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ONODERA, Makoto, Gen. Military Attache - Jap. Sweden 28/5/45
Stockholm
(see also the ROUSSEAU MISSION, Jap 26)

Description: Born, 19/9/97 Iwata Married, wife of high Jap. nobility; 3 sons, eldest 15 at school in Japan;
Speaks & writes Russian fluently; German poorly; understands some English; a moderate man; drinks little; doesn't smoke; suffers from low blood pressure; a diligent & tireless worker, Ambitious, suspicious & intelligent.

Education: Grad. War College 1923

Career: Capt. (Intelligence Officer), Gen. Staff, Manchuria - 1930; Instructor of tactics, War College; 1930-36; organized Pro-Japanese "National Chinese Movement", China - 1936-37; Commander, Inf. Div., China (1 yr.) - 1940; returned to War College; Military Attache, Stockholm - 1944-
Repatriated on SS PLUS ULTRA (q.v.) 1/46.

Remarks: Subject has built up a splendid net of agents covering Germany, England, Russia etc.; contacts Latvian & Estonian diplomats; subject & wife do all the code work; reported to have orders to remain at present post after Germany's collapse to take over Jap. intell. system for all Europe; heads violent pro-Jap group in Jap. colony, Sweden; suspected of collaboration with VOZDONDY, Lasalo to usurp functions of Hungarian Min. to Sweden - 1/45; prior to 11/44 received money from various sources, immlu-
(over)

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ing 150,000 Swiss francs thru Jap. Attache, Finland; sends money to informants in England
Maintained good contact with a German named KRAEMER in Stockholm - 11/7/45; now in
charge of all intelligence in Europe, the Baltics, British Isles & the West-
ern Hemisphere; reported to rank higher within the Legation than the Minis-
ter & has a free hand in all intelligence activities - 7/7/45;
Reported to be Chief, Eastern Service (directed against Russia) of JIS. Received reports
from SUGIHARA (Koenigsberg), and ONUCHI (Helsingfors).

TI-822, 14 May 1946 - request by Swedish police for interrogation of ONODERA, now in Japan.
Subject collaborated with Heins Krämer, Sec'y of the German Legation in Stockholm, from
mid-1943 to Spring 1945, furnishing two Allied sitreps on Western Europe, etc. Other subj.
contacts: Asst. Germ. Air Attache Henrik Wenzlau; Lt. Col. Haalama & Col. Paasonen of the
Finnish General Staff; official of French Legation named Pierre Garnier. ONODERA familiar
with activities of JIS and GIS, possibly Hungarian IS, in and concerning Sweden.

TDX-34 (Jan./May 1946): ENOMOTO to LIUM re repatriates on SS PLUS ULTRA (B-2) -

"(Gen. ONODERA) proved unswerving in his faith in the person of Mr. Liium and conviction
of indispensable collaboration with the Allies, despite all the happenings during the
voyage. He said that the French Intelligence Captain, who had interviewed him at Na-
ples, produced letters addressed to the French authorities by Col. Gano, chief of staff
of the Polish C in C in London, Gen. Bor Kormansky, and by a Polish Brigadier in Italy,
requesting that a Japanese friend of Poland be accorded friendly attention by the French
ally. The general in reply to a question by the French captain stated that he had had
no direct contact with Mr. Garnier, the contact having been made through a v. Belle-
garde, who is a friend of Messing's. In the course of his conversations with the gener-
al, the French officer confirmed that Finns like Col. Paasonen and Haalama, whose ren-
dition from Sweden had been requested by the Moscow Govt., were 'safe' in Paris."

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TDX-84 (Jan./May 1946): ONODERA to ENOMOTO to LIUM (B-2) - Subject's relationship to German IS ("always done his best for using the GIS for his own purposes")... "As it was part of his duties at the Stockholm post to watch the German situation for objective appraisal, he had had difficulty in dealing with the Germans on more than one occasion. Info. he got on the Western front was mostly of the German sources. He did not gather as much info on the Eastern front, in accordance with Tokyo's policy." —Contacts with other services: Italian (none), Finnish, Hungarian, Polish. "According to ONODERA's own experiences, it is very difficult for Japanese to organize in Europe an information network of born-Japanese agents. It seemed most fruitful to single out European agents with former record at the Japanese offices for a Japanese-managed network according to their respective capacity and objectives and further to organize close collaboration with friendly European services of members thereof. ONODERA could have had certain success in services organized along the above lines." — Comments under each of the above-mentioned national services with respect to their coverage of Russian intelligence. (See TDX 93, Encl. #5c for original and more detailed report on this by ENOMOTO)

OUT 0629 (23 May '46 to R. Rousseau): Concise summary of the above for briefing of R.; emphasis on ONODERA's remarks vis-a-vis coverage of RIS and Russia by Finns, Poles, etc.

TDX-93, Encl. #2 (Jan./May 1946): LIUM - "His career as director of Japanese Intelligence activities is well known. A tough, brilliant militarist. In conversation, a reserved, quiet, kindly person. (Para.) Many in the Jap. Colony in Sweden felt that ONODERA will never collaborate with the Allies. I lean towards the optimistic side as a result of very many conversations with him. (Para.) Two things should always be remembered about him. He worships the Emperor. It is reliably reported that when the Capitulation came, he said, 'Thank God it is over and we saved the Emperor.' He expressed his desire to be alone and spent some time before the picture of the Emperor with very great emotion. (Para.) Secondly, he hates

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....hates Communism. Since the Capitulation he devoted his entire time to a study of the methods of the Russian Revolution. He is considered a Russian expert by his colleagues. He told me personally that it was his conviction that Russia could never be defeated with only military pressure from without, but only through a combination of (that) and intrigues from within; that the time is not ripe for such intrigues because of the intense nationalism which resulted from Russia's great military victories in this war. I asked him if he was of the opinion that if war broke out between Russia and the Western Powers, Japan would quickly emerge as a great power as a result. He stated categorically that he did not believe such a result would take place, for Japan would become a frontline and suffer almost complete destruction, unless Japan and the Western Powers collaborated in preparedness.

"...He agreed in principle (that the Japanese would probably react favorably to Allied Occupation terms). He added that collaboration with the Allies and the reconstruction of Japan is not a decision but a process. That one must watch policies and the effect on the Japanese over a long period of time."

"A deep and bitter enmity existed between ONODERA and OKAMOTO, the Jap. Minister in Stockholm. ONODERA had his agents within the Jap. colony. These, in my opinion, were: Momotaro ENOMOTO (q.v.) to inform on the journalists, Kichinosuke SATO to inform on the Military and Naval Attache personnel, and Jun TSUCHIYA to inform on the Legation staff. These informers openly discussed ONODERA as a brilliant Intelligence Director with an incredibly amazing capacity to penetrate Intelligence organizations on the very highest levels. It was also stated that ONODERA developed an intricate system of contacts, but because of his sympathetic nature, developed loyalty and did not lose even his remote contacts. It was suggested that ONODERA presents in his person one of our greatest problems in Japan. That the success or failure of our reconstruction program in Japan would depend on how successful we are in winning over men of ONODERA's ability. I explicitly asked how ONODERA could be of service to the Occupation Authorities and whether or not he would collaborate. I was told that if allowance is made for his position as a soldier serving his country during the war, and if willingness

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...willingness was shown to understand his record on this basis, he would probably begin to feel at ease. If he were given a position to uncover underground nests in Japan and reactionary forces, he could turn in a brilliant job if he would. I suggested he would probably play a double game if he were given such a position. I was told he probably would (to) begin with, but if he saw our policies working towards the betterment of the Japanese people he would progressively collaborate, and would persuade a great many reactionaries to collaborate also.

"It was suggested also that ONODERA could turn in a brilliant job in gathering information from Russia through his former contacts, or through establishment of new channels."

X-2 30314, 5/21/46 (ROUSSEAU to War Dept. for SSU) - Progress Report on Interrogation of Major General Makoto ONODERA, begun 6 May 1946. A preliminary account (q.v. - Dos, Jap le, ONODERA) of subject's relationships with Finnish, Swedish and Polish IS and of his mission. "ONODERA has confirmed that his chief mission was to obtain intelligence on the USSR and that his training and career have centered on Russia."

TDX-93, Encl. #5c, 5/46; ENOMOTO to LIUM - same as TDX-84, as briefed on 3., above. See dossier Jap le, ONODERA.

IN 39831, 27 July 1946, Rousseau: Interrogation of ONODERA completed. ONODERA and ONOUCHI have given the following information concerning collaboration of the Japanese and Polish intelligence services (see Jap le, JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE: COLLABORATION WITH POLISH IS, or cable in FBZ files)....Information from the following sources was transmitted through Japanese and Manchurian missions in Berlin and ONODERA's office in Stockholm to London: JACUBIC (alias KUNCZEWIECZ and LAPINSKA) in Berlin; PERZ and TADEUS (with Sugihara) ~~in Kaunas~~ in Kaunas and Koenigsberg; MISHKIEWIECZ and ~~JESKIEWICZ~~ TOMAS in Warsaw; MURKA in Vienna; KUBKIEWIECZ and JESOVITOW in Riga; BZABA (JABA) in Helsinki; ~~KOWALEWSKI~~ KOWALEWSKI in Portugal. All

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these sources were agents (Polish) of or contacted by Michal RUBIKOWSKI (alias Pritre IWANOW alias RIBICKI), who worked with NISHIMURA in Stockholm, ONOUCHI in Riga 1940, and ONODERA in Stockholm 1941-44. A member of the Polish mission to Moscow—the former Polish minister to Helsinki—is also believed to have served as a source for RUBIKOWSKI; his reports were sent to RUBIKOWSKI and ONODERA through London.

After the departure from Stockholm in the spring of 1944 of RUBIKOWSKI, who was expelled by the Swedish Govt. and went to London, later joining Gen. Anders' army in Italy, ONODERA continued to receive information from him and Col. GANO through BRZESKOWSKI, Polish Mil. Attache at Stockholm (warning of entry into war against Japan of USSR; Russian troop movements in Far East); Col. GANO offered ONODERA ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ protection and money after the Japanese surrender.

For reports which he believed to be British deception, ONODERA paid \$10,000 to RZABA and 'Mr. BERG' in Stockholm, via Stephan GADOWSKI, an arrangement for getting info on Western Allies made for ONODERA by RUBIKOWSKI before the latter left Sweden.

ONODERA and ONOUCHI provided Rousseau with a list of specialists (JIS) on Russia and Poland for further questioning.

OUT 1566 to Madrid (re IN 39000 from Madrid): In addition to all details about Hungarian and Japanese services and their interrelation subject should be questioned specifically on (1) W/T contact with ONODERA and knowledge of his whole network; (3) Appraisal of Jap agent Waldemar ARAUJO.

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WASH 3763, 27 Jun 47-Text of cable see ROUSSEAU MISSION, U.S. Operational, Japan, Japan Desk.

Memo. Vandervoort (OSO Control) to FEC, 29 May 1947--Queries whether ONODERA interrogation report was given to British forces in the field (Japan) or to British authorities by the ID, WDGS, Washington. Memo. Austin (FEC, WDI) to Dir of Int. WDGS, 23 June 1947 states in reply that 1 copy only was retained in the Theater and record indicates that it has not been shown to British forces there. Further states that Lt Comdr Rousseau kept all pertinent papers in his personal file during preparation.

FSRO-438, Tokyo, July '46: SSU Interrogation of ONOUCHI Hirose -- subj. named as no. 8 on ONOUCHI's graded list of Japanese specialists on Russian intelligence. See pp. 4, 9, 19, 20, 23, 28 and 33 of report.

See Japan Desk dossier file folder "ONODERA Disseminations" for disseminated reports based on the SSU (ROUSSEAU) interrogations of ONODERA Makoto, ONOUCHI Hirose, HIROSE Eiichi, ITO Kiyokazu, KIGOSHI Yasukazu, SATO Tatsuya, INOUE Yoichi and SATO Kichinosuke.
