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31 AUG 1970

4224

MEMORANDUM FOR: [Director of Central Intelligence]  
THROUGH : [Deputy Director for Plans]  
SUBJECT : [Options in Chilean Presidential Election  
During the Congressional Run-Off Phase]

1. On 25 March the 40 Committee endorsed a proposal for [redacted] for political action designed to reduce the threat of a presidential victory by Salvador Allende, candidate for the Popular Unity (UP - a coalition of Communists, Socialists and other leftists). On 27 June the Committee approved Ambassador Korry's request for an additional [redacted] for anti-Allende activities, but deferred action on the Ambassador's proposal for influencing the congressional vote should the election go to the Congress.

(b)(3)

2. [The attached memorandum, based on the assumption that no candidate will win a majority of the popular vote, provides the Committee with a series of options which, if implemented, could influence the outcome of the election of a president by the Chilean Congress on 24 October. It is recommended that you adopt the following positions with regard to the options and issues raised in the paper in connection with the electoral situations listed below:]

(b)(3)

Alessandri in first place over Allende by more than 100,000 votes.

In this situation the propaganda campaign should continue in order to maintain pressure on the Congress to elect Alessandri. [redacted] propaganda mechanisms should be used exclusively!

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

Alessandri over Allende by less than 100,000 votes.

In this case the election of Alessandri is less certain and the U. S. Government's effort should include a propaganda campaign in tandem with limited political action

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[redacted]

(b)(3)

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- 2 -

against persuadable congressmen in an attempt to obtain their vote for Alessandri. As in the earlier situation, these activities should be conducted through [redacted] exclusively.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

Allende over Alessandri by any number of votes.

No action should be taken in this situation because of the increased risk of exposure caused by a more hostile environment that would be created by the UP followers. On this point, our COS has stated, "If Allende emerges first, even by a small margin, UP forces rallying to his support may soon prove to be overpowering."

[redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

Alessandri has stated publicly that he would accept the presidency only if he received a plurality in the elections. In this situation most of the Radicals and many Christian Democrats could be expected to vote for Allende in a congressional run-off. Thus, even if action is taken despite the risks, such action probably would not prevent Allende from being chosen by the Congress.

Allende over Tomic by any number of votes.

As in the situation above, there would be increased risk of exposure caused by a more hostile environment, but there would be a greater chance for success because of the large PDC voting bloc in Congress. In this situation, the propaganda campaign should continue and, [redacted] the Alessandri supporters in Congress urged to vote for Tomic.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

3. Furthermore, it is recommended that the COS be authorized to contact [redacted] as soon as possible after the elections on 4-September in order to implement and/or plan whatever programs are authorized.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

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[REDACTED]  
- 3 -

4. If the Committee decides in favor of a propaganda effort, it is estimated that [REDACTED] would be required; if in favor of limited political action, [REDACTED] would be required; and if in favor of broad political action, [REDACTED] would be required.

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

5. While a preliminary discussion on some aspects of this paper to the 40 Committee was held with Mr. Charles A. Meyer, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, the paper only has been discussed extensively with Mr. Viron P. Vaky, Senior Staff Member of the National Security Council.

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Western Hemisphere Division

CONCUR:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Deputy Director for Plans

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Executive Director-Comptroller

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

Release of the attached proposal to the members of the 40 Committee is authorized:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

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