

Recd. FBI 11-2-57

CONTACT REPORT

No. _____

LIAISON UNIT F/2 - POCAPON

DATE AND TIME OF CONTACT: 3 Dec 55, 1100 hours - 1315 hours.

EXACT LOCATION: POCAPON's official residence in Shibuya and the ASHIE Restaurant in Ginza.

ALL PERSONS INVOLVED: POCAPON, POCAPON's Secretary (during lunch), C I

PURPOSE: ROUTINE Liaison contact

COMMITMENTS MADE: None

MONETARY TRANSACTIONS: None

MATERIALS PASSED: "The Status of National Minorities in Communist China"
"Three Designs for Checkmating Communism"
"Russia And China under Communism"
"The New Chinese Communist"
"Kommunist Article Offers further evidence of Changing Soviet Strategy in Asia"
"The Inevitability of Peace (Soviet Propoganda Revives Litvinov's Slogen"
"The Soviet Record in Reducing Tensions; Molotov's Claims and the Actual Fact"
"Daily Life in the Soviet Sattelites"
"Leading Positions and Personalities in the Soviet Government and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union"
(All 9 items above were received by FJHM-3532 dtd 28 Oct 55 for passage to POCAPON)

REPORTS RECEIVED: 2 bottles of Black and White and 4 cartons of Cigarettes. See Below.

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE ACCOUNT

1. By pre arrangement I called on POCAPON at his official residence in Shibuya at 1100 hours, 3 Dec 55. I took 2 bottles of Black and White scotch for POCAPON and 4 cartons of cigarettes for his 4 secretaries. I met with POCAPON in the second floor living room. After a brief exchange of greetings and apologies on the Part of POCAPON for not having gotten in touch with me at all during the several hectic days when the new Hatoyama Cabinet was being formed he explained that my message informing him through his secretaries of the new telephone exchange number for my quarters had not reached him. I assured him that I realized he would have been busy and probably would not have been able to meet with me even if he had gotten in touch with me by telephone. We rehearsed the episode of my change in telephone numbers. I told POCAPON that I had informed his secretary, NAKANO of the change in number on the day the change took place; I did not know that NAKANO merely made the notation in his own memo book and forgot to tell

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(b)(1) Privacy
(b)(7) Methods/ Sources
(b)(8) Foreign Dis.

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by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

... about ...
quarters of ...
getting a busy signal ...
to think that ...
receiver of ...

... in discussion of the ...
indicated that he wished to give ...
the past several weeks which, he said, he hoped ...
party took place. He said that for one thing the merger had been accomplished;
as far as he personally was concerned this was the primary target so he should
be satisfied, however, in view of the tactics employed by the Democrats (who
wished to stay in a controlling position) and ...
the new head of the party did not come out as planned. He said that the sentiments
he had expressed to ... and ...
a strong conservative merger remained unbroken. ...
was nothing but a stop gap measure which must be solidified next April with the
open elections for the new head of the party. The reason he said that he had
given in to the Democrats and ... in particular for a four man control
board was not due to political or financial pressure as is generally reported to
the public but a slaking of position by ... alone as the only means of
getting together before the 15th of Nov. 55 as has been promised to the people of
the nation. ... said that he realized that ...
had tried every means conceivable of delaying the question of merger, not
because they were against it in principle but because each was aiming for a
stronger position in the party and in the government. ... said that in
a meeting with ... earlier in 1955 he had indicated to the latter that
if worse came to worse ... would agree to a split of functions (i.e. party
work and Government with ... if that would guarantee a merger. ... is
reported to have declined to take up this matter with the Democrats at the time
because he had tried this maneuver himself many months previously as a means of
avoiding the general elections which brought ... into power. ...
at that time had incurred the wrath of the ... for even suggesting a joint
leadership - he could not lose face now and have them get mad at him all over
again) ... said that he could get liberal support for the idea at this time
due to the change in the political scene and the need for a merger being as
imminent as it was. As this was a secret meeting between ... and ...
nothing was released on this for a while. When the four top members of the
Liberal and Democratic party were finding ways and means of merging ... let
them become aware of the fact that he wanted merger by the 15th of Nov 55 as
had been promised to the nation. He agreed to the four man control board
acting in a caretaker capacity until the elections could be held before the
current extraordinary session of the Diet convened. The Democrats agreed to
this and then threw in a monkey wrench by indicating that they wanted the
... for the Prime Minister to be handled on the basis of separate elections
in the House of Councillors and in the House of Representatives and in the
event of a difference in result the vote of the House of Councillors would not be
counted. (The strategy in this was that the Democrats controlled the lower
house and naturally would vote for ... while the upper house was controlled
by the Liberals and would come up with an ... vote. ... would lose for
sure in such an agreement) ... said that he made his decision at this time

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to allow the four men considered to take over until April if HATAYAMA wanted to be prime minister so much. He said that in doing this he and MIKI B. can get the Party aligned with the left during that time and there would be a more favorable vote for HATAYAMA. In spite of the fact that the conservatives still lie, it will be an uphill battle all the way for POCAI since HATAYAMA is actually the one who gets his name and his picture in the papers more than POCAI. POCAI's job for the next five months with therefore be one of public relations, handshaking and vote buying. He said that he does not like to engage in such tactics but he is forced to do so since he personally does not believe that HATAYAMA will step down or resign from his position as PRIME MINISTER as he promised. POCAI said that although he himself could care less about the political situation or about being top man in the political picture he did not feel that HATAYAMA had either the inclination or the ability to ride herd on the Communist menace staring Japan in the face at the present time in the clothing of the Socialists. For this reason alone he would like to take over the government and put some more positive force behind its activities directed against communism.

3. I asked, if POCAI had decided to give in to the Democrats on the issue of the open vote, why had he not gotten more of his own "kobun" into the Cabinet. POCAI said that the reason for this was that the present cabinet has its days numbered and its seats are filled by people who are ready to say good bye to the world after one more moment of glory. He said that KONO B. had many political debts to pay and by letting him have his chance to repay these old gentlemen before they died it would enhance his prestige with them, and also their "kobun" at the same time rather than trying to work on the present cabinet if he got KONO B. on his side as a supporter he did not have to worry about this problem. As for himself he said that he was still, he hoped, spry enough to pay his political debts at some future date... perhaps he said, with the next cabinet if he should become the Prime Minister. In discussing the lineup of this current cabinet POCAI had this to say. The two most controversial figures are YASUHIRO and MIYOSHI. Liberal opposition to these men lies in the fact that they had never done any Party work to earn their position. MIYOSHI opposed to YASUHIRO due to prior unpleasant association but this is not as deep rooted as made out to be. MIYOSHI would rather have put in a MIYOSHI to whom he is greatly indebted but HATAYAMA opposed because KONO paid him substantial amount of money to keep the Democratic contribution to the present cabinet as much KONO flavored as possible. According to POCAI one sure way to get elected next April would be to conclude a secret pact with KONO to assure him an important position on a POCAI cabinet, however, he said that everyone was aware of KONO's necessary tactics and for every one that KONO might bring to POCAI's support away from HATAYAMA he might go the other way when they learned about it. He said that there were few men in Japanese recent history who were as powerful and as hated as KONO, and fewer still who could be so easily moved by money. I asked why MATSUO did not get in the cabinet when his name had been mentioned as a likely possibility in the early stages. POCAI said that MATSUO had indicated he wanted to have HIRAI come into the cabinet if he came in. HIRAI is a opponent of MIKI B. in their home constituency of Kochi. MIKI B. would not endorse the latter's entry but above all of these considerations MATSUO would not want to give up his post as the chairman of the party in the upper house and position he would have to give up if he entered the cabinet. I questioned the advisability of MATSUO's entry in the cabinet in

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view of his entry into the Democratic Party prior to the merger in spite of his promise to wait until the merger had been accomplished. COUCH said that he had tricked the liberal party but should again see a necessary individual who could be swung by ~~BRIGGS~~ money and power. MIKI B. had promised him a cabinet position if he came to the Democrats. COUCH said that SHIBATA had too little prestige, political ability or training and would not possibly be a threat in the near future and with his age there was no need of fear at a future date. When I mentioned that COUCH seemed to be indicating that money played a great part in Japanese politics would it be right for me to assume that the financiers, big business and banking interests could and did exert a controlling influence on Japanese politics. COUCH was emphatic in his reply that the big business or economic classes in Japan did not influence politics to anywhere near the extent that most people believed. He added that big cash outlays were made by big business to influence certain individuals or cliques but this could be done by anyone. As for the party policy it was up to the top officials and the executive committee; it was true they needed money and did get the support of big business but this was political support for a party and did not bind the party to meet demands made by them in individual cases. Then with a dry smile he said, but, you know humans are human and money is a tempting offer when it is placed before an individual with apparently no strings attached.

4. I asked about COUCH's schedule for his trip to OKAYAMA and he told me that he would leave on the 21:00 train, 3 Dec and arrive in OKAYAMA at noon on 4 Dec. After attending the merger functions there he will spend the night in OKAYAMA and proceed to TAKAMATSU on Shikoku Island where he will join MIKI B. and leave TAKAMATSU on the night of the 5th. Arriving at Osaka on 6th Dec he will take the HATO Express and be back in Tokyo at 21:00 hours. He indicated that while he did not have anything scheduled for the evenings in either OKAYAMA or TAKAMATSU it was customary for the local delegates to have receptions and parties and his time would most likely be taken up fully. He said that he planned to take a number of trips throughout Japan between now and April and when ever I could get away from Tokyo he said I would be welcome to go with him. Reminiscing, he recalled the trip to Fukuoka in May and said that to this day no one has found out or even suspected that I was anything other than another of POCARON's secretaries.

5. After arranging to meet again as soon as possible after his return I took up the subject of documents to pass on to POCARON. Explaining briefly each title I gave him the 9 documents listed in the front of this C/R. This gave me an opportunity to discuss with POCARON the note about his associations with KUBARI as contained in SHACID contact report of Mr. Lamb. POCARON said that one should not worry about what a little fellow says. The more fuss a big person makes over a small matter like this the more the little fellow will try to capitalize on it. He said further that as far as he knew no one was apprehensive about his meeting with anyone, that, TU the ROF councillor was notorious for transmitting and starting rumors that few paid much attention to him, that if POCARON felt any qualms about meeting any KUBARI personnel he would be the first to tell us. He added that for safety's sake he will be careful about meeting with caucasians however and indicated that my continued calls to his residence or to his official residence were welcome.

6. We went in POCARON's car to the Ashibe tenjura restaurant in Ginza for lunch. Nakano joined us. With no further pertinent matters discussed I left him at approximately 1:15.

L.T.C.