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AIR

DELA-3578

OHLBRECHT  
12 MAY 1953 *drawn*

Chief, FE

INFO: GCM, Bann, SOB, and  
CADRAIN

Chief of Base, Pullach

Operational/ZIPPER/CART

RFV-Rumored Activation of "Special Office" in Berlin  
ZIPPER/RFV/LFV Berlin Relations

Reference - ROBA-4388 - *RFV*

1. Perhaps the first point to note here is that a ZIPPER agent, *all/hms*  
OHLBRECHT, is also working for [ ] who is presumably running a CADRAIN operation; the extent of ZIPPER knowledge of the operation and implications to KUBARK security should be considered. *BOB/PP*

2. We assume that the RFV "Special Office" in Berlin is probably identical with that described in ROBA-1188. It is also noteworthy that the RFV is getting on well enough with the LFV chief in Berlin, Friederich, to suggest that they would prefer the Allied liaison officers in Berlin deal with the "Special Office" only through Friederich.

3. [ ] a POB OR officer, advised [ ] during the course of the investigation of the HOFER kidnapping. OHLBRECHT was reasonably well informed on the activities of "Gruppe [ ]" (which is not surprising if he is an employee), was a direct contact of HOFER and described to ZIPPER something of the activities of "Gruppe [ ]" when [ ] was present in Berlin. So much for the CADRAIN angle; we find this development something less than shocking since we reached the conclusion many months ago that ZIPPER's inventory of this type of activity was reasonably complete.

4. The [ ] connection is interesting. One of UTILITY's favorite themes is that [ ] has systematically organized their wartime associations with the Radio Calais group. On 29 October 1952 UTILITY asked me if I knew a Frank W. LUNGER whom he described as a wartime German refugee to England, an employee of Radio Calais during the war, a close friend of Otto JURE, a postwar Reuters correspondent in Berlin and a 1952 member of MI 6 stationed in the Calais area. I had never heard of LUNGER.

5. Friederich Victor NIEST is, of course, no stranger to either ZIPPER or POB. He falls clearly into the "anti-ZIPPER" camp. About six months ago

Distribution:

3 - ER 1 - BSB  
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*copy sent separately to CE/PP/G*

11 May 1953

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[ ]  
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-2-

ZIPPER determined via a "D" source that NISSE was attempting to peddle a rather comprehensive story regarding ZIPPER for publication. Der Stern had plans to run this story; however, at the last minute intervention by ZIPPER via the Konslerant with the owner of Der Stern resulted in a cancellation. This story came to us from ZIPPER. FE has been independently attempting to follow the affairs of NISSE and recently approached Region IV CIC for cooperation. They refused and referred us to Stuttgart. Stuttgart tentatively is withholding information, indicating a special CIC interest. They have assured us of something in "a month or so." We are not pressing the case. We did not know that NISSE was a Radio Calais alumnus.

6. Since some evidence of BND/British/BIV cooperation is evident in this whole affair, we might throw in the statement that Fritz HEINE, who is also reported by UTILITY to have close friendships with Otto JOHN, Saffon DELMAR and others that go back to Calais days, is regarded by ZIPPER as being under considerable [ ] influence. The Saffon DELMAR attacks on ZIPPER were labelled by ZIPPER as the product of HEINE/JOHN/DELMAR cooperation.

7. Throughout 1951-52 ZIPPER produced a number of reports to the effect that Otto JOHN was attempting to penetrate ZIPPER through Paul SCHMIDT of the Heese VG. There seems to have been some evidence to suggest that this was taking place.

8. In the event future developments prove [ ] report to be correct, we feel it would be highly rewarding for KUBARK to maintain a window into this operation; however, we believe that this should be done only without revealing such interest to ZIPPER or the BIV and subject to the reservations outlined in paras 9 and 10 below. We are in complete accord with the view that ZIPPER should not be briefed on this lead at this time.

9. GELBRECHT must be evaluated in light of his actions at the time of the KOENIG kidnapping. It was he who, at the request of HONIG's ZIPPER case officer, went to Public Safety and requested that the case be removed from the custody of the German police. If the BIV (or [ ]) proceeds with the plan to penetrate ZIPPER through GELBRECHT, it will undoubtedly be a question of who is really penetrating whom.

10. Since our KUBARK policy is to emphasize ZIPPER's dependency on us in Berlin (as opposed to our willingness to grant them increasing independence in the conduct of their affairs in the Federal Republic), we cannot simply say to GELBRECHT that we consider the matter of the BIV effort to penetrate ZIPPER as an internal German matter—particularly if the actions involved are to take place in Berlin. In Berlin we must admit a degree of proprietorship or at least trusteeship for ZIPPER and not indicate that we would regard with indifference any effort by anyone to penetrate ZIPPER. On the other hand, the possibility that this is a provocation by ZIPPER or the BIV to determine American reaction should not be overlooked — particularly in view of GELBRECHT's request for an American position — Thus, we believe that we should simply content ourselves with whatever chance information we can obtain from [ ] You are obviously in the best position to judge how far it is safe to go in exploiting this angle.

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FOIA-3572

-3-

11. ZIPPER's interest in GLEISBACH has recently increased. An internal ZIPPER memo which has just come to our attention, indicates that GYRL, ZIPPER's CI/OK agency, intends to take over handling of GLEISBACH directly. Whether it is GLEISBACH's position with GABRIEL, or his recommended position with the RIV "Special Office" or some other and unknown element that prompts this increased interest remains to be determined.

12. Finally, a few comments on ZIPPER's position in Berlin and the relationship with the RIV:

- (a) ZIPPER has a generally unsatisfactory liaison relationship with Berlin police agencies. In spite of ZIPPER's occasionally "satisfactory" relationship with the SPD, UTILITY demonstrates great reluctance to place this relationship on trial by using it as a point of departure for working out technical liaison arrangements with SPD officials--particularly SPD officials in Berlin. Periodically, UTILITY speaks hopefully of getting GLEISBACH to make representations to KNOTER regarding ZIPPER's liaison needs in Berlin; it has never materialized and we do not anticipate that it will in the immediate future.
- (b) We have a standing offer with ZIPPER to provide KUMARK good offices to establish ZIPPER/Berlin Police liaison contacts; they show increased interest but have not taken up the bait at this time. However, about nine months ago they did request us to assist one of their Berlin investigators, Kurt MORITZ, in getting a position with the West Berlin Kripo. After some correspondence, we finally decided that it would not be in KUMARK interests to intervene in this case and advised ZIPPER that our efforts were unsuccessful because of MORITZ' political background. ZIPPER then attempted on their own to get MORITZ placed but without success.
- (c) ZIPPER's relationship with the RIV is increasingly unsatisfactory. Agreements reached between ZIPPER and RIV in 1951 provide the framework for cooperation; communications channels exist but distrust on both sides seems to be on the upswing. The unresolved conflict regarding the role of the GIB and the RIV in the OK (IIIF) field is principally the basis for this disagreement. At the same time deep-seated ZIPPER suspicion toward the Otis JOHN/British complex does not help the situation. Consequently, all ZIPPER/RIV cooperation in the OK field has ceased.
- (d) Currently, ZIPPER's efforts to gain an independent foothold in Berlin police circles are concentrated on an approach through the Berlin representative of the Chancellor. We do not have the impression that things are moving very rapidly in that quarter. We, at Fallach, have an extremely vague picture of the legal and official status of that office in Berlin.

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- (e) ZIPPER is politically closely linked with both the CDU and FDP—probably most closely with the latter party. Thus, the move on the part of the Allies to remove HANSEN (CDU) and RACHLEBNER (FDP) from key posts in the LfV Berlin would strike at potentially the most approachable elements in the LfV Berlin. Several years ago, [ ] suggested that ZIPPER would do well to come up with several politically acceptable and professionally qualified candidates for the Berlin LfV. We discussed this with ZIPPER at the time but nothing significant developed.

[ ]

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