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## THE MALENKO-KHRUSHCHEV NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

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**D**uring the past few years the Soviet Union has been through a period of economic stagnation. The stagnation was caused by a number of factors, including the failure of the government to carry out its economic policy. This article analyzes the economic policy of the Soviet Union during the past few years. It shows that the government has been unable to carry out its economic policy because of a number of factors, including the failure of the government to carry out its economic policy.

The economic policy of the Soviet Union during the past few years has been characterized by a number of factors, including the failure of the government to carry out its economic policy. This article analyzes the economic policy of the Soviet Union during the past few years. It shows that the government has been unable to carry out its economic policy because of a number of factors, including the failure of the government to carry out its economic policy.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

trade, Mikoyan.<sup>12</sup> He called attention to the increased quantity of goods allocated for sale to the population already during April-December, 1953, that is, following Stalin's death, and to the sixth consecutive annual reduction of retail prices in state stores ordered by the Soviet government on April 1, 1953.<sup>13</sup> He further stated that, in the course of three years, 1951-53, the production of manufactured consumer goods will increase almost by

50 per cent. He also mentioned consumption: cotton and wooden goods and leather footwear. It will be noted that the production goals provide for a relative moderate increase in 1954, a sharp increase in 1955, and an enormous rise in 1956. Parenthetically, the 1955 goals are only slightly higher than those specified in the Fifth Five Year Economic Plan, promulgated in October, 1952, namely, 2 per cent for cotton goods, 5 per cent for wooden goods, and practically no

TABLE 1\*

Production of Selected Consumer Goods in the USSR  
 (in million units) 1951-1956 (Five Year Economic Plan, 1950)

Year	Cotton Goods	Wooden Goods	Leather Footwear
1951	1,000	10,000	100
1952	1,000	10,000	100
1953	1,000	10,000	100
1954	1,000	10,000	100
1955	1,000	10,000	100
1956	1,000	10,000	100

50 per cent. It is clear that such percentage increases are unobtainable because of the high level of production.

More significant than the above composition of the production targets for the consumer goods is the production of the most important articles of mass consumption. The production of these goods is planned to increase by 50 per cent in 1956 over the 1951 level. This is a very high rate of increase, especially in view of the fact that the production of these goods in the USSR is still very low. The production of cotton goods, for example, is planned to increase by 50 per cent in 1956 over the 1951 level. This is a very high rate of increase, especially in view of the fact that the production of these goods in the USSR is still very low.

change for leather footwear. Even if the sweeping increase planned for the output of these goods was achieved, the Soviet Union still would not reach the Western level of a Western living standard. Thus, for textiles, the 1954 and 1955 goals are below the 1952 output of the United States of 9,510 million yards, 8,000 million meters of cotton goods, and 352 million yards of 871 million meters of woollen goods. Although the Russian population at the beginning of 1951 was roughly 33-30 per cent larger than that of the United States, the production in 1956 is the planned 13.4 per cent

\* The figures are based on the Five Year Economic Plan, 1950, published by the State Planning Commission, Moscow, 1950, p. 100.



make up for lost time. In our land of socialism, this equipment will become, in the not too distant future, an inalienable possession of the majority of Soviet households. Be it as it may, it is reasonable to suppose, however, that during the next few years such appliances will constitute "inalienable possession" of the Soviet aristocracy, not of the masses. However, as to the simpler articles of mass consumption, it can hardly be gainsaid that, if the goals set by the Malenkov administration for 1955, and especially for 1956, were reached, the U. S. S. R. would take an important step in a long journey to extricate itself from the sharply deficit stage of the planned-factored consumers' goods economy, which has so long plagued this economy.

But will the goals be reached? What can be said about the outlook for the new campaign? There are, obviously, many uncertainties, but it is possible to elaborate some of the essential elements in the equation. To begin with, a highly important positive factor, never before since the inception of the five-year plan era, a quarter century ago, has so energetic and determined an effort by the Kremlin been evident on behalf of the consumer. It appears to represent a significant shift in Soviet economic policy. However, many misgivings remain with regard to the success of this campaign to give a new deal to the Soviet consumer. First of all, a serious question arises as to the continuity of the new policy trend. Will the Soviet rulers persevere in their most solicited-for the welfare of the people, or will the campaign lose much of its momentum after a few months or perhaps a year, and eventually fade away? And there always hangs the possible premature reversal of the policy before it is able

to bear fruit, particularly because of competition with the heavy industry and armaments production a point I shall touch upon a little later. Incidentally, the Kremlin can scuttle a policy or program without the benefit of publicity. Yet, continuity, the time element in this matter, is the more important, since a reorientation of Soviet industry to give the consumer, though it presents no insuperable technological stumbling blocks, nevertheless involves some difficult problems of readjustment.

First, there is the problem of technical reversion. It is accentuated by the fact that production of many consumers' goods, such as bicycles, electric appliances, etc., is parcelled out to industries controlled by different ministries. Thus, in addition to the Ministry of Consumer Goods Industry, there were the Ministry of Electric Power and Electric Industry and the ministries of machine building, aviation, defense, metallurgy, food and paper and construction materials, textiles and light industries not subject to the control of the national ministries, all of these must cooperate. A new subdivision of industrial ministries in the spring of 1954 does not simplify the problem.

And the Soviet economic apparatus has been notorious for poor coordination of its component parts. In general, the technical reversion, involving retooling and reeducating of management and labor, is no more difficult in the U. S. S. R. than in the more industrialized countries of the West. There is, so partly because the Soviet industrial system is less developed and partly because of the considerable inflexibility and inertia induced by the rigid central planning and excessive supervision from above and by the absence

of competition.<sup>17</sup> Closely related is the unwillingness on the part of the management to take risks, make decisions, and shoulder responsibility, except at the highest level of authority, as a consequence of the fear instilled by a quarter century of purges. It will be recalled that the first "witch" trial, involving alleged sabotage by engineers in the Donbas coal industry, the so-called "Shakhtinsky" trial, took place as long ago as 1928. While the Soviet "captain of industry" can be perfectly secure about market demand and competition and can easily take care of the "official" synthetic substitute for the latter in the guise of "socialist competition," he is quite insecure against the terror of the Soviet police state. However, managerial flexibility and creative ingenuity are no less and perhaps are even more essential in the manufacture of the much more variable consumers' goods than in the manufacture of standard producers' goods.

In the second place, the process of reorientation to serve the consumer must overcome certain psychological obstacles arising from the attitude of the managerial bureaucracy of the monopolistic nationalized industry. It became thoroughly imbued with the spirit that may be epitomized by the motto, "The consumer lies damned." Therefore, something in the nature of a psychological reversion of the managerial class is essential, particularly in the matter of improvement of quality of consumers' goods and their assortment, which is so much stressed by the new program.

To the need of reversion of exist-

ing plant facilities is added that of expansion of plant and equipment. For instance, in the textile industry it is planned to add 480,000 new spindles in 1955 and 1,381,000 in 1956 and 15,507 and 38,000 looms, respectively, during the two years. Expansion in textiles presupposes a similar process in the dye industry, which had often been blamed for the inadequate quan-

TABLE 3  
Planned Increase in Production of Selected  
Food Products, 1955-1956 and  
1956-1957

Product	1955-1956	1956-1957
Wheat	100%	100%
Rye	100%	100%
Oats	100%	100%
Barley	100%	100%
Maize	100%	100%
Soybeans	100%	100%
Beans	100%	100%
Peas	100%	100%
Apples	100%	100%
Pears	100%	100%
Plums	100%	100%
Cherries	100%	100%
Oranges	100%	100%
Lemons	100%	100%
Vegetables	100%	100%
Fruit and vegetables	100%	100%
Meat	100%	100%
Poultry	100%	100%
Eggs	100%	100%
Dairy products	100%	100%
Alcohol	100%	100%
Tobacco	100%	100%

... and poor quality of the dyes supplied to the textile mills. Expansion is also contemplated in the leather, shoe, clothing, and many other industries. Increased investment will also be needed if the distribution system is to be improved, because of a great shortage of retail store space and warehouse facilities reported by Mikoyan.

But this is not all. As part of the planned rise in commercial production of various foodstuffs indicated in Table 3, there is projected a considerable expansion of the food processing industry, requiring construction of new plants and equipment. Capital investment in the enterprises of the Ministry of Food Industry is scheduled to increase from

<sup>17</sup> See Alexander Vainich's chapter, "The Factory" in his *Soviet Economic Development*, Introduction by Sergei Yulovskii (London: Stanford University Press, 1952), pp. 6-56.

<sup>18</sup> S. Yulovskii, "The Soviet Food Industry," in *Trade*, November 12, 1954.

4,800 million rubles in 1953 to 8,500 million in 1954 or by 77 per cent. Corresponding figures for the Ministry of Manufactured Consumers' Goods are 3,118 and 5,850 million rubles, or an increase of 86 per cent.

There is, furthermore, the demand imposed on industry by the raised targets for agricultural machinery and fertilizer, dictated by the new agricultural program, which will be discussed later. There is also the problem of extensive housing construction, as well as of building new schools and hospitals, strongly emphasized by Malenkov.<sup>21</sup> And what about his promise of continuing development of heavy industry?<sup>22</sup> Such a promise by gadding a favorite Soviet child cannot be lightly disregarded, especially should the Kremlin be unwilling to negotiate a settlement that would reduce international tension and the armaments race. Finally comes the question of the increased supply of agricultural raw materials required by the expanded light industry. Will it be possible, for example, to supply the textile industry with cotton, flax, wool, etc. As will appear from the subsequent discussion of the agricultural situation, there is much room for skepticism also on this score. Thus the new policy poses the task of simultaneous expansion in various directions to a deficit economy, characterized as it is by scarcity of many resources, including since the war even the formerly plentiful labor force.

What emerges from this assessment is the need for caution. The situation in consumers' goods industries will, of course, be influenced by the progress, or lack of it, in agriculture. Much will depend also upon the foreign policy of the Kremlin and its effect on inter-

national tension. A more peaceful, less aggressive foreign policy, which would help to relax international tension, would *ipso facto* provide a more favorable environment for concentration on consumers' goods at home, and vice versa.<sup>23</sup>

Barring further complications on the international scene, it seems reasonable to anticipate an expansion of consumers' goods output in 1955-56 at a more rapid rate than perhaps during any comparable period of the preceding quarter century, though the improvement in 1954 is likely to be at best a moderate one. But it would be premature and risky, at the present juncture, to expect the fulfillment of the high targets set up by the Malenkov-Khrushchev program. As to a marked improvement in the quality and assortment of goods, it appears to be more problematical the greater the quantitative achievement; for it is precisely the chase after "statistical" fulfillment of government plans that so often interferes with qualitative results in the U.S.S.R.

It is tempting to speculate about the psychological effects of nonfulfillment or partial achievement of the high targets set for manufactured consumers' goods. Many observers believe that even a modest advance in the standard of living would go far in satisfying the Soviet consumer, so long as such an advance is continuous. But it may be also true that the Russian appetite for consumers' goods will be greatly whetted, as it becomes a little easier to acquire.

<sup>21</sup> Whether the emphasis on increasing production of consumer goods is a result of a new foreign policy on the part of the Kremlin, or the result of a new foreign policy on the part of the United States, as some observers believe, is a question of semantics. It is a moot question on which no definite judgment seems hardly possible, and it is not for an economist. It may be suggested, however, that the two views are not necessarily irreconcilable if it is true that the Kremlin, like a good chess player, usually seeks to prepare for several alternatives.

<sup>22</sup> *Pravda and Izvestiya*, Aug. 19, 1953.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

them, and the Soviet citizen may feel that he is getting too little too late. Thus, the growing popular discontent may force the Kremlin to make even greater concessions. For one of the lessons of history is that revolts usually are not started by those who are in the slough of despond but by those whose lot is improving, albeit too slowly.

It must not be overlooked that the supply of consumers' goods may also be expanded by increased importation from abroad, and a definite tendency in this direction was discernible in the bilateral trade agreements and trade deals concluded by the Soviet government during the second half of 1953. It is not certain, however, of how far the Soviets would be willing to go in changing the basic character of their imports, which had long consisted predominantly of producers' goods and raw materials.<sup>21</sup> But even assuming a greater real change in Soviet foreign trade policy, it would be hampered by the deficit character of the Soviet economy, which, as experience has demonstrated, tends to limit available exports and, consequently, the paying capacity of the U. S. S. R. A serious effort to improve living standards at home under such conditions would probably create export difficulties unless the Soviet government were willing to ex-

port gold on a large scale from its presumably substantial stocks. There were straws in the wind during the winter 1953-54 pointing to a new major role of gold in Soviet foreign trading, but the situation is still enigmatic. The question of a possible expansion of consumers' goods imports from the satellite countries is complicated and will not be discussed here.

#### IV

If light industry were something of a Cinderella, then agriculture could be described as an Achilles' heel of Soviet economy. However, it is often forgotten that "Achilles could, after all, walk upon his heel," and, likewise, the Kremlin was able to lean heavily on Russian agriculture in its soaring industrialization drive. Nevertheless, the existence of a serious problem of lagging agricultural production cannot be gainsaid.<sup>22</sup> This was acknowledged by Malenkov and more explicitly by Khrushchev, who gathered considerable supporting evidence. In fact, not since A. A. Andreyev's Khrushchev's predecessor as the top "agriculturalist" among the Bolshevik leaders celebrated report on the agricultural situation, in February, 1947,<sup>23</sup> was so much statistical agricultural information revealed as by Khrushchev.

According to Khrushchev, agricultural production in 1952 was only 10 per cent

<sup>21</sup> For a report by French business men who visited the Soviet Union in Moscow in the summer of 1954, see *Le Monde*, no. 10, 1954, p. 10. For a similar report by American and French delegates to the Paris Peace Conference, see *Le Monde*, no. 10, 1954, p. 10. For a report by the same delegates, see *Le Monde*, no. 10, 1954, p. 10. For a report by the same delegates, see *Le Monde*, no. 10, 1954, p. 10. For a report by the same delegates, see *Le Monde*, no. 10, 1954, p. 10.

<sup>22</sup> The Soviet system differs greatly in this respect from that of a normally functioning free economy in which commodities are automatically produced and exported by the movements of exchange rates and prices and the process of substitution.

<sup>23</sup> *World War II: The Soviet Union's Contribution to the War*, *Le Monde*, XXXI, 13, 1953, pp. 80.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. A. P. Filin, *Le Monde*, "New Soviet Page on Agricultural Aspect," *Le Monde*, no. 10, 1953, p. 10.

<sup>25</sup> It was published in the Soviet press on March 7, 1947, and, in addition to the report of the Communist Party made during the report, appeared in Soviet newspapers on February 28, 1947.

higher than in 1940,<sup>22</sup> while industrial production was more than twice as high. Moreover, the estimates of the chief component of agricultural output, crop production, have been obfuscated by Soviet reports of unrealistic figures of so-called "biological crops." These were estimates of crops standing in the field prior to harvest, which did not reflect the officially admitted large harvesting losses and, in general, lent themselves

not be forgotten that our country, our collective farms can prosper with a crop gathered in the barn and not with a crop standing in the field."<sup>23</sup> Presumably the practice of reporting biological yields will be discontinued.

The crop picture, however, is not uniform. On the one hand, the areas sown to such important crops as flax and hemp failed to reach the prewar level by 1955 and even exhibited a downward

TABLE 4  
DISTRIBUTION OF SOWING AREA BY CROPS IN SOVIET UNION, 1928-55 (in million hectares)

Crop	1928		1940		1955		1955/1928	1955/1940
	M. Ha.	%	M. Ha.	%	M. Ha.	%		
Cereals and legumes	71.4	33.0	71.8	30.4	77.8	33.4	108.8	151.5
Wheat <sup>1</sup>	11.5	5.0	30.5	13.1	29.0	12.5	25.2	79.7
Industrial crops	11.0	4.7	8.0	3.4	28.9	12.8	263.8	332.3
Planting and forage crops	19.4	8.6	16.9	7.4	66.6	29.0	342.3	451.4
Field crops	10.1	4.4	10.8	4.6	43.5	19.0	425.2	553.5
Total sowing area	216.9	100.0	233.8	100.0	231.6	100.0	106.7	100.0

<sup>1</sup> Excludes wheat sown for seed.   
<sup>2</sup> Includes cereals and legumes sown for seed.   
<sup>3</sup> The increase in sowing area for wheat between 1940 and 1955 is due to the increase in the area sown for seed.

to exaggeration for fiscal, propaganda, or other invidious purposes."<sup>24</sup> They were not comparable with crop figures for other countries or, indeed, with Russian figures prior to the 1930's. Such a statistical practice, or malpractice, which has been current for the last twenty years, brought down the wrath of Malenkov, who declared that "it should

ward trend after 1950. On the other hand, cotton, sugar beets, and wheat acreages were above prewar levels. Wheat particularly showed a spectacular increase, at the expense of its old competitors, rye, and feed grains. Total grain acreage also decreased, but the group of so-called "industrial crops," and especially forage crops, including sown grasses (stem hay), showed a gain (see Table 4). However, the positive effect of the large increase in average under forage crops and grasses was largely offset by

<sup>22</sup> *Pravda and Izvestiya*, September 15, 1953. Even this is subject to question, see below, *Appendix 6*.

<sup>23</sup> See Lazar Volin, "Agricultural Statistics in Soviet Russia: Their Usability and Reliability," *American Statistician*, VII (June-July, 1953), 8-12.

<sup>24</sup> *Pravda and Izvestiya*, August 9, 1955.



low yields per acre, especially in the dry regions where it is now officially recognized that the acreage under grasses was overextended. Animal husbandry has long been considered the weak spot of Soviet collective agriculture and was repeatedly an object of widely publicized critical official reports. According to Khrushchev's figures, the cattle numbers, at the beginning of 1953, were below those of 1916 (when Russia was in the throes of the first World War) and of 1928, before agricultural collectivization began. There is a question whether the 1916 and 1928 figures given by Khrushchev are fully comparable territorially with 1953. The 1953 figures were likewise lower than the estimated numbers for the present territory in 1938. Khrushchev's figures also reveal the further alarming fact that, while cattle numbers were increasing during the postwar years until 1951, they declined again between 1951 and 1953. The situation was aggravated by a decrease in the proportion of cows in the cattle herd, from a half or more before the war to 43 per cent in 1953, with a consequent detrimental effect on dairy production.

A glaring example of this deterioration was the decreased production of butter in Siberia compared to the period before the first World War, when Siberia was the principal butter-exporting region of Russia. According to Khrushchev, Siberian butter production in 1952 was 65,000 metric tons as compared with 75,000 in 1913,<sup>32</sup> and this, despite the large increase in population and the boasted agricultural development of Siberia under the Soviets. Mikoyan actually admitted the fact that the U.S.S.R., formerly a significant exporter of butter, is now an importer.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>32</sup> *Pravda and Izvestia*, September 15, 1953.

<sup>33</sup> *Pravda*, October 25, 1953; *Izvestia*, October 25 and 27, 1953.

The situation was better with respect to most other types of livestock, as Table 5 indicates; but even at the end of 1953 none was anywhere near the goals set for 1951. As compared with the United States, with a population about a fifth less than that of the U.S.S.R., the latter had 37 million, or 40 per cent, less cattle and 26 million, or nearly 50 per cent, less hogs at the beginning of 1953. Only with respect to sheep, of

TABLE 5  
NUMBER OF LIGSTOCK IN THE SOVIET UNION,  
LAST YEAR FOR SEVERAL YEARS  
(In Millions)

Year	Cattle	Hogs	Sheep	Goats
1953	37.0	26.0	100.0	100.0
1952	38.0	27.0	100.0	100.0
1951	39.0	28.0	100.0	100.0
1950	40.0	29.0	100.0	100.0
1949	41.0	30.0	100.0	100.0
1948	42.0	31.0	100.0	100.0
1947	43.0	32.0	100.0	100.0
1946	44.0	33.0	100.0	100.0
1945	45.0	34.0	100.0	100.0
1944	46.0	35.0	100.0	100.0
1943	47.0	36.0	100.0	100.0
1942	48.0	37.0	100.0	100.0
1941	49.0	38.0	100.0	100.0
1940	50.0	39.0	100.0	100.0
1939	51.0	40.0	100.0	100.0
1938	52.0	41.0	100.0	100.0
1937	53.0	42.0	100.0	100.0
1936	54.0	43.0	100.0	100.0
1935	55.0	44.0	100.0	100.0
1934	56.0	45.0	100.0	100.0
1933	57.0	46.0	100.0	100.0
1932	58.0	47.0	100.0	100.0
1931	59.0	48.0	100.0	100.0
1930	60.0	49.0	100.0	100.0
1929	61.0	50.0	100.0	100.0
1928	62.0	51.0	100.0	100.0
1927	63.0	52.0	100.0	100.0
1926	64.0	53.0	100.0	100.0
1925	65.0	54.0	100.0	100.0
1924	66.0	55.0	100.0	100.0
1923	67.0	56.0	100.0	100.0
1922	68.0	57.0	100.0	100.0
1921	69.0	58.0	100.0	100.0
1920	70.0	59.0	100.0	100.0
1919	71.0	60.0	100.0	100.0
1918	72.0	61.0	100.0	100.0
1917	73.0	62.0	100.0	100.0
1916	74.0	63.0	100.0	100.0
1915	75.0	64.0	100.0	100.0
1914	76.0	65.0	100.0	100.0
1913	77.0	66.0	100.0	100.0
1912	78.0	67.0	100.0	100.0
1911	79.0	68.0	100.0	100.0
1910	80.0	69.0	100.0	100.0
1909	81.0	70.0	100.0	100.0
1908	82.0	71.0	100.0	100.0
1907	83.0	72.0	100.0	100.0
1906	84.0	73.0	100.0	100.0
1905	85.0	74.0	100.0	100.0
1904	86.0	75.0	100.0	100.0
1903	87.0	76.0	100.0	100.0
1902	88.0	77.0	100.0	100.0
1901	89.0	78.0	100.0	100.0
1900	90.0	79.0	100.0	100.0
1899	91.0	80.0	100.0	100.0
1898	92.0	81.0	100.0	100.0
1897	93.0	82.0	100.0	100.0
1896	94.0	83.0	100.0	100.0
1895	95.0	84.0	100.0	100.0
1894	96.0	85.0	100.0	100.0
1893	97.0	86.0	100.0	100.0
1892	98.0	87.0	100.0	100.0
1891	99.0	88.0	100.0	100.0
1890	100.0	89.0	100.0	100.0

<sup>34</sup> See above, p. 197. The 1953 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1952 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1951 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1950 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1949 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1948 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1947 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1946 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1945 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1944 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1943 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1942 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1941 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1940 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1939 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1938 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1937 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1936 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1935 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1934 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1933 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1932 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1931 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1930 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1929 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1928 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1927 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1926 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1925 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1924 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1923 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1922 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1921 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1920 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1919 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1918 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1917 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1916 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1915 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1914 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1913 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1912 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1911 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1910 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1909 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1908 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1907 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1906 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1905 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1904 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1903 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1902 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1901 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1900 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1899 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1898 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1897 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1896 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1895 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1894 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1893 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1892 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1891 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1890 figures are preliminary and subject to change.

<sup>35</sup> While the figures were not published, it is probable that the 1953 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1952 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1951 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1950 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1949 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1948 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1947 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1946 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1945 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1944 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1943 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1942 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1941 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1940 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1939 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1938 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1937 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1936 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1935 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1934 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1933 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1932 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1931 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1930 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1929 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1928 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1927 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1926 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1925 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1924 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1923 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1922 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1921 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1920 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1919 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1918 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1917 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1916 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1915 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1914 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1913 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1912 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1911 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1910 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1909 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1908 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1907 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1906 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1905 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1904 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1903 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1902 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1901 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1900 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1899 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1898 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1897 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1896 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1895 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1894 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1893 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1892 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1891 figures are preliminary and subject to change. The 1890 figures are preliminary and subject to change.

<sup>36</sup> Figures roughly correct for the first World War. U.S.S.R. - Not available.

which the United States had 32 million, is the U.S.S.R. much ahead.

Khrushchev boasted of the great increase in collectivized livestock or communal herds, which Soviet policy has consistently aimed to accomplish since 1930 and especially since the end of the war. Collectivized livestock in 1953 accounted for more than half of total cattle and hog numbers and for 70 per cent of total sheep and goats, as compared with 37 per cent for cattle, 30 per cent for hogs, and 46 per cent for sheep and goats in 1911. But, though the decree of September 7 acknowledges it,<sup>37</sup>

<sup>37</sup> See above, p. 10.



factory. This was, no doubt, long delayed, but observers of the U.S.S.R. had predicted that it would have been tantamount to a disaster as he did before. Malenkov and Khrushchev stepped it with the Khrushchev's intervention. Now Khrushchev went so far as to reveal, by showing that Kholodny, not their number one, had 17,300 des per workday, the main unit for labor productivity. The necessary delivery of cotton in the principal cotton-growing regions of Central Asia, 12 rubles per workday for 100 pounds of the principal sugar beet producing region of the Ukraine, 28 rubles per 100 lbs. of industrial output in the U.S.S.R. and 8.14 rubles per gram of the principal primary mineral of America in the North Carolina. But for the delivery of livestock products it was only 5 rubles per workday for the whole U.S.S.R. that is, less than 1 ruble for the Ukraine. This disparity is made more glaring by the fact that even the higher prices paid by the government for grain are still not covering the whole Khrushchev's cost of production. Nor does he get the full benefit received for maintaining the stock needed by the farmer. The growth of the livestock industry under such conditions needs no further explanation.

The farmer appears to be fully aware of the fact that without a radical improvement of the livestock situation the dairy and other standards would index of the Russian population cannot be improved. This principle is solidified in the common problem which has been much to the fore, particularly because of a lack of resources of other resources.

There are low yields of sow grasses, lucerne and other farm crops displayed, laying of natural meadows, reduction in the quantity and quality of hay, wasteful and inefficient utilization of forage, the neglect of feed grains, oats,

barley, and corn in the preoccupation with wheat and rye; these are at the root of the perennially vexing problem of an inadequate feed supply.

What makes the whole Soviet agricultural problem look even larger on the horizon is a fairly rapid growth of population. It poses the problem of sheer increase in numbers to be fed and clothed. It is true that, with increasing industrialization and urbanization of the country, the rapid population growth may not necessarily continue in the future. The trend may be reversed. The Malthusian poster of a scarcity of land between the population and the food supply is not, as it is in Russia, a realistic one. The productivity of land and animals can be increased with proper management, and the cost of increasing the number of animals and the capital investment in animal husbandry can be reduced. That is, a nation's food production is not, as Malenkov and Khrushchev insist, dependent on the individual of Malthusianism. To paraphrase a famous Englishman, it is not still a matter of the U.S.S.R. but is, no doubt, starting at the moment, ready to be managed by the likes of Mary Letwin and Stalin, who never thought much of Malthus anyway. The food and

the author is indebted to the following sources: *Pravda*, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 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The first series of concessions was the retention of the cumbersome system of taxation of the private farming of vegetable plots. This is the so-called "agrarian tax rate" to which only vegetable growers and workers having garden plots are subjected, but not the kolkhoz taxed separately. On the basis of the annual produce. Under the old system each crop grown and each type of livestock was taxed separately at varying rates, depending upon their assumed profit margins. To this, were added any earnings the kolkhoz could have had from the sale of produce. The total sum of the payments was kept proportionally at present, as the kolkhoz's calculated annual income has risen along with the country's income. Until 1953, the tax was so high that there was practically no private farming.

The "agrarian tax rate" was replaced by a system of land tax of so many rubles per hectare (a hectare is roughly 2.5 acres) on the basis of the crop yield, average yield, as well as an appeal and lower built-in tax. The law on the tax system stipulates that the basis of the average rate and within these limits varying rates are set for each region and districts, depending upon the crops grown, their yields, the market situation, and farm income. Lower rates, however, were established for the Ukraine recently converted to areas under voluntary kolkhoz. The 1953 USSR provincial and

called "Eastern Ukraine." The average tax rate is 8.5 rubles per 1,000 hectares, with variations from 5 to 12 rubles, while in the western provinces of the Ukraine the rates are 1, 2, and 6 rubles, respectively. Higher tax rates are set for irrigated land. In the Uzbek Republic of Soviet Central Asia the tax rate is 22 rubles for irrigated land and 8 rubles for nonirrigated land on the average.

Ever since the introduction of the tax is granted to the kolkhoz of the settlement, kolkhoz, and private garden plots, etc., and Soviet citizens working on rural areas and having private plots, cooperatives, and so on, are exempt. Within various limits the kolkhoz's and private plots are also granted tax concessions under certain conditions.

As a result of the revision of the land tax system, the average rate in 1953 is 11.87 rubles per hectare, 13 percent higher for 1954, 60 percent as compared with 1952. Moreover, the tax rates of 4 rubles and lower are established for the private plots and the kolkhoz plots of the heavy overburdened farms.

The simplification of the agricultural tax has, first of all, the obvious advantage, as the number of taxes is equal, or easier and less expensive to administer. But, even more important, the tax reform in the Ukraine and other Soviet spaces of irrigated territories, the decrease in the tax rate for the private farming of vegetable and garden plots, stimulate its development. Since the low tax rate and the high yields of the crops grown, the farmer has incentive to use the kolkhoz plots in a more advanced manner, to improve the soil, and to utilize them. The new tax attracted the

pecially to encourage livestock ownership by *kolkhozniki*, which was adversely affected by government policies since 1939, with the result that 15 per cent of *kolkhoz* peasant households had no cows, according to Khushcheyev. Livestock is not taxed separately, and, furthermore, those *kolkhozniki* who do not possess cows of their own are to be granted a tax reduction of 50 per cent in 1953 and 30 per cent in 1954 to help them to purchase cows.

However, the one-annumment of peasant farming is perhaps the most important consideration in the collective farm economy. It means a complete prohibition of the new law that it is allowable to hold a second or a peasant household or work certain doses of crops, but not any valid means in the special kind of farms, and to use the land for the raising of the poultry, including a cow or a pig, is to be considered as 50 per cent. It is not clear, however, whether the agricultural tax on the private holding of a cow or pig is increased by 75 per cent if an able-bodied member of working age of the family is a member of the household or if he left or was expelled from it and is not working for some state or cooperative enterprise. Thus, the old position of cooperation of the *kolkhozniki* with the state, collective farms, and the devotion of the *kolkhozniki* to the state, the *Kooperatsiya*, the state, and the peasant household, is the present amount of private farming on *kolkhozniki* is reduced.

The second concession dealt with an even more important factor, namely, the use of private deliveries by *kolkhozniki* of farm products for their own use at exceedingly low fixed prices. A reduction of delivery quotas of animal products and

potatoes was ordered, and all arrears accumulated by January 1, 1953, were cancelled. Those *kolkhozniki* who had no personally owned livestock on June 15, 1953, were entirely exempt from meat deliveries during the second half of 1953 and for the whole year of 1954.

The third concession closely related to the second, was the increase in the very low prices paid by the government for its compulsory deliveries of animal products, potatoes, and vegetables.

These increases apply to the compulsory deliveries only of the *kolkhozniki* and not to the *sovkhozniki*, since the latter are deemed to operate on a purely state or subjective basis. These increases in delivery prices were 100 per cent for potatoes, 53 per cent for animal products, and 18 per cent for vegetables. These increases are in addition to the price increases which would be expected in a normal year.

The year when the government might attempt to increase the compulsory delivery quotas would also be increased. Such price increases were always higher than those for compulsory deliveries and often were supplied to the *kolkhozniki* for the purchase of foodstuffs after the quotas were raised on the average of 30 per cent for meat and 50 per cent for milk.

The fourth concession was the new official allowance given to the *kolkhozniki* for their own use of a barrel of fat or a barrel of sugar. The *kolkhozniki* and industry received for a long time only a barrel of sugar. But since Stalin's home organized for them a new course, the barrel idea was dropped, at least for the time being. It will be interesting to see what kind of a new competition in the market will be the result. Thus, according to the minister of trade, Milyutin, the *kolkhozniki* are an important component part of Soviet

<sup>1</sup> *Izvestia*, and *Pravda*, September 19, 1953.



the peasants' standpoint or too fruitful from that of the Kremlin.

However, the Kremlin, as both Malenkov and Khrushchev made crystal clear, continues to place relative predominance in the kolkhoz, which in recent years has grown larger. The campaign for consolidating kolkhozy, spearheaded by Khrushchev, reduced their number from more than 250,000 early in 1950 to 97,000 in 1953. The gap has thus increased between the rural and the membership of the enlarged kolkhozy and the management, consisting mainly and mostly of specialists and other outsiders, with the resulting decline of living power of management over labor. There is no indication of any change from this course, though, judging from statements of Soviet spokesmen, the problem of finding loyal and competent managers continues to be a headache to Soviet authorities. Needless to say, the election of kolkhoz managers prescribed by law has become more of a rite than ever before.

It is true that Khrushchev criticizes the excessively central planning of agriculture, which, as many objective observers had long ago pointed out, leads "grass roots" initiative. However, the Malenkov-Khrushchev program actually calls for relaxation of control but for increased regimentation by tightening the local party tutelage over the kolkhozy. In this connection, Khrushchev's "suggestion" that 50,000 Communists be sent as party workers to the country side is symptomatic.

The rural Communist party apparatus was reorganized so as to allocate better the responsibility for supervision over

kolkhozy. A responsible party official (secretary of the regional committee of the Communist party) is to be attached with a group of Communist associates to each state machine tractor station or MTS, serving a group of kolkhozy. He is to be accountable to the first secretary of the regional committee of the Communist party—the real boss of the regions.

The role of the increasingly important MTS was further enhanced. It is to become the decisive force in the development of kolkhoz production, the most important prop for the nation of industry by the socialist state.<sup>11</sup> In general, the tie up between the kolkhozy and the MTS has become closer with the enlargement of the latter unit. This trend is further developed by the Malenkov-Khrushchev program, still without changing their priorities.

Various measures were prescribed for the improvement of technical education and training of the workers of the MTS. Two years ago, no special attention was first, there is the transfer out of the state of part of the MTS workers by the transfer of several thousand kolkhoz men who were not only employed only seasonally. This strengthening of the MTS over the rural labor force is the disadvantage of the latter. The kolkhozy, however, will continue to contribute a part of the wages of these workers. The second device is the transfer of industry and the administrative apparatus to the MTS and not by virtue of the flow of technicians, engineers, mechanics, and livestock specialists, and skilled labor, especially workers with rare experience, such as tractor drivers, combine operators, etc. The mobility of this factor will be fully appreciated when it is remembered that, as previously noted, the

<sup>11</sup> *Izvestia*, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 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war, skilled labor was channeled for the most part out of agriculture. Even Khrushchev admitted that during the postwar period "a large number of the most literate and cultured kolkhozniki have transferred to industry,"<sup>26</sup> with an unfavorable repercussion on agriculture.

Various inducements are offered to the technicians and workers transferring to the MFS, including noninterest bearing ten-year loans for building individual houses. The shift from the cities to the countryside is supposed to be, in accordance with the time-honored Soviet custom, "an enthusiastically voluntary" one, and many stories have appeared in the Soviet press since the autumn of 1953 concerning such "socialist enthusiasm." But there were also reports of a distinct lack of enthusiasm for roughing it in the countryside beyond the suburbs. That the qualifications of those transferred are often not up to the mark is patent from Khrushchev's remarks at a conference of provincial editors. He said that, while much is being written about the number of specialists and other workers shifted from industry to agriculture, "there is silence as to who is being sent and whether these workers are able to render real assistance to the kolkhozy, MFS, and state farms."<sup>27</sup> In any event, it was officially reported in the Soviet press on January 31, 1954, that by the end of 1953 more than 100,000 agronomists and animal husbandry specialists and a considerable number of engineers and mechanics were transferred to MFS and kolkhozy.

More important perhaps than this mobilization campaign, which, like all Soviet mass campaigns, is bound to have many pitfalls, is the laying down by the highest Soviet authorities, even if im-

PLICITLY, of the principle that Soviet agriculture should not be denuded of brains and skill in favor of industry. Thus, Khrushchev chides the "gentlemanly bureaucratic"<sup>28</sup> attitude toward the work in the countryside among "some Communists occupying even responsible positions. . . . Such people do not understand the simple truth that without the advance of agriculture the problem of building Communism cannot be successfully solved. Communist society cannot be built without an abundance of grain, meat, milk, butter, vegetables, and other agricultural products."<sup>29</sup> However, to implement this principle of nondiscrimination against agriculture in distribution of manpower will be difficult unless the living conditions in the countryside, which are inferior even to those in the Russian cities, are considerably improved.

Like so many previous Soviet plans, the Malenkov-Khrushchev program concerns itself with raising the productivity of Russian farming and with increasing crop yields per unit of land and per worker. The problem of improved farm practices and management, planned and directed from above, therefore looms as large as it did during the Stalin era. But there are significant departures from the Stalin pattern. The prominent nostrum of the magic-producing Lysenko Michurinist science and the "Great Stalinist Plan of Reconstruction of Nature" through afforestation of the dry steppes and irrigation are considerably devalued or shelved.

While apparently shedding or modifying some of the unrealistic aspects of

<sup>26</sup>The Russian word *peremesteni* is translated as "shift" and "move" comes to mean "to shift or even to leave the Revolution" and "to leave" in the Vietnamese.

<sup>27</sup>*Pravda*, *Pravda*, September 15, 1953.

<sup>28</sup>*Pravda*, *Pravda*, September 15, 1953.

<sup>29</sup>*Pravda*, December 1, 1953.

Stalin's program of agricultural improvement, his successors went far beyond in one important respect, namely, the increasing use of commercial fertilizer. The idea itself is sound, since higher crop yields depend upon increased application of fertilizer, especially in the northern and central agricultural regions outside the Black Soil belt, where soils are naturally less productive but crops are not endangered by frequent droughts. Furthermore, the reduced supply of manure, because of smaller numbers of livestock, increases the need for commercial fertilizer, which so far has been used predominantly for the more valuable crops, such as cotton and sugar beets, and very little for grains, forage crops, and oil seeds. However, the exceedingly high targets for fertilizer production, increasing from some 6 million metric tons in 1953 to 16.5-17.5 million in 1959, and to 28-30 million in 1964, do not appear realistic. Nor does problematic seem to be the most recent phase of the new agricultural program, the projected considerable extension of acreage under grain in the dry area.<sup>9</sup>

In accordance with a long established Soviet practice, the big stick in the

<sup>9</sup> Yet another serious criticism of the agricultural program is that inadequate crop production was revealed contrary to earlier Soviet optimism by an expert group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. in April, 1954. *Pravda* (Moscow), March 6, 1954. An report on the subject by Khrushchev, made on February 23, 1954, was published in *Pravda* and *Trud* on March 21. The area called for the growing of 1955 is at least 13,000,000 hectares (32,000,000 acres) of grain, mostly spring wheat, on the Virgin Land or land long out of cultivation east of the Volga, but partly on the Urals, southern Siberia, and Kazakhstan. Thousands of young men and women all over the country have been mobilized as "volunteers" to help in this project. The unfavorable climatic conditions and often inferior soils in many of these areas, combined with organizational difficulties that have already cropped up, make the Kremlin's expectation of a production of an additional 18-20 million tons of grain seem exceedingly optimistic.

Malenkov-Khrushchev program was accompanied by the proverbial carrot, perhaps a somewhat larger carrot than usual, for the *kolkhozy*. During the Stalin era the provision of economic incentives in agriculture usually took two directions. The main one was *stakhanovism*, in which high material rewards and often better working conditions were set for a small number of pace-making workers or groups of workers. The high performance standards of *Stakhanovites*, frequently achieved under such favorable conditions, helped the management to drive the rest of the labor force harder. The other direction—a more bypath—was the increase of *kolkhozy* earnings through higher prices. It was practiced during the Stalin era with regard to a limited number of crops, such as cotton, sugar beets, and a few others, when a rapid and large increase in production was deemed urgent.

The Malenkov-Khrushchev program has concentrated on the second method of increasing economic incentives by raising prices in those branches of agriculture where progress was slow or nonexistent. As was pointed out earlier, the prices for compulsory delivery of animal products, potatoes, and vegetables were increased. The compulsory delivery quotas for potatoes and vegetables were, at the same time, reduced for *kolkhozy*.

Enough has been said already about Soviet failure in animal husbandry. It is only necessary to call attention to the new serious obstacle to future statistical appraisals of the Soviet livestock situation created by moving the count of livestock from January to October. As a consequence, the needed historical statistical framework of reference will be lacking, since livestock data are only available for winter and, for a few years, for summer months. Livestock numbers vary, some

times considerably, between different periods of a year. For instance, during the period 1931-38 the average variation between winter and summer counts was as follows: cows, 8.4 per cent, all cattle, 23.7 per cent, hogs, 21 per cent, and sheep and goats nearly 50 per cent.<sup>1</sup> This factor precludes comparison between different years unless the data are for the same period.

As for potatoes, they not only are a valuable article of the human diet but also an important animal feeding—a problem that looms large on the Soviet agricultural horizon. Potatoes are also an inexpensive source of alcohol, which has varied industrial uses. I shall not venture into the details of the unsatisfactory potato and vegetable situation revealed by the famine, except to note the differences arising from the low degree of mechanization contrasted with such crops as wheat and other small grains, sugar beets, and cotton. This has meant heavy reliance on hand labor, which has been so plentiful in the black earth agricultural zone. The second World War certainly the moment shortage of potatoes and vegetables in state stores confirms the pessimistic analysis of the Soviet planners. Under such conditions the 50 per cent reduction of retail prices of potatoes and vegetables in state stores on April 1, 1953, is a vivid example of how a controlled price mechanism should not be administered.

I have already pointed out that the increase in delivery prices is not as imposing as it appears, since it applies to a very low price base. Furthermore, it is significant that the low prices of grain, the most important crop, accounting for about 70 per cent of the Russian crop average, have not been raised. It is also a question

of how much the increase in delivery prices will percolate to the rank and file members of collectives, considering the large capital investment, the heavy overhead for administration, and the huge waste prevalent in collective farming. And, in the last analysis, there is the problem of the supply of consumers' goods, on the adequacy and reasonable pricing of which the real value of any increase in cash income of collective farmers depends.

Another reform which bears on economic incentives is the elimination of the widespread practice of saddling with higher delivery quotas those more efficient collective farmers having a larger output. As Khrushchev put it, "as soon as a kolkhoz surpasses its neighbor, the government procuring agents treat it just as a gardener treats the Chinese with shears."<sup>2</sup> This saddling of the more efficient collectives is contrary to Soviet law requiring, as a rule, uniform quotas per unit of land for kolkhozes in the same district. Yet, the palpably illegal practice revealed by Khrushchev was obviously tolerated by authorities, and it would be hard not to balk at its disappearance, despite the howling of the Kremlin.

So much for the Malenkov-Khrushchev program. Returning to the question raised at the outset, it appears on the basis of the foregoing review that, with a more decisive emphasis on consumers' goods, the Soviet economic policy has, in a sense, acquired a "new look," though its continuity is by no means assured. In agriculture this is much less so. Some of the Stalinist farm programs were diluted to more realistic proportions by eliminating

<sup>1</sup> *Trudy Gosstatizna*, vol. 8, no. 15, 1953. The source for the average of the winter and summer counts for the period 1931-38 is the same as the source for the winter and summer counts for the period 1949-52, and the same for the period 1949-52. The source for the average of the winter and summer counts for the period 1949-52 is the same as the source for the winter and summer counts for the period 1949-52.

<sup>2</sup> *Pravda*, 1953, 22 July 1953, p. 1.

ing a certain amount of gigantomania. Private farming of *kolkhozniki* has won what seems to be a temporary reprieve. Greater attention is focused on economic incentives in line with the more liberal policy with respect to consumers' goods. But the main emphasis continues to be centered, as during Stalin's era, on the agrarian "supercollectivism" and party domination, even though they have largely failed thus far to raise agricultural productivity in the U.S.S.R.

That a serious improvement is likely to take place in the short run in the agricultural situation, as a consequence of the Malenkov-Khrushchev policy, is problematical. It is symptomatic that shortly after his celebrated report to the Central Committee, Khrushchev was

already denouncing the delays in implementation of the new policy decisions.<sup>13</sup> And once again the most backward sector—animal husbandry—was a prominent target for complaints which sang that familiar duet about the inadequacy of forage supplies and livestock shelters. But in the long run, one must not overlook the impact of the new industrial labor and investment policies on agriculture, assuming, of course, that such policies are not short-lived. By creating a more favorable environment for collective agriculture, they would inevitably, in the same token, a decisive test of its productive capacity.

<sup>13</sup> "The Case of Khrushchev," *Pravda*, 1964, p. 10; *Pravda*, 1964, p. 10; *Pravda*, 1964, p. 10.