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## RUSSIA, SOUTHEAST ASIA AND POINT FOUR

By ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

UPON the present timid and inadequate approach of the United States to the pressing problems of under-developed areas, the Soviet Union is carefully preparing the way for eventual Communist control of Southeast Asia. Through a combination of Western hesitation, a regrettable degree of xenophobic Asian nationalism, and astute Soviet diplomacy, the prestige of the U.S.S.R. is on the rise in this crucial area. It is rapidly approaching a position where it may seriously compete with the West for the attention and tacit allegiance of non-Communist Asia.

No post-war Western proposal so imaginatively captured the interest of the under-developed countries as did the concept of "Point Four." But the dream of Point Four appears to be fading under the impact of partisan bickering. Originally proposed by former President Truman, and now implemented through the United Nations technical assistance program as well as the Foreign Operations Administration, Point Four is designed to provide technical assistance and limited amounts of financial aid to backward

areas. It seeks to accelerate a vigorous economic growth, increase agricultural and industrial productivity, and encourage the backward countries to help themselves.

The appeal of Point Four has been particularly strong for those Asian countries which only recently emerged from a long period of colonial domination. As a program conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, it remains sensitive to the needs and desires of the under-developed countries without in any fashion compromising their newly acquired, and jealously guarded, sovereignty. This psychological ingredient is of great significance. The non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia, i.e., India, Indonesia, and Burma, are still intensely suspicious of any foreign attempt to penetrate economically into their national life. Now independent, they are perhaps even more sensitive to imagined efforts at Western restoration. Indeed, they appear more concerned over the loss of former colonial economic privileges than over the entire pattern of post-war Soviet imperialism. As a result, they, though essentially friendly in attitude to their former exploiters, with the West it serves to complicate the lines of communication between the Western democracies and the nations of Southeast Asia.

Soviet policy seeks to exploit existing differences, promote the alienation of East and West, and thereby sow the ground for eventual Communist subversion. The Great Power struggle is often referred to as a struggle for the

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mind of man. In competition for the friendship and respect, if not the open allegiance, of the non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia, this conflict has focused on one fundamental issue, namely, the different approach of the Great Powers to the national aspirations and economic needs of the under-developed countries.

#### THE UNFOLDING PATTERN

More than in any other area of Soviet behavior in the United Nations, early post-war Soviet policy toward the problem of under-developed areas reflected a basic discrepancy between what it said and what it did. This policy became apparent during the initial sessions of the Economic and Social Council and crystallized at subsequent sessions of relevant subsidiary bodies. This policy remained unchanged throughout the Stalinist post-war period. Rigid, unimaginative and greatly influenced by the character of its Eastern European objectives, early Soviet policy toward the under-developed areas was designed primarily to embarrass the West and sharpen East-West differences.

Through a Machiavellian combination of Marxist idealism, natural suspicions of the West, and deep-rooted Asian nationalist sentiments, the U.S.S.R. sought to establish itself as the self-styled champion of the under-developed areas. At the various meetings of United Nations economic bodies the Soviets invariably came out in strong support of the PRINCIPLE of technical assistance. However, while affirming support for the principle involved, the Soviet delegates insisted that significant differences existed over the approach to be adopted. In practice, this not only resulted in the Soviet failure to approximate its stated position, but the U.S.S.R. pursued a course of opposition to all United Nations efforts to institute a working program of technical assistance.

Soviet proposals were dominated by a rigid ideological dogma admitting of

no compromise. One of the fundamental aspects of Soviet thought stresses the importance of heavy industry. The Soviet delegates maintained that, in order to achieve national independence, all United Nations programs of technical assistance should be devoted to creating a heavy industrial network in the under-developed countries. They held that only in this manner could independence be assured.

On the other hand, the Western approach suggested that available resources and technicians be utilized to foster higher agricultural productivity, attack problems of health and communication, and promote light industry. It regarded economic development as an intricate and inter-related process demanding growth in several areas of economic life and not merely in heavy industry. The Soviets refused to acknowledge that economic logic precluded the rapid development of heavy industry in ALL under-developed areas. In the interest of propaganda effect, they chose to ignore the insurmountable obstacles raised by an obvious lack of iron and coal and other necessary resources.

The under-developed countries of Southeast Asia tended toward the Soviet approach in theory. For the Soviet emphasis on heavy industry coincided with their national striving for military power and appeared to offer a more rapid solution to the problems of unemployment and under-employment. However, they soon realized that the Soviet proposals were not feasible in terms of their physical resources, available investment capital, and technical know-how. These facts of economic life loomed large as barriers to any inordinate expansion of heavy industry. Innumerable United Nations surveys lent credence to the Western view. But despite the weight of evidence, the Soviets persisted in their approach to the problem of the economic development of under-developed areas, often flavoring it with bitter attacks on the West. This occasionally incurred

the impatience of those under-developed countries which the Soviets sought most to impress. Their problems demanded immediate attention. As a result, the Asian countries accepted the need to compromise and supported moves to institute a concrete program as soon as possible. No similar sense of urgency motivated Soviet policy during these early years. Rather, the Soviets exploited ingrained Asian prejudices and fears, employing deceit, simplification and tenuous offers of help, to obstruct any effective cooperation with the West.

Several instances may be cited. In sessions of the Economic and Social Council and the Economic Commission for Europe, the Soviet delegates indicated their opposition to all modes of international investment, insisting that such financial arrangements inevitably led to political interference. It should be noted that no comparable hesitancy afflicted Soviet investment practices in Eastern Europe, where they were manipulated to promote subsequent Soviet political domination. The Soviets inferred that the "evils" attributed to international investment occurred only in the non-Communist world.

The Soviets repeatedly insisted that all technical assistance should be given through the United Nations as the organization best equipped to safeguard the integrity of the countries concerned. However, they refused to extend their support when presented with the opportunity of establishing a system of disbursing loans and credits through the United Nations. Significantly, and contrary to its supposed intentions, the U.S.S.R. utilized bilateral agreements in carrying out its own program of technical assistance in the Eastern European countries. No effort was made to channel the funds through the United Nations. Indeed, the Soviets opposed every measure which entailed the sending of United Nations officials and fact finding missions into Eastern Europe. This stemmed from the Soviet policy of eliminating Western influence from the area.

Finally, at one session of the Economic and Social Council, the Soviet delegate, M. Morosov, affected a grave concern over the high prices exacted by the "capitalists and monopolists." He proposed that the United Nations take immediate steps to reduce prices to under-developed areas. Again the Soviets cynically toyed with Asian needs and belittled the validity of past efforts. However, analysis of Soviet trade negotiations with the non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia, e.g., India, reveals that the Soviet Union has always demanded top world prices for its products. Soviet benevolence apparently does not extend to the negotiation of actual trade treaties.

Despite its formal statements of principle, the Soviet Union opposed every constructive endeavor to establish and expand the United Nations technical assistance program. With the creation of the Technical Assistance Administration in 1950, prospects for an expanded program seemed bright. The Soviets took advantage of their status to become a member of the Technical Assistance Committee, the policy-making group responsible for implementing the resolutions of the Economic and Social Council. However, it did not participate in any of the concrete projects nor did it contribute to the financing of technical assistance. In great measure this aspect of Soviet policy proceeded from Stalin's preoccupation with the entrenchment of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe and the corresponding perpetuation of Western European instability. It precluded any active support for the United Nations technical assistance programs.

The problems of under-developed areas were relegated to a secondary position in the hierarchy of Soviet strategy. At no time during the 1946-1953 period did the Soviet Union join in any of the United Nations technical assistance projects designed to improve the lot of the under-developed areas. The poverty of the Soviet record exposed the insincerity of Soviet state-

ments. To detract attention from their pitiful record, which was a constant source of embarrassment, the Soviets tried to minimize the achievements of United Nations efforts and to raise the specter of a return of colonialism to Southeast Asia.

#### RECENT TRENDS

Since the death of Stalin, Soviet policy toward the under-developed areas of Southeast Asia has experienced a drastic and challenging reversal of tactics. This "new look" of Soviet diplomacy is clearly evident in those United Nations agencies most concerned with the problems of economic development. It is also apparent in the recent conduct of Soviet relations with the non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia. Bearing, at moderate, deceptively reasonable stages, Soviet policy compares advantageously with the blunt, often ill-observed and naïve approach of the West, particularly the United States.

In the summer of 1953, the Soviet Government made its first offer of financial aid to the United Nations technical assistance program. Though the amounts contributed have been small, approximately one million dollars in both 1953 and 1954, the attendant prestige accruing to the Soviet Union has been great. The uncommitted countries of Southeast Asia, and certain members of the NATO coalition, purport to see in such moves the unfolding of a new pattern of Soviet policy, one aimed at a less truculent type of "competitive co-existence." In theory, there are three ways in which the Soviet contribution may be spent. First, the rubles may be used to hire Soviet experts; second, to defray the expenses of nationals from the under-developed countries desiring to study in the Soviet Union; and third, to purchase Soviet equipment.

Thus far, the under-developed countries have hesitated to partake of Soviet benevolence. However, of late, their reluctance seems to be waning un-

der the growing weight of Soviet reasonableness and national need. Soviet aid would serve to supplement the small, but increasing, exchange of personnel already occurring on a bilateral basis between the U.S.S.R. and several of the governments of Southeast Asia.

Of the non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia, India has the firmest ties to the West, to Western institutions, legal and political traditions. But as a nation contiguous to Communist power it must seek a suitable accommodation. This, tends, at times, to tinge Indian foreign policy with an anti-American sentiment which does not accurately mirror the spirit of India's position. It is vital for the United States, as the leader of the free world, to appreciate the dilemmas confronting India, to be patient, and above all to understand that the present leaders are men of the West. They deserve Western support and sympathy in their Olympian efforts to channel revolutionary currents toward Western inspired principles and institutions. Should these fine considerations of international equity be denied to them, the results would be tragic and might indeed ensure the decay of Western civilization.

Influential Indians, burdened with the responsibility for effecting an economic revolution, have long been impressed by the success of the rapid Soviet industrialization. It reinforces the attraction of a Soviet "Point Four" program for those seeking to transform India from a backward society to an industrial one. This Indian interest takes many forms. Students, professors and technical experts, representing a variety of fields, now visit the U.S.S.R. at Soviet expense. Occasionally the returns are rapid and tangible. Last summer the Director of the Indian Statistical Institute, P. C. Mahalanobis, was an official guest of the Soviet Government. As a result of his visit negotiations are in progress to permit Soviet experts to teach at the Institute.

The recent Soviet offer to build and equip a huge steel plant is by far the most spectacular yet proposed. New Delhi is interested. If consummated, it would represent the first major industrial enterprise built in the non-Communist world under Soviet supervision and would pave the way for an expanding economic exchange. A similar offer is being entertained by the Indonesian Government. India is also experimenting with Soviet tractors. Reputed to be cheaper, more economical to operate, and better suited to the peculiarities of Indian agricultural needs than their British and American counterparts, they pose an immediate challenge to the ingenuity of Western business concerns. Indian experts, attending the mammoth October agricultural exhibition in Moscow, expressed a keen interest in Soviet wares.

Seemingly unimportant in themselves, these isolated instances nevertheless presage the establishment of more vigorous Soviet-Indian economic and technical associations. The writer is well aware that there are now, and will remain for many years to come, a far greater number of Indian students studying in the United States than in the Soviet Union. But if Soviet policy continues in its present vein, the psychological effects of the Indian-Soviet rapprochement may make an indelible impression upon the molders of India's future, the budding intelligentsia.

A corresponding pattern of economic inducement has been offered to Indonesia and Burma. Stressing the political, as well as the economic, the Soviet Government recently sent its first Ambassador to Indonesia. A fragile governmental structure, torn by internal dissension, revolution, and a significant Communist minority make Indonesia especially vulnerable to external influence. The lure of a large Soviet loan to develop a heavy industry and the promise of increased technical assistance and trade appear to have blinded Indonesian leaders to the realities of international politics. The

present pittance of Soviet assistance can never hope to approach the available surplus of Western capital. But the Indonesian leaders, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, show little grasp of the need to make the most elementary compromises necessary to attract Western investment. Private business interests ask only the chance to function unfettered by oppressive restriction though willing to accept reasonable supervision and modest profits.

The financial needs of these countries are great. Despite the steady post-war increase of direct investment by private enterprise, only a small percentage of this available capital has trickled to the under-developed areas of Southeast Asia. The bulk has been invested in Latin America and Western Europe. If a recent report by the Federal Minister of Finance on foreign capital investment is indicative of future prospects, the death knell of democracy in India may well have sounded. During the 1948-1951 period, private investment by foreign concerns totaled about \$200 million. Measured against a population growth of one million a half annually, deteriorating economic conditions, and the enormity of India's problems, the amount is depressingly inadequate.

United States policy in the United Nations offers little cause for optimism. Highlighted by the recent signed Manila Pact, it has been preoccupied with the immediate task of curbing the expansion of Communist power through a series of military alliances.

#### THE FUTURE

The significance of Soviet participation in the United Nations technical assistance program cannot be over-emphasized. Its purpose is to give life to the demise of the "Point Four" concept. Realization of this objective would ensure the abolition of East and West. In such an emergency, Asia is the key to a possible Communist takeover in Asia and Europe. Stalin reemphasized this tenet of Soviet dogma in October, 1952, at the Nineteenth Party Congress.

A vigorous Point Four program is the best answer to the specious idealism of International communism? It can provide the stimulus and reassurance so vitally needed by the frail democratic forces struggling for vindication in the crucible of Asian economic, social, and political ferment. The Soviets are certainly aware of the potency of its appeal. How else can the tardy Soviet membership in United Nations agencies, intimately concerned with the implementation of technical assistance, be explained? The rationale behind the recent decision to join the International Labor Organization and UNESCO can only be understood in terms of basic Soviet opposition to all efforts designed to promote the stability, progress and independence of the Southeast Asian countries.

Soviet participation in international organizations is determined by political considerations. The newly acquired memberships are designed to increase the Soviet voice in guiding the pattern of economic development of underdeveloped areas.

The long term objectives of Soviet foreign policy remain unchanged. However, the shifting pattern of Soviet tactics requires a corresponding flexibility on the part of the West. The present Soviet leadership seeks to undermine the non-Communist world by an illusory cooperativeness. Only through a Western-supported expansion of United Nations technical assistance activities can the underdeveloped nations of Southeast Asia be enabled to perceive the true character of Soviet policy and Soviet intent.

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*What is Russia's attitude toward the various nations of the world today? As this author sees it, the notion of traditional friendship between the United States and the U.S.S.R. is unfounded, although at various times a common enemy or parallel interests have seemed to bring the nations into harmony. Here is a history of Russian-American relations since the reign of Catherine II.*

## RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES

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THE "traditional friendship" between Russia and the United States is a pleasing notion which strikes a responsive chord in the hearts and minds of many Americans. It was probably inevitable that it should have gained considerable popularity in the early and middle 1940's, when the Red Army, much against the will of the Kremlin, found itself fighting the common enemy in partnership with the Western Allies.

The doctrine of "traditional friendship" stems from vague concepts such as the similarities of background and character of the two nations, the vast

expanse and great natural riches of their territories, and the belief that the fundamental objective of their foreign policy has been the same—the maintenance of peace. "A deep love of peace," President Roosevelt told the newly appointed Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Alexander Troyanovsky, in 1933, "is the common heritage of the people of both our countries." This assertion is hardly supported by Russia's historical record.

Throughout the entire history of the United States, Russia has been its best friend [the noted sociologist F. A. Steadman

wrote in 1944 (*Russia and the United States*): "If the respective governments do not commit the stupidest blunders, Russia will constitute in the future our best and most important ally."

There were, of course, dissenting voices even at a time when clear thinking about Russia was discouraged. Referring to the "historic tradition" of American-Russian friendship, E. H. Zabriskie (*American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East*, 1946) rightly stated "upon examination, it is found that this tradition has no basis other than the existence at given times of a common enemy and an absence of competing interests."

What Sorokin described as the "miracle of lasting, unbroken peace between the United States and Russia" is thus reduced to its true proportions, and the present unhappy state of Russian-American relations ceases to be an incomprehensible violation of a pre-ordained historical process.

In the Nineteenth Century, the anti-British sentiment shared by the two governments was the one element which, at times, tended to create the impression of the solidarity of Russian and American interests.

#### CATHERINE II AND ALEXANDER I

To interpret realistically the policies of imperial Russia it is well to keep in mind that until 1906 Russia was an autocracy. Both before and after that date the Crown, most of the time, exercised considerable influence upon the conduct of foreign affairs which were not subject to public control and did not reflect the feeling of the country although, especially during the later period, they were discussed in the press.

Empress Catherine II, in spite of her professed admiration for the Enlightenment and her frequent references to her *ami republicain*, believed in autocracy and upheld the principle of monarchical solidarity. She was much distressed by the revolt of the American colonies and while the request of King George III (August, 1775) for the

sending of a Russian expeditionary force to fight the American rebels was refused, the Empress promised to help England in any possible way. In fulfillment of an obligation assumed in 1778, Russia withheld recognition until after England had established relations with the United States. St. Petersburg, indeed, was the last European capital to recognize American independence.

Although the Armed Neutrality Declaration launched by Catherine in 1780 gave much comfort to the United States, the text of this document was not officially communicated to the United States government. American ships, unlike the ships of other belligerent powers, were denied the use of Russian ports. Francis Dana, the first American envoy to St. Petersburg, who reached his destination in 1781, was not received at court and two years later returned home empty-handed.

Emperor Alexander I was emotionally attached to liberal thought, professed admiration for the United States constitution, and corresponded with Thomas Jefferson. During his reign relations with the United States became normal and, for a time, cordial.

In 1808, Alexander Dashkov was appointed "charge d'affaires near the Congress of the United States" and the next year John Quincy Adams went to St. Petersburg as the first fully accredited American minister. In September, 1812, the Czar offered to mediate the Anglo-American war. President Madison accepted the proposal somewhat too hastily and the American plenipotentiaries who went to St. Petersburg found themselves in an embarrassing position; England had refused mediation; Alexander, engrossed in the struggle with Napoleon, lost all interest in the matter, and peace between England and the United States was finally concluded without Russian participation.

More damaging to Russian-American relations were Russian expansionists' designs on the American continent and Alexander's plans for the restoration of

Spanish sovereignty over her South American colonies.

In the Eighteenth Century, Russian adventurers and hunters, attracted by the lucrative fur trade, began to settle on the Aleutian Islands, in Alaska, and along the northwest coast of America. In 1799, an imperial decree reorganized the Russian settlements as the Russian American Company. The agency was granted a trade monopoly, exclusive jurisdiction over the American coast north of the fifty-fifth degree, and the right to occupy further vacant territories in the name of the Russian Crown.

The resulting friction with American traders and the United States government came to a head when, in September 1821, an imperial decree laid claim to the Northwest coast north of the fifty-first degree and ordered the exclusion of non-Russian vessels from the adjoining territorial waters. John Quincy Adams, the Secretary of State, rejected the Russian contention, but St. Petersburg showed a conciliatory spirit and after protracted negotiations the question was amicably settled. Russia renounced her territorial claims and recognized freedom of navigation in territorial waters (Treaty of April 17, 1824).

The second important source of friction was the Holy Alliance inaugurated by Alexander in September, 1815. Ostensibly a league for the maintenance of peace and the advancement of the principle of Christian morality, the Holy Alliance was actually the instrument of extreme reaction, its policies being devoted to the suppression of revolutionary and independence movements and to the safeguarding of "legitimacy." Repeatedly urged by the Czar to join the Alliance, the United States notified Russia in July, 1820, of its "absolute and irrevocable determination" not to participate in any European league.

Meanwhile Alexander, in pursuance of the doctrine of "legitimacy," became the protagonist of the restoration of

Spanish rule over her South American colonies whose independence the United States recognized in 1822.

Russia's attempted expansion in North America and her plea for intervention in South America were weighty considerations behind the Monroe Doctrine (December 2, 1823) which stipulated that the Americas "are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Power," and that the United States should regard any attempt to extend the European system to any part of this hemisphere "as dangerous to our peace and safety."

Surprisingly, St. Petersburg took no exception to this momentous pronouncement, probably because the Russian colonies in America were a matter of very minor importance and plans for intervention on behalf of Spain but a passing whim of the Czar. The whim, moreover, in the existing international situation, had little chance of success.

#### RAPPROCHEMENT AND ESTRANGEMENT

For three decades following the Treaty of 1824 relations between Russia and the United States were uneventful. In 1832, the two countries signed a commercial treaty, but trade between them remained insignificant. Faithful to the tradition of the Founding Fathers, the United States kept aloof from European entanglements which absorbed the attention of Russian diplomacy. St. Petersburg and Washington had no common interests, little to quarrel about, indeed, hardly any points of contact.

Extraneous events—the Crimean War, the Polish rebellion of 1863, and the Civil War in the United States—injecting new life in Russo-American relations and brought about a temporary  *rapprochement*.

During the Crimean War the Russian Government, fearing an attack by the British on Alaska, arranged for the transfer, for three years, of the properties of the Russian American Company to American interests, thus put-

ting them under the protection of the American flag. This precaution proved unnecessary: a convention negotiated by the Russian American Company and the British Hudson's Bay Company and ratified by both governments excluded the territories held by the two companies from the sphere of military operations.

During the American Civil War the attitude of the imperial government was one of support of the North and of the cause of American unity. As Edward Stockl, Russian minister to Washington, put it, "the American confederation is a counterpoise to English might" and, from the Russian standpoint, "the disintegration of the United States, as a Power, is most undesirable." In 1862, Prince Gorchakov, Russian minister of foreign affairs, turned down the Anglo-French proposal for mediation between North and South.

Washington reciprocated in 1863 by refusing to participate in a collective *démarche* advocated by England and France on behalf of the Poles in revolt against Russian rule. Russian popularity in the United States reached its peak in the early autumn of the same year when squadrons of the Russian fleet made unheralded appearances in New York and San Francisco. Their arrival was generally held as evidence of Russia's determination to lend naval support to the federal government in case of foreign intervention. This was not, however, the intention of St. Petersburg. Fearing an outbreak of hostilities with England over the Polish question the Russian government endeavored to remove its weak Navy from the reach of the British and sent it to America because, to quote R. F. Dulles, "there was in fact nowhere else the Russian vessels could go."

Of far greater moment, although little appreciated at the time, was the purchase by the United States of Russia's American colonies. Negotiations for the sale of Alaska began in 1854 but were not completed until 1867. Two main reasons account for the Russian

decision to dispose of her American possessions: (1) economically, the colonies were unprofitable and, according to an official Russian report in 1863, presented a picture of "complete stagnation in all matters of colonization, industry, commerce, and citizenship"; (2) militarily they were indefensible and it was realized that sooner or later they would be taken over either by the United States or by Great Britain.

The price agreed upon was \$7.2 million; that is, substantially more than the \$5 million that the Russian Government was prepared to accept. The transaction was unpopular in both countries, but far more so in United States than in Russia where the sale of Alaska—a distant and little-known land—received little attention.

The aggressive anti-Semitism of the closing decades of the Russian Empire and the clash of national interests resulting from Russian expansion and American economic penetration in the Far East tended to embitter relations between the two countries. The pogroms which swept Russia in 1881 and again in 1904-1906 were the direct cause of mass migration of Russian Jews to the United States. Pogroms, fabricated and sometimes instigated by the authorities, and discriminatory anti-Jewish legislation aroused public opinion abroad, especially in the United States and England, and stimulated the ratification of the American-Russian Treaty of 1922 on the ground that its provisions were violated by the treatment accorded to Russia to United States citizens of Jewish-Russian origin.

#### FAR EAST FRICTION

Russian expansion in the Far East entered a new and active phase with the conquest of the vast Amur region and the founding in 1860 of Vladivostok on the Pacific coast, near the Korean border. Beginning in the 1840's the United States, too, displayed marked interest in China and the Far East. Washington and American business leaders thought in terms of trade, railway concessions and opportunities for

commerce and investments; St. Petersburg, in terms of annexations, conquest and ice-free outlets to the Pacific.

In September, 1899, John Hay, the Secretary of State, enunciated the doctrine of the Open Door in China. The Russian government, grudgingly and with reservations, accepted the principle of the Open Door but immediately proceeded to violate it, particularly in Manchuria which was under Russian occupation. American government and business circles were alarmed and their dislike and suspicion of Russia's Far-Eastern policy were widely shared in England and other Western European countries (with the exception of Germany) with interests in the Far East.

When the Russo-Japanese War broke out in January, 1904, American and British opinion were solidly aligned behind the Japanese. "I have from the beginning favored Japan and have done all that I could . . . to advance her interests," Theodore Roosevelt wrote in May, 1906. "I thoroughly admire and believe in the Japanese." Although President Roosevelt had at times doubt about Japan's ultimate intentions, the importance of American assistance to that country during the Russo-Japanese War cannot be exaggerated.

The peace conference that terminated the Russo-Japanese War met in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, under the auspices of President Roosevelt. The Treaty of Portsmouth (September, 1905), although it involved the loss by Russia of half of Sakhalin, the Liaotung peninsula with Port Arthur (which Russia had wangled from China in 1897), and a section of the Southern Manchurian Railway, was no worse than could have been expected in view of Russia's undistinguished war record. Indeed, the treaty was much more resented in Japan than in Russia. Significantly, during the next decade relations between Russia and Japan improved greatly, while tension between Russia and the United States continued in the Far East.

The Russian revolution of March, 1917, which overthrew the monarchy, and the entry of the United States in World War I opened promising vistas of cooperation between the two nations. Washington recognized the Russian Provisional Government five days after the abdication of the Czar and there was much real enthusiasm in the United States for the newly born Russian democracy.

The course of the Russian revolution, however, proved disappointing. The promise of the Provisional Government to carry the war to a victorious end could not be fulfilled and much embarrassment was caused to Allied leaders, including President Wilson, by persistent Russian demands for the great definition of war aims.

Meanwhile Russia's social and economic structure rapidly disintegrated, the army refused to fight and melted away; and on November 7, 1917, the helpless and tottering Provisional Government headed by Alexander Kerensky was overthrown by the Bolsheviks.

#### THE SOVIET PERIOD

The advent of Lenin to power was a great deal more than a mere change of government; an untrod and formidable factor—international communism—had entered the arena of world politics. The policies of Moscow, where the Russian capital was transferred in March, 1918, were henceforth determined by the Marxist doctrine which predicated the inevitable downfall of capitalism.

The momentous implications of the change were not grasped at the time nor, indeed, for many years to come. In 1918, the Western Allies, shocked as they were by Soviet theories and excesses, were primarily concerned with the continuation of the war and the maintenance of the Eastern front. On March 3, 1918, however, the Soviet Union finally withdrew from the struggle by concluding with Germany the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

Intervention in Russia was designed primarily to prevent the massive trans-

fer of German troops to the hard-pressed Western front. The decision of the European Allies and Japan to land troops in Russia was reluctantly accepted by President Wilson. The American soldiers sent to Archangel and in Siberia in June, 1918, were instructed not to interfere in Russia's internal affairs. This condition could not be observed and the American expeditionary force, like other Allied troops in Russia, became hopelessly enmeshed in the unspeakable disorder of the Russian civil war.

Intervention was a disheartening and sobering experience. It was denounced by the Soviets as "wanton aggression," and its one lasting result was to provide a semblance of justification for the Communist doctrine of capitalist "encirclement."

Until about 1924 Soviet policy was predicated on the assumption of the imminence of the world revolution. When the international revolution failed to materialize, the Kremlin resigned itself to temporary co-existence with capitalism and embarked on the stupendous task of rebuilding the Russian economy in accordance with Stalin's doctrine of socialism in one country.

Co-existence led to diplomatic recognition which was granted to the Soviet Union by the principal countries in 1922-1925. Diplomatic recognition by the United States was withheld until November, 1933.

Among the obligations assumed by the Soviet Union on this occasion was the promise to negotiate a settlement of American claims arising from the confiscation of American properties in Russia and loans made to the Kerensky government, as well as the undertaking to refrain from subversive propaganda in the United States.

Neither promise was honored. Negotiations dealing with American claims were abruptly terminated early in 1935 and in the summer of the same year the State Department vainly protested against the meeting in Moscow of the seventh congress of the Communist In-

ternational—in violation of the pledges given to Washington in 1933.

The Soviet-German pact of August, 1939, prelude to World War II, sharpened the estrangement between the American and the Russian government, but Hitler's attack on his erstwhile partner (June, 1941) once more reversed the situation. Stalin became talkative and almost amiable, he corresponded with Churchill and Roosevelt, the doors of the Kremlin were thrown open to American and British envoys, and the Communist International "dis-solved itself" (May, 1943), while \$11 billion of Lend-Lease supply sent by the United States played their part in helping to stem the tide of German invasion.

In England, and in the United States, enthusiasm for Russia mounted with the retreats of the German armies. In war-time negotiations, especially at the conferences of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam, the Soviet Union was a member of major points that paved the way for the expansion of the Soviet rule over central and southeastern Europe.

The post-war world—divided, scarred and impoverished—offered fertile ground for Communist propaganda. It was not surprising therefore that the Comintern was revived as the Cominform in September, 1947.

While the methods of Soviet foreign policy are flexible, its basic objectives have been maintained unaltered since 1917. The principal of these objectives in the phrase of Stalin is the elimination of capitalist encirclement. Since World War II, this aim has been pursued by Moscow with considerable perseverance and no small success. Hence the conflict between American and Soviet policies in every part of the world today.

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