

UNCLASSIFIED

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### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

2.

3.

EE/G JEIR

2/27  
63

EB

JE/G/EXT

WV

5.

6.

7.

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9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

RETURN TO

JE 58

15.

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DO NOT REMOVE ANY PAPERS OR  
MUTILATE FOLDER.

D-1

**VERIFIED**

FILE NO. WASH-REC-INT-12

DOCUMENT: MEB-1995

**DE-INDEXED**

BOX: 15

FORM 1 DEC 55 **610** USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (OP-8) 3-62

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Job 76-780 R, Box 260

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

76-780R  
260

# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

ACCESSION NO.  
**MCB-1995**  
 DATE RECEIVED IN S.A.  
**FEB 12 1947**

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. <i>FBM S</i>	<i>2237</i>	<i>13/2</i>	<i>14/2</i>	<i>D.F.S.</i>	
2. <input type="checkbox"/>		<i>FEB 14 1947</i>	<i>FEB 14 1947</i>	<i>Jr</i>	<i>Can you figure this one?</i>
3.					<i>yes - why not?</i>
4. <input type="checkbox"/>	<i>2150</i>	<i>20/2</i>	<i>7/3</i>	<i>D.F.S.</i>	<b>No dissemination!</b>
5. <input type="checkbox"/>	<i>2237</i>			<i>D.F.S.</i>	<i>This report not too signif. 40% without Telegraph article.</i>
6.					<i>D.S.W.</i>
7.					
8.					<i>D.M. - When logging for last round please give reason as stated on clip-sheet attached to source sheet.</i>
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					<b>DE-INDEXED</b>
15.					

SECRET CONTROL

SECRET-CONTROL

NO. MGB-1995

EXTERNAL SURVEY DETACHMENT 11

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

HEIDELBERG

COUNTRY Germany (Berlin)

DATE:

SUBJECT The Telegraf Attack on Ernst Lemmer

INFO. 4-15 January 1947

DIST. 17 January 1947

PAGES 3

ORIGIN Berlin

SUPPLEMENT

EVALUATION OF SOURCE

EVALUATION OF CONTENT

A	B	C	D	E	F
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED

1	2	3	4	5	6
CONFIRMED OTHER SOUR.	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED

SOURCE The following report comes from usually reliable, well informed sources. Paragraphs 1 to 3 are from a CDU source; paragraph 4 is from a reliable SED source; paragraph 5 is from an SPD source.

1. The article in the Telegraf on the subject of Ernst Lemmer's past, which appeared on 4 January, aroused a great deal of bad feeling between the Executive Committee of the CDU and the SPD. The circumstances leading up to the publication of the article are as follows:
  - a) On 2 January, the editor of the Telegraf contacted Ernst Lemmer and notified him that he had received an article with certain information on him, that he was sending this article over to Lemmer for him to read and comment upon before publishing it. At the same time he assured Lemmer that if he published the article, Lemmer would be accorded an equal amount of space in the Telegraf to answer the article.
  - b) Lemmer got in touch with Jacob Kaiser, Chairman of the CDU, and notified him of these circumstances. Kaiser visited Dr. Suhr, Secretary-General of Berlin SPD, and made it clear to him that the facts mentioned in the article were already known and it would not serve any useful purpose to stir up this material again, since it might easily start a mud slinging battle between the different parties and the leading personalities. Suhr was in full agreement with Kaiser and assured him that he would do everything to stop the publication of the article.
  - c) The article, however, was published on 4 January. Kaiser went to see Suhr to find out why the article had been published. Suhr gave the following explanation which Kaiser accepted:
  - d) Suhr contacted the editor of the Telegraf and asked him not to publish the article. The editor of the Telegraf said that the article had to be published since it had already appeared in the foreign press. When Suhr asked him what foreign newspaper, the editor mentioned a Belgian paper. Suhr, therefore, put in an urgent long distance call to Brussels and got an assurance from the editor of the Telegraf that the article would not be published until such time as

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CLASSIFICATION SECRET-CONTROL

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EXTERNAL SURVEY DETACHMENT - INTELLIGENCE REPORT

- 2 -

MGB-1995

a check has been made with Brussels. Suhr waited until midnight of 3 January for the long distance call and after it had not come through assumed that it would not come and, therefore, according to agreement, the article would not be published. The next day, when the article did appear in the Telegraf, Suhr went over to see the editor of the Telegraf and protested against the handling of the matter.

e) In the meantime, Der Abend approached Lemmer for an answer to ~~the~~ the article in the Telegraf, which Lemmer gave. When Lemmer wanted to put his reply in the Telegraf also, the editor refused to publish it, stating that Lemmer had already found space in Der Abend.

2. On the evening of 4 January, the Russian Political Division in Karlshorst approached Lemmer and assured him of their complete backing and complete faith in him and of their disregard of the article which had appeared in the Telegraf.

3. After the article in the Telegraf, the Central Committee of the CDU appointed an investigating committee to look into the Lemmer case. The Political Division of SMA talked separately with Jacob Kaiser about the Lemmer crisis in a meeting on 9 January 1947 in Karlshorst. Kaiser was criticized for allowing an investigation in the Lemmer case. The Russian representatives stated that they have a feeling that the CDU Central Committee is getting much too western in its orientation, and that if Lemmer should be forced to resign they would have to regard the CDU Central Committee in Berlin as non-representative of the CDU in the Russian Zone. The Russians stated that they then would see themselves forced to have the CDU of the provinces appoint a new Central Committee which would not be subject to western direction. In that case, the old CDU Central Committee would represent Berlin only and have no jurisdiction in the zone. In an internal meeting between Kaiser and the top men of the CDU, it was decided to hold Lemmer, if at all possible, and not to give the Russians a chance to liquidate the CDU Central Committee in Berlin. The investigation committee had, therefore, been instructed to proceed with great caution.

Field Comment: A reliable CDU source says the charges against Lemmer are confirmed by everyone "in the know".

4. The SED considers the Telegraf's attack on Lemmer a maneuver in connection with the coming FDGB elections. SED leaders speak openly of the fact that Lemmer is guilty of the charges against him. Nevertheless, the SED has decided to support Lemmer indirectly, because it can count on his support in the FDGB. Wilhelm Pieck was at first at a loss as to what to do in the Lemmer case but finally helped to carry the decision not to attack him.

Field Comment: Source one reports that the FDGB wanted to send an SPD delegate from Berlin to the recent Trade Union Conference in Hannover. The SPD member refused to go (acting on instructions of Berlin SPD). Lemmer did attend the conference despite an SPD request not to. Afterwards the SPD leaders in Berlin were criticized by the SPD in the western zones for exaggerating SED discrimination, since FDGB representation by a CDU leader seemed to indicate a certain amount of "fair play" in the FDGB.

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EXTERNAL SURVEY DETACHMENT - INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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MGB-1995

5. A reliable source reports, on 9 January, that Arno Scholz intends to press his attack against Lemmer in the Telegraf. At present he is gathering material from the Pester Lloyd for which Lemmer worked during the war. Journalists and CDU people allegedly are offering Scholz more material against Lemmer. Kaiser originally told Scholz he would have to drop Lemmer; later, however, Kaiser changed his attitude completely. Scholz attributes this to Russian influence. Scholz expressed the opinion that the Russians desire to retain Lemmer in the FDGB as proof of its non-partisan character.

SECRET-CONTROL

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MGB-1995

The Telegraf Attack on Ernst Lemmer

Raw Material: Paras. 1,2,3: MGB-~~1936~~  
Field Comment to Para. 3: MGB-1936  
Para. 4: MGB-1952  
Field Comment to Para. 4: MGB-1904  
Para. 5: MGB-1969

Outdated  
Known  
Previously received  
Previously denied  
Vague  
Insignificant  
Improbable  
Available Publications  
X-2 Information  
Third Agency Role  
Not our field  
Other.

*Wsu*  
This report makes sense only  
if read in connection with  
the article in the Telegraf which  
is missing.

**DE-INDEXED**

**VERIFIED**

Job 76-780R  
Box 260

MGB 1904

PRIORITY (HANDLE FIRST)

Dizzied in MGB-1995  
Parts 1, 2, 3 [REDACTED]  
and Field Comment to #4

S E C R E T

PETER REPORT COVER SHEET

REPORT NO. B 1904

DATE : 13 Jan. 1947

SUBJECT

Pol/Telegraf attach on Lemmer:  
1) Background; 2) possible conse-  
quences for CDU - Sov. Zone

SOURCE

[ ]

SUBSOURCE

DATE OF INFORMATION

4-11 Jan. 1947

DATE OF SOURCES REPORT:

EVALUATION :

B-2

COMMENT :

abc

**SECRET**

1. The article in the Telegraf on the subject of Ernst Lemmer's past, which appeared on 4 January, aroused a great deal of bad blood between the executive committee of the CDU and the SPD. The circumstances leading up to the publication of the article are as follows:

"On 2 January, the editor of the Telegraf contacted Ernst Lemmer and notified him that they had received an article with certain information on him, that he was sending this article over to Lemmer for him to read and comment upon before publishing it. At the same time he assured Lemmer that if he published the article, Lemmer would be accorded an equal amount of space in the Telegraf to answer the article.

Lemmer put himself in touch with Jacob Kaiser, Chairman of the CDU, and notified him of these circumstances. Kaiser visited Dr. Suhr and made it clear to Dr. Suhr that the facts mentioned in the article were already known and that it would not serve any purpose to stir up this material again, since it might easily start a mud slinging between the different parties and the leading personalities. Suhr was in full agreement with Kaiser and assured him that he would do everything to stop the publication of the article.

The article, however, was published on 4 January. Kaiser went to see Suhr to find out why the article had been published. Suhr gave the following explanation which Kaiser believed:

'Suhr contacted the editor of the Telegraf and asked him not to publish the article since it was not advisable to start political mud-throwing at this time. The editor of the Telegraf said the article had to be published since it had already appeared in the press. When Suhr asked him what foreign newspaper, the editor

**SECRET**



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mentioned a Belgian paper. Suhr, therefore, put in an urgent long distance call to Brussels and got the assurance from the editor of the Telegraf that the article would not be published until such time as a check up had been made with Brussels. Suhr waited until midnight of 3 January for the long distance call and after it had not come through assumed that it would not come and, therefore, according to agreement, the article would not be published. The next day when the article did appear in the Telegraf, Suhr went over to see the editor of the Telegraf and protested against the handling of the matter.'

In the meanwhile, Der Abend approached Lemmer for an answer to the article in the Telegraf which Lemmer gave. When Lemmer wanted to put his reply in the Telegraf, also, the editor refused to publish it stating that Lemmer had already found space in Der Abend.

2. On the evening of 4 January, the Russian Political Division in Karlshorst, approached Lemmer and assured him of their complete backing and complete faith in him and of their disregard of the article which had appeared in the Telegraf.

4. Jan. 1947

**SECRET**

**RUSSIAN ZONE/ POLITICAL/ GDU CRISIS** On attacks on ERNST LEMMER/ Circumstances leading up to and surrounding the Crisis.

Date of Information Week ending 12 Sept January, 1947

Evaluation : B-2

**SECRET**

1. The circumstances leading up to the publication in the Telegraph of the article revealing the past history of Lemmer were the following.

(a.) The FDGB wanted to send to the recent Trade Union Conference in Hanover an SPD member of the FDGB. The SPD member refused to go. Thereupon ERNST LEMMER was approached and in spite of requests by the SPD to refuse to represent the FDGB, ERNST LEMMER went to HANOVER to represent the FDGB. After the conference the SPD in BERLIN was criticised for overemphasising their persecution, since it was quite evident that in Berlin at least there was a fair amount of liberty if a GDU man was chosen to represent the FDGB in the west and express his views.

(b.) Around the sixth of January a representative of the Political Division of BRITISH MILITARY GOVERNMENT went to see JACOB KAISER to talk about the present policies of the GDU. The British Officer stated to KAISER that his certain members of the GDU could not be supported by the British due to their past history and their compromising activities during the Nazi time. As an example they mentioned ERNST LEMMER, who had gone altogether too far in making his peace with the Nazis. They did not object to him being in the party hierarchy but objected to his having such an important position at present. The British Officer stated that ERNST LEMMER ought to be forced to resign from his present position. They did not object to his being in the party in a minor position.

2. After the "expose" in the TELEGRAPH the Central Committee of the GDU appointed an investigation committee to look into the LEMMER case. The Committee is sitting at present and hopes to make its report in the week ending 20 January.

**SECRET**

SECRET

3. The Political Division of KARLSHORST in the meanwhile talked separately with JAKOB KAISER about the LEDNER crisis. In a meeting which took place on 9 January, 1947 in KARLSHORST they started off by criticizing KAISER for his allowing an investigation in the LEDNER case. They stated to KAISER that they have a feeling that the CDU Central Committee was getting altogether too westerly orientated, and if LEDNER was forced to resign they would have to regard the CDU Central Committee in Berlin as non-representative of the CDU in the Russian Zone. The RUSSIANS stated that they then would see themselves forced to have the CDU of the PROVINCES appoint their own Central Committee from their representatives, which would not be subject to Western direction. In that case the CDU central committee in Berlin would only be good for Berlin, and have no connections to the Zone.

4. In an internal meeting between KAISER and the top men of the CDU it was decided to hold LEDNER if at all possible, and not to give the RUSSIANS the <sup>liquidate</sup> chance to ~~liquidate~~ the CDU Central Committee in Berlin. The investigation committee has therefore been instructed to proceed with all precautions.

SECRET

MGB 1936

ROUTINE

Dizzied as MGB-1995

Field Comment to Para 3.

S E C R E T

PETER REPORT COVER SHEET

REPORT NO. B 1936

DATE : 13 Jan. 1947

SUBJECT

Pol/ 1) Meeting of Publishers;  
2) Lemmers; 3) Anticipated  
attacks on Karl Brammer.

SOURCE

[ ]

SUBSOURCE

DATE OF INFORMATION

3 Jan. 1947

DATE OF SOURCES REPORT:

EVALUATION

B-2

COMMENT

abc

Information: Am Freitag, d. 3.1.47 war nachmittags eine gemeinsame Sitzung des Verlegerverband-Vorstandes und des Vorstandes des Verbandes der deutschen Presse in den Räumen, des Kulturhaus-Klubs in der Jägerstraße. Der Vorsitz Herr v. Murr, Verlagsdirektor des Kurier. Es war eine interne Aussprache über Geldmittel, die die Verleger für soziale Aufgaben, das zeitungswissenschaftliche Institut u. a. m. bewilligen sollten. Der Ton der Verleger war bei allem sachlichen Entgegenkommen sehr aggressiv und wurde zunächst von dem Vorsitzenden des Verb. d. d. Pr. ( Ufermann, Vorwärts ) sehr vorsichtig, später von Ackermann ( Morgen ) sehr energisch zurückgewiesen. Der Vorstand des Verb. d. deutschen Presse wird sich in nächster Sitzung ( 9.1.47 ) mit der Verkehrsform der Verleger beschäftigen.

In der oben erwähnten Sitzung saß auf der Verlegerseite auch der Chefredakteur des " Telegraph ", Scholz. Er ermahnte die Presse zu einem anständigen Ton und Unterlassung aller persönlichen Angriffe, die den Stand des Journalisten in der Öffentlichkeit herabsetzen können. Besonders wandte er sich an Ufermann, dessen " Vorwärts " sehr oft und sehr stark gesündigt hätte. Er erregte bei den Anwesenden später allgemeines Erstaunen, als am nächsten Morgen die heftigen Angriffe gegen den 2. Vorsitzenden der CDU, Lemmer, erschienen.

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1. Ernst Lemmer.

Die Angriffe des "Telegraph" auf Ernst Lemmer werden von allen Eingeweihten bestätigt. L. soll bis zum Schluss der Nazizeit das Bild von Ribbentrop auf seinem Schreibtisch zu stehen gehabt und auch gute Beziehungen zu der Pressestelle des Auswärtigen Amtes gehabt haben. Er genoss auch den Vorzug der sogenannten Diplomatenverpflegung. Journalisten, die mit ihm im Kriege zusammen kamen, bestätigen, daß ihm das Propagandaministerium bis Kriegsende einen Wagen zur Verfügung gestellt hat.

2. Karl Brammer.

In manchen CDU-Kreisen befürchtet man, daß auch gegen Brammer Angriffe erfolgen könnten.

Karl Brammer, geb. 11.7.91. Vor dem Kriege Herausgeber der Demokratischen Korrespondenz, die sehr gutes Material im Sinne der damaligen Demokratischen Partei brachte. Blieb auch in der Nazizeit Besucher der Pressekonferenz und gab nach dem Eingehen der Demokr. Korrespondenz die "Nachrichten für Sippenforschung" und im Kriege Nachrichtendienste für die Wehrmacht heraus. Nach dem Kriege stellv. Chefredakteur des CDU-Parteiorgans "Neue Zeit" und Mitglied der CDU.

Aus seiner antinationalsozialistischen Gesinnung hat Brammer niemals einen Hehl gemacht, aber dennoch hat er, um sein Leben zu fristen, Nachrichtenblätter herausgegeben, die Nazi-propagandamaterial verbreiteten.

**SECRET**

MGB ~~1952~~ 1952

PRIORITY (HANDLE FIRST)

*Dizzied as MGB-1995  
as Para 4*

S E C R E T

PETER REPORT COVER SHEET

REPORT NO.	B <del>1952</del> 1952
DATE	: 13 Jan. 1947
SUBJECT	Pol/SED/Meeting of Executive Committees views on Trade Unions
SOURCE	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SUBSOURCE	
DATE OF INFORMATION	3-10 Jan. 1947
DATE OF SOURCES REPORT:	
EVALUATION	: B-2
COMMENT	: Note attitude in Lemmer case

*awc*

**SECRET**

(3-10, Jan, 1947)

Der Parteivorstand der SED hat sich in seinen letztwöchigen Sitzungen und Besprechungen mit den beiden im Vordergrund stehenden Problemen beschäftigt: den Wahlen im FDGB und den Deutschlandabesprechungen.

Zu den Gewerkschaftswahlen ist die SED mit ihren »Sozialpolitischen Richtlinien« hervorgetreten, die im wesentlichen eine Arbeit von Paul Merker sind. (Veröffentlicht im »Neuen Deutschland« vom 7. Januar.) Im Parteivorstand herrschte im übrigen eine ziemlich Misstimmung über die bisherige Lässigkeit des FDGB in der Zusammenarbeit mit der Partei. Es soll Vorsorge getroffen werden, dass die Verbindung der führenden SED-Gewerkschaftler zum Parteivorstand enger wird und dass vor allem auch die bisher unzulängliche Pressestelle des FDGB (unter der Leitung von Weinburger) ausgebaut wird. Im übrigen wurde im Parteivorstand der Standpunkt vertreten und gebilligt, dass der Wahlkampf nicht als ein Kampf *Qualek contra Suhr* geführt werden kann (wie es bis jetzt manchmal aussah), sondern dass neue Argumente in den Kampf geführt werden müssen. Wie immer, wenn von anderer, gegnerischer Seite längst die Offensive ergriffen wurde, trat auch diesmal wieder die Forderung auf, offensiv vorzugehen: und das sei nur möglich, wenn man in die Betriebe gehe. Die Berliner Betriebe, hies es, müssten mobilisiert werden und dort müsste man die Arbeiterschaft zu einer Stellungnahme zur bisherigen Gewerkschaftspolitik veranlassen. Dabei könne man mit einer durchaus kampfgewillten Schaar sicherer Funktionäre rechnen, die vor den Arbeitern das bisher vom FDGB

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Erreichte klar herauszustellen hätten, gleichzeitig aber auch selbstkritisch aufzutreten unter Betonung dessen, was noch in der Zukunft errungen werden und geschehen müsse. Das »New Deutschland« wurde aufgefordert, seine Berichterstattung über Gewerkschaften unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Betriebsprobleme bedeutend zu verstärken.

Die Stimmung im Parteivorstand, in dem in immer fühlbarerem Masse Grotesk die entscheidende Rolle spielt, war bei der Erörterung der FDGB-Wahlen ziemlich unerfreulich und gereizt. Dazu beigetragen hat zweifellos der Fall Lemmer, der vom »Telegraf« zweifellos auch als Sprengbombe im Kampf um die Gewerkschaften beabsichtigt war. Die SED hat sich in der Erörterung dieses Falles die Frage vorgelegt, was im Augenblick für sie und im Interesse der Einheit der Gewerkschaften vorteilhafter ist: die Vorwürfe gegen Lemmer nicht zu übersehen, aber ab- auch nicht etwa zu unterstützen, oder Lemmer fallen zu lassen. In Parteivorstand wurde der Fall sehr lebhaft erörtert, niemand machte ein Wort daraus, dass Lemmer zweifellos schwer belastet ist. Trotzdem hat sich der Parteivorstand dahin entschieden, man sich aus in keiner Weise in den Fall Lemmer aktiv einzugreifen sondern die Austragung des Falles der CDU und dem FDGB zu über- lassen. Es ist also nicht zu erwarten, dass die SED im Falle Lemmer etwa wie im Fall des Dr. Ernst oder des Stadtrates Hellus vorgehen wird. Lemmer ist im Augenblick des Kampfes um die Gewerkschaften und um die Einheit der Gewerkschaften zu wichtig, als dass man einen so blamablen Abgang dieses Mannes entragen möchte. Die SED hat sich also hier für die Politik des von Nebels entschieden, das heißt, dafür, Lemmer zu- indirekt zu stützen und zu halten. Allmählich ist man

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**SECRET**

im SED-Vorstand etwas nervös geworden über die häufigen politischen Katastrophen mit CDU-Leuten, die deshalb gar nicht willkommen sind, weil man mit dem Kaiser-schen "christlichen Sozialismus", so niedrig man ihn in Wirklichkeit einschätzt, doch noch politische Geschäfte machen zu können hofft: 1. gegen Adenauer und 2. durch die Aufrechterhaltung der Blockpolitik in der Ostzone. Besonders W. Pieck war über den Fall Lemmer zunächst etwas ratlos, trug aber dann entscheidend mit zu der abwartenden, neutralen Haltung ein, die der Parteivorstand für die Behandlung des Falles Lemmer beschloss.

MCB 1969

ROUTINE

*Discontinued MGB-1995*

*as Para. 5*

S E C R E T

PETER REPORT COVER SHEET

REPORT NO. B 1969

DATE : 15 Jan. 1947

SUBJECT

Pol/SPD attacks on Lemmer

SOURCE

[ ]

SUBSOURCE

DATE OF INFORMATION

9 Jan. 1947

DATE OF SOURCES REPORT:

EVALUATION ;

B-3 Subsource: C

COMMENT ;

Disguise origin

*abc*

Betrifft: Ernst Lemmer.

**SECRET**

Wie ich heute von Arno Scholz hoere, ist er gewillt, den Angriff gegen ~~den~~ Ernst Lemmer fortzusetzen. Scholz ist zurzeit dabei, neues Beweismaterial aus dem Pester Lloyd herbeizuschaffen. Interessant ist, dass sich Presseleute und auch Angehoerige der CDU bei Scholz mit belastenden Angaben ~~gegen Scholz~~ gegen Lemmer melden. So ist Scholz mitgeteilt worden, dass ein frueherer Pressechef, - dessen Namen ich nicht mehr erinnere, der jetzt in Holland arbeitet - geaussert haben soll, er betrachte es als seine Aufgabe, Lemmer unmoeglich zu machen, <sup>etwa 1943</sup> weil ~~dieser~~ nach einer Diskussion mit 4 Presseleuten deren Verhaftung am naechsten Tage veranlasst haben soll. Ausserdem sollen fuehrende CDU-Leute Scholz ihre Sympathie bei seinem Vorgehen gegen Lemmer ausgedrueckt haben. Die Namen der Betreffenden wollte Scholz noch nicht angeben. Er erzaehte aber in diesem Zusammenhang, dass Jakob Kaiser bei Beginn der Presseveroeffentlichung geaussert habe, Ernst Lemmer sei nicht zu halten. Erst spaeter habe sich Kaisers Einstellung grundlegend geaendert. Scholz fuehrt diese Meinungsaenderung auf russischen Einfluss zurueck. Beachtenswert ist ja auch das eigentlich unmotivierte Auftreten des FDGB fuer Lemmer. Scholz vertritt die Ansicht, dass die Russen, abgesehen von allem anderen, daran interessiert sind, Lemmer im FDGB zu halten, um diesem dadurch den nach dem Ausscheiden von Suhr so bitter notwendigen Anstrich der Ueberparteilichkeit zu bewahren.

B., den 9.1.47

**SECRET**