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## Foreign Report

### CONTENTS

*The Red Plan for Unification*  
*Roubles for Tourists?*

*Presidential Imponderables*  
*The West's Faulty Arms Drill*

*Japanese on the Tight-Rope*

## The Red Plan for Unification

Soviet policy for Germany can be properly understood only when it is studied side by side with developments in Indo-China and Korea. We have often pointed out that the Communists have followed a single basic plan for divided territories in the past. This is still true, but with a difference. The Soviet and Chinese leaders have evidently decided that the settlement of the Indo-China and Korean wars between the great powers has provided an imperfect model for Germany, and the weakness in the agreement made at Geneva in 1954 was not repeated at Geneva in 1955.

The weakness of Geneva 1954 and the lesson drawn by the Communists for German policy are:

1. The settlement between the great powers, including China, was made over the heads of the local anti-Communist leaders, Mr. Diem in Saigon, and Dr. Syngman Rhee in Seoul. And they have prevented its realisation. Diem flatly refused to agree to the Geneva 1954 pact and now holds out against preparing all-Vietnam elections with the Communists. Syngman Rhee has also been recalcitrant.
2. The Americans did not underwrite the Indo-China settlement and have supported Diem; in Korea, though they have refused to give Syngman Rhee armed support for launching an attack on the Communists, they have not agreed to Communist terms for reunification (Neither, for that matter, has Britain, though the British acquiesced to similar terms for Vietnam.) These terms—which closely resemble those for Germany—were turned down at Geneva last year, and the Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr. Chou En-lai, has now proposed another conference

in which they will be put forward again. They will now, however, be tied into the Communist plan for an Asian Security pact, on the same lines as Bulganin's plan for Europe.

The settlement in Geneva in 1954 achieved for the Communists one outstanding victory—the agreement of France and Britain to the all-Vietnam elections to be preceded by a *rapprochement* between South and North. But it failed to secure at that time: (a) either the submission or the downfall of Diem and Syngman Rhee; and (b) the agreement of the Americans, and their complete withdrawal from Vietnam and Korea.

In the present plan for Germany, these weaknesses are to be avoided, though the strategy remains the same. The tactics for Germany are:

1. Dr. Adenauer (the German Diem) must be first isolated, then overthrown. If he is removed by old age, this naturally means that Communist work is done for them.
2. The isolation of Adenauer and his withdrawal from leadership must come *before* the Russians give up, or weaken, the Communist position in East Germany as the result of a great power agreement on all-German elections. Dr. Adenauer must be isolated in German public opinion, and in the United States. An important part of this process begins with Adenauer's invitation to Moscow. The German Chancellor is to be made to appear, in German eyes, as a separatist who does not want reunification; and, in American eyes, as a trouble-maker who is blocking a peaceful global settlement of East-West quarrels.
3. The two Germanies must be brought nearer together *step by step* in their economic, social and political structure during the current period—that is, before there is a great power agreement on elections, and a peace treaty. It is the economic and political system in liberal Federal Germany which must change, in order to come closer to the Communist Democratic Republic (the DDR)—not the other way round.
4. *Administrative* changes will be made in the Democratic Republic in order to make reunification (on Communist terms) easier. The various *Länder* will probably be reinstated on paper. The federal constitution of both parts of Germany would then be the same. The *Länder* in East Germany were suspended because the Soviet system demanded a division of the country into economic areas, with centralised direction, but they were never formally abolished.

If the *Länder* are re-established, the way would be made easier for an interim all-German government to be established without: (a) the Communist system in the DDR being essentially touched; and (b) the *entire* system in Federal Germany being changed into an exact copy of the DDR. The various *Länder* in West Germany have their own constitutions as well as their own elections to *Land* parliaments, and the re-established Soviet *Länder* might each adopt a constitution drafted by the Socialist Unity Party (Communist) and hold *Land* elections, in which a large majority of Communists would be returned on a single hand-picked list. Reunited Germany would then have a federal parliament in which the former DDR would be represented by Communists. The former Federal Republic would, in the Soviet

plan, be represented largely by Left-wing Socialists, anti-Western neo-Nazis and Prussian nationalists who would eventually be dominated by the Communists. At the moment the East German leaders are appealing to the Socialists to bring West Germany into line with the DDR by eliminating "monopoly capitalists, bankers, Junkers and militarists." According to the German Communists, Bulganin demands that the political conditions laid down in the Potsdam agreement of 1945 must be adopted now by West Germany. The first to be reunited on these terms is to be Berlin.

In the Communist plan the West German left-wing Socialists and nationalists are to carry out this preliminary to reunification by stages—without Dr. Adenauer. Only then will the Soviet Union talk to the Western Great Powers about a German settlement; and in the meantime, the all-European security pact is to be established.

#### FORMOSA PLAN SIMILAR

These tactics for divided countries are now to be applied, it seems, to Formosa. Analysis of the latest Chinese statements indicate a plan which is identical—as far as circumstances permit—with that for Germany. It is:

1. The talks in Geneva between the US and Chinese are only the preliminary to a *far-reaching* settlement between the US and China covering all Asia, and made "within the United Nations."
2. This is to be achieved by setting up an Asian security system similar to that proposed by the Russians for Europe.
3. The US-Chinese conference (the present talks in Geneva and the main conference to come) must *not* deal with settlement of the status of Formosa, though it would cover the relaxation of US-Chinese tension in the area, i.e., withdrawal of the American fleet, in acknowledgment of the fact that there has been no shooting in the Formosan straits in recent months. Formosa itself is to be dealt with by mainland Chinese and Formosan "local authorities"—*not* between Chinese and Americans. Peking would be willing to deal with Chiang in the unlikely event of his becoming tractable, but would turn to other Nationalists if he remains stubborn.

The parallel with Germany is plain. Chiang Kai-shek—like Dr. Adenauer—is to be isolated both from local opinion and from the Americans, if he continues to be a stumbling block in the way of reunification.

### Roubles for Tourists?

The Soviet Government is believed to be considering measures to put the rouble on a more realistic basis. The existing official rate of 11.2 roubles to the £ sterling substantially over-values the Russian currency, but so far the Soviet leaders have firmly ignored this anomaly. But there are two reasons for believing that a change of attitude towards the rouble is on the way in Russia:

1. The new post-Geneva policy of amity with the West; it may now be expedient to abandon an artificially inflated rate of exchange which has been a continual irritant to the West.

2. The opening up of tourist trips to Russia organised by the official Intourist agency; visits to Russia, which are paid for in Western currencies at the official rate are exorbitantly costly.

One possibility which the Russians are believed to be exploring is the introduction of a special "tourist" rate for the rouble, which would make holiday excursions to Moscow for Western tourists a more practical proposition. A ten-day round trip to Russia from Britain is at present quoted at about £175—much too high for the ordinary tourist. Two factors, however, operate against an early introduction of a "tourist" rouble: (a) the Intourist facilities, which are still inadequate; and (b) the shortage of hotel accommodation in Russia.

Some observers think that if the Russians are seriously considering doing something about the exchange rate for foreign tourists, they might prefer instead to take the plunge and devalue the rouble against western currencies. This argument is based on:

A.—The assumption that the Russians are now anxious to become members of the international economic institutions like the International Bank and Monetary Fund and Gatt. They have certainly been showing more interest of late in these organisations; but to join the Monetary Fund, for one, they would have to be prepared to justify their exchange rate to the controlling body in Washington. The present inflated rate would obviously be unacceptable and, moreover, the Fund would object to a special "tourist rouble."

B.—The belief that some of the present difficulties in Soviet East-West trade are attributable to over-priced Soviet exports. Devaluation would make these more competitive, but against this it can be argued that in a totalitarian country, where prices are fixed by officials and not by the market, exports can be priced at whatever level suits the planners.

C.—The argument that the post-Stalin leaders, who have shown a greater respect than their predecessors for the machinery of the market, would not be opposed to giving the capitalistic device of devaluation a trial. This argument, if accepted, over-rides the objection that in the Soviet state, planners prefer to fix their own prices.

Devaluation is, however, too far reaching in its effects to be very likely. It would, for instance, play havoc with economic arrangements inside the Soviet bloc; all the Eastern European currencies are tied to the rouble at a rate of exchange which is generally favourable to the Russians. A more probable solution would be the introduction of multiple exchange rates. One of these would be the "tourist rouble." If and when the Russians move in this direction, it can be expected that the satellites will move with them.

## Presidential Imponderables

Most of the speculations about the 1956 American Presidential race have ignored some factors which are not less important for being less openly discussed. These factors, however, cannot be seen in perspective without a recapitulation of the Republican dilemma, which is that:

If President Eisenhower ran now, he would, if public opinion polls are correct, obtain even more votes than President Roosevelt mustered in 1936; but if he ran in 1956, he would, if public opinion polls are correct, obtain even more votes than President Roosevelt mustered in 1936.

2. Without Eisenhower, the Republicans would stand little chance of victory next year.

It is probable that the President himself has not made up his mind, but it is clear from his own reported statements and from those closest to him that three factors will weigh most heavily with him when the time comes to do so:

1. *The international situation.* The President will retire only if the present relaxation of international tension continues, particularly if it shows signs of spreading to Asia as well as Europe.
2. *His health.* Mr. Eisenhower has mentioned his gloomy forebodings based on the fact that no American President has reached the age of seventy while in the White House. Mr. Eisenhower's seventieth birthday would come before the end of his second term in 1960.
3. *Mrs. Eisenhower's health,* which has been discouraging, and her clear wish to see the President out of harness and at his Gettysburg farm.

Since the only way to forestall the dilemma is to make sure that Mr. Eisenhower runs for a second term, the *Republican* politicians favour a strategy of "drafting Ike" once again by: (a) relying on his sense of duty to those who depend on him; and (b) hoping that certain domestic issues with which the President is personally involved will loom large by next summer, thus forcing "Ike" to present himself for re-election to avoid running away from a battle.

### THREE DEMOCRATIC LINES

Some aspects of the *Democratic* attitude have been given less publicity. The party's tacticians are divided on what they can do to nullify the massive fact of "Ike's" popularity, but two main schools of thought are emerging, with a third group in the offing:

A.—In the opinion of men like Senator Kefauver and Mr. Stevenson, Eisenhower must be "put back into politics" and attacked as a Republican first and last. He must be branded as the champion of big business in government and as a man whose domestic policies are dictated by a clique of millionaires and hunting cronies between shots on the golf course.

B.—Other Democrats, many of whom—especially in the South—supported "Ike" in 1954, feel that such a policy would backfire and destroy the party's excellent chances in 1960. They would prefer to run a "lost race" this time and concentrate on maintaining their control of Congress. Their theme would be "Ike with a Democratic Congress is best for the nation."

C.—A middle group would like to support a good Democratic candidate on his own merits and concentrate their attacks on the Republican party rather than on the President. It is likely that Governor Harriman of New York could best fill the role of a candidate big enough to challenge "Ike," and yet able to avoid an all-out radical platform. There is no doubt that Mr. Harriman's chances for the nomination have been gaining rapidly and that his hold-over the New York delegation—96 votes at the Democratic national convention—gives him a head start.

So far, Democratic politicians have been acting coy when White House hopes are mentioned, but if President Eisenhower does choose not to run, there will be a ferocious scramble for the nomination. If, on the other hand, he does try for a second

term, there is every expectation that he will win. But the man of to-morrow will then be the defeated Democratic candidate for the Vice-Presidency. It is to him that the party may look to regain the White House in 1960, when Mr. Eisenhower will have left it. Senator Kefauver seems to be thinking along just these lines.

One of the issues least discussed in public is that of Mr. Nixon, the Vice-President: It is thought that for reasons which many party colleagues do not share, President Eisenhower firmly supports Mr. Nixon and will see to it that he is once again nominated for the Vice-Presidency. Many Americans, however, shudder at the thought of what might happen if Mr. Eisenhower did not complete his second term and if Mr. Nixon found himself President. Certain audacious Democrats are, in fact, saying that the 1956 election should be fought under the slogan "Keep Mr. Nixon out." But such a strategy, based on the implication that "Ike" may not last the distance, would probably exasperate the floating voter and strike him as in bad taste.

## The West's Faulty Arms Drill

With only ten days to go before disarmament talks begin again in New York, uncertainty still pervades the Western camp. When the five-power talks (Britain, Canada, France, United States, Soviet Union) were adjourned in May it was argued: (a) that the Western governments needed time to consider the complex proposals put forward by the Russians on May 10th; and (b) that adjournment would leave the field clear for the statesmen at the "summit." At the "summit," the Russians held to their May 10th terms, so that the West has now had ample time to digest them. But the western heads of government each put forward at Geneva a project bearing on disarmament, with scant previous consultation; these were:

1. President Eisenhower's offer to exchange "blueprints" with Russia and to arrange reciprocal aerial inspection of Soviet and American territory.
2. Sir Anthony Eden's suggestion of a "pilot" scheme for inspection and control of arms and forces in Germany and immediately neighbouring areas (the latter have not yet been precisely defined).
3. M. Faure's idea that contributions to a world development fund would not only become possible through disarmament but actually stimulate disarmament.

### WESTERN DISARRAY MAINTAINED

Thus, the disarray in which the western governments were left in May (see FOREIGN REPORT of May 26th), instead of being straightened out, has been kept up by western rather than by any Soviet actions. As August 29th approaches, the postures of the western powers are as follows:

A.—The Americans are trying to knit together the Eisenhower project (which might be better named a Nelson Rockefeller project) for aerial surveys with the Russian suggestion of May 10th that inspectors should have access to road and railway junctions to give warning of any big movement or concentration of troops.

B.—The British are not happy at the possibility of Mr. Stassen springing any such ambitious proposal on them at short notice. They can, however, maintain some of their phlegm, for they are not immediately involved; so far, the Americans have talked in terms of a purely bilateral Soviet-United States exchange. The British,

for their part, are likely to ask fresh questions about the meaning of the Russians' May statements, and to press Sir Anthony Eden's "pilot" scheme again.

C.—The French—if M. Moch remains true to form, as he has long done in these negotiations, despite the rise and fall of French governments in his rear—will stress the Moch formula under which nuclear arms would go when three-quarters of the agreed conventional cuts had been made. The Americans are still uncommitted to this, while the Russians, although surrounding it with their own conditions, now accept it.

The Russians may be expected to show indifference to the Faure idea, coldness to Sir Anthony Eden's proposal, and, towards the American plan, just enough interest to avoid a clear break. This was indicated when Marshal Bulganin took pains to correct himself before the Supreme Soviet and to insist that President Eisenhower's idea had not been definitely rejected, Soviet tactics of this kind might bring the Western governments along to the UN Assembly next month still out of step. But if the Russians stick to their demands for the early and total removal of all allied bases in Europe and Asia, they will thereby help the western negotiators to close ranks again.

## Japanese on the Tight-Rope

Despite several successes on the economic front, Japan's foreign policy is in the doldrums. This is due partly to over-optimism in interpreting recent international developments; and partly to circumstances outside its control. The Japanese are finding it increasingly difficult to walk the tight-rope between the "Russian" policy of the Prime Minister, Mr. Hatoyama, and the "American" policy of his Foreign Minister, Mr. Shigemitsu. The results, so far, amount to frustration on both fronts. Thus:

A.—The Japanese have been expecting a dramatic turn for the better in their peace talks with the Russians in London because:

1. They considered that this should be a natural consequence of the *détente* achieved between the Big Four at Geneva last month.
2. Japanese delegates to the London conference have reported to Tokyo their belief that the Russians now want to maintain the balance of power in Europe and Asia on the basis of the *status quo* in both areas. The Japanese interpretation of this attitude seems to be that the Russians would be prepared to normalise relations with the Japanese in the "Geneva spirit."

So far, however, these hopes have shown no signs of materialising. The Japanese have found that the Russian interpretation of *status quo* applies as much to Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles as, presumably it might apply to Indo-China or to Korea. It is clear that the "territorial issues" between the two countries remain intractable. Indeed, the only progress since Geneva has been an agreement in principle on two points: (a) the Russians would withdraw their opposition to Japan's admission into the United Nations; and (b) both sides would agree not to intervene in each other's domestic affairs. The first of these points could be thrown in by the Russians as an inducement to the Americans to accept their package deal for the admission into UN of the seven Communist and fourteen non-Communist countries still excluded.

As for the agreement not to intervene in Japan's domestic affairs, it is aptly timed to coincide with the emergence of the Japanese Communist party into the open as a "normal" democratic group.

B.—While failing to make progress towards a *rapprochement* with the Russians, the Japanese have also failed to arrest the deterioration in their relations with the Americans. It is fair to point out, however, that this is largely due to circumstances beyond the government's control. Thus:

1. The American disclosure of the intended dispatch to Japan of rocket launchers capable of using atomic warheads could not have come at a more unfortunate time. It coincided with: (a) the debate on defence in the Diet; and (b) preparations for the "world conference for a ban on atomic and hydrogen bombs" which opened in Hiroshima on the tenth anniversary of the Hiroshima atomic bombing.
2. The American disclosure enabled the Japanese Socialists to torpedo the two defence bills before the Diet: (a) the one setting up a Defence Council to frame long-term defence measures; and (b) the bill to create a Research Council to prepare the way for amendments to the "anti-war" Constitution which would provide a legal basis for large-scale rearmament.
3. Mass dismissals of Japanese workers employed by the American forces have aroused trade union opposition. Four years ago the Americans employed 297,000 Japanese workers; the present figure is only 157,000, and 20,000 more are expected to be dismissed before October.

#### ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING

The ill-feeling created by the American dismissals of Japanese workers is merely part of the wider anti-American feeling arising from the existence of American air bases. Well-informed Japanese are well aware that the dismissals are inevitable in view of American cuts in military expenditure. They are also aware of the connection between these cuts and plans for the Japanese to take over a larger share of their own defence burden. But this awareness merely makes the failure of the Diet to pass the defence bills more bitter to swallow.

As things stand, Mr. Shigemitsu will start on his trip to Washington next week badly handicapped. Since the Diet session ended, the government has done its best to regain lost ground by: (a) setting up a cabinet committee to review long-term defence policy; and (b) issuing a plea for popular understanding of the need to co-operate with the Americans over the air bases. But these palliatives may not impress the Americans when it comes to facing the hard facts of American aid—if any money is still waiting to be distributed—or any other advantages Shigemitsu may hope to gain from his visit.

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### Abstract

The USSR and Communist China today are the greatest colonial powers in Asia. Communist China has created a vast new empire in East Asia by cynically exploiting the legacy of the Manchu empire, an empire which in the past it has condemned.

Peiping has used six forms of imperialist practice to build this empire: a) denying independence to non-Chinese peoples within its borders; b) deliberately keeping its boundaries fluid; c) asserting Chinese sovereignty over non-Chinese peoples who at one time were ruled by the old Chinese empire; d) declaring itself the protector of ethnic Chinese irrespective of their present citizenship and residence; e) selecting certain treaty obligations of predecessor governments, rejecting others, and remaining conveniently silent on still others; and f) using its geographic position, ideological influence, and military strength to turn certain former Chinese colonies into Communist satellite states.

A glance around the frontiers of the Chinese Communist empire will show these cynical practices in operation at different points. Taiwan, for instance, is a former Chinese colony, to which the Communists had disclaimed juridical rights, but whose "return" they now demand. At the same time, Peiping makes no mention of the Soviet Maritime Provinces, to which it has a legitimate claim. In Mongolia and Sinkiang, Chinese and Soviet imperialisms have been competing for the control of minority peoples, to whom Mao Tse-tung had at one time promised autonomy. Communist China has also swallowed the alien people of Tibet, likewise promised true autonomy by Mao. It threatens north Burma and the countries north of India with future territorial aggrandizement by rejecting existing conventions and holding open the

question of boundaries. Finally, through the use of Soviet methods of political infiltration, Peiping has gained partnership with the USSR in administering the Communist colony of north Korea and considerable influence in Communist-held north Vietnam.

Taiwan is a particularly flagrant example of Chinese Communist cynicism and aggression. For at least fifteen years (1932-47) the Communists favored self-government for Taiwan, and clearly conceded that China has no juridical claim to this former "colony." Now they trumpet that Taiwan is inalienably part of mainland China and use their old instrumentality the Taiwan "Self-Government League" to push this blatant propaganda. Although the Communists in the past have attacked the legality of the National Government when it controlled the mainland, they have nonetheless now built their case for Taiwan upon certain Nationalist acts, notably the denunciation of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) and its participation in the Cairo Declaration (1943). In pursuing their demands for Taiwan, moreover, they now attempt to exploit US participation in the Cairo and Potsdam declarations, though they have alleged in the past that the US in its role in the Pacific war and in defeating Japan was motivated solely by imperialism.

Peiping, in raising the question of Taiwan, has carefully skirted the issue of the so-called unequal treaties of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Chinese Communists would be hard pressed to deny that the settlement of the Taiwan issue rests not only upon a final disposition of issues raised during World War II but, more importantly, issues left unresolved by the dissolution of the Manchu empire and the unequal treaties of the past 125 years. In this respect their greatest vulnerability is their silence with respect to the Treaty of Aigun (1858), the Treaty of Peking (1860), and a series of subsequent Sino-Russian treaties which formalized

Russia's seizure of the trans-Amur-Ussuri region (now the Soviet Maritime Provinces) and parts of western Sinkiang (now in the Soviet Kazakh and Kirghiz Republics). These treaties were denounced by the Soviet Government in 1919, but no territory has ever been returned.

The Peiping regime has violated Communist standards of self-determination -- ones enunciated by Mao Tse-tung for China in 1936 -- as well as foreign standards, through asserting Chinese sovereignty and extending Han administrative control over major Tibetan, Mongolian, and Moslem nationalities, thus showing its unprincipled character.

A similar lack of principle is found in Chinese Communist policy toward the Han people overseas. Whatever provisions Peiping makes to recognize the foreign citizenship of Chinese abroad or to encourage the cessation of political activity by them, it will still be committed by Articles 49 and 98 of the Constitution to "oversee the affairs" of such Chinese and to "protect" them.

The Chinese Communists are thus guilty of crimes of imperialism more heinous than those which they would charge against the West: they keep fluid territorial boundaries, without principle press claims against neighboring states, and hold minorities which would revolt and secede if given the opportunity. They have not, as have the US and the UK in Asia, ever relinquished control over an alien people.

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST EMPIRE; PEIPING'S NEW IMPERIALISM

The leading colonial and imperialist powers in Asia today are the USSR and Communist China. Both seek to perpetuate by a system of so-called autonomous areas the territorial imperialism of their predecessor government -- policies which both governments have condemned -- and to impose cultural colonialisms of their own. In Communist China, contrary to the principles of "self-determination," "autonomy," and "no territorial expansion" which it professes to support, minorities have been brought forcefully under the yoke of the imperial center, local cultures have been subverted, and claims have been levied against territory to which the regime does not have juridical rights. Although both the USSR and Communist China profess to be federations, in which all elements have a voice, the political bodies providing for minority representation are actually powerless facades. Real power in each state is vested in a central Communist Party and a central administrative organ which does not allow for minority representation.

The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the new imperialism of Communist China. But Soviet acts of imperialism in Asia will not go entirely unrecorded because historically the parts of China and the minority peoples unfortunate enough to be situated in the Sino-Russian frontier area were early and principal target areas for Moscow's expansionist drive.

Since their troops occupied Tibet in 1951, the Chinese Communists have stated repeatedly that, with the exception of Taiwan (and Hong Kong and Macau) which they regard as part of China, they have no territorial ambitions in the rest of Asia. The Chinese Communists would also deny that their rule extended at present over any "colonial areas," that they intended to exert an influence over other governments in Asia friendly to them, or that they had an "imperial policy" of any sort.

Yet the Chinese Communists do have an imperial policy based upon the following general principles:

- 1) A state is not contained within immutable boundaries, but has the right at any time to expand or contract the extent of its jurisdiction.
- 2) Prior Chinese conquest of non-Chinese peoples, even though it be characterized as an act of "oppression," vests in a succeeding Chinese government the right to claim at any time sovereignty over such of these peoples as it desires to rule.
- 3) A people of an "advanced" culture has the right to claim stewardship over peoples of "inferior" culture.
- 4) A regime may reexamine the international obligations of a predecessor government and select those obligations which it will continue to honor and absolve itself of certain other specified obligations.
- 5) A government has the right to conduct political and social activities among citizens who have emigrated abroad, their descendants living abroad, and even among former citizens who have become naturalized citizens of a foreign state and their descendants living abroad.
- 6) A large state may exploit its size, geographic propinquity, cultural affinity, military aid, advanced techniques, or military occupation, in order to influence a weaker state to accept present or former citizens of the larger state as government officials and to pattern its policies after those of the larger state.

These principles are in contrast to the principles of Communist territorial policy, which are discussed below.

## I. MAIN ASPECTS OF COLONIAL POLICY

### A. Policy Regarding Territorial Claims

The limits of the old Manchu empire as of the early nineteenth century have been the starting point for Chinese Communist territorial claims. At times, the Chinese Communists have chosen to claim their succession to the Manchu empire's sovereignty over a given area; at other times or with respect to other areas, they have elected not to do so. Expediency has been the determining factor in their decision, and principle has been lacking. The Peiping regime has also been selective, again on grounds of expediency, in its denunciation of earlier treaties under which the Manchu court had ceded or leased certain territories to foreign states. Moreover, the Peiping regime has made no known effort to have demarcated those sections of its vast boundaries that have been in dispute in the past. It may be presumed, therefore, that the Chinese Communists have no fixed conception of what territory should be included in China.

The border areas formerly acknowledged to be under Manchu sovereignty that at present seem to be regarded by Peiping as being within the Chinese realm are: Tibet, Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Tannu Tuva, Outer Mongolia, the Soviet Maritime Provinces, Korea, and northern Vietnam (Tonkin) are not now regarded by Peiping as parts of Communist China.

The following cases indicate the variations and inconsistencies that have occurred in Chinese Communist territorial claims:

- 1) In July 1936, Mao referred to Taiwan as a "former colony" of China and stated that Chinese Communist policy would be to lend "enthusiastic help" to the people on Taiwan, if they should wish to "break away from the chains of Japanese

imperialism" and "struggle for independence." Far from denouncing on this occasion the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, by which China ceded Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan, Mao implicitly acknowledged that its terms were still binding on China. That Taiwan was a Japanese possession whose subjects should strive for their "independence" continued to be the Chinese Communist "line" into the 1940's.

Now, however, the Chinese Communists understand the "liberation" of Taiwan to mean its eventual incorporation as a province into Communist China, not its establishment as a Communist-ruled, but nominally independent state. Moreover, the Peiping regime has accepted, in effect, the earlier denunciation (in 1937) of the Treaty of Shimonoseki by the Chinese National Government.

- 2) Although claiming Taiwan and the Pescadores as Chinese territory by denouncing the "unequal" Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Chinese Communists have not brought into question that treaty's provisions establishing Korea's independence from Manchu China.
- 3) In July 1936, Mao apparently expected that Outer Mongolia, which had once been a part of the Manchu empire but later had come under a Communist regime imposed directly by Soviet troops, would "automatically" decide to become a part of a future, Communist-ruled "Chinese federation."

In the fall of 1948, however, Liu Shao-chi referred to the "Mongolian People's Republic" (the name adopted by the Communist regime in Outer Mongolia) as a "long-liberated" country. On February 14, 1950 the Peiping regime formally

recognized the "independent position" of the "Mongolian People's Republic," despite the fact that the Chinese National Government had already done so in 1946.

- 4) The Chinese Communists have apparently accepted the incorporation into the USSR sometime in 1944 of Tannu Tuva (Urianghai), which had been a part of Outer Mongolia under the Manchu administrative system.
- 5) The Chinese Communists have also chosen to ignore the Soviet assertion of sovereignty over territories which the former tsarist government had acquired by force from the Manchu empire. These are: a) areas that were detached from western Sinkiang under the terms of three treaties negotiated between 1860 and 1881, and b) the huge area bounded roughly by the Ussuri River, the Amur River, and the Sea of Japan that was detached from Manchuria under the terms of the Treaties of Aigun and Peking of 1858 and 1860. Although the Peiping regime has in general characterized the Manchu-tsarist treaties as "unequal," it has acquiesced tacitly in the Soviet succession to these territorial claims of the former tsarist government.
- 6) On several occasions Chinese Communist diplomats in India and Burma have had to explain away maps published in their country that show Communist China's boundaries extending well into territory claimed by India and Burma. At no time has the Peiping regime taken any initiative to demarcate its southern frontiers and thus to end the anxiety its attitude has aroused.



B. Policy Regarding Minority Groups in Communist China

The Chinese Communist position on China's "nationality (or national) question" has likewise undergone considerable alteration. It now calls for a greater degree of direct Chinese administrative control and conformity to Chinese culture than before. At no time have the Chinese Communists declined to seek control over non-Chinese peoples on the grounds that such peoples, having a culture apart from the Chinese and having revolted on several occasions from Chinese rule, were entitled to their political independence.

In 1938, Mao conceived of an ultimate "Chinese federation," which would join together the people following the Chinese way of life (the Hans) with "autonomous republics" of certain non-Chinese peoples (e.g., Mohammedans, Tibetans, Mongols) who had "of their own will" decided to join this federation.

By 1949 the Chinese Communists had refined their policy toward the non-Chinese peoples living within what they considered to be Chinese territory. The non-Chinese peoples were to have "equal rights" as compared to the Chinese and were to enjoy "regional autonomy." But "equal duties" were also imposed upon them, even before their "regional autonomy" had been established. Article 50 of the Common Program of 1949 (the charter of the Chinese People's Republic) clearly permitted minority groups little freedom in the conduct of their affairs:

All nationalities within the boundaries of the People's Republic of China ... shall establish unity and mutual aid among themselves, and shall oppose imperialism and their own public enemies. ... Greater nationalism and chauvinism shall be opposed. Acts involving discrimination, oppression and splitting of the unity of the various nationalities shall be prohibited.

In practice, the Chinese Communists have permitted "regional autonomous areas" to be established formally only when each minority group has demonstrated, with the help of Communist Chinese (Han) cadres, that it has performed its "equal duties." In particular, each minority group has had to perform the duty of "opposing its own public enemies," who have usually been those persons in the minority group most likely to object to Chinese Communist policies.

C. Policy Regarding Communist Regimes in Former Chinese Colonies or Zones of Influence

Peiping's new imperialism also touches Communist regimes in the former Chinese colonies of north Korea and north Vietnam. Although Communist China now recognizes these regimes as independent, it has used its position as both Communist and cultural "elder brother" to attempt to secure varying degrees of subservience.

Communist China's policy in regard to these countries is based on:

- 1) the weakness of the local Communist governments; 2) the juxtaposition of traditional and strategic Chinese interests in each area; and 3) the opportunity to exert influence in their political affairs through military occupation or military and economic aid supervised by corps of Chinese advisers.

Communist China publically justifies this policy by taking the stand that it has a "more advanced" culture which entitles it to guide both regimes. Though the aim toward both countries is the same, the actual degree of Chinese influence or control in the two areas varies widely owing to local conditions, the extent and forms of Soviet influence, and the extent to which Peiping has been able to capitalize on its respective military footholds in the two areas.

D. Policy Towards Chinese Resident Beyond China's Borders

The millions of Chinese permanently residing outside of China have provided an extra dimension to Peiping's imperial policy. The Chinese Communists have not made any claims for the territory on which the overseas Chinese live. Neither have they sought to dominate the governments of the countries in which their overseas "compatriots" live. The target of the Chinese Communists' imperial policy is, instead, the political allegiance of the substantial Chinese portions of the populations in Southeast Asian countries.

The Peiping regime adheres to the principle that any person born of Chinese parents is entitled to its protection and to participate in the "political affairs of his own fatherland," irrespective of where he was born or lives, or of any act of naturalization taken by himself or his parents.

There have been indications recently that Peiping may make some nominal exceptions to this principle, in order to appear to be furthering the "relaxation of international tensions" in Asia. Specifically, foreign interpreters of Peiping's views (e.g., Mehru) have stated that the Chinese Communist regime would be willing to withdraw its protection from those overseas Chinese who did not positively elect to become citizens of the Chinese People's Republic. Moreover, Chou En-lai has stated (September 23, 1964) that "we are willing to urge the overseas Chinese to respect the laws of the governments and the social customs of all the countries in which they live."

The sincerity of the Peiping regime in regard to these self-imposed restrictions on its overseas Chinese policy, however, may be questioned on three counts:

- 1) Article 98 of Communist China's Constitution, promulgated in September 1964, does not except from the CPR's protection those persons of Chinese ancestry living overseas who have elected to become citizens of their respective countries. Instead, the article unilaterally asserts Peiping's right to protect the "proper rights and interests of Chinese residents abroad." The vague, all-inclusive term "Chinese residents abroad" conveniently ignores the concept of citizenship, which, however, is recognized in other articles of the constitution.
- 2) Significantly, Chou En-lai has indicated that any exceptions Peiping makes to its policy of protecting "Chinese residents abroad" will not be generally extended to all countries with Chinese communities but only to those Southeast Asian countries that have established diplomatic relations with Peiping. The governments of Thailand, the Philippines, Malaya,

south Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia can continue to expect Chinese Communist intervention on behalf of Chinese persons living within their borders.

- 3) Even in countries which do have diplomatic relations with Communist China, such as Indonesia and Burma, it is clear that the Chinese who have elected not to become citizens of the CPR could not be shielded from Peiping's propaganda and protective actions nominally directed at only those Chinese who have elected to become citizens of the CPR.

## II. CHINA'S HISTORIC INTERESTS IN SPECIFIC AREAS: TAIWAN

Peiping's case for demanding the return of Taiwan is based upon the Cairo and Potsdam declarations, the first of which committed the signatories to return to China all territories "stolen" from China, including Taiwan. It is noteworthy that the Communists in their legal arguments make little mention of China's "historic" claim to Taiwan, to the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) under which China ceded Taiwan to Japan, or to Taiwan's status under the Republic of China.<sup>1</sup> China historically had a very weak claim to control over the aboriginal Taiwanese and their island, and Taiwan did not receive full provincial status until the disorders of 1947. Mao's statement of 1936 took cognizance of this status by proclaiming Taiwan a "former colony" of China, which was entitled to receive its "independence." It is to be noted that the Chinese Nationalist Constitution of 1936 did not explicitly mention Taiwan as part of the territory of China, that the island was not mentioned in annual reports of the Ministry of Interior, and that by Nationalist admission the juridical status of Taiwan is still unsettled.

The Communists themselves, through word or actions, endorsed the principle of an independent Formosa from 1932 till nearly 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek moved to the island and the Communist campaign for "liberation" was begun. This endorsement was subject to the qualification that the Formosan Government after its liberation from Japan would be dominated by native Communists. The Twelfth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, which met in late 1932 stated:

The Communists of Korea and Formosa, in close collaboration with the C.P. of Japan and the C.P. of China, must mobilize the workers and peasants of Korea and Formosa for the struggle against Japanese imperialism, for the independence of Korea and Formosa, and must establish a revolutionary fighting alliance of all the oppressed and exploited for the National liberation struggle.

1. Peiping apparently "accepts" the Chinese Nationalist renunciation in 1937 of all treaties with Japan as "binding"

The first Communist notice of Taiwan, subsequent to Mao's 1936 interview with Edgar Snow, is recorded in the world Communist publication World News And Views of October 12, 1940. This describes the formation of a Federation of Formosan Revolutionaries, dedicated to the following propositions:

If China wants to be permanently free from Japanese aggression, she has to build up her defenses. This can be done along the Fukien and Kwangtung coast with Amoy, Kiungchow and Ponghu Lake of Formosa as a triangular base. The restoration of the freedom of Formosa, therefore, is strategically necessary to China.

The Federation of the Formosan Revolutionaries is guided by the following three principles:

1. To support the Three People's Principles and the policy of resistance and reconstruction of China, and obey her leader, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek;
2. To consolidate all revolutionary forces of Formosa to overthrow Japanese rule in Formosa and restore the freedom of the Formosan people; and
3. To mobilize the Formosan masses for the revolution and increase participation in China's resistance by Formosan volunteers in order to oust the Japanese invaders from China.

The continuing Communist endorsement of Taiwan independence from Chinese control was implied in Communist reporting of the Taiwan revolts of February 1947 against the administration of the Nationalist governor, Chen I. At that time Taiwanese Communists were active in attempting to exploit genuine native sentiment against Chinese rule. Whatever their connection with the Taiwanese "Committee for the Settlement of the February 28 Incident," they were described by the New China News Agency in a broadcast from Yenan as "a provisional autonomous government." The following Yenan quotation from TASS suggests that the long-term Communist policy of opposing "colonialism" and supporting separation of Taiwan from Chinese control was still in force:

This tragedy of Taiwan was not accidental. The administrator of Taiwan, Chen Yi, established very strict and unreasonable Government control placing Taiwan in the category of a colony. As Chen Yi adopted the Japanese system of controlling the Taiwanese people, Taiwan was only nominally liberated after the war was over. Some people said the only way to improve the conditions in Taiwan was to let Taiwan have a self-administrative government.

Indeed Peiping radio on February 28, 1955, boasted that "the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at that time broadcast their support of the Taiwan compatriots revolt over the north Shensi radio."

A. Areas Ignored Partially or Totally but to which China Has Claim

1. The Maritime Province of Siberia. It is probable that Moscow's unwillingness on the Taiwan issue to offer Peiping more than the support of one "people" for another stems not only from concern over Soviet military involvement but also from its own position with respect to the Maritime Provinces, particularly the trans-Ussuri area. This territory was taken away from China by the Treaty of Aigun in 1858 and the Treaty of Peking in 1860. Walter Kolarz in The Peoples of the Soviet Far East (pp. 44-46) states that until the mid-1930's the Chinese complexion of Vladivostok was such that it appeared to be a northern Shanghai; but that thereafter strenuous efforts were made by Moscow to Russianize the city and turn it into a Soviet bastion in the Pacific.

The Soviet and Chinese Communists have been remarkably silent on this issue, but important Chinese elements in Manchuria expect it eventually to be raised. The USSR has gilded its reputation in Manchuria and Sinkiang by the withdrawals effected under the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements of 1950 and 1954. Nothing has been done, however, to restore Chinese sovereignty in the trans-Ussuri, despite the fact that the USSR denounced all "unequal" Russian treaties with China in 1919. The Chinese Communists have carefully avoided this question,

although they themselves have implicitly denounced "unequal treaties." The Common Program of 1949 states merely that the Peiping regime will reexamine old Kuomintang treaties. Whether Peiping believes that nineteenth century Russian treaties should be abrogated or should be reserved for discussion when, for instance, the status of Hong Kong is again renewed, is a moot point.

The essential facts to be kept in mind in taking up the question of the Maritime Provinces are: 1) the area was the largest territory ceded by China in the nineteenth century; 2) it was not returned despite Soviet renunciation of the treaties under which it was ceded and considerable Soviet effort to adjust the Soviet position in Manchuria; 3) a Far Eastern settlement should rightly consider China's claim to this area as having equal or greater validity than its claim to Taiwan; and 4) a considerable group in China still expects the question to be reopened.

2. Hong Kong. The Chinese Communists have never in public official statements or publications asserted China's claim to Hong Kong. However, they have decried the Treaty of Nanking (1842), which confirmed Chinese cession of the island of Hong Kong to Great Britain "to be possessed in perpetuity." Premier Chou En-lai has indicated in private conversations that Peiping plans eventually to take over Hong Kong. In 1953, Chinese Communist interrogators of Richard Applegate, a US citizen who was seized in March 1953 while sailing a yacht in Hong Kong waters, told him that Hong Kong was "Chinese territory outside Chinese control." On occasions propaganda issuing from Canton radio has described the island as Chinese and a territory which should be returned to China in the "not distant future."

The crown colony of Hong Kong occupies a 32-square-mile island ceded to  
 By 1842 and an additional small territory added by the Convention of  
 Peking in 1860. In the latter territory, the 1860 convention preserved Chinese



jurisdiction over Kowloon City, but British administrators soon supplanted the Chinese. All Chinese governments since that time have protested against this "illegality." The Treaty of Peking added in 1898 some 350 square miles of territory, which is held under a 99-year lease. This is known as the "New Territories."

B. Minority Areas Subject to Competition Between Chinese Communist and Soviet Imperialisms

1. Outer Mongolia and Tandu Tuva. On February 14, 1950, in an exchange of notes accompanying the signing of their alliance, Communist China and the USSR went on record as recognizing the "independent position" of the "Mongolian People's Republic." The motivation for this act was probably to be found in the Soviet Government's sense of insecurity about the validity under international law of its satellite's claims to being a state and its uncertainty concerning Communist China's ultimate intentions in Outer Mongolia. Moscow therefore desired to have the Peiping regime confirm the "independence" of the "Mongolian People's Republic."

Soviet sensitivity on the score of Outer Mongolia's status as a state under international law stems from the fact that 1) Soviet troops invaded Outer Mongolia in 1921 to establish a Communist regime and have been stationed there off and on ever since to guarantee the continuation of a Communist regime favorable to the Kremlin's bidding; and 2) between 1924 and 1945 the Soviet Government was simultaneously assuring the National Government of China that it recognized Chinese "sovereignty" over Outer Mongolia, negotiating bilaterally with the Mongol regime at Ulan Bator, and securing Japanese recognition of the "Mongolian People's Republic's" status as a Soviet protectorate.

Soviet uncertainty as to Chinese Communist claims to sovereignty over Outer Mongolia was not allayed by Peiping's public recognition of the MPR Government on October 16, 1949, and its professed desire to establish regular diplomatic relations with that government. Under the terms of Article 56 of Communist China's Common Program, published in September 1949, the Peiping regime announced that it would reexamine the international undertakings of the Republic of China and would "recognize, abrogate, revise, or renegotiate them according to their

respective contents." Among the international acts of the Republic of China were 1) its agreement with the USSR on August 14, 1945 to poll the people of Outer Mongolia on their desire for independence; 2) its subsequent acceptance of the results of the plebiscite of October 20, 1945 showing a 100-percent vote for "independence"; and 3) its recognition on January 5, 1946 of the "independence" of the "Mongolian People's Republic."

The Soviet Government was also aware that earlier, in 1936, Mao had selected Outer Mongolia from among the several border areas of the former Manchu empire for inclusion as an "autonomous republic" within a future Communist-ruled "Chinese federation."<sup>1</sup> Significantly, Mao ignored at this time, and so have all subsequent Chinese Communist comments, the fact that Tannu Tuva had been a part of Outer Mongolia under the Manchu administrative system and that it had been split off from the territory of the "Mongolian People's Republic" by the USSR, placed under a separate Communist-controlled regime, and ultimately incorporated into the USSR in 1944.

Continued Soviet dominance over the Mongol Communist regime at Ulan Bator is, among other things, indicated by: 1) the growing importance of Russian as a second language; 2) the responsiveness of the Mongolian Communist party to developments within East European Communist parties; 3) the MPR's dependence upon the USSR for its manufactured goods; 4) the Sino-Soviet communique of October 12, 1954, which stated that the USSR was helping to construct that portion of the new Ulan Bator-Ch'ining railroad which ran on MPR territory, but not that portion which ran on Chinese Communist territory.

2. Sinkiang. Sinkiang, which is populated predominantly by Moslem and Turkic peoples, has been an area of Chinese and Soviet condominium and joint

1. Edgar Snow's interview with Mao was translated into Russian and published in Bol'shevik, 1937, No. 1, pp. 67-75. The Bol'shevik version of the interview omitted Mao's replies to questions that involved the USSR's relationship with the MPR.

exploitation for the past two decades. Both countries have treated the local peoples cynically -- the Russians inciting their animosity towards the Chinese when it seemed the most effective way of implanting Soviet influence, and the Chinese improving local material conditions in sufficient measure to induce the people to support Chinese rule and policies. The relative share of China and the USSR in this joint rule and exploitation, however, has been constantly changing.

From 1934 through 1942, Sinkiang was governed by a local Chinese warlord (Sheng Shih-ts'ai) who accepted Soviet military and economic aid in order to establish and maintain his personal power and who effectively prevented the National Government of China at Hanking (and later Chungking) from exercising any authority in the area. Sheng believed that he could grant the Soviet Union exclusive mineral development and commercial rights and extraterritorial police privileges and also permit Communist Chinese from outside Sinkiang to hold important posts in his administration, without diminishing his personal control over the region. A combination of circumstances, however, brought about a partial reassertion of the Chinese National Government's authority in Sinkiang beginning in 1943, the simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet personnel and equipment, and Sheng's own departure from the area in late 1944.

The National Government of China was not able to extend its authority completely throughout Sinkiang, however, during the period from the time Sheng relinquished his remaining power until the capitulation of its officials to the Chinese Communist Government in Peiping in September 1949. Within two months of Sheng's departure, a Soviet-instigated and Soviet-equipped uprising of local Moslems had broken out against the Chinese administration. Supported directly at times by Soviet and possibly MPR military units, this armed rebellion succeeded by October 1945 in wresting from control of the Chinese National

Government some of the most valuable areas of northern and northwestern Sinkiang. Within the insurgent-held area, unofficially called the "East Turkestan Republic," Soviet mining and police activities were resumed, but under much less surveillance than Sheng had exercised.

When it became clear that the Chinese Communist armies would seize control of all of mainland China from the National Government, the Soviet Government abandoned its covert support of the "East Turkestan Republic" and arrived at an agreement with the new Peiping regime which permitted it to exploit Sinkiang's mineral resources not only in the former "East Turkestan Republic" area but throughout the whole province. Beginning in 1950, the USSR provided additional technicians and equipment to two new, jointly owned and operated enterprises -- the Sino-Soviet Petroleum Development Company and the Sino-Soviet Nonferrous Metals Development Company. It received in exchange half of the output of these companies. Although these companies became entirely Chinese owned and operated in January 1955, the Chinese Communists retained many of the Soviet technicians in their employ. Until the Lanchou-Alma Ata railway is completed, the best market for Sinkiang's oil and non-ferrous metals will continue to be the Soviet Union.

The Soviet "sphere of influence" in Sinkiang is now reduced, for beginning in 1949 the USSR was obliged to give up its previous police and political activities. Indeed, the Chinese Communists denounced, and perhaps killed, many of the Muslim leaders of the Soviet-sponsored "East Turkestan Republic."

The present Chinese Communist plan is to establish Sinkiang Province as an "autonomous region" similar to Inner Mongolia in May 1955. Over two dozen subordinate "autonomous people's governments" have already been set up, nominally governed by local Moslem leaders, and several thousand local Moslem youths have been trained for jobs in Sinkiang's government, economy, and schools.

The Chinese Communist Party organization in Sinkiang is still headed and dominated by Han Chinese, and there are few, if any, "autonomous people's governments" which do not have a Chinese in surveillance as vice-chairman.

5. Inner Mongolia. In the competition for control of those Mongols who now live in Inner Mongolia (a population nearly double in number than that of Outer Mongolia), Chinese Communist imperialism has won over that of the USSR. With cynicism both sides played upon Mongol hopes for freedom toward 1945, and the USSR for a time after 1945 fostered through its MPR spokesman and agents a vision of a pan-Mongol state. The fact that it was the Chinese Communists who brutally destroyed this vision and helped to establish Han sovereignty over the area between 1945 and 1949 does not excuse the USSR of culpability in playing expediently upon Mongol sensibilities. For Soviet treatment of other minorities clearly indicates that Moscow could never have tolerated for long a union on Mongol people in even a normally satellite state.

The situation in Inner Mongolia after 1945 was the reverse of that in north Korea. Much of the area was occupied by Soviet and Outer Mongolian troops in 1945, which under the provisions of SCAP General Order No. 1 quickly withdrew from the southern and western portions, occupying only those eastern portions which were in Japanese Manchukuo. The influence of the USSR and MPR was evident during this early period (August to September 1945) in the formation of a "Republican Provisional Government" for Inner Mongolia which did not mention allegiances to China and declared its ultimate objective to be socialism.

This government was quickly disbanded when the Chinese Communists entered Kalgan (September 1945) and the MPR channeled its support to an "independent" government for East Mongolia, which (like so many satellite regimes created by the USSR on its borders at this time) was known as the "East Mongolia People's Republic." When this abortive movement sought to make its peace with the

Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists, so serious were the Chinese Nationalist and Communist objections to it that Soviet-Outer Mongolian strategy shifted in late 1946 and decided it should be an autonomous state within a Chinese federation.

The Chinese Communists became a force in Inner Mongolia at the end of World War II by virtue of their occupation of Kalgan, following the Soviet-MPR withdrawal. As with the Korean emigres, Mao's regime in Yanan prior to 1945 had carefully nurtured a Mongol group, chief among whom was the present leader of Inner Mongolia, Yun Tse. At that time the Chinese Communists stood for the union of the two Mongolias within a Chinese federation and intimidation was practiced by Yanan upon border Mongols who opposed the doctrine of union with the MPR.

The defeat of Japan therefore led to a fairly drastic reversal in Chinese Communist policy. In November 1945, Yun Tse became head of an Autonomous Movement Association, which stood for a single "autonomous" Inner Mongolia coming under Chinese sovereignty and which was intended to serve as a counterweight to MPR-sponsored separatism in the east. The doctrine of Chinese sovereignty continued to dominate Chinese Communist policy through the Civil War to the present, although for long periods prior to 1948-49 the Communists were able to apply their policies in only small portions of the area. When the Chinese Communists, after the vicissitudes of struggle with the Nationalists (they lost Kalgan in 1946 and recaptured it in 1949), found themselves in a position to organize the Hulunbuir area of Eastern Inner Mongolia under their control, a blood bath was reported among all former protagonists of a unified Mongolia or people with close associations in the MPR.

4. North Korea. China agreed to recognize the independence of Korea under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the same instrument under which it "ceded" Taiwan to Japan.<sup>1</sup> As in the case of Taiwan, Mao's 1936 acknowledgement of the right of Korea to be independent reflected the virtual freedom of Korea from Chinese sovereignty for at least two centuries prior to the above treaty.

The extent to which the Chinese Communists nevertheless intended to interfere in the post-"liberation" government of Korea can only be surmised. By 1938 an organization of Koreans in Yenan was formed which eventually became the "Korean Emancipation League."<sup>2</sup> In September 1945 this comprised both a large party and a well-organized army, to which the Chinese Communists rapidly added when they gained access to the Koreans in Manchuria. Major elements from both the party and army were in the group of returnees which crossed the Yalu River in November 1946. As the "New People's Party" they immediately proceeded to become a significant force in north Korean politics and the basis of the first north Korean army.

The story of the decline from 1945 to 1950 of the Yenan faction in north Korea at the hands of the USSR and its citizens and agents in the area is well known. The implication of this decline was that the Chinese Communists were too weak and preoccupied internally, even if they had been so inclined, to exert direct influence in support of their agents there.

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1. As noted above, Peiping has now chosen to accept the Nationalist denunciation of this treaty as binding on it. It is likely, in view of the provisions of the treaty relating to Korea as well as the implications for the "unequal" treaties with the USSR and Great Britain, that the Chinese Communists would be seriously embarrassed if challenged to denounce the treaty themselves.
  2. There was also formed in Yenan in 1943 a Japanese People's Emancipation League, comprised of Japanese Communists and their Japanese converts in China.



This trend was reversed by the Communist conquest of all China in 1948-1949 and their intervention in the Korean war during late 1950. As a result of the physical occupation of north Korea by Chinese forces and the sacrifices made by Peiping for the Communist cause in the area, Communist China gained at least a condominium with the USSR in Korea. Although the fortunes of the Yen-an faction in the north Korean administration may not have risen proportionately to those of Communist China in the area, there is reason to believe that China's position in north Korea will be reasonably permanent.

C. Other Minority Areas Brought Under Chinese Sovereignty: Tibet

Tibet is the one area remaining in the "Chinese People's Republic" whose inhabitants the Chinese Communists have not yet brought under their complete control. It remains the Chinese Communist purpose, however, to eliminate the present centers of Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule and to establish Tibet as an "autonomous region" of China.

Like the other border regions of the Manchu empire now inside the "Chinese People's Republic," Tibet came under Chinese Communist rule by virtue of military conquest and occupation. But unlike these other border regions, Tibet had sufficient claims to a status of autonomy under international law to cause the Peiping regime concern about its own claims to full sovereignty over the area. In consequence, representatives of the "local government of Tibet" were brought or induced to come to Peiping, while Chinese Communist troops occupied parts of eastern Tibet, and on May 23, 1951 were forced to sign an agreement for the "peaceful liberation of Tibet."

By the terms of this agreement, Tibetans were declared to be "one of the nationalities with a long history within the boundaries of China." Although not directly acknowledging previous Tibetan claims of autonomy, the agreement made an elaborate attempt to dismiss such claims. All acts of the "local government of Tibet" were, by implication, suspect and not deserving of recognition by the Peiping regime because the Tibetan leaders had shown an "unpatriotic attitude towards the great Motherland" by opposing neither the "deceptions and provocations of the imperialists" nor the "Kuomintang reactionary government's ... policy of oppressing and sowing dissension among the nationalities."

To date, the Chinese Communists have pursued a moderate policy toward the Tibetans in order to allay their suspicions and minimize the tasks of the

remote Chinese Communist garrison force on Tibet. Recently the Chinese Communists improved the military effectiveness of this force and increased their capabilities for adopting harsher policies by completing two motor highways from China proper to Lhasa.

Even before this there were clear indications that Peiping intended to exploit Tibet as a colonial region. Tibet's customary trade pattern before 1951 has been drastically reoriented away from India toward China proper. Teams of Chinese Communist scientists have been surveying Tibet's terrain and mineral resources since 1952, and the Chinese garrison troops have established farms for themselves. So far this small-scale Chinese economic development of Tibet has not benefited the Tibetans as much as it has the Chinese -- as Chu Te himself admitted last September to the Dalai Lama. Moreover, the Chinese Communists have not permitted the Tibetans to extend their traditional hospitality to foreign Buddhist pilgrims.

Peiping has already prolonged its concept of the time required for subjugating the Tibetans. A "Military and Administrative Committee" for Tibet was to be established under Article 16 of the May 1951 agreement, "absorb[ing] as many local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in [its] work." But the first Chinese Communist officials that arrived in Lhasa in the summer of 1951 found so few "local Tibetan personnel" of any stature willing to work with the Chinese, that the projected "Military and Administrative Committee" has never been established.

The person the Tibetans most revere, the Dalai Lama, has not been deposed, but he has been "smothered with kindness" in the traditional Chinese manner and for the past seven months has been kept outside of Tibet touring the various new Communist showplaces in China proper. Meanwhile, the Chinese

Communist officials in Tibet itself have begun organizing the common people of Tibet, starting with the youth and women in Lhasa, in an effort ultimately to undermine the authority and bases of power of the Lamaist hierarchy.

D. Areas Threatened by Unsettled Boundaries: Nepal, Kashmir, Sikkim, Bhutan, north Burma

Communist China's policy toward the countries lying along its southern borders appears to have two general objectives: 1) the securing of recognized titles to as many of the currently disputed border areas as possible; and 2) the fomenting of local hostility against larger, non-Communist states, in particular, the US.

The Chinese Communists have sought simultaneously to lay claim to huge tracts of land along their southwestern frontiers, now in other hands, and to deny that these disputed territories are a problem in their foreign policy. Some stretches of China's borders have in fact never been accurately defined or demarcated, but the Peiping regime has apparently made no effort to present its "unofficial" claims through regular diplomatic channels. Chinese Communist border claims in the southwest have become known by indirection. Maps published in Shanghai and Peiping have placed within Communist China a large portion of northern Burma, a sizable part of northern Assam, and certain key mountain passes in Kashmir.

Chinese Communist diplomats in New Delhi and Rangoon have explained these phenomena as "unofficial cartographic errors" on several occasions, but the "errors" have been perpetuated in later editions of the same maps. The Chinese Communists probably desire to keep alive the notion that they do not regard their southwestern borders as fixed, until such time as circumstances might favor an advantageous settlement of their claims.

Meanwhile, the Peiping regime has begun a long-range program of "agitation" among the border peoples living in the countries to the southwest of China. The

general purpose of this propaganda program appears to be to turn these people against any pro-Western ideas, especially any admiration of the US, and to dispose them favorably to the "Chinese People's Republic." To this end, Peiping has exploited the cultural ties existing between minority peoples in China (e.g., those living in Tibet and Yunnan Province) and cognate peoples on the other side of the Chinese border (e.g., the people of Nepal and the Kachins in northern Burma). The Chinese Communists have also indicated that they will not hesitate to make use of political exiles, such as K. I. Singh from Nepal, if this will advance their influence in the bordering countries.

E. Former Colonies Now Partially or Potentially Satellites

1. North Korea. North Korea has already been treated under the heading of conflicting imperialisms. It might be mentioned, however, that Korea is one of the two areas -- the other being Tonkin -- outside the domain of the Republic of China, 1911-49, which for long periods actually constituted a province of China, as distinct from a vassal. The area has become in part a new type of Chinese Communist satellite, owing to the success of the Chinese Communists in supplanting Soviet controls with their own during their military occupation of north Korea after 1950.

2. Tonkin (North Vietnam). China traditionally has possessed a substantial interest in the Tonkin Delta -- an interest possibly more obsessive than the traditional Chinese attitude toward Korea. Although the history of the Vietnamese people as a distinct ethnic group extends back at least 2,000 years, north Vietnam was under the political and cultural domination of China for about 11 centuries of that period. From 1873 to 1885, China sporadically opposed with military force the consolidation of French rule in Vietnam, which was the result of several French-Vietnamese treaties. China did not formally renounce her claim to suzerainty over Vietnam until 1885, and then only because of military defeat.

In the period of French colonialism in Indochina before and during World War II, south China served as a haven and a base for Vietnamese revolutionary groups, including the Viet Minh. In 1945, Chinese Kuomintang troops occupied Vietnam down to the sixteenth parallel under authorization of the Potsdam Agreement and the Chinese occupation authorities participated vigorously in Tonkinese politics until they were forced out by the return of the French in mid-1946. A major Sino-French treaty of February 1946 provided, among other things, for most-favored-nation treatment and special privileges for Chinese nationals in Vietnam and for cession to China of portions of the Haiphong-Kunming railroad which were located in China.

Today, this traditional Chinese interest in the Tonkin Delta is reinforced by several apparent aspirations of the present Communist regime in China toward the area. These aspirations appear to include Chinese use of Haiphong as port of import and as a sea outlet for the products of south China, exploitation of the mineral wealth of Tonkin, protection of the southern flank of China by a friendly power, and, possibly, utilization of Tonkin as a base for further aggression southward.

Because of the lack of reliable evidence, the degree of independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in policy formulation -- or the degree to which its policies are shaped by Communist China, on the one hand, or the Soviet Union, on the other hand -- cannot be determined exactly. Nevertheless, since Chinese Communist troops arrived on the Tonkin border in late 1949, Communist China clearly has had closer and more frequent relations with the DRV than any other Communist state, and has equally clearly served as the most direct and substantial channel of liaison and influence from the international Communist movement to the DRV. Communist China has furnished

extensive war materiel to the DRV, and has supplied large-scale training facilities for DRV troops and political cadres. Although the degree of foreign control in the DRV evidently is smaller and less open than in north Korea, large numbers of Chinese political and technical advisors have served and are now serving in the DRV.

Communist China appears desirous of achieving at least preponderant influence in the DRV, although it theoretically acknowledges the latter's sovereignty and independence by according it diplomatic recognition.

It seems likely -- because of the underlying realities of the situation, such as geographical propinquity -- that heavy Chinese influence in the DRV will continue in the foreseeable future regardless of how greatly such influence is concealed in order to rally nationalism behind the DRV in Vietnam. The DRV will continue to need technical assistance and capital goods from Communist China for use in its economic development program, as well as for military protection. In recent months, the DRV has increased its economic ties with Communist China through agreements on junctures of postal and communication systems and on construction of railroad lines between the two countries.

Appendix A INTERVIEW WITH MAO TSE-TUNG

On July 16, 1936 and on at least one other occasion during the same year, Mr. Edgar Snow, a newspaper correspondent, interviewed Mao Tse-tung, who was then acknowledged to be the leader of the Chinese Communist Party and of the government apparatus controlled by it. The interviews took place at Fao-an in Shensi Province. Mr. Snow wrote down in English the replies which Mao gave in Chinese to his questions. Mao then personally checked a Chinese translation of Mr. Snow's rendition of his answers. Finally, a Chinese Communist translator worked jointly with Mr. Snow in re-translating Mao's replies in English. This second English version of the Mao-Snow interviews appears in Snow's book Red Star Over China, New York: Random House, 1938, pp. 88-89.

The passages that are pertinent to the foregoing discussion of Chinese Communist "colonial policy" in 1936 are as follows:

Question: Is it the immediate task of the Chinese people to regain all the territories lost to Japanese imperialism, or only to drive Japan from North China, and all Chinese territory above the Great Wall?

Answer: It is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories, not merely to defend our sovereignty below the Great Wall. This means that Manchuria must be regained. We do not, however, include Korea, formerly a Chinese colony, but when we have re-established the independence of the lost territories of China, and if the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence.

The same thing applies for Formosa. As for Inner Mongolia,<sup>1</sup> which is populated by both Chinese and Mongolians, we will struggle to drive Japan from there and help Inner Mongolia to establish an autonomous State."

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1. See next page for footnote.



In another section, in another interview, Mao Tse-tung made the following statement concerning Outer Mongolia:

The relationship between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union, now and in the past, has always been based on the principle of complete equality. When the people's revolution has been victorious in China the Outer Mongolian republic will automatically become a part of the Chinese federation, at their own will. The Mohammedan and Tibetan peoples, likewise, will form autonomous republics attached to the China federation.

This footnote is omitted from Russian editions of Red Star Over China.

UNCLASSIFIED

- 29 -

Appendix B

COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF ASIAN COUNTRIES' TRADE WITH THE  
COMMUNIST BLOC IN 1953

Tables 14 and 15 show the commodity composition of selected Asian countries' foreign trade with the Soviet bloc in 1953. Comparable data were not available for Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Afghanistan and the Philippines, but with the exception of Afghanistan the trade of these countries with the bloc is small relative to the trade of the countries covered in these tables.

Over half of the value of imports from the bloc was foodstuffs, predominantly rice. Textiles and other light manufactures and raw materials for consumer goods industries were also of importance. The composition of imports has not changed significantly in recent years.

Crude rubber, raw cotton, and raw jute comprised about three-fourths of the 1953 exports to the bloc. This share was not appreciably different from that of 1951 even though the total value of these countries' exports to the bloc was about one-half of the 1951 level.

It is interesting to note that the Communist China-Ceylon rice for rubber barter trade alone accounted for about one-third of these countries' total trade with the bloc in 1953.

Table 16 shows for 1953 the foreign trade of Asian countries with the Soviet bloc by leading commodities, and by share of total trade in the commodity. As in Tables 14 and 15, data were not available for Afghanistan, Indochina, Thailand, Burma, and the Philippines. For the most part, trade with the bloc in any single commodity is not significant to any of these countries' industries. In some instances, such as superphosphate of lime exports from Japan, iron ore exports from India, and imports of eggs into Malaya, the percentages of total trade in these commodities are impressive, but they are not so important when related to domestic production or consumption.

The important exception to this generalization is Ceylon's exports of rubber and imports of rice from China. The trade in these two commodities represents an important share of the domestic production and consumption of the respective commodities and also of the country's total trade with the world.

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Table 14. COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES' EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET BLOC, 1953

(Value in millions of dollars)

Country	Food-stuffs	Textiles & Raw Fibers	Crude Rubber	Vegetable Oils	Metals & Ores	Chemicals	Other Light Mfgs.	Other N.E.S.	TOTAL
Japan	0.8	0.7	-	-	-	1.8	1.2	0.1	4.6
Formosa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Indonesia	-	-	4.4	-	-	-	0.1	-	4.5
Malaya	-	-	10.4	2.3 <sup>a</sup>	2.6 <sup>b</sup>	-	-	0.2	15.5
India	2.4	1.4	-	-	3.9 <sup>c</sup>	-	0.4	6.5 <sup>d</sup>	14.6
Pakistan	-	19.6 <sup>e</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	19.8
Ceylon	-	0.1	49.0	2.4	-	-	-	-	51.5
Total	3.2	21.8	63.8	4.7	6.5	1.8	1.7	7.0	110.5

NOTE: These values are f.o.b. exporting country and have been converted to US dollars at the official exchange rates.

- a. Includes some copra.
- b. Tin.
- c. Mainly iron ore.
- d. It is probable that this may include exports of the specified commodity categories.
- e. Raw cotton and raw jute.

Source of basic data: Bureau of Foreign Commerce, U. S. Department of Commerce.

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Table 15. COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES' IMPORTS FROM THE SOVIET BLOC, 1953

(Value in millions of dollars)

Country	Food-stuffs	Raw materials	Textiles	Other Light Mfgs.	Coal	Other N.E.S.	Total
Japan	4.7	28.1	-	0.3	3.6	1.1	37.8
Formosa	3.6	2.0	-	0.1	-	0.1	5.8
Indonesia	0.8	0.7	2.5	2.7	-	0.3	7.0
Malaya	24.1	3.6	4.9	7.4	-	0.3	40.3
India	1.4	1.4	-	0.9	-	4.2 <sup>a</sup>	7.9
Pakistan	10.2 <sup>b</sup>	0.1	3.0	0.5	2.1	0.7	16.6
Ceylon	44.3 <sup>c</sup>	-	-	1.0	-	0.2	45.5
Total	89.1	35.9	10.4	12.9	5.7	6.9	160.9

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NOTE: These values are c.i.f. and have been converted to US dollars at the official exchange rates.

- a. It is probable that this may include imports of the specified commodity categories.
- b. Government imports of wheat. In 1954 these imports have not reoccurred.
- c. Predominantly rice.

Source of basic data: Bureau of Foreign Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce.

Table 16. ASIAN COUNTRIES' FOREIGN TRADE WITH THE COMMUNIST BLOC BY LEADING COMMODITIES AND PERCENT OF TOTAL TRADE IN THESE COMMODITIES, 1953  
(Value in millions of dollars)

Country	Exports	Value	Percent of total exports of commodity	Imports	Value	Percent of total exports of commodity
Japan	Superphosphates of lime	1.0	35.2	Vegetable oilseeds	9.5	13.2
	Rayon filaments	0.5	5.1	Potassium sulphate & chloride	5.4	22.6
	Antibiotics	0.6	35.3	Coal	3.6	4.4
	Total all commodities	4.6	0.4	Total all commodities	37.8	1.6
Formosa		--	--	Beans and peas <sup>a</sup>	2.9	80.3
		--	--	Total all commodities	5.8	5.5
Indonesia	Crude rubber	4.4	2.7	Cotton fabrics	1.9	na
	Total all commodities	4.5	0.5	Total all commodities	7.0	0.9
Malaya	Crude rubber	10.4	2.6	Cotton fabrics	3.6	9.2
	Coconut oil	1.9	10.7	Paper and paperboard and manufactures	3.3	29.7
				Eggs	3.7	63.1
	Tin ingots	2.6	2.0	Vegetables, fresh and prepared	8.1	36.5
	Total all commodities	15.5	1.6	Plants, seeds, etc. for medicinal use	2.4	57.6
				Total all commodities	40.3	3.8
India	Food preparations	1.1	23.7	Rice	1.3	4.2
	Cotton piece goods	1.1	0.9	Raw wool	1.4	8.9
	Iron ore	3.4	32.7			
	Total all commodities	14.6	1.3	Total all commodities	7.9	0.7

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