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SECRET CONTROL

STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT, WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington, D.C.

2 October 1946

COUNTRY: Japan, Poland.

SUBJECT: Japanese Wartime Collaboration with the Polish Intelligence Service: with Appendix, Japanese Specialists on Poland and Polish Wartime Activities in the Far East.

NOTE: This account is supplementary to the more general one, with background, given on pages 16-17 of Reference (a), and should therefore be used in conjunction with the latter.

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1940-1946

EVALUATION: B-2 for both Japanese and German material.

REFERENCES: (a) Japanese Wartime Intelligence Activities in Northern Europe: SSU, 30 Sept. 1946, DB #1225.
(b) ONODERA, Major General Makoto -- Biographical Sketch of: SSU, 25 Sept. 1946, DB #1226.

1. The following information, with the exception of that under the last two headings prior to the Appendix, was obtained from the subject of Reference (b) during his interrogation at Sugamo Prison, Tokyo (8 May - 20 July 1946), by a representative of SSU.

2. Page, paragraph and line numbers which are among the subject headings hereinafter used refer to Reference (a), and items appearing beneath such headings may be considered as footnotes to or continuations of corresponding items in Reference (a).

14/1/4-9

One of the JAKUBIC family (see below) was a member of this Polish-Japanese club, and a Col. SASAKI who visited Poland -- ONODERA cites him as an example -- was invited to stay with the family.

14/5/8-11

Again despite the existence of a state of war between Japan and Poland and despite the formal alliance and working arrangement of the latter country's forces in exile with the British, ONODERA was, through RYBICKI, several times in direct contact with General RYBICKI and the Polish General Staff in London.

15/2/1-6; 15/3/1-4

DB #1235

In addition to providing RYBICKI with protective cover, a

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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salary and communication facilities, ONOZUKA gave him information under the following headings:

- i. Soviet troop movements in Europe and Asia (from Tokyo, German, Hungarian and Finnish sources).
- ii. War potential of the USSR (Tokyo and German sources).
- iii. Soviet Army D.B. (German sources).
- iv. Technical developments in Germany and the USSR (German sources).

15/3/5-3

Working at the Japanese Embassy in Berlin, JAKUBIC A. KONFESICZ was assisted by a Polish woman named LAPINSKA who had a job as secretary in the Manchurian Legation. There she collaborated with First Secretary HOSHINO and Attachés NASAI and YAMADA; sometimes with NAKAMURA, the Manchurian Consul at Hamburg. (HOSHINO was a cover name used by General AKINUSA, one of the best Japanese specialists on Soviet intelligence, who had been sent to Berlin as a Manchurian diplomat with the special mission of working through the Poles against the USSR. He traveled back and forth frequently between Berlin and Warsaw.) Their reports went to MIYOKI (at Riga before the Soviet occupation, later at Helsinki) and were forwarded by him via the Japanese courier to Stockholm.

About the middle of 1941 JAKUBIC was arrested in Berlin by the S.S. His interrogation revealed the whole Polish network, as well as the extent of Japanese participation in it and the role of the so-called "KAWANO" (RYBIKOWSKI) in Stockholm. KONFESICZ relates that about this time he was planning to take RYBIKOWSKI with him on a trip to Berlin. The latter's visa had been obtained from the Germans with such facility that KONFESICZ became suspicious; on examining it and comparing it with his own he found that it had a special marking. Therefore he thought it wiser to have RYBIKOWSKI remain in Stockholm, and when he arrived in Berlin he found his decision justified upon learning of JAKUBIC's arrest. JAKUBIC also was arrested, and in her possession the Germans found a hair brush whose handle contained a microfilm report on German Army eastern front D.B. (ONOZUKA was shown this by Col. BUEHLER -- Chief, Abwehr III F -- as proof that the Poles had been working against the Germans.)

The German Government protested officially to the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin, ONOZUKA, who ONOZUKA says attempted to clear himself by putting the blame on the office of the Japanese Military Attaché at Stockholm. ONOZUKA immediately telegraphed to Tokyo demanding to be recalled and threatening to commit hara-kiri if he was not. (The reply from Tokyo was a long time in coming and when ONOZUKA finally received it - the attack on Pearl Harbor having meanwhile taken place - he was too busy with other matters to be further concerned about it.) RYBIKOWSKI remained for a long time thereafter in ONOZUKA's office, though the Germans never ceased exerting pressure for his dismissal. KONFESICZ, the chief of S. S. Buehler, came to ONOZUKA

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and demanded a list of HYSINGOSKI's agents in Germany and Poland, threatening to protest to Tokyo through HIRSHBERG or KOTTEL if it was not given. However, ONODA ignored this demand and it was not until almost three years later that the Swedish Government intervened and HYSINGOSKI was expelled (see below).

JARUSIC (and presumably others as well) died in the hands of the Gestapo. For certain aspects of his affair see below, Translation of S. HIRSHBERG's Statement.

15/3/5-5

SHIMAZU, Japanese Consul in Königsberg, had formerly taught Russian in the Japanese language school at Berlin, where KASAI and YAMADA (see first paragraph of above item) had been among his pupils. His Königsberg office being the center of the Polish network located in that city and in Lituania, he was assisted by two Poles named PERZ and LADYSKI whom he had taken with him when he moved from Lituania to East Prussia after the Soviet invasion. These two worked under the leadership of JARUSIC and, as indicated in reference (a), were in touch with members of the Polish resistance movement in Lituania and the neighboring area.

In Lituania SUGIYAMA had received their reports and sent them by Japanese courier to Riga, where SHIMAZU (then working in ONODA's office) gave them to Col. BRZESNIEWSKI, the Polish Military Attaché (later assigned to Stockholm); he in turn forwarded them to London. From Königsberg reports were sent -- still by Japanese courier -- to Berlin, where they were taken by JARUSIC and dispatched to London via HIRSHBERG and BRZESNIEWSKI, both at this time in Stockholm. These reports were concerned with Soviet movements in Lithuania, the Soviet Army and Air Force, and German troop concentrations.

ONODA claims to be ignorant of further details of SHIMAZU's organization and activities, but the account which he has given definitely confirms the essential pattern of the more detailed story given below under the heading, SIBU Letter: Japanese Espionage in the Reich. As for SHIMAZU's ultimate whereabouts, inquiries made in July 1946 of the Japanese Foreign Office by U.S. authorities in Japan were met with the statement that he had remained in Lituania. PERZ was heard by ONODA to have escaped and reached Turkey.

15/4/1-5

The Bialystok-Minsk-Smolensk network was organized by Col. GAN (Polish I.S. chief) in 1935. HIRSHBERG arranged for information gathered by its agents to be picked up at railway stations by the Japanese couriers traveling back and forth between Riga, Moscow and Berlin. In Germany it was received by JARUSIC of the Berlin Embassy. He forwarded it to Stockholm and from there it went to London.

The system functioned successfully through 1940, until one of the couriers missed a connection and contact was lost. A plan was made to renew

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it by sending to Moscow a Polish I.S. officer with the cover name of [redacted], who had remained in Warsaw since 1939. All preparations to do this, including assignment of the password by which he was to make himself known to YAMAMOTO, the Japanese Military Attaché in Moscow, had been completed when outbreak of the Russo-German war made the execution impossible.

15/4/5-7

Information obtained from the underground Polish resistance movement was gathered at the Manchurian Consulate in Warsaw (until its closing early in 1942) by THOMAS (above paragraph) and WISNIEWSKI, who spoke Japanese and had formerly been employed in the Japanese Embassy at Warsaw. They worked under the direction of [redacted] (AKIYAMA) and forwarded their findings via Japanese couriers to Berlin, whence the information reached Stockholm and London.

15/5/1-3

CHONERA claims to know no details of the relationship of RYBICKI with his sources in Finland, or of the types of intelligence exchanged. He states that before the invasion of the Baltic countries RYBICKI received information from Finnish contacts in Riga, Latvia; later liaison was carried out by a member of the Finnish I.S. who came to Stockholm for that purpose. Many of the reports from Helsinki were sent to Stockholm through ONUCHI and the Japanese diplomatic pouch; others, CHONERA thinks, were transmitted by U.S. diplomatic couriers. (He explains this opinion by the fact that U.S. officials in Sweden and Finland were interested in Soviet intelligence.) RYBICKI's Finnish sources functioned until August 1944.

15/5/3-4

The two Polish agents at Narva, Estonia, covered Soviet troop movements and transportation of war material, sending their reports to Helsinki via a member of the Finnish I.S. Later, after 1940, they established direct communication with Great Britain over the northern route.

One of the Poles working for RYBICKI at Riga, Latvia, was named RUBRIEWITZ; the other was a woman whose name began with "W" and ended with "KA." Before 1940 they were in direct contact with RYBICKI and ONUCHI. After the Soviet invasion they communicated through the same member of the Finnish I.S. who was in liaison with the Poles at Narva, and through Estonian sailors in MAASING's organization. They ceased operations after the beginning of the Russo-German war.

15/5/4-11

The group of Polish agents in the Ural and Caucasus regions of Russia had taken refuge there after the defeat of Poland in 1939. Among them were former members of the Polish I.S. who had been organized and briefed by GARG and RYBICKI before their departure.

15/8/1 SF.

According to the report, the cause of the compromise in 1942 of the Moscow source was for a while believed by the Allies to have been a leak which occurred when the Japanese passed on the information obtained to the Germans. Evidence subsequently given at trials of the persons involved, however, revealed that it had actually lain in the penetration of Polish codes by the Soviets.

The Expulsion of ONODERA

At the beginning of 1944 the Germans finally succeeded in obtaining Swedish support for the expulsion of ONODERA, and General ROSSIGNOL -- head of the Attaché Section of the Swedish General Staff -- came to ONODERA privately and told him that the Swedish government had positive evidence that "IFANO" was an international spy, working for all and against all; therefore, unless ONODERA promised to get rid of him at once, the government would take official action. ONODERA tried in vain to get this decision changed by appealing to BERGREN and FAGER of the Swedish I.S.; he was finally obliged to arrange for RYBIZWSEKI's departure. At first he considered sending him to Finland, where PAASIKIVI (Chief of the Finnish I.S.) was willing to receive him, but after several months RYBIZWSEKI went to England, and then later to Italy. ONODERA's last message from him was received at the end of 1944 and came from the headquarters of General ANDERS' Army.

Before leaving for England, RYBIZWSEKI made an agreement to send ONODERA information from there for which he was to be paid in dollars. His reports were to be signed "JOHANSSON" and were to be handed to ONODERA by BRZESKOWSKI or one of the latter's assistants. ONODERA was to reach RYBIZWSEKI through a Pole named STEPHAN GAWALSKI. His letters were to be inscribed with three names: Mr. BERG, RZADA, and STEPHAN. ONODERA received about 25 letters from this source.

At first in the summer of 1944 the information was good. It concerned Allied military activities in India and Burma. At the end of the year it began to deteriorate; the reports then told of an impending British attack on Borneo which was belied by all other developments of the war. They gave much information about Japanese war crimes, and stories about the low morale of the Japanese troops. At this time ONODERA became convinced that he was receiving deception material; however, he continued to send money, paying in all about 10,000 American dollars for the information. He feels sure that it all went to the British, but he declares himself more than happy to have paid this price for the entry of RYBIZWSEKI into Great Britain. After his three and a half years of work in a Japanese office it was evident that some price would have to be paid, and ONODERA says that at heart he would much rather think of RYBIZWSEKI as having sent deception material, thus remaining to the end loyal to the cause of the western Allies.

After the German surrender ONODERA received occasional personal letters from RYBIZWSEKI and two messages from Col. GANO. They all came through BRZESKOWSKI's office. One of GANO's messages announced the impending Soviet

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declaration of war against Japan, and the other gave details of the movement of ten Russian divisions to the Far Eastern front.

Polish-Japanese Contacts After V-J Day

CHODURA's contacts with the Poles continued even after the Japanese surrender. He says that in October 1946 BRUKESZEWICHI came to see him on behalf of Col. GARGO, asked if he was in need of money, and said that if he was not on good terms with the new Japanese government the Poles would take care of him and his family. In January, 1948, when the Japanese repatriation party was in Naples, CHODURA was interviewed by a French colonel named GODEFRAY who showed him a letter from Col. GARGO recommending the best treatment for CHODURA -- "a faithful friend of Poland." He still has absolute confidence in his prestige with the Poles.

STACHOWIAK & DORNA

CHODURA says that in 1946 a young Pole who gave his name as DORNA came to the Military Attaché's office and was interviewed by Ass't M. A. KIGOSHI. Saying that he had escaped from Poland and was on his way to America, he offered his services to the Japanese. KIGOSHI introduced him to CHODURA, but he made a very bad impression and it was decided to break off contact immediately. CHODURA denies that DORNA said anything about having formerly worked for the Abwehr or having been directed to Stockholm by the Japanese Military Attaché's office in Berlin.

SIPO Letters: Japanese Espionage in the Reich

The following letter dated July 1941, with subject indicated as above, was sent from the Chief of the SIPO to Reichsmarschall GOEBBES and marked 'Personal':

"1.

"Since 1939, the counter-espionage section has informed us that SUGIHARA, formerly Japanese Consul at Kowno, ~~Kowno~~ then Vice Consul at Prague, and who, since the beginning of March of this year, has been in charge of the Japanese Consulate at Koenigsberg, was to be considered as a friend of England and of Poland. Since the time he was at Kowno, he has drawn attention to himself by his particular interest in German military affairs.

"In his new position at the Consulate at Koenigsberg SUGIHARA has been so active in his intelligence work that his stay in Koenigsberg threatens to break down the good relations which exist between Germany and Japan. The Governor General proposes to have SUGIHARA withdrawn through the intermediary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

"Associated with SUGIHARA in the intelligence service is a Pole named Jan-Stanislaw PENCZ, born 15 November 1909 at Puszkow, whom SUGIHARA knew at Kowno and whom he had naturalized as a Japanese. SUGIHARA knew another Pole at Kowno, Jerzy KUCZMICKI ~~JANUSZ~~, born 4 March 1905 at Swieciany. He also obtained Japanese citizenship for the latter.

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"The Consul ~~SAKURAI~~ is not, however, the only Japanese diplomat having Poles in his service. The above-named ~~KUCZYNSKI~~ worked at the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. A Polish woman, Salomea ~~LAPINSKA~~, born 17 November 1914 at Loby, naturalized Japanese, is employed at the Embassy of Manchukuo at Berlin. She is supposed to work there as a cook but it has been discovered that she has three agents in her pay who are working against Germany.

"A former Polish officer named ~~KYBICKI~~ ~~RYBIKOWSKI~~ has been attached as "advisor" to Colonel ~~CHODERA~~, Japanese Military Attaché at Stockholm. Under the false name of Peter ~~FRANCK~~, he poses as a White Russian, native of Moscow, born 11 November 1898.

"At the beginning of March 1941, the Italian counter-espionage informed us that ~~KANAHARA~~, formerly secretary general of the Japanese Embassy in Rome and now at Berlin, had had many interviews with ~~VLAJIMAR~~ ~~LEDUCHOWSKI~~, general of the Jesuits. The general of the Jesuits was maintaining an illegal correspondence with the Polish resistance movement at Wilno by the Japanese diplomatic pouch from the Embassy in Rome to that in Berlin. According to the Italian counter-espionage, ~~LEDUCHOWSKI~~ has received and transmitted several times important military information in Germany.

"II

"The Pole, Jerzy ~~KUCZYNSKI~~, formerly an intelligence officer of the Polish General Staff at Warsaw, was arrested in Berlin the 6th of July 1941 with the so-called "cook" of the Manchukuo Embassy in Berlin, Salomea ~~LAPINSKA~~, during a meeting with a liaison agent of the resistance movement in Warsaw. His interrogation has led to the arrest of others in Berlin and Warsaw. Here is the information which has been obtained from ~~KUCZYNSKI~~.

"III

"A. The Japanese Military Attaché, Brig. Gen. ~~BANZAI~~, is the chief of the Japanese intelligence service in Germany. His office is in Berlin at No. 2 Wollendorf Square. He employs there about forty Japanese officers. This number exceeds that which is known officially. Every two or three months this office of Gen. ~~BANZAI~~ receives all the intelligence reports prepared by Japanese intelligence officers in the various capitals of Europe. The Japanese intelligence service is composed of the Service East and the Service West. The Service East works against Russia; the Service West against Germany, England and France.

"Colonel ~~CHODERA~~, Japanese Military Attaché in Stockholm, is the chief of the Service East. His predecessor was Colonel Hishizura. The office at Stockholm has two subsidiary offices: Helsingfors - Colonel ~~ONOGUCHI~~; and Königsberg - Consul ~~SUGIMURA~~. The office at Königsberg works with three sub-stations: one at Wilno directed by a former Polish student named ~~WOJCIKOWSKI~~; one at Kowno directed by a Lithuanian named ~~KOZIOLO~~; and one at Grodno under a Pole named ~~REY~~. Finally there is a mobile station situated on the railroad between Baronowice and Bialystok,

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founded by a Polish Captain JAN KZIN, and which is now directed by Captain Tadeusz KUCZYNSKI who is disguised as a railway worker.

"According to MR. KUCZYNSKI, Consul [redacted] also has some agents in Berlin. A secret room of the Manchukuo Embassy in Berlin is the office of a Colonel HOSOKAWA, the attaché YAMAMOTO and a certain ASHIDA who are engaged in intelligence work against Germany. According to MR. KUCZYNSKI, another office of the Japanese intelligence service is located near the Manchukuo Consulate in Hamburg. An attaché of the Consulate comes often to Berlin to contact the three men named above. There is reason to believe that this Japanese who comes from Hamburg is HAKAMAZA, an attaché of the Consulate at Hamburg. It is interesting to note that three days after the arrest of Salomea LAPINSKA, HAKAMAZA succeeded, after numerous telephone calls to the Ministry, to arrange an interview with the officer in charge of the affair in question and invited him, the same evening, to an extravagant dinner at the Bar Trausquitta, near the Berlin Zoo.

"B. The Polish Resistance Movement and the Complicity of the Japanese: Referring to the information concerning the General of the Jesuits, LUKASZ-CHOWSKI, it remains for me to inform you of a letter from ILKO [see below] to LUDCZINSKI, dated 15 September 1940. The letter was intercepted, and it dealt with the German persecution of the Catholic priests in Russia. This letter, passing through WACIENKOWSKI, had been expedited by a Japanese courier of the Polish Resistance Movement. A note from WACIENKOWSKI was attached, in which he gave instructions to the Jesuit General on the system of sending the next courier dispatches:

"The outside envelope should be addressed to Dr. FURUUCHI, Secretary of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. There must be two inside envelopes, one addressed to KUCZYNSKI, the other to [redacted]. Letters to be dispatched with the Japanese courier.

"KUCZYNSKI made an interesting report to LUDCZINSKI in which he announced the departure of a large quantity of illegal mail for Stockholm, from which it will certainly be transmitted to the exiled government of SIKORSKI in London.

"The Pole [redacted], alias RYKOWSKI, is working with the Military Attaché IWANAGA, chief of the Eastern Bureau of the Japanese S.R. Service de Reconnaissance - I.S. in Stockholm. [redacted], as well as KUCZYNSKI, is in contact with a former Polish State employee named Henryk MATYSZEWSKI. He is living, under the name of WANDERER, in room No. 2 or 3 in the Hotel Silvia in Stockholm, and is the liaison agent between the Polish Government in London and the resistance movement in Poland via the Japanese Military Attaché (IWANAGA, Stockholm - Annex of the Japanese S.R. Service de Reconnaissance - resistance Movement in Warsaw.)

"According to other information furnished by KUCZYNSKI, [redacted] may have brought his mail to Berlin, which [redacted] received from WANDERER, continued without doubt for the resistance movement in Warsaw. It was a question here of dispatching money. KUCZYNSKI declares furthermore that MASAI, Commercial Attaché of the Embassy of Manchukuo in Berlin, in his turn, may have sent the courier, dispatched by the resistance movement in Warsaw, to the Embassy apartments.

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"The declarations of KENNEDY, who is under detention, of the Japanese S.R. in the Reich, will be examined again. He states that he worked in the Eastern section of the Japanese S.R. since he possessed, as a former official of the Polish S.R., all the aptitudes demanded by this work against Russia. He has no information on the activity of the Western section, which, according to him, is working against the Reich primarily.

"However, according to information in a footnote in connection with the Japanese Consul KOBAYASHI in Stockholm, it appears that even the Western network was engaged in a certain amount of activity against the Reich. The fact that KENNEDY succeeded in obtaining information on war preparations against Russia confirms this hypothesis.

"KENNEDY tells us that there were two copies of Consul KOBAYASHI's report. The first was for Colonel SCHMIDT, Chief of the Eastern section in Stockholm. KENNEDY was responsible for taking the second one from Stockholm to Berlin to General of Brigade BANZAI, Japanese Military Bureau in Berlin.

"Since the arrest of KENNEDY and KOBAYASHI with the S.R. /resistance movement/ liaison agent of Warsaw, it has been possible to put hands on the material destined for London. Almost all the documents are encoded. When they are decoded, it can be seen whether they contain any espionage material. In this event, radio stations between Warsaw and London branches of S.R., which are annexes of the Japanese S.R., would in turn exploit this material.

"Through the arrest of other Poles of the Resistance and through the continual interrogations of those detained, it is to be hoped that reliable diplomatic relations between Japan, the Resistance Movement, the Polish Government of London, and the Vatican will be revealed.

"Heil Hitler.

"Sincerely yours."

Translation of ROHLSDORF's Statement

The following statement, dated 17 May 1946, was submitted during his interrogation by Col. Joachim ROHLSDORF, German intelligence officer and, at the time of the action described below, chief of Abwehr III P:

"KURCZYNSKI - Polish SpY.

"A careful watch by my 'Hauskapelle', working under my orders, on the Manchurian Embassy in Berlin resulted in a letter from the Embassy and destined for Italy, falling into German hands. The Embassy was suspected of carrying on intelligence work detrimental to Germany's prosecution of the war -- a member of the Embassy had tried to recruit a German national as an agent.

"It was addressed to the General of the Jesuit Order, Count LEON KRZYWICKI, well known as a fanatical Polish patriot who though well in the seventies, was still a very vigorous man. The typewritten letter bore a handwritten

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signature, practically illegible, which might possibly have been 'KUNCEWICZ.' The main part of the fairly comprehensive letter consisted of reports on the fate and work of Catholic priests and parishes in German-occupied POLAND and LITHUANIA. It added suggestions for the further development of channels by which information could be passed; the writer laid the greatest stress on the need for careful camouflage -- the Manchurian and Japanese diplomats were to be kept in ignorance of his true position. He also informed his correspondent of the days on which his agent in Rome prepared courier post for Germany, as well as the days on which he himself in Berlin prepared post for, and received post from, Poland. The tone of the letter was deferential and indicated a personal acquaintanceship.

".....Investigations carried out by my subordinates revealed that a Pole, KUNCEWICZ, though not on my official list, was in fact employed as assistant at the Manchurian Embassy, and had been supplied with a Manchurian passport.

"At this juncture, the Abwehr was obliged to bring in the Gestapo on the case. The latter arrested KUNCEWICZ in the street.

"The Manchurian and Japanese diplomatic representative took no steps towards finding KUNCEWICZ, and when several days later the Embassy was informed of what had happened (as far as it was in the German interest to do so) they professed complete agreement with the German measures taken.

"As a result of KUNCEWICZ's cross-examination -- the Abwehr was not present but was kept informed of the statements made -- as well as further private inquiries, the following facts became known:

"KUNCEWICZ was formerly an officer in the Polish Army, trained in intelligence work. He had, in all probability, been working for the Japanese diplomatic representative in Warsaw even before the outbreak of war in 1939, because after the military collapse of Poland in 1939 he found protection and employment at the Embassy there, was given a Manchurian passport and an appointment in Berlin.

"For the remainder of the war, a Manchurian/Japanese Consulate-General functioned in Warsaw and kept in constant touch with the Japanese and Manchurian Embassies in Berlin through a diplomatic bag. [KUNCEWICZ] implies that the Manchurian Consulate-General in Warsaw was closed or inactive after early 1942, and says that the Japanese Embassy had been abandoned before that; Poles were also employed in this Consulate in Warsaw.

"KUNCEWICZ admitted that he had received current miscellaneous information from Poland and Lithuania via his agents employed at the Consulate-General -- which served as a collecting point -- through the diplomatic bag. He denied, however, that the information was of a military nature. The information was then forwarded through a Japanese/Manchurian courier to the office of the Military Attaché at the Japanese Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden. There, working as a colleague of the Japanese Military Attaché (Col. KUNCEWICZ -- promoted in 1943 to the rank of General) was a former Polish colonel and

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intelligence officer called Piotr or Peter IWANOW, who held a Japanese passport; his real Polish name became known later on, but I can no longer recall it. Oberst. Dr. WACHS, who until the beginning of 1945, worked in Stockholm for the Abwehr, knows all the details on the subject.

"KUCZYNSKI received directions and considerable sums of money through the same channels from Peter IWANOW, which he forwarded via Warsaw to members of his intelligence net in Poland and Lithuania. IWANOW kept in constant touch with the Polish Government in London through the Japanese Embassy in Stockholm, and after Japan's entry into the war through the Polish Embassy in Stockholm.

"The Japanese Military Attaché in Stockholm, General SHIMAZU, was Military Attaché in Lithuania years before the war; it is therefore probable that his close relations with Peter IWANOW date from that time. SHIMAZU claimed to have used IWANOW to receive information from London; I am certain that the latter had channels through Finland and the Baltic countries to agents on the Russian frontier, and that he supplied SHIMAZU with Russian and most probably German military information.

"The German authorities drew Gen. SHIMAZU's attention to the dangerous character of his colleague. The Swedish Intelligence finally also grew suspicious of IWANOW. The latter left for London in 1944.

"KUCZYNSKI was, at the time of his arrest, suffering from a chronic illness, and died during his imprisonment before being brought to trial -- the latter information was supplied by the Gestapo.

"In parenthesis, there was never any evidence to show that the Jesuits used the many channels available to the Catholic Church for passing military information.

"The General of the Order, Count LUDOWIKOWSKI, died during the war."

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APPENDIX: Japanese Specialists on Poland and Polish Wartime Activities in the Far East

OHODERA has supplied the following list of Japanese officers, all of whom have been at one time or another on duty as Military Attaché in Poland and should be informed of Polish activities in the Far East during the war.

The first four names given below are those of men considered to be especially well qualified:

YAMAWAKI Masataka, Major General

Twice on duty in Poland, first in the twenties and again from 1934 to 1936. Later commanded the Japanese forces in Borneo (?).

HATA Hikosaburo, Lieut. General

On duty in Poland 1930 - 1933. Intelligence officer, organization specialist. Has worked in Russian Section, Dept. II, Japanese General Staff. Afterwards (1936) Asst Military Attaché in Moscow.

UREDA Masao, Major General

On duty in Poland 1938 - 1939; cooperated closely with Colonel GANO (Polish I. S. Chief) Intelligence officer, has worked in Russian Section, Dept. II, Japanese General Staff.

FUJITSUKA, Major General

Military Attaché to Rumania 1939 - 1942. Well informed on Polish - Japanese collaboration in southeastern Europe.

OKASE Masaburo, Col. General (? - no such Japanese rank)

Teacher in the Japanese War College. On duty in Poland during the twenties.

HIGUCHI Kichiro, Lieut. General

In Poland during the twenties. Intelligence officer. At the end of the war was a commander in north Japan (?).

SUZUKI Shigeyasu, Lieut. General

In Poland about 1929. Operations officer.

YANAGIDA Genzo, Lieut. General

On duty in Poland 1932 - 1934. Chief of Japanese military intelligence at Warbin, 1940 (?).

FUJITSUKA, Lieut. General

Assistant to YANAGIDA in Warsaw. Intelligence officer, Russian specialist. Said to know a lot about penetration of the USSR.

SAWADA Shigeru, Lieut. General

On duty in Poland 1936 - 1938. Intelligence officer. At the end of the war, commander in Shanghai (?).

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