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Chief of [] Base, []

Chief, FF

INFO: Chief of Section, []

Operational Reporting
POCAPON's Pre-Merger Reporting

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1. In view of the fact that the reports received from POCAPON prior to the merger of the conservative parties, were largely at variance with what actually took place, Headquarters has been re-viewing the KUBARK-POCAPON relationship in an attempt to ascertain the whys and wherefores.
2. As you are no doubt aware, POCAPON insisted that he would not be a party to any merger that did not have as a prerequisite the removal of MATOYAMA and an open election of a new Prime Minister. He further stated that the Liberals were in a very favorable position and would not agree to merger unless their terms were met by the Democrats.
3. We need not concern ourselves at this time with the possible consequences of the merger, but rather with the fact that POCAPON told us one thing, and then acted in a contrary manner.
4. There are many possible explanations of this, some of which do not appear likely but all of which should be explored to the fullest extent possible. The following are the explanations that have occurred to us in the order of likelihood, starting with the least likely:
 - a. POCAPON deliberately fabricated his reporting to deceive KUBARK.
 - b. POCAPON was using KUBARK as a channel to UBACID in order to get their reaction on an adamant stand on the part of the

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Liberals.

c. POCAPON told us only his overt stand because (1) fear of a leak and/or (2) he did not know what compromise he would be forced to make, and/or (3) he considered KUBARK only a channel by which his views could be made known and his bargaining position thereby strengthened.

d. POCAPON was sincere when he reported to us, but was forced by political expediency during the final weeks of negotiations to compromise.

5. In any case it would appear that POCAPON was somewhat less than completely frank with us with regard to the necessity of compromise. Thus KUBARK was placed in the position of having as an informant one of the principal figures in the merger negotiations and yet not being able to predict accurately the form that the merger would take.

6. We are aware that the KUBARK-POCAPON relationship is unusual, in that POCAPON is not controlled, is not obligated to KUBARK, and as a rule is not given EEI.

7. However, we feel that if this relationship is to continue, POCAPON must at least report accurately all the possibilities in a given situation, and should tell us his decision when he makes it.

8. We believe it would be profitable for [] Base to explore the various explanations mentioned in para 4 above, as well as any others that come to mind.

9. Headquarters solicits [] Base's comments and course of action on this matter.

Originated by: [] []

8 Dec 1955

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