

# ASIAN ANALYST

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT



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Between Chou En-lai's appearance at Geneva in 1954 and his appearance at Bandung in 1955 it seems to have been brought home to the Government in Peking that Chinese claims to leadership in Asia had been too hasty and too outspoken. The aspect of the Bandung Conference most strongly accentuated throughout Chinese press comment was that it provided "the precious opportunity of removing misunderstanding." That this was recognised and that the Chinese Foreign Minister devoted himself so strikingly to the task is to some extent a tribute to those other representatives—whether anti-Communist or uncommitted—who placed beyond doubt their people's disinclination for foreign leadership.

One of the major objectives of Peking's foreign policy—admission to the United Nations and to a permanent seat on the Security Council—is strangely at variance with Communist denunciations of the United Nations and indeed with Communist practice. In terms of the ambitions of Communist China, however, it is as inevitable as the bid for leadership in Asia. Because China needs Asian support, her best tactics are clearly to conceal her ambitions for leadership from Asian opinion.

#### II. COMMUNISM IN OPERATION

##### Struggle for Power

By denying the existence of any serious ideological differences behind the purge of "the Kao-Kang-Jao Shu-shih Anti-Party Alliance" (see *Asian Analyst*, April, 1955) the Chinese Communist Party have drawn attention to the struggle for personal power which the Communist system inevitably engenders. Kao Kang, on the surface, had sought a position as "heir apparent" to Mao Tse-tung, thus replacing both Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai. He wanted, said the Party resolution of April 4, "to overthrow

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the long-tested nucleus of leadership of the Central Committee of the Party headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung so as to seize power of leadership of the Party and the State." On his record he was as good a Communist in his way as Bukharin or Beriya. The announcement of his death by suicide is the only Chinese variant on the Soviet example; and the purge of Kao Kang and his associates (of whom eight were named without specifying how they had been dealt with) came as the climax of an internal struggle in China first made public at the famous Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee in February, 1954, which followed and moralised upon the "unmasking" of Beriya.

Nothing in the resolution condemning Kao Kang suggests that this struggle is over. "Party organisations at all levels," it warned, "must continue to fight against the tendency towards personal dictatorship and fragmentation which undermines the principles of collective leadership." One of the basic lessons drawn from the Kao Kang affair by the *People's Daily* editorial of April 10 was this:

"Our Party must, through a definite organisation, exercise strict, constant, systematic supervision over the work of all Party members (even of the most responsible position). Without a top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top supervision, even a good Party member may commit grave errors and degenerate."

This states a primary problem facing the Communist system.

**Dangerous Thoughts**

It is clear from the C.C.P. resolution that the elimination from the Party of unreliable elements will continue at lower levels, and that further crises and further purges are to be expected in the future. The offence of "regionalism" is not easily eradicated. Moreover Kao Kang, who had been in the Party for thirty years and had been so prominent in the "advanced" areas of the North-east, must have had numerous official followers and protégés. Ironically enough it was Kao Kang himself who launched the Party's 1952-54 "rectification movement" in the North-east. The more

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through rectification now demanded is expressed in the decision to abandon the former Discipline Inspection Committee, which functioned both at the centre and locally, as "no longer suited to the task of strengthening Party discipline in the new era of class struggle." The new central and local control committees to be set up in its place are clearly intended to reach further and to operate more strictly. They can order removal from office and "higher forms of punishment."

Discipline is one arm of thought-control. Indoctrination is the other. The implication on the one hand is that even veteran Communists are not to be trusted, and on the other that the best of them have much to learn. Calling for general indoctrination against bourgeois ideology, the National Party Conference (held March 21-31, 1955) stressed the need for giving Party members, even senior members, a "minimum education in Marxism and Leninism." Thus, although motives of policy or ideology were played down in the presentation of the Kao Kang conspiracy, the whole case has been fitted into the ideological framework and provided with ideological, as well as disciplinary, remedies.

**Hu Feng and the Five Daggers**

The indoctrination programme is not confined to the Communist Party. It is total, and the size of the project to capture minds is, accepted. Stating that the present number of literate "intellectuals and cadres" in Party, Army, official departments and mass organisations was about five million, the *People's Daily* of April 11 went on:

"It is an enormous task to enable the majority of them—say, three million—to understand the basic concepts of Marxism-Leninism, the distinction between materialism and idealism, the fundamentals of dialectical materialism and idealism, and through them to employ the materialistic ideology to educate the broad masses of comparatively low educational and cultural levels. This goal can be attained only if we carry out a correct, nation-wide, long-term plan of ideological work."

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On the literary front of this attack the most prominent target since mid-January of this year has been Hu Feng, a Party member since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. His "bourgeois idealism" and "factionalism" were formally condemned by the All-China Association of Writers on February 7, but the flood of criticism—the most wrathful to be unleashed upon any Chinese writer in the past five years of Communist rule—was by then already in full spate. It still continues. On April 1 Kuo Mo-jo himself contributed to the *People's Daily* a thorough refutation of Hu Feng's work as running "counter to the aspirations of all the people in our country." This was based on Hu Feng's opposition to the ideological reform of writers, his wish to admit influences from the past and from other countries (to "drag all the people into a swamp of cosmopolitanism"), and his opposition to the official provision of "important" topics for literature. On the latter point Kuo Mo-jo explained that the question was not whether the writer should employ themes of primary or secondary importance but "whether he should serve the most important political task at a given moment."

Hu Feng had been quite open in venting the grievances of writers and pleading for less regimentation. Though an avowed Marxist, he opposed doctrinaire control and even claimed "the expansion of the inner self." Dictatorship of literature by the Party, he said, stuck "five daggers" into the writer's head, these being:

- (i) Revolutionary writers must have a Communist world-view.
- (ii) Writers must penetrate the lives of the workers, peasants and soldiers.
- (iii) Writers must submit to ideological reform.
- (iv) Literary and artistic works must have a prescribed national form.
- (v) Writers must choose the topics declared to be of great significance.

On this basis, he suggested practical reforms to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, including the sanction of popular journals edited by established writers with divergent views.

The result of such protests, despite Hu Feng's former good standing as a Leftist writer, could have been foreseen. The campaign, which opened with the attack on Professor Yu Ping-po's studies of the classic *Red Chamber Dream*,\* turned next to the liberal philosopher, Hu Shih, and then in full strength to the deviating Party member, Hu Feng.

#### Five-Year Plan Delays

China's first Five-Year Plan, which was discussed for the first time by the National Party Conference in the last week of March this year, was stated by the *People's Daily* of April 5 to have been first drafted in the spring of 1951. "The actual operation of planned construction," it was added, "began in 1953." In fact the Plan had been promised for presentation to the National People's Congress before the end of 1953, and although the Congress was postponed until September, 1954, it was still not ready for adoption. The draft now accepted by the National Party Conference will be presented to the second session of the National People's Congress (which should be some time this year) after revision by the Central Committee of the Party.

The delay, said the *People's Daily*, "is not a bad thing for China's planned construction," since after two years of practical experience it is now possible for the whole Plan to be worked out "in closer conformity with reality." The switch to a less ambitious programme had been foreshadowed by the same official journal on January 27, when it referred to the efforts necessary "to oppose the deviation of blind adventurist progress, that is, the inclination for 'everywhere and everything on a grand scale,' an inclination inconsistent with the over-all interests of the State." Criti-

\* See *Asian Analyst*, December, 1954, pp. 1-2, and February, 1955, pp. 7-8.

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cisms from the same source during the past few months have indicated shortcomings in the establishment of heavy industries and attacked "arrogance and conceit among leading cadres in industry." On November 6 last year the situation was described as "serious." More recently, on March 28 the building industry as a whole came in for a detailed scrutiny of its faults. In agriculture two years' failure to reach production targets has left its mark on the economy, while the costly industrialisation programme, itself behind in its schedule, was pushed forward. In March, over and above rationing and sales-control, the Government started a nation-wide campaign for grain austerity. Yet spring famine is again reported, even from provinces like Kwangtung, where last year's production plans were fulfilled.

No fresh light has been thrown in the Chinese press on the Five-Year Plan itself; but the priority of heavy industry (as in the Soviet Union) is again stressed, with a special mention in the *People's Daily* of its importance for military purposes, "with the international situation as it is at present."

#### A Party Transformed

The All-China Democratic National Construction Association, which held its National Congress between March 30 and April 4, is one of the "parties" that still lend colour to the fiction of a "United Front." It was originally formed in December, 1945, to represent those who opposed both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party but were prepared to work with the Communists when the latter came to power under the banner of a "New Democracy." Composed of commercial and industrial interests and professional people connected with them, it has declined by stages from a party expressing the views of its members to a "mass organisation" for transmitting the orders and policy of the Communist Party. Its special task being to promote the voluntary submission of the bourgeoisie to their inevitable "transformation," the D.N.C.A. is now permitted to widen its membership in order to bring



"more capitalist elements . . . into the glorious camp of Socialist construction."

The opening address by the association's founder, Huang Yen-pei, revealed that the reaction to "Socialist reform" had left much to be desired. To cope with an accelerated pace in the taking over of private business by the State, ideological training must be intensified, and also the work of "inspection and investigation."

#### **Economic First Aid**

Foreign (especially Chinese, Indian, and French) businessmen and technicians are finding it increasingly hard to carry on in North Viet Nam. Many have been driven out by the method of collecting the turnover tax. The authorities do not at first demand an exorbitant sum, but instead have been asking firms to "pay what they owe for 1954" without examining their books. A few days later the average firm makes a payment. It is intimated that this hardly looks enough: surely there is more to come? In alarm, the firm's representative soon returns with more money and the procedure continues until the collectors are satisfied that every possible piastre has been extracted. The various difficulties which Indian businessmen are experiencing in North Viet Nam were raised in the Indian Parliament on April 15.

The exodus of merchants and technicians is already damaging the Viet Minh economy. The non-Communist world is capable of making good all the shortages in North Viet Nam, but the authorities are reported to have brushed aside international offers of necessary medicines and comforts for the poor, the young and the sick. In fact there are many shortages in the country, and as Pham Van Dong pointed out to the Assembly on March 20, although "friendly countries" would supply technical advice, in other respects the Viet Nameese people must help themselves.\*

\* At a cadres' meeting organised by the Administrative Committee of Bac Ninh Province "reliance on the aid of friendly countries" was criticised as a "mistake."

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The gravest shortage, that of rice, is due in part to widespread discontent among the peasants, many of whom now have not only to work for the Government one day out of two, but to attend Communist meetings and demonstrations outside working hours. The rice taxation system is such that a man with three hectares is allowed to keep less for himself than a man with one, while a man owning over five hectares owes the Government more rice than he can cultivate and so is forced to relinquish part of his holding in order to get out of debt.

Rice production has also suffered from over-zealous execution of the Communist land reform. Although collectivisation naturally remains as the ultimate aim, some collectives are in fact to be set up shortly. The present need to restore the pre-war production level has compelled certain modifications in agrarian policy. These were announced by the *Viet Nam News Agency* [Viet Minh] on April 9, 1955. For the moment landlords who are not despotic and criminal will no longer be tried at the Special People's Courts and will be compensated for their requisitioned land. If they have become democratic or patriotic personalities they will even be allowed to offer their lands according to principles already laid down by law. But the peasants are still invited to expose the crimes of despotic landlords in court, and peasant mass mobilisation for land reform is to continue.

**III. COMMUNISM IN OPPOSITION**  
The need for a steady stream of propaganda is a constant one for the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). The Party's Secretary General, D. N. Aidit, has been working hard to refute charges of his Party's subservience to Moscow. In an interview with the *Djakarta* daily, *Pedoman*, (February 17, 1955) he cited examples to show that the PKI has its own policy — a national policy. Perhaps his boldest claim

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was that the P.K.I. "seeks to make the peasants have their own land, whereas in Russia the land is nationalised. We do not agree with the Soviet system because the peasants' sense of land property is great in Indonesia." To have made such claims is in keeping with Aidit's declaration in the Cominform journal last October that Party slogans advocating nationalisation of the land were to be replaced by slogans calling for the distribution of individual landholdings to the peasants, since these were "in keeping with the present stage." \* "Therefore," his declaration continued, "in the conditions of Indonesia it is necessary to advance towards nationalisation and the Socialist development of agriculture not directly but by proceeding along the path of distributing the landlords' land to the peasants as private property." (For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy! October 15, 1954.)

The need for a roundabout approach to the peasants is also felt by the Communist Parties of India and Japan. One of the reasons for the Party's electoral failure in Andhra (as given by a Communist politician to the Ceylonese news magazine *Jana*) was its pre-election promise to expropriate the larger landowners. This, explained the politician, had led to a suspicion that "while landed gentry holding more than 20 acres would be the victims immediately, others with smaller holdings would suffer later. The entire countryside full of Andhra landowners swung against us... great harm was done because we announced our policy in advance." (*Jana*, April, 1955).

In Japan, the Communist radio station attributed the impressive electoral success of the Democratic and Liberal Parties in the countryside partly to Communist neglect and partly to the fact that "feudalism still dominates these regions." (*Radio Free Japan*, March 10, 1955.) "The broad success of the non-Communist land reform carried out in Japan after the war is naturally not mentioned."

\* The change of slogans was decided, according to Aidit, at the Fifth P.K.I. Congress, held in March, 1954.

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**More Non-interference**

On April 23, 1955, Pham Van Dong, the Viet Minh Foreign Minister, gave the following undertaking to the Prime Minister of Laos:

"The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam considers that the political settlement which is due to take place between the Royal Government of Laos and Pathet Lao, by virtue of the Geneva Agreements, is a question of internal order which the Royal Government of Laos and Pathet Lao are entirely free to solve in the best way possible in the higher interests of the country and people of Laos." (Joint Laotian-Viet Minh statement, as reported by *New China News Agency*, Bandung.)

If the Government of Ho Chi Minh had observed the Geneva Agreements no such statement would have been necessary. During the past few months, however, the Viet Minh have been following a policy of "strengthening unity with Pathet Lao." This has meant that at least 4,000 young Laotians have been forcibly recruited and taken to North Viet Nam for Communist training, arming and indoctrination. They will be held ready for subsequent revolutionary action at home. In the two Laotian provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, where the Pathet Lao are concentrated, Viet Minh advisers have replaced former area leaders and now dominate the "Resistance Government of Pathet Lao." One consequence of their advice is the Pathet Lao's continuing truculence as negotiators with the Government of Laos. Viet Minh political commissars are attached to each Pathet Lao military unit. Pham Van Dong no doubt had them in mind during his speech to the Assembly on March 20, when he said that the organization of the Viet Nam People's Army would consist of the training of troops from the political as well as the technical standpoint.

Viet Minh activities of this kind were not slowed down by Ho Chi Minh's assurance to Mr. Nehru last October that he wished to apply the Five Principles to the relations of North Viet Nam with Laos and Cambodia as well as with other countries, so that the States of Indo-China might prosper without external interference. (Reported

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by Communist *Voice of Viet Nam*, October 18, 1954.) It is therefore doubtful whether Pham Van Dong's latest undertaking will affect the Communists' consistent denial, in practice, of the Laotian Government's sovereignty over its own territory.

**Attack on a Plural Society**

Two surrendered Communist terrorists have thrown light on the Malayan Communist Party's (M.C.P.) approach to the peoples of Malaya.\* Osman China, former leader of the M.C.P.'s "Malay Department of Work" in North Pahang, who surrendered in December, 1954, has stated that late in 1953 the Regional Committee received a directive against preaching pure Communism to the Malays before the time was ripe. Instead the Party must stir up anti-feudal feelings and make tactical use of Islam. Consequently the Communists, while promising Chinese comrades that after a Communist victory the Government of the country "will be in our hands and all races will have to conform to our policy," have done their best to foment Malay and Indian resistance to the building of a plural society in Malaya.

According to Hor Leong, who commanded a Communist "jungle base area" in North-west Pahang before surrendering in March, 1955, these tactics have failed. The Communists did not have the support of the people, he said, and their armed struggle was doomed. (Singapore *Sunday Times*, April 10, 1955.)

On April 29, 1955, two more areas of Malaya, totalling 7,300 square miles, were officially declared free of Communist terrorists.

\* It should be remembered that about 90 per cent. of M.C.P. members are Chinese.

## IV. RUSSIA IN ASIA

**How Minorities Arise**

At Bandung the Soviet Union's colonial record in Asia was less noticed than its subjugation of Eastern Europe. Some details of recent population trends in Soviet Central Asia may therefore be of interest.

According to the official censuses of 1926 and 1939,\* the over-all increase between those years in the native population (of Turkic and Iranian race) of the area originally annexed by Imperial Russia, and now divided into the five republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Turkmenistan and Tadjikistan, was not more than five per cent. The increase during the same period in the non-native population, mostly Russians and Ukrainians, settled in these republics was not less than 72 per cent. The average proportion in 1939 of settlers to natives was approximately one to two, about 5½ million settlers to 11½ million natives.

The colonising process has probably been most vigorous in Kazakhstan. In 1926, the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic had a total population of 6,503,006, three-quarters of which was concentrated in the South and East of the territory. Of these, almost 4 million or just over 61 per cent were Kazakhs. Most of the Russian and Ukrainian colonists inhabited the northern area of Kazakhstan.

By 1939, the number of Kazakhs in the U.S.S.R., which should have risen by a little over half a million, had instead fallen by 870,000. This great deficit was the result of the Soviet policy of collectivising agriculture which led to widespread resistance, deportations and deaths among the native Kazakhs, of whom almost 98 per cent lived on the land in 1926.

However, the over-all decrease in the population of Kazakhstan was minimised by the large number of Russians

\*Date of the most recent official census.

and Ukrainians brought in to carry out the Soviet industrialisation plans. In 1939, the total population numbered 6,146,000, of which, according to the 1939 census, a maximum of 3,098,764 (or 50.4 per cent.) could have been Kazakhs. The increase in the Slav population must accordingly have been of the order of half a million, concentrated primarily in the central industrial region around Karaganda, which grew from a tiny village in 1926 to an industrial town of 165,000 by 1939. During and after the Second World War the colonisation of Kazakhstan with Slav industrial workers continued at a rapid rate, and by early 1954 the total population had reached about 7.2 millions.

#### The Virgin Soil Campaign

The Government's current plan to cultivate vast areas of virgin soil in North-west, North and North-east Kazakhstan envisages a further great influx of Russians and Ukrainians, this time as agricultural workers.

Initially the plan provided for the cultivation of 13 million hectares of virgin and derelict land, of which 6.3 million were in the northern areas of Kazakhstan. Over 150,000 young "volunteers," mainly Russians and Ukrainians, were recruited and despatched to the East in the spring and summer of 1954. Their task was to strengthen the Machine Tractor Stations (M.T.S.) and set up new State farms in the virgin soil areas.

Later plans provide for the cultivation of up to 30 million hectares of virgin land in 1955-56, of which about 18 million hectares will be in northern areas of Kazakhstan. To cultivate this vast area, 450 new State farms will be set up in the Kazakh S.S.R. and staffed primarily with more Russian and Ukrainian personnel. On September 3, 1954, when the time was thought to be ripe for an army of farm workers to follow the tractors, a long article in *Pravda* set out the advantages of colonising Soviet Asia in a way which could not fail to attract the impoverished peasants

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of European Russia. North and North-east Kazakhstan are represented as particularly rich and inviting areas. Thousands of families are already reported to be migrating.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the final figure for Slav settlers in the potentially rich North of Kazakhstan, even if the plan is restricted to its present scope, will be well over a quarter of a million and probably nearer half a million. In this case, the Kazakhs in the area, already greatly outnumbered, will eventually become insignificant both economically and numerically. This would provide ethnic grounds for a readjustment of the R.S.F.S.R.-Kazakh frontier, which could be effected just as simply as the abolition of the Crimean Tatar A.S.S.R., carried out in 1944 and confirmed by decree in 1946.

V. CURRENT QUOTATIONS

"The activities of the Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih Anti-Party Alliance are a reflection of the growing complexity and sharpening of the class struggle in China."

Chinese Communist Party Resolution, March 31, 1955.

For some years past, 'not to allow a single person to starve to death' has been a resounding slogan that consolidates the close relationship between the Party and the Government on the one hand and the peasants on the other. But the present danger lies in the lethargy and neglect of Party and Government leaders. The material resources are available for combating spring and summer famines, but they have not been brought to bear on the situation, so that people have been starved to death."

*Southern Daily*, Canton, editorial on "Overcoming Spring Famine and Averting Summer Famine," February 24, 1955.



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"Our programme says that the Communist Party of India believes that through parliamentary activity alone there could be no real change in the condition of the people of the country, and that belief has neither been shattered nor changed."

Ajoy Ghosh, General Secretary, Communist Party of India, at Press Conference, March 30, 1955.

"The school and the family share one common task—to educate the growing generation in the Communist spirit."

*Zarya Vostoka* (Kirghizia), February 22, 1955.

"Islamic studies, as an independent branch of science, acquired under the conditions of the Soviet system a completely new ideological content. The study of Islam, as of every other religion, was determined after the Great October Socialist Revolution primarily by the necessity to overcome this injurious survival of the past in the consciousness and lives of the workers, by the tasks of propagating a scientific and materialist world outlook and of giving Soviet people a Communist education."

*Outlines of the History of Islamic Studies in the U.S.S.R.*, N. A. Smirnov. (Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., 1954.)

"Lenin's definition of the idea of God . . . always was and always will be the most strong and necessary weapon for the propagandist in the struggle against religion of whatever kind. This weapon is as necessary for the struggle against Christianity, Judaism and Buddhism as it is in the struggle against Islam. In this lies its superlative strength and significance."

*Ibid.*