretary  
of the Political  
Bureau Returned as Populist deputy  
for ARGOLIDO-CORINTHIA in  
1936 and March 1946 elections.
22. Georgios  
LAZANAS Minister of  
Welfare Of Mytilenian origin. Was  
U/S of Communications under  
TSALDARIS 1935. Arrested by  
the Germans in MYTILENI in 1943.  
Returned as Populist deputy for  
MYTILENI in March 1946  
elections.
23. A. KALANTZAKOS Minister of  
Health Former deputy and senator  
for MESSENIA, and returned  
as Populist deputy for same  
division in March 1946  
elections.
24. Athanasios  
PERROTIS Minister of  
P.T.T. Comes from KALAMATA.  
Returned as Populist  
deputy for MESSENIA in  
March 1946 elections.
25. John  
KOTTAS Minister and  
Governor-General  
of Northern GREECE Elected Populist deputy  
for SALONIKA 31 March 46.  
After March '46 election  
was favoured by Macedonian  
deputies as a suitable  
man for Governor-General  
of MACEDONIA.
26. Christos  
GOULOPOULOS Governor-General  
of THRACE Former Macedonian deputy.  
Elected Populist deputy  
for KCZANI 31 March 1946.

Post Mortem on the Greek Elections.

Though the official signed statement of the Allied Mission for Observing Greek Elections has not yet been published, the more important conclusions to which the Mission came were announced on 11 April.

The Mission consisted of British, American and French personnel forming 240 observer teams. Each team consisted of one observer, one interpreter, driver and vehicle. GREECE was divided into five districts, at the head of each of which was an Anglo-American-French committee. A similar central committee was formed in ATHENS. The Mission functioned continuously from 25 February - 10 April. Though the observers could not of necessity be experts on Greek affairs, they did undergo a short intensive course to get themselves in the picture. Expert statisticians were included in the Mission.

Two methods of ascertaining the election conditions were adopted. Firstly scientific sampling was carried out by British and American experts before the observer teams arrived. Secondly questionnaires designed to assemble precisely the information necessary to answer the important questions were prepared. These questionnaires were used by the observer teams which visited 1,556 polling places before the elections, watched the whole voting procedure at 105 selected places and visited 708 other places in addition on election day. The teams also conducted post election inquiries and investigation of complaints. From the mass of data obtained which was specially selected so as to be representative, the sampling section of the Mission was able to arrive at definite statistical conclusions.

The Mission's verdict after studying all factual information was that the elections were conducted under conditions that warranted holding them on 31 March: they were on the whole fair and free, and the result represented a true and valid verdict of the Greek people. The Mission's decision took in to full account the present intensity of political emotions in GREECE.

On the subject of intimidation and terrorism, the Mission stated that some intimidation of voters both by Left and Right took place. But while this was not considered to be general enough to be consequential on election day itself, it was regarded as a natural product of GREECE'S experiences under domestic dictatorship, occupation and especially the brief but desperate civil war in December 1944. The political passions which resulted did produce intimidation in the year preceding the elections and were a factor in the absence from voting of EAM sympathisers. The Mission found that although this pre-election intimidation did have "some effect" on the elections, it did not materially effect the outcome. According to the sampling section of the Mission not more than 11,000 of the registered voters who did not vote can be definitely regarded as having abstained because of intimidation.

With regard to the state of electoral rolls which the Left have repeatedly alleged to be inaccurately compiled, and falsified, the Mission found that of a population of 7,500,000 a maximum of 1,989,000 were qualified to be registered and that of those 1,850,000 were validly registered. This represents 95% of those eligible. The number who voted on 31 March was 1,117,000, a voting density of 60%.

According to the official electoral rolls the number of registered voters was 2,211,791. This discrepancy between the official rolls and the Mission's estimates is due to the fact that some of the rolls had not been revised since 1936 consequently persons who had died since 1936 were still on the rolls. This fact might have supplied opportunities for fraudulent voting; the Mission found, however, that there was no evidence of such fraud taking place on an important scale. In fact the number of votes which might have been cast illegally was estimated, at the maximum, not to have exceeded 2% i.e. 22,000 votes out of the total cast.

The Mission's findings rather took the wind out of the Left wing's sails in regard to the success of the abstention campaign. The 40% who did not vote included, in the Mission's opinion, only 9.3% who abstained due to political manoeuvres. The remaining 30.7% was made up of varying percentages due to other reasons not identifiable with political strategy. The statisticians, however, in their basic calculations were prepared to allow from 10% to an absolute maximum of 20% for abstention due to political reasons.

On other points of interest, the Mission states that the presence of British troops in GREECE had no effect on the election results. The Mission also pointed out that while under present Greek electoral law abstention is illegal, its practice as party strategy is too well established by custom to permit control by legalistic means and party abstention in the March elections did not constitute a new and alarming element in Greek politics. The fact that official abstention was countenanced by the Greek government gave even the dissident elements an opportunity to express their views. The date of the elections, the Mission's report continues, was delayed several times to meet demands of the Left. The adoption of the proportional representation system was also a concession to the Left. Complete freedom of the press was found to characterise the election period.

The full findings of the Allied Mission were passed to the Russian Ambassador in accordance with the agreement that the Soviet government would be kept informed on the Mission's activities though the Russians, themselves, had declined the invitation to participate.